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A PRIMER IN Positive Psychology

A PRIMER INPositive Psychology

CHRISTOPHER PETERSON

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataPeterson, Christopher, 1950 Feb. 18–A primer in positive psychology / by Christopher Peterson. p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and indexes.ISBN-13 978–0-19-518833-2ISBN 0–19-518833-01. Positive psychology. I. Title.

BF204.6.P48 2006150.19′8—dc22 2005029442

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of Americaon acid-free paper

I dedicate this book

with love and gratitude

to my parents, who taught me

to love learning, to work hard, and

to get along with others

Preface

Positive psychology as an explicit perspective has existed only since 1998, but enough relevanttheory and research now exist concerning what makes life most worth living to fill a booksuitable for a semester-long college course. This is that book. Writing occupied me during 2005,and I wrote with an audience of college students in mind. Perhaps they had previously studiedpsychology, perhaps not. Regardless, all the material here is accessible and—I hope—interestingand informative.

In writing about this new field, I did so from the viewpoint of general psychology. Positivepsychology is psychology, and psychology is science. I have tried to do justice to the science ofthe good life in covering topics ranging from pleasure and happiness to work and love. What dowe know, and how do we know it? And what remains unknown?

I also wrote with a more general audience in mind, given growing popular interest in positivepsychology. Perhaps even more so than psychology students, for whom critical thinking isexplicitly urged by their instructors, the general public needs a fair and balanced presentation ofwhat psychologists know and what they do not. Positive psychology is plenty exciting withoutthe need to run far ahead of what has already been established.

Who am I? My personality will show itself in the pages to come. But more formally, I am ababy boomer who grew up in the Midwest. I went to school at the University of Illinois, then theUniversity of Colorado, and finally the University of Pennsylvania. I have been a psychologyprofessor at the University of Michigan since 1986, where I have taught a variety of courses,including introductory psychology, psychopathology, research methods, and—of course—positivepsychology, to more than 20,000 students. I am the former director of our Clinical PsychologyTraining Program, but my identity is now that of a positive psychologist. I spent most of myprofessional career concerned with depression, despair, and demoralization. I am now a differentkind of psychologist, one concerned with happiness, character, and purpose.

It has been said that physical scientists stand on the shoulders of their predecessors, whereassocial scientists step in their faces (Zeaman, 1959). My story is different because as a member ofthe Positive Psychology Steering Committee, I have been able to stand next to and to work withsome remarkable scholars who have shaped positive psychology from the beginning: MikeCsikszentmihalyi, Ed Diener, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, George Vaillant, and—first among equals—Marty Seligman.

The positive psychology research which has so energized me has been generously supported

by the Mayerson Foundation, the Templeton Foundation, the Annenberg/Sunnylands TrustFoundation, Atlantic Philanthropies, and the U.S. Department of Education. And much of what Ihave written here had its beginning in collaborative projects with Nansook Park and MartySeligman.

Writing this book went smoothly, in no small part because I worked with Oxford UniversityPress, in particular associate publisher Joan Bossert and associate editor Jennifer Rappaport,unwavering supporters of positive psychology and my own writing. Lisa Christie carefully editedwhat were rough chapters and suggested useful resources for each chapter. Vincent Colapietro,Ed Diener, Steve Maier, Nansook Park, Stephen Post, Lilach Sagiv, and George Vaillant helpedme to track down some specific citations. Thanks to all.

Contents

1 What Is Positive Psychology?

2 Learning About Positive Psychology: Not a Spectator Sport

3 Pleasure and Positive Experience

4 Happiness

5 Positive Thinking

6 Character Strengths

7 Values

8 Interests, Abilities, and Accomplishments

9 Wellness

10 Positive Interpersonal Relationships

11 Enabling Institutions

12 The Future of Positive Psychology

References

Name Index

Subject Index

A PRIMER IN Positive Psychology

1What Is Positive Psychology?

The chief purpose of education is to teach young people to find pleasure in theright things.—PLATO (~400 BCE)

If it is possible, talk to your parents about the day your were born. Not how or where or when,but what they were thinking and feeling when they first held you. I suspect that what rushedthrough them was a mix of fears and hopes. The fears included whether you were healthy andsafe and whether they would be able to take care of you. The hopes included the wishes that youwould grow up to be happy, that you would live a fulfilling life, that you would have skills andtalents, that you would learn how to use these in a productive way, that you would somedayhave your own family and friends, and that you would become a valued member of a socialcommunity.

Now think about the very end of your life, whenever that might be. Suppose you have thetime to think back over your life in its final moments. What would be your greatest satisfactions?And what would be your greatest regrets? I suspect that your thoughts and feelings would playout along the same lines as those of your parents decades earlier. Was your life a good andfulfilling one? Did you do your best, even when it was difficult? Did you have people in your lifewho loved you and whom you loved in return? Did you make a difference for the better in yourcommunity? I doubt that your regrets would include not eating more Fritos, not working longershifts, or not watching—for the 10th time—cable television reruns of Law & Order. I doubt thatyou would wish you had taken more shortcuts in life, that you had put your own needs morefrequently ahead of other people’s needs, or that you had never thought about what life means.

Positive psychology is the scientific study of what goes right in life, from birth to death andat all stops in between. It is a newly christened approach within psychology that takes seriouslyas a subject matter those things that make life most worth living. Everyone’s life has peaks andvalleys, and positive psychology does not deny the valleys. Its signature premise is more nuancedbut nonetheless important: What is good about life is as genuine as what is bad and thereforedeserves equal attention from psychologists. It assumes that life entails more than avoiding orundoing problems and hassles. Positive psychology resides somewhere in that part of the humanlandscape that is metaphorically north of neutral. It is the study of what we are doing when we

are not frittering life away.

In this book, I describe positive psychology and what positive psychologists have learnedabout the good life and how it can be encouraged. Some of you are reading this book because ithas been assigned for a college course. Others of you are reading it simply because you arecurious and want to learn more. In either case, I will voice one more suspicion: You will findsome food for thought here and an action plan that might make your own life a better one.

Positive Psychology: A Very Short History With a Very Long PastYou may already have studied psychology. If so, perhaps you encountered this tersecharacterization of the field by Herman Ebbinghaus, one of the field’s luminaries: “Psychologyhas a long past, but only a short history” (Boring, 1950, p. ix). What this means is thatpsychology has been a formal discipline for little more than 100 years but that its enduring issueswere phrased centuries before by philosophers, theologians, and everyday people. How do weknow the world? How and why do we think and feel? What is the essence of learning? What doesit mean to be a human being?

Let me borrow this characterization and assert that positive psychology has a very long past

but only a very short history. The field was named1 in 1998 as one of the initiatives of mycolleague Martin Seligman in his role as president of the American Psychological Association(Seligman, 1998, 1999). One of the triggers for positive psychology was Seligman’s realizationthat psychology since World War II had focused much of its efforts on human problems and howto remedy them. The yield of this focus on pathology has been considerable. Great strides havebeen made in understanding, treating, and preventing psychological disorders. Widely acceptedclassification manuals—the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) sponsoredby the American Psychiatric Association (1994) and the International Classification of Diseases(ICD) sponsored by the World Health Organization (1990)—allow disorders to be described andhave given rise to a family of reliable assessment strategies. There now exist effective treatments,psychological and pharmacological, for more than a dozen disorders that in the recent past werefrighteningly intractable (Barrett & Ollendick, 2004; Evans et al., 2005; Hibbs & Jensen, 1996;Kazdin & Weisz, 2003; Nathan & Gorman, 1998, 2002; Seligman, 1994).

But there has been a cost to this emphasis. Much of scientific psychology has neglected thestudy of what can go right with people and often has little more to say about the good life thando pop psychologists, inspirational speakers, and armchair gurus. More subtly, the underlyingassumptions of psychology have shifted to embrace a disease model of human nature. People areseen as flawed and fragile, casualties of cruel environments or bad genetics, and if not in denialthen at best in recovery. This worldview has crept into the common culture of the United States.

We have become a nation of self-identified victims, and our heroes and heroines are calledsurvivors and sometimes nothing more.

Positive psychology proposes that it is time to correct this imbalance and to challenge thepervasive assumptions of the disease model (Maddux, 2002). It calls for as much focus onstrength as on weakness, as much interest in building the best things in life as in repairing theworst, and as much attention to fulfilling the lives of healthy people as to healing the wounds ofthe distressed (Seligman, 2002; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Psychologists interested inpromoting human potential need to start with different assumptions and to pose differentquestions from their peers who assume only a disease model.

The past concern of psychology with human problems is of course understandable. It will notand should not be abandoned. People experience difficulties that demand and deservescientifically informed solutions. Positive psychologists are merely saying that the psychology ofthe past 60 years is incomplete. As simple as this proposal sounds, it demands a sea change inperspective.

The most basic assumption that positive psychology urges is that human goodness andexcellence are as authentic as disease, disorder, and distress. Positive psychologists are adamantthat these topics are not secondary, derivative, illusory, epiphenomenal, or otherwise suspect.The good news is that these generalizations about business-as-usual psychology over the past 60years are simply that—generalizations. There are many good examples of psychological research,past and present, that can be claimed as positive psychology.

The very long past of positive psychology stretches at least to the Athenian philosophers inthe West and to Confucius and Lao-Tsu in the East (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). Inthe writings of these great thinkers can be found the same questions posed by contemporarypositive psychologists. What is the good life? Is virtue its own reward? What does it mean to behappy? Is it possible to pursue happiness directly, or is fulfillment a by-product of other pursuits?What roles are played by other people and society as a whole?

Somewhat later but still many centuries ago, we encounter the ideas of religious figures andtheologians—Jesus, the Buddha, Mohammed, Thomas Aquinas, and many others—who alsoposed deep questions about the meaning of the good life and its attainment. When we identifycommon themes across the disparate world views they advanced, we see that they advocatedservice to other individuals, to humankind as a whole, and to a higher power and purpose,however it is named. Today’s positive psychologists also emphasize a life of meaning andemphasize that it can be found in both spiritual and secular pursuits. In so doing, positivepsychology places the psychology of religion in a central place it has rarely occupied in thehistory of the discipline (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003).

Within psychology, the premises of positive psychology were laid out long before 1998. In thebeginning, psychologists were greatly interested in genius and talent as well as in fulfilling thelives of normal people. Setting the immediate stage for positive psychology as it currently existswere humanistic psychology as popularized by Rogers (1951) and Maslow (1970); utopianvisions of education like those of Neill (1960); primary prevention programs based on notions ofwellness—sometimes dubbed promotion programs—as pioneered by Albee (1982) and Cowen(1994); work by Bandura (1989) and others on human agency and efficacy; studies of giftedness(e.g., Winner, 2000); conceptions of intelligence as multiple (e.g., Gardner, 1983; Sternberg,1985); and studies of the quality of life among medical and psychiatric patients that went beyondan exclusive focus on their symptoms and diseases (e.g., Levitt, Hogan, & Bucosky, 1990).

Today’s positive psychologists do not claim to have invented notions of happiness and well-being, to have proposed their first theoretical accounts, or even to have ushered in their scientificstudy. Rather, the contribution of contemporary positive psychology has been to provide anumbrella term for what have been isolated lines of theory and research and to make the self-conscious argument that what makes life worth living deserves its own field of inquiry withinpsychology, at least until that day when all of psychology embraces the study of what is goodalong with the study of what is bad (Peterson & Park, 2003).

FAQs About Positive PsychologyPositive psychology is not without its critics (Cowen & Kilmer, 2002; Lazarus, 2003; Taylor,2001). Up to a point, those of us who are positive psychologists welcome criticism because itmeans that people are paying attention and, more important, because we can learn from it. Hereare some of the frequently asked questions (FAQs) that I have encountered in the past few yearswhen I speak and write about positive psychology (Seligman & Pawelski, 2003). Some of thequestions come from the general public and others from my academic colleagues.

My experience is that everyday people find it exciting and the sort of thing psychology shouldbe doing (Easterbrook, 2001). Despite the pervasiveness of a victim mentality, everyday peopleseem to know that the elimination or reduction of problems is not all that is involved inimproving the human condition. In contrast, the academic community is often skeptical ofpositive psychology. Contributing to skepticism are widespread assumptions within the socialsciences about human nature as flawed and fragile, notions more explicit among social scientiststhan the general public. From this starting point, the field can only be seen as the study of fluff—perhaps even as a dangerous diversion while the world goes to hell. Social scientists are doubtfulabout the existence of the good life and certainly about the ability of people to report on it withfidelity. We too are mindful of the dangers of self-report but point out that “social desirability” ishardly a nuisance variable when one studies what is socially desirable (Crowne & Marlowe,

1964).

Is Positive Psychology Just Happiology?

When positive psychology is featured in the popular media, it seems that no one in charge of

layout can resist accompanying the story with a graphic of Harvey Bell’s clichéd smiley face,2

beaming at readers in its jaundiced glory (e.g., U.S. News & World Report, September 3, 2001;Newsweek, September 16, 2002; USA Weekend, March 9, 2003; Time, September 17, 2005;Psychology Today, February 2005). This iconography is terribly misleading because it equatespositive psychology with the study of happiness and indeed with a superficial form of happiness.

All other things being equal, smiling is of course pleasant to do and pleasant to observe, but asmile is not an infallible indicator of all that makes life most worth living. When we are highlyengaged in fulfilling activities, when we are speaking from our hearts, or when we are doingsomething heroic, we may or may not be smiling, and we may or may not be experiencingpleasure in the moment. All of these are central concerns to positive psychology, and they falloutside the realm of happiology.

To foreshadow later chapters in this book, I note that pleasure and happiness are certainly ofgreat interest to positive psychology but are more complex than whatever is conveyed by asmiley face. Positive psychologists study positive traits and dispositions—characteristics likekindness, curiosity, and the ability to work on a team—as well as values, interests, talents, andabilities. They study social institutions that can enable the good life: friendship, marriage, family,education, religion, and so on.

I cannot resist noting that not all smiles are created equal. Researchers have longdistinguished among types of smiles, arguing that some are more genuine than others. A so-

called Duchenne3 (1862/1990) smile involves one’s whole face and is sincere because it cannotbe faked. Contrast it with a flight attendant’s smile, a forced grimace that involves only one’slower face.

What Is the Relationship of Positive Psychology to Humanistic Psychology?

In one of the early discussions of positive psychology, Marty Seligman and Mike

Csikszentmihalyi4 (2000) tersely distanced this new field from humanistic psychology, one ofpsychology’s venerable perspectives that was particularly popular in the 1960s and 1970s andstill has many adherents today. In very general terms, humanism is the doctrine that the needsand values of human beings take precedence over material things and, further, that peoplecannot be studied simply as part of the material world. Humanists argue that scientificpsychologists miss what is most important about people by focusing on the supposed causes ofbehavior, as if people were simply billiard balls, doing poorly or well depending on what other

billiard balls happen to have ricocheted into them.

Well-known psychologists within the humanistic tradition include Abraham Maslow (1970)and Carl Rogers (1951). Both emphasized that people strive to make the most of their potentialin a process called self-actualization. Self-actualization can be thwarted by various conditions,but if these conditions are changed, then the potential within each individual will necessarilyunfold.

This is a very different way of thinking about human nature than that embodied inpsychoanalysis or behaviorism, dominant perspectives within psychology during the 20thcentury. Humanistic psychology stresses the goals for which people strive, their consciousawareness of this striving, the importance of their own choices, and their rationality. Theattention of psychology is thereby directed away from mechanical causes and towardfundamental questions about existence and meaning.

Humanistic psychology often overlaps with another venerable viewpoint: existentialism. Thecritical idea of existentialism is that a person’s experience is primary. To understand anyindividual is to understand him or her subjectively, from the inside out. There is no other way.

Existentialists see people as products of their own choices, and these choices are freelyundertaken. To use their phrase, existence precedes essence, with essence understood to mean aperson’s particular characteristics. Existentialists stress that there is no fixed human nature, onlythe sort of person that each unique individual becomes by the way she chooses to define herself.

As applied specifically to psychology, these humanistic and existential viewpoints haveseveral emphases (Urban, 1983):

the significance of the individual

the complex organization of the individual

the capacity for change inherent in the individual

the significance of conscious experience

the self-regulatory nature of human activity

Implicit here is an impatience with “scientific” psychology as it is typically conducted, because itdoes not always deal with what is most important about people (Maslow, 1966).

Humanists and existential theorists believe that psychologists must pay more attention to anindividual’s way of seeing the world, and here they join ranks with yet another intellectualmovement, phenomenology, which attempts to describe a person’s conscious experience interms meaningful for that individual. Described so starkly, phenomenology has a superficialresemblance to cognitive approaches within psychology (H. Gardner, 1985), in that both areconcerned with thoughts and thinking, but this is a misleading similarity. Cognitive psychologists

specify the terms with which to describe thinking and then try to use this theoretical language todescribe the thoughts of all people. In contrast, phenomenologists start with the experience of aspecific individual and then attempt to describe it.

In light of this background, why did Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi say that positivepsychology was different? They made two arguments. First, positive psychology regards both thegood and the bad about life as genuine, whereas humanists often—but not always—assume thatpeople are inherently good. Second, positive psychology is strongly committed to the scientificmethod, whereas humanists often—but again not always—are skeptical of science and its abilityto shed light on what really matters.

As points of relative and occasional contrast, I agree with the arguments of Seligman andCsikszentmihalyi, but as positive psychology has evolved and more carefully examined alliedperspectives, the wholesale dismissal of humanistic psychology now seems glib and mistaken.Certainly, most existentialists would agree that each person has the capacity for good and bad,just as positive psychology assumes. That the good life is simply a matter of choice seems to gotoo far, given the well-documented barriers to thriving posed by external circumstances likepestilence, poverty, and prejudice, but positive psychologists nowadays acknowledge that notionsof choice and will are indispensable ones (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

Many humanistic psychologists, from decades ago (e.g., Rogers, Gendlin, Kiesler, & Truax,1967) to the present (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000), are as committed to science as any positivepsychologist. The deeper issue is what one counts as legitimate science. I have a relaxed andinclusive conception of the scientific method: the use of evidence to evaluate theories. There aremultiple sources of useful evidence—each with its own pros and cons—and science should notprivilege one source over another. Scientific psychology can learn much from carefully controlledlaboratory experiments, but so too can it learn much from case studies of exceptional individuals,from interviews and surveys of the general population, and from analyses of historicalinformation.

The aforementioned billiard ball conception of psychology is a caricature that appliesnowadays to very few psychologists of any stripe. Like humanistic researchers, positivepsychologists believe that people are appropriately studied by talking to them about things thatmost matter and seeing how their lives actually unfold (Park & Peterson, in press a).

In sum, positive psychology and humanistic psychology are close relatives. In some instances,their features are identical, and in some other instances, they can be distinguished. No goodpurpose is served by wrangling over which provides a better overall perspective, a debate thatlikely has no resolution. In any event, science is always about particulars, and some empiricalstudies undertaken from a humanistic perspective will shed light on the good life, as will some

empirical studies undertaken from a positive psychology perspective.

Is Positive Psychology Anything More Than What Sunday School Teachers Know?

Some of the findings of positive psychology (and humanistic psychology, for that matter) seemcommonsensical once articulated. So, other people matter mightily. Money cannot buyhappiness. Those with a reason to live do so, and do so rather well. “I knew that,” says theskeptic, which leads to another frequently asked question about the field: Does it add anything towhat we already know about the good life and how to achieve it?

I am sure that you are familiar with Robert Fulghum’s (1986) popular book All I Really Needto Know I Learned in Kindergarten and its numerous spin-offs. It seems only a matter of timebefore someone asserts that everything that positive psychology has to teach was already taughtto most of us in kindergarten, in Sunday school, on our grandmother’s knee, or on the LizzyMcGuire Show. How do I respond to this criticism?

Well, for starters, it is wrong. Common sense and obviousness can always be asserted after thefact. Suppose I had pointed out—contrary to the actual evidence—that positive psychology hasshown that we need not be concerned with what other people think or do, that “he who dieswith the most toys wins,” and that a ceaseless quest for the meaning of life is a fool’s errand. “Iknew all that as well,” says the same skeptic, which leaves us with an obvious need for evidencethat will allow us to sort through the contradictory things that we all seem to know so well.

As you read this book, you can judge for yourself which of the findings of positive psychologyare surprising. But when they are not especially surprising, I urge you to ask further, “So what?”Psychology makes too much of its counterintuitive findings, showing for example that peoplemay be unaware of what influences their judgments and actions (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977),that our memory of events—even vivid ones—is rarely if ever literal (cf. Brown & Kulik, 1977),and that there are limitations to people’s rationality (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Thiscelebration of the counterintuitive often takes the form of highlighting the shortcomings ofpeople and in effect saying, “Look at how stupid we all are.” Research like this can be importantfor correcting common sense, but not if it leads to the conclusion that people are hopelesslyflawed and inadequate. Then we have the scientific equivalent of shock journalism.

Remember the basic premise of positive psychology: that human goodness and excellence areas authentic as are human flaws and inadequacies. Too much attention to the counterintuitiveleads us to ignore what people do well and results in a strange view of the human condition.Some of the true miracles of human activity receive scant attention from psychologists. Forexample, consider that most automobile drivers most of the time negotiate interstate highwayswithout accident, all at more than 70 miles per hour. Consider that most people who give upsmoking are successful on their own without professional help. Consider that almost all children

learn language without explicit instruction. Consider that most people who experience atraumatic event recover from its effects.

In chapter 4, I describe research showing that people are often unable to predict how longthey will be happy or sad following important life events. So, most young people predict thatbeing dumped by a girlfriend or boyfriend will produce a state of despair that will last formonths, if not years. It turns out that the typical person is sad for a much shorter period, andthen he or she gets on with life (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). This is aninteresting and even important finding, especially because people seem not to learn fromrepeated experience that their emotional forecasts are wrong (Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001),but it should not be taken to mean that people are complete ignoramuses. This research did notshow that a romantic breakup makes somebody happy—that would be a counterintuitive finding!

We expect that the larger culture should know something about the conditions for the goodlife. How could this not be the case? Accordingly, many of the findings of positive psychologywill be unsurprising. But there will be important exceptions. Consider the widespread belief inthe contemporary United States that “all you need are looks and a whole lot of money” in orderto be happy. This may work for Paris Hilton (perhaps), but the relevant research shows ratherclearly that this is a wrongheaded formula for most of as we pursue the good life (chapter 4).Positive psychology needs to sort through conventional wisdom, and this is where the scientificmethod proves indispensable.

Are Positive Psychologists Indifferent to Suffering?

Psychologists who study human problems have the best of intentions: They want to eliminatesuffering. The unstated corollary of this good intention is that well-being can be taken forgranted. Indeed, the study of people who are happy, healthy, and talented may be seen as aguilty luxury that diverts resources from the goals of problem-focused psychology. From theperspective of positive psychology, I suggest a different possibility, namely, that a betterunderstanding of well-being will allow psychologists to help all people, troubled or not.

In chapter 4, I describe some of my own recent research showing that deliberate interventionscan encourage lasting happiness. Part of this research entails the further demonstration thathappiness interventions also alleviate symptoms of depression.

The ranks of positive psychologists are filled with people whose larger professional identitiesare as social psychologists—a subfield of psychology that has long studied such social problemsas prejudice and aggression—or as clinical psychologists with explicit concerns with problems inliving and how to remedy them. None of these positive psychologists sees a disconnect betweenhis or her core identity and an interest in the good life. Rather, suffering and well-being are bothpart of the human condition, and all psychologists should be concerned with both.

Indeed, the link between suffering and well-being deserves study. Are there lessons to belearned from those who have grappled with the worst of what life has to offer? In chapter 6, Idescribe some research that suggests that at least some people emerge from crisis and traumawith an increased appreciation of what matters most in life. Furthermore, with rare exceptions,people’s satisfaction with life is remarkably robust after a period of adjustment andaccommodation to bad life events (chapter 4).

Psychologist Shelley Taylor (1985) described a research program that began as aninvestigation of depression that followed in the wake of a diagnosis of breast cancer, a terribleand serious life event. The problem with her research is that she had trouble identifying asufficient number of cancer patients who were severely depressed. Instead, most were able todeal with the diagnosis by a process Taylor labeled downward social comparison—thinking of

someone5 who had it worse off than they did. “Sure, I have breast cancer, but it could be worse.… after all, I could be younger. … The surgery required is a lumpectomy rather than amastectomy, a single mastectomy rather than a double mastectomy.... I can tolerate the sideeffects of chemotherapy better than most.... I have a supportive family” and so on. A previousgeneration of psychologists might have concluded that these women were in denial, but theywere clearly open-eyed, lucid, and sober. The only thing they denied was despair, and Taylor(1989) foreshadowed the premises of positive psychology by concluding that this was animportant aspect of human nature.

This is not to say that we should program traumatic events for our children in the hope thatthey will somehow benefit. I think of the Johnny Cash tune about the father who named his sonSue in order to toughen him up. But neither is this to say that once people suffer, we shouldwrite them off as permanently flawed and bounded in their achievement of the good life (Linley& Joseph, 2004a).

Isn’t Life Tragic?

Despite the arguments I have been making, some skeptics still believe that positive psychologistsmiss the “obvious” point that life is tragic. We are born, and then we die. What happens inbetween is short, brutish, and cruel. Look at the history of humankind (or yesterday’s eveningnews)—war, disease, and natural disasters galore. There is no good answer to this charge if one’sdebate opponent sticks to his philosophical grounds (Russell, 1930). But why would anyone wantto do so? Perhaps a tragic view of life provides some odd comfort to a person who wishes neverto be disappointed or who thinks that a tragic view is smarter or more sophisticated. “Realistic”is a frequently chosen adjective by those who espouse such a view.

I disagree but will not belabor the point except to note that tragedy admits to gradations.Even if everything sucks, some things suck more than others, an irrefutable fact given how

people actually behave if not what they say. We prefer some outcomes rather than others, pursuesome goals rather than others, and desire some emotional states rather than others. Whether welabel these preferred circumstances “positive” or “less sucky” then becomes a matter ofsemantics.

Are Happy People Stupid?

Our common culture is replete with stereotypes linking happiness and stupidity. We call someonea Pollyanna if we want to dismiss hope as foolish (chapter 5). We call someone a grinning idiot ifwe want to say that happiness is naïve. We talk about fiddling while Rome is burning. Moreclever is Elbert Hubbard’s (1927) definition of a pessimist as a person who has been intimatelyacquainted with an optimist. Or consider The Devil’s Dictionary’s definition:

OPTIMISM, n. The doctrine, or belief, that everything is beautiful, including what isugly, everything good, especially the bad, and everything right that is wrong. It isheld with greatest tenacity by those most accustomed to the mischance of fallinginto adversity, and is most acceptably expounded with the grin that apes a smile.Being a blind faith, it is inaccessible to the light of disproof—an intellectual disorder,yielding to no treatment but death. It is hereditary, but fortunately not contagious.(Bierce, 1911/1999, p. 137)

We can even find similar sentiments in the scientific literature, as in the conclusion that thesadder are wiser, a proposition I examine in detail in chapter 4 (Alloy & Abramson, 1979).

Part of this stereotyping results from the aforementioned view in some quarters that life istragic and that the human condition is draped in doom and gloom. Freud (1927/1953c) takessome responsibility here by arguing that people are unaware of their true motives, which reduceto sex and aggression, and that anything positive or happy is a defense, at best a sublimation andat worst a delusion.

The evidence, however, points to the opposite conclusion. When researchers compare thecharacteristics of “happy” and “unhappy” people, as ascertained by their own reports as well asthe presumably more-objective reports of those who know them well, the happy people almostalways come out on top (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). They are more successful at schooland at work; they have better relationships with other people; and they even live longer.

In research described in detail in chapter 4, positive psychologists have shown that theexperience of positive emotions can actually pay intellectual benefits. In a positive emotionalstate, people are more flexible and creative.

What about IQ? Here the evidence is equivocal, showing at most a small association betweenmeasured intelligence and life satisfaction (Argyle, 1999). But it is a positive correlation, not a

negative one. In any event, “stupidity” (if that is what a low score on an IQ test reflects) usuallyresides in no particular place along the spectrum of happiness and certainly not at the high end.

I acknowledge that extremely exuberant people can be annoying when they unleash theirhappiness on us at the wrong time. Haven’t we all had the experience, after receiving someterrible bit of news, of running into someone who tells us to cheer up and look on the brightside? At that moment, there is no bright side, and the good cheer they urge upon us isunwelcome. These people may or may not be stupid, but they are insensitive. I stress, however,that not all happy people are so obtuse.

Is Positive Psychology a Luxury?

Another charge that I sometimes hear is that the concerns of positive psychology are a luxuryonly for the privileged in our society. Positive psychologists may have inadvertently contributedto this perception. When the field took form in the late 1990s, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi(2000) speculated that such an endeavor was only possible within a society that was prosperousand at peace. Positive psychologists have since changed our minds. For starters, even in theUnited States of the 1990s, not everyone was prosperous or a full participant in society. But is itplausible to think that only rich people care about fulfillment or that only White Anglo-SaxonProtestants concern themselves with character? Whatever else is captured by the red-bluepartition of U.S. states into Republicans and Democrats, it is not an interest in the psychologicalgood life (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New York and onthe Pentagon and their aftermath changed our thinking profoundly. Those of us in the UnitedStates are no longer so prosperous, and we are no longer so much at peace, but if anything,interest in positive psychology has grown. We had the momentary thought post-9/11 thatAmericans would hunker down and attend to grim basics, postponing the pursuit of the good lifeuntil they again felt safe. But this is not what happened, and we now realize that the good life atits core involves how one rises to the occasion.

We should have studied history more carefully. For good reason, the men and women whosuccessfully mounted the World War II effort are spoken of as the best generation in the 20thcentury (Brokaw, 1998). Faced with a terrible crisis from which they could have turned, theyinstead embraced it. The Allies worked together not only to help win the war against fascism butalso to usher in an era of unprecedented progress and innovation.

Now, in the aftermath of 9/11, there is another occasion to which to rise, and we have someevidence that Americans are doing just that. Our ongoing study of character strengths has foundthat post-9/11, people reported that they were more likely to display the theological virtues offaith, hope, and charity (love; Peterson & Seligman, 2003a). Whether these changes will be

sustained for a generation or beyond is an empirical matter that we will track with interest, butin the meantime, we have revised our original view about the societal conditions that makepositive social science possible. As already noted, crisis may be the crucible of character.

Is Positive Psychology Value-Laden?

The goals of positive psychology are description and explanation as opposed to prescription. Theunderlying premise of positive psychology is prescriptive in that it says that certain topics shouldbe studied: positive experiences, positive traits, and enabling institutions. But once the studybegins, it needs to be hard-headed and dispassionate. The routes to the good life are an empiricalmatter. Indeed, whether what seems positive is always desirable is also an empirical question.

My own research into optimism has documented many benefits of positive thinking(happiness, health, and success in various achievement domains) but one notable downside:Optimistic thinking is associated with an underestimation of risks (Peterson & Vaidya, 2003).Should someone always be optimistic? The empirically informed answer is certainly not if one isa pilot or air traffic controller trying to decide if a plane should take off during an ice storm(Seligman, 1991). Here, the data advise caution and sobriety—pessimism, as it were (chapter 5).

The task for positive psychology is to provide the most objective facts possible about thephenomena it studies so that everyday people and society as a whole can make an informeddecision about what goals to pursue in what circumstances. Not all of the news will be upbeat,but it will be of value precisely because it provides an appropriately nuanced view of the goodlife.

Is the Rest of Psychology “Negative”?

Another stumbling block is the umbrella term itself—positive psychology—because manypsychologists hear what they have been doing throughout their careers dismissed as negativepsychology. This automatic juxtaposition is unfortunate, and positive psychologists intend nodisrespect. I prefer the term business-as-usual psychology to describe work that focuses on humanproblems. As emphasized, business-as-usual psychology is important and necessary—and what Ihave spent most of my own career pursuing.

To call someone a positive psychologist is but a shorthand way of saying that he studies thetopics of concern to the field of positive psychology. It does not mean that the positivepsychologist is a “positive” (happy, talented, virtuous) person, and it certainly does not implythat other psychologists are “negative” people. After all, social psychologists may or may not besocial, and personality psychologists may or may not display a scintillating personality.

What About Culture?

Positive psychology cannot be just a Western endeavor (Walsh, 2001). So, the 2002 PositivePsychology Summit in Washington, DC, had an explicit international emphasis, and the lessons tobe learned about the good life from scholars around the world are rich indeed. My research teamhas been inspired to collect and study what we dub culture-bound states and traits reflectingstrengths of character, like gelassenheit among Old Order Amish, kuy guyluk among Koreans, or

hao xue xin among Chinese.6

Along these lines, positive psychologists should attempt to identify cultural practices from allparts of the globe that contribute to the good life within given societies (e.g., Sandage, Hill, &Vang, 2003). I remember speaking to my friend and colleague Nansook Park, who grew up inKorea, about an exercise that Marty Seligman and I had devised for our American collegestudents, asking them to write a letter of appreciation to their favorite high school or elementaryschool teacher (chapter 2). I was quite proud of our creativity in crafting a gratitude ritual thatwent beyond the saccharine messages of preprinted Hallmark cards. She politely heard me out,and then asked, “Do you mean that your students never did this before?” Apparently, in Korea,

every schoolchild every year writes a letter of appreciation to her teacher.7 How many other suchcultural practices need to be documented and disseminated across national borders?

Is This a Paradigm Shift?

Let us turn from these skeptical FAQs to one that embodies an over-the-top compliment. Ispositive psychology something so new and revolutionary that it reflects an altogether differentway of going about psychological science? The term that gets applied is philosopher of scienceThomas Kuhn’s (1970) notion of a paradigm shift, which he introduced to describe radicalchanges in a scientific field. According to Kuhn, scientific progress is marked by periods ofstability in which an overarching perspective dominates and dictates the particulars of scientificactivity: theory, research, and application. To be sure, progress is made in these periods of so-called normal science, but it is incremental and entails finetuning the dominant paradigm.

Every once in a while, a new way of conceiving things is introduced that catches on andcreates what Kuhn termed a scientific revolution. The old paradigm is displaced, and a new era ofstability and incremental progress begins. Einstein’s physics supplanted those of Newton, whichhad supplanted those of Copernicus. The theory of evolution introduced by Darwin (1859)similarly revolutionized biology. And so on.

Let us leave aside the fact that Kuhn himself wrote about the natural sciences and seemed tobelieve that the various social sciences—including psychology—did not fit his formula becausethey have never had a single overarching perspective to be displaced. Social scientists introducenew perspectives all the time and rail against old perspectives, as Max Wertheimer (1912) did increating gestalt psychology or John Watson (1913) did in creating behaviorism. But what usually

happens is that seating at the table of social science just becomes more crowded, and when oldperspectives do die, it is a slow demise due to neglect rather than a quick death due torevolution.

Let us leave aside the ironic fact that self-proclaimed paradigm shifts fall remarkably flat.Scientific articles that immodestly trumpet a new contribution as a scientific revolution or aparadigm shift are by my own checking less frequently cited by subsequent scientists than thosearticles immediately adjacent to them in the same journals.

Simply put, the answer is a resounding no. Positive psychology is a refocusing of subjectmatter and not a revolution. Indeed, the notable strength of positive psychology is its continuitywith tried-and-true psychological research methods and its belief that these can be usedproductively to study new topics—those that make life most worth living.

What About Bad Company?

The problem, as it were, of being involved in something popular is that it is popular. There is ahuge bandwagon emerging around positive psychology, and sometimes I do not know if I amhelping to lead the parade or simply keeping up with the stampede.

There is a long tradition, at least within the United States, of pop psychology books andarticles and more recently audiotapes, DVDs, and Web sites that take a few ideas frompsychology and expand them into maxims for living. At its best, pop psychology succeeds in“giving psychology away” (Miller, 1969), and some of these endeavors are certainly valuable forthe general public. But sometimes what emerges is a caricature of psychology that serves no goodpurpose besides entertainment. There is something amiss when the best-known psychologists inthe world today are Dr. Joyce Brothers and Dr. Phil, not to mention Dr. Ruth or Dr. Laura, whowere not to my knowledge ever trained as mental health professionals but who—like BobNewhart and Kelsey Grammar—simply play the part of one. This is like confusing Judge Judywith Justice Thurgood Marshall or Britney Spears with Maria Callas.

Positive psychology’s bad company includes any and all people who are mangling—note thatI did not say “popularizing”—the theories and findings that are emerging from our carefulstudies and presenting them to an eager public as simple truths as opposed to tentativegeneralizations. A visit to the psychology section at Barnes and Noble or Borders will give youample examples. Beware of any book titled something like Five (or Seven or Nine) Easy Steps toLasting Happiness (or Career Success or Physical Fitness or Scratch Golf).

Bad company is not defined by celebrity or the intrusion of the profit motive. After all, I hopethat you bought this book, and I will gladly cash whatever royalty checks I may receive. But Ialso hope that you read this book not only for what it says but also for what it does not. Earlierin this chapter, I promised food for thought and a tentative action plan, which may or may not

work for you and in any event will require hard work to enact.

The bad company of positive psychology may not have bad motives. I assume that many ofthese folks simply like the positive and wish it for others; their only sin is overlooking the scienceexcept when it suits them. It is therefore important to emphasize that positive psychology is notan ideological movement nor a secular religion. It is not a get-rich scheme nor the mantra of aninspirational speaker. Our world has enough of these. To be sure, many provide insights into thegood life that positive psychology should explore. I happen to be impressed with Oprah Winfreyand Tony Robbins, among others, and their ideas about the human condition. But to callsomething positive psychology, the emphasis needs to be on the exploration of these insights withthe tools of psychological science to see which ideas square with the facts of the matter andwhich do not.

The bad company against which I am warning threatens to bring down positive psychology—or at least tarnish its credibility—by running far ahead of what the evidence actually shows,promising what cannot be delivered, and glossing over the real problems that many people face.More insidiously, glib popularizations run the risk of making unhappiness seem to be simply amatter of choice and will (and of course not buying a given book). Social scientists have longbeen aware of the dangers of unfairly blaming the victim (W. Ryan, 1978). The positivepsychology flipside of this is unfairly congratulating the winner.

Do You Have to Be Happy to Be a Positive Psychologist?

This question may not be posed to all positive psychologists, but it is one I frequently hear frommy friends and colleagues, who know me as a somewhat dour individual. I do my share ofcomplaining, and I roll my eyes much more frequently than I smile. Am I drawn to this endeavorbecause at some level I simply do not get it? Said another way, what does a gloomy guy have toconvey about positive psychology that anyone else should take seriously?

I think the answer is quite a lot. As already mentioned, positive psychology is not all aboutebullience. And indeed, “authentic” happiness entails more than just positive feelings (Seligman,2002). With my typically straight face, I can say that I am happy because I love what I do andbecause I am fiercely loyal to my family and friends. I am a teacher who comes into daily contactwith the best and the brightest young people in the world. I lose myself in my work, and I canlook myself in the mirror every morning and be highly satisfied with what I do—although a fewcups of coffee certainly help this affirmation.

Positive psychology is much too important a field to trust its study only to the most cheerfulamong us.

What’s Missing?

Although still a new field, positive psychology has attracted psychologists from many otherestablished fields, notably social psychology, personality psychology, and the appliedsubdisciplines of clinical psychology and organizational psychology. For reasons not clear to me,positive psychology is not well populated with folks from developmental psychology, communitypsychology, or cultural psychology, fields of obvious pertinence if our goal is to understand thegood life. To date, there is only a smattering of representation from “hard” (natural science)psychology—those who study cognitive and biological processes. As a result, there are gaps inpositive psychology and unfortunately in this book as well.

And as has been pointed out to me, always by someone with a twinkling eye, there is nopositive psychology of human sexuality. Maybe the field’s leaders are a bunch of prudes or on thewrong side of middle age, or maybe we are dubious about obtaining federal funding in thecurrent political climate to do research on “good” orgasms (as if there were other types). Butmaybe there does not need to be an explicit field devoted to the subject. From the Kama Sutra toAlex Comfort’s (1972) The Joy of Sex, sexuality has rarely been discussed or pursued with theassumption that “good enough” is good enough.

The Pillars of Positive PsychologySexuality aside, within the framework of positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi,2000), one can find a comprehensive scheme for describing and understanding the good life. Wecan parse the field into three related topics: (a) positive subjective experiences (happiness,pleasure, gratification, fulfillment), (b) positive individual traits (strengths of character, talents,interests, values), and (c) positive institutions (families, schools, businesses, communities,societies). A theory is implied here: Positive institutions facilitate the development and display ofpositive traits, which in turn facilitate positive subjective experiences (Park & Peterson, 2003).

The word facilitate deliberately avoids strict causal language. It is possible for people to behappy or content even in the absence of good character, and people can have good charactereven when living outside the realm of positive institutions. The example of apartheid’s demise inSouth Africa shows that citizens can do the right thing even in the face of oppressive historicalprecedent. The example of whistleblowers shows that employees do not always conform withworkplace norms. And the example of excellent students from underfunded school districts showsthat intellectual curiosity is not always stamped out by educational mediocrity.

But matters are simpler when institutions, traits, and experiences are in alignment (Gardner,Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon, 2001). Indeed, doing well in life probably represents a comingtogether of all three domains, and that is why I discuss each at length in this book.

Chapters 3 and 4 cover the first pillar, positive subjective experiences; chapters 5 through 9

focus on the second pillar, positive traits of the individual. Chapter 10 begins the discussion ofthe third pillar—enabling institutions—by looking at interpersonal relationships (friendship andlove), and the discussion of these institutions is continued on a more macro level in chapter 11.The concluding chapter is a brief look at the possible future of positive psychology. In the nextchapter, I discuss ways to apply the ideas of positive psychology to your own life.

As you may know, psychology textbooks are often accompanied by an instructor’s manualand a student study guide that contain exercises and applications. In the best of all pedagogicalworlds, the content in these supplements is well integrated with the textbook and facilitates itsstudy and mastery. Whether or not this typically occurs, I do not know, but in the case of positivepsychology, exercises and applications are too essential to be relegated elsewhere for students toblow through the night before an exam.

Indeed, the philosophical underpinnings of positive psychology demand an experientialcomponent to solidify learning. Those who have thought about the inculcation of good habits,from Aristotle to the present, agree that doing so requires both theory and practice (Park &Peterson, in press d). Theory is important because we need labels for what we are doing and ascheme for relating the specifics to one another. Practice is important because we best learnwhen we see the relevance of abstract information to the concrete, and if the concrete happens tobe our own life, so much the better.

Every chapter in this book therefore contains a suggested exercise along with a rationale interms of the ideas presented in the chapter. I urge you to try these out. These are not canneddemonstrations. They may or may not work exactly as intended and should be approached in thespirit of experimentation. I would love to hear from you about your reactions. You can contactme at [emailprotected] and tell me how these exercises worked for you.

Also note that each chapter ends with a glossary of important terms and their definitions. Ialso suggest further readings, some academic and some popular. Web sites are also suggested. Iadditionally recommend some films that can provide the bases for papers or discussions. Finally,because I have spent as much of my life listening to music as doing psychology, I note somepopular songs that embody the themes in a given chapter. Some of us who teach positivepsychology courses play one of these songs to signal the beginning of a class. (A much morecivilized strategy than pounding on a table or trying to talk over the chitchat of students.) I showmy age in most of these suggestions. I was born in 1950 and came of age in the 1960s, and Ibelieve that the 20th century’s greatest poets were John Lennon and Smokey Robinson. I wouldbe happy to hear more-contemporary suggestions from readers.

EXERCISE Writing Your Own Legacy

Remember that I started this chapter by asking you to imagine the final moments of your life andhow you might take stock of how you had lived. This exercise formalizes the request. Thinkahead to your life as you would like it to be and how you would like to be remembered by thoseclosest to you. What accomplishments would they mention? What personal strengths would theyenumerate? In short, what is your legacy?

This is not the occasion to be modest or flip. But neither is this the occasion to indulge in afantasy. Hopes and dreams have a way of not coming true unless we do something to make themhappen. Look back over what you have written, and ask yourself if you have a plan that willbring about your legacy that is realistic and within your power. And more to the point, are youenacting this plan in your present life?

Psychologist Howard Gardner has been studying professional journalists and is interested inwhat he calls “good work” on their part, stories that blend professional competence and moralexcellence (e.g., Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon, 2001). Journalism is a field with a clearlyarticulated code of ethics, but most would agree that this code has eroded in recent years. Onereason is the intrusion of big money into the news business. Journalists have always competed tobreak stories, but now the competition involves enormous monetary stakes, which can overrideethical values.

Gardner interviewed young journalists, all of whom acknowledged the importance of ethics intheir field and none of whom had any confusion about the right way to cover a story. But theyalso lamented that they could not “afford” to do good work early in their careers. When theywere more established—with their own byline, a corner office, a good salary, and a looselymonitored expense account—then they would do good work.

I heard Gardner describe this research at a psychology conference, and everyone in theaudience chuckled at the foolishness of these young journalists. But we soon stopped chucklingwhen we saw the larger point that of course applied to all of us, in our professions as well as inour everyday lives. “Good work” is not a faucet we can turn on when we eventually are moved todo so. Rather, it is the result of a lifetime of developing appropriate talents and habits, whichinclude a moral sense.

Like many academics, I spent my young adult years postponing many of the small things thatI knew would make me happy, including reading novels for pleasure, learning to cook, taking aphotography class, and joining a gym. I would do all of these things when I had time—when Ifinished school, when I had a job, when I was awarded tenure, and so on. I was fortunate enoughto realize that I would never have time unless I made the time. And then the rest of my lifebegan.

That is the realization I am urging upon you as you think about your legacy and how you will

make it happen.

Put aside what you have written, but do not lose it. Read it again a year from now, or 5 yearsfrom now. Have you made progress toward your goals? And feel free to revise it if new goalshave emerged. It is, after all, your legacy.

Here is a legacy written by one of my college students:

He was a good man.

He was a good husband. He deeply loved his wife. Like all couples, they hadtheir disagreements, but no matter what, he focused on the good.

He was a good father. His children were a priority, and he was always patient,supportive, and fair. They never doubted his love because they never had reason.

He was a good worker. He did his job well, not because he loved it, but becauseit was the right thing to do. When he retired, there was an outpouring ofappreciation from friends, colleagues, and supervisors.

He was a good citizen. He always lent a helping hand. As a young man, he spenthis weekends working with a community outreach program that repaired low-income housing. Later on, he became more active in his church, and as long as hecould, he led backpacking trips for troubled teens.

All in all, he was a man who loved life. And life in turn loved him.

GLOSSARYexistentialism: doctrine that a person’s experience is primary

humanism: doctrine that the needs and values of human beings take precedence over materialthings and, further, that people cannot be studied simply as part of the material world

paradigm shift: radical change in a scientific field

phenomenology: description of a person’s conscious experience in terms meaningful for thatindividual

positive psychology: scientific study of what goes right in life

self-actualization: inherent tendency of people to make the most of their potential

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Seligman, M. E. P. (2002). Authentic happiness. New York: Free Press.

Snyder, C. R., & Lopez, S. J. (Eds.). (2002). Handbook of positive psychology. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

American Psychologist. Special issue (January 2000).

American Psychologist. Special issue (March 2001).

Review of General Psychology. Special issue (March 2005).

Time. Special issue (January 17, 2005).

Journal of Positive Psychology

Articles

Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction.American Psychologist, 55, 5–14.

Sheldon, K. M., & King, L. (2001). Why positive psychology is necessary. American Psychologist,56, 216–217.

Peterson, C., & Park, N. (2003). Positive psychology as the evenhanded positive psychologistviews it. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 141–146.

Gable, S. L., & Haidt, J. (2005). What (and why) is positive psychology? Review of GeneralPsychology, 9, 103–110.

Web Sites

http://www.positivepsychology.org. This is the Web site of the Positive Psychology Center at theUniversity of Pennsylvania, which “promotes research, training, education, dissemination, andthe application of positive psychology.”

http://www.authentichappiness.org. This Web site is associated with Martin Seligman’s (2002)trade book on positive psychology, Authentic Happiness, and contains many positivepsychology surveys that can be taken on-line.

http://www.apa.org/about/division/div17.html. The Society of Counseling Psychology (Division17 of the American Psychological Association) has a section devoted to positive psychology.

Films

It’s a Wonderful Life (1946)

Schindler’s List (1993)

The Family Man (2000)

About Schmidt (2002)

American Experience: Partners of the Heart (2003)

Hotel Rwanda (2004)

Montana PBS: “Introducing Positive Psychology: Signature Strengths, Flow, and Aging Well”(2004)

Millions (2005)

Songs

“All You Need Is Love” (Beatles)

“Big Yellow Taxi” (Joni Mitchell)

“Cat’s in the Cradle” (Harry Chapin)

“Here Comes the Sun” (Beatles)

“Oh, What a Beautiful Morning” (from Oklahoma)

“The Secret of Life” (Faith Hill)

“Time in a Bottle” (Jim Croce)

2Learning About Positive Psychology: Not a SpectatorSport

If I study, I seek only the learning that … instructs me in how to die well andlive well.—MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE (1580)

Positive psychology courses have only been offered since the 1990s,1 which means that I knowsomething about their short history and how they have changed over the past few years. Amongthe very first such courses were small seminars for undergraduate and graduate students offeredby Marty Seligman at the University of Pennsylvania. Taking a leave from my position at theUniversity of Michigan, I joined him in September 2000 and co-taught these courses over thenext 3 years. Early on, these were conceived as typical seminars—assigned readings, discussionsin class, and written papers.

But Seligman (2004) hit upon a way to begin these courses that we have come to call seriousintroductions. Most seminars begin by the students introducing themselves like this: “My name isJennifer. I am a sophomore studying psychology because first-year premed courses killed me andmy GPA. I grew up in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. I am taking this particular course because it fitsmy schedule.” The instructor may say something similar, probably mentioning where he went toschool and what his current scholarly interests are.

Introductions like these are so familiar to college students as to be clichéd. But Seligmanstarted one of the first positive psychology courses with a different sort of introduction, whichhas come to be known as the “Nikki Story,” after his then 5-year-old daughter and a pivotalencounter he had with her one afternoon.

For years, Seligman was a self-proclaimed grouch—urgent about time, task oriented, andincapable of small talk. His wife, Mandy, and their children are lively, cheerful, and attuned toothers, making Seligman a “walking nimbus cloud in a household radiant with sunshine”(Seligman, 2002, p. 28).

One afternoon, he was in the garden weeding, doing it like he did everything—seriously.Little Nikki was helping him, which took the form of throwing weeds in the air, dancing, andsinging. That may strike many of you as a perfectly reasonable way to weed a garden, but it

distracted Seligman, who yelled at his daughter. She walked away but returned in a few minutes.

“Daddy, I want to talk to you.”

“Yes, Nikki.”

“Daddy, do you remember before my fifth birthday? From when I was threeuntil when I was five, I was a whiner. I whined every day. On my fifth birthday, Idecided I wasn’t going to whine any more. That was the hardest thing I’ve everdone. And if I can stop whining, you can stop being such a grouch.” (Seligman,2002, p. 28)

At that moment, Seligman had a realization. Actually, he had two. First was a personalinsight: Raising children is not about correcting their weaknesses and fixing whatever is wrongwith them. Rather, it is about identifying and nurturing their strengths. In Nikki’s case, thesestrengths included a precocious will to improve herself and the ability to challenge her grumpyfather to find that same will within himself.

Second was a professional insight that led to positive psychology: Psychology as it existed hadlittle to say about these remarkable strengths. Where do they originate? How can they beencouraged? To describe Nikki as not whiny is to miss her essence by a country mile. To describeanyone in terms of the weaknesses and shortcomings they do or do not have is to ignore half ofthe human condition—the good half, obviously, that makes life worth living. And yes, the gardenwas eventually weeded, and yes, Seligman became less of a grouch. Nikki remains delightfullyherself, even as the teenager she has since become.

In telling the Nikki Story to students in his first positive psychology course, Seligman’s intentwas just to put a face on a subject matter that seemed at odds with what he had spent his lifestudying and teaching: depression, despair, and disorder. But embedded here was a seriousintroduction, not just to the subject matter but to himself and his family. Here was a father whocared enough about his child to take her advice about life seriously. Here was a child who madea decision to be a better person. Here was a story about people at their best. What a good way toframe all subsequent interactions. Even when Seligman would relapse into grouchiness, hisstudents would remember Nikki and know that there was more to their teacher than his sobrietyand absence of small talk.

In every positive psychology course we have since taught, all students are asked to tell ananalogous story about an event in their lives that showed themselves at their very best. We havelearned to preface this request by a small sermon on modesty, a virtue in many circumstances

but not if it is at odds with the truth. And we say that we are not interested in achievements orperformances but rather in strengths of character. As instructors, we tell our own stories, andmine goes like this:

A friend of mine at another university was preparing a new course to teach anddiscovered that her school library did not have any films or videotapes pertinent tothe course. Showing such tapes would help bring the course material to life, so whatwas she to do? I offered to help, because my own university has lots of audiovisualresources. I went to the library and checked out a number of relevant tapes thatwere in the public domain. I bought blank videotapes and spoke to a colleague atMichigan who had a fancy videotape duplicating machine in her laboratory. Iexplained what I wanted to do. She told me I could use the machine and gave me abrief lesson. I sat down and started to make copies, a process that went on for hours.Every once in a while, my colleague would walk by and see that I was still at it.Finally she stopped and said, “This is taking you forever. Why don’t you ask one ofyour students to do this for you? After all, your friend won’t know that you didn’t doit yourself.” “True enough,” I responded. “But I would know.”

That was me at my best, and I am proud when I am able to act this way. Mind you, this is notme in every venue of my life. No one would confuse me with Mother Teresa of Calcutta, but itwas a good day—tedious, boring, and frustrating when I would push the wrong button and undowhat had been accomplished. Indeed, it was a very good day.

This story has a postscript that concerns my Michigan colleague who had chided me forwasting my time. Several times, I had to leave her lab for a few minutes to use the bathroom. Iwas confused that the repetitive process of inserting and removing tapes was apparently notdelayed by my periodic breaks. At first, I assumed that I had so automated the steps that I wassimply unaware of my progress. But then I noted that the identifying labels attached to the newtapes had a different handwriting than my own. My colleague was coming by during my breaksand helping. Although I now knew what was going on, I never said a word to her. In keepingwith my own lesson, I thought it enough that she knew what she was doing.

In a class of 15–20 students, these serious introductions can take several hours and maystretch over several class periods, but we believe that it is time well spent. As mentioned, theyframe how we all think about one another for the rest of the semester and thereafter. Withapologies to my readers from the Garden State, it is much better to know that Jennifer once wentagainst the social currents to befriend an ostracized classmate in junior high school than to knowthat she grew up in New Jersey and had failed chemistry.

We have also learned that we need to tell students about appreciative listening, how to listen

carefully to what is said and then to respond in a way that builds on what has been conveyed asopposed to disagreeing with it or dismissing it. Once I told my story without this preface, andone of my students—meaning well—said, “I think that is a terrible use of your time. You are aprofessor and very busy.” I responded as gently as I could, “And that is why the giving of mytime means something.”

Positive psychology has become for us a course in rhetoric—not just one in reading andwriting, but one in speaking and listening (Seligman, 2004).

Something powerful goes on during these serious introductions. During at least a third of theintroductions, one of the listeners is moved to quiet tears. With or without tears, strong bonds areforged. No one sits in the corner of the classroom working a crossword puzzle. Baseball caps andsunglasses are removed without prompting. A cell phone has never rung. Students even drop theannoying conversational hedges “like” and “you know” from what they say because they arespeaking from the heart and not just filling time. Everyone can see the principles of positivepsychology in action, and this is heady stuff indeed.

Contrast this with typical classroom demonstrations. They may work in physics andchemistry, but woe be it to the psychology instructor who tries to demonstrate psychologicalprinciples in class. At best they work in the aggregate, where their effects cannot be apprehendedwithout stopping to compute some statistical average. Even so, they often fall flat.

Positive psychology seems to be different, and we realized that we could assign exercises—inside and outside the classroom—that compellingly illustrated the ideas on which we focusedeach week. As our positive psychology course evolved, we accumulated, tried out, and polisheddifferent exercises. Some of the very best were suggested by our students.

Skeptics might worry that the field is too new to inspire interventions, but I have a differentopinion. I agree with social psychologist Kurt Lewin’s (1947) sentiment, expressed decades ago,that the best way to understand a psychological phenomenon is to try and change it. By thisview, intervention research is not something that follows basic research at a polite distance butinstead is its inherent complement (Linley & Joseph, 2004b).

Being “Cool” as the EnemyIn an ongoing project, my colleagues—Angela Duckworth, Tom Geraghty, Jane Gillham, KarenReivich, Barry Schwartz, Martin Seligman, and Tracy Steen—and I have packaged togetherexercises like these into a positive psychology course that is being taught by regular classroomteachers to ninth-graders in a high school in suburban Philadelphia. In keeping with our view ofpositive psychology courses as rhetoric, these are part of the language arts curriculum—notsocial sciences. Our eventual goal is to evaluate the effect of such a course on student well-being

and achievement, and to this end, we are also looking at comparable students not enrolled in thecourse. This project fits under the rubric of character education but—we hope—goes beyondsloganeering to take a rigorous look at the long-term consequences of learning about thepsychological good life (Berkowitz & Bier, 2004).

We believe that one can best learn about the good life by engaging in it, and weekly exercisesdone outside of class by these ninth-graders are therefore a critical component. Remember myearlier point that the best way to understand a psychological phenomenon is to try and changeit? We have since learned that if you really want to understand something, try and change itamong young adolescents.

Our ninth-grade students are bright and capable, and their school is an outstanding one.Critical thinking is constantly encouraged and frequently displayed, and students are given agreat deal of autonomy. These are all good things, but they contain as well a downside thatthreatens the whole rationale for the course. Indeed, there is a general lesson here about anyexercise in positive psychology for any group of people.

If one approaches these exercises with cynicism or half a heart, then of course they cannotwork, and at least some of the students in our study do exactly this. The critical thinking honedthroughout their education manifests itself as automatic criticism. They are skeptical andseemingly afraid to try something that is not only new but also on the face of it corny.

Barry Schwartz has described this barrier to positive psychology exercises as being “cool,”and although “cool” is no longer adolescent jargon, it remains an apt description of a stance ofskeptical distance. Point out what is wrong in someone else’s ideas rather than what is right. Donot show enthusiasm. Do not do anything that would leave you open to ridicule. This describesmuch of academics, even or especially at good schools, but it is exacerbated by the peculiarfeatures of the adolescent mind.

We all survived adolescence, but if you are like me, you have painful memories of beingscrutinized and judged by “them” even if we could not put a finger on just who “they” were.Adolescence is a time of mushrooming intellectual and emotional growth, and it results in anacute self-awareness unprecedented for the young person (Strauch, 2003). It is not surprising thatwhile experiencing these changes, the adolescent believes that no one else understands—especially teachers and parents—although of course all adults do understand because they toowent through this themselves once upon a time. As adolescents, we believe that our peers aremore together and less troubled simply because they are no more likely to talk about their doubtsand insecurities than we are. Victor Raimy (1976) even gave a name to this phenomenon—hecalled it the special person misconception—and it contributes to coolness.

Many of the exercises we have devised for our ninth-graders involve opening themselves up

to their peers, teachers, and parents. What are their long-term goals? What do they value inthemselves and others? We even ask them to talk to “old” people (i.e., those over 30 years ofage). These activities make them extremely self-conscious and as a result reticent. Because theyare good students, they go along with our requests but at an emotional arm’s length. In sum, theyare too cool to try something that might make them happy.

In an unpleasant exchange I had with one of the ninth-grade students in a debriefing sessionone summer, I sat patiently while he regaled me for 30 minutes about my evil intents tobrainwash him. He concluded, “You can’t make me happy if I don’t want to be!” And I blurtedout, “Fine. You can be as miserable as you want to be.” I was immediately embarrassed, but Iadmit that it felt good.

We can call this teen angst or adolescent sturm und drang, but I think that is anoverinterpretation (cf. Arnett, 1999). Instead, I think kids (and most adults) want their happinessto be spontaneous, to happen rather than to be deliberately created. In a stint as a clinicalpsychologist, while doing therapy with couples, I encountered a similar sentiment:

“Tell your spouse what you want. Tell him what would make you happy.”

“I don’t want to do that.”

“Why?”

“It wouldn’t be real when he did it.”

“But maybe he doesn’t know what you really want.”

“Well, he should know.”

“Why?”

“He just should.”

I suppose the divorce rate would be lower if we all were the mind readers that our spousesassume us to be (chapter 10). But we are not. A couple that is unhappy enough and committedenough to their marriage will eventually try out some of the standard couples-therapy exercisesand usually to good effect. But there is a lingering suspicion that spontaneity has been subvertedand that love deliberately given is somehow less genuine than love that just happens.

I have a different point of view. Love (or, for that matter, happiness) is not reserved “only forthe lucky and the strong” but instead is hard work that may entail careful deliberation andawkward action. Happiness as positive psychology conceives it is not for sissies. I like ErichFromm’s (1956) point that our ideal should not be to “fall in love” but rather to “stand in love”—

love and happiness are not heedless freefalls that just happen when gravity is on our side.

Contrast the experience with the adolescents with the experience we have had with adultvolunteers to whom we have offered these exercises as a possible way to lead more fulfilling lives(Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). They are eager to learn, and when they try them out,they go the extra mile, elaborate them, and take them very seriously. They do not worry aboutbeing cool. Many are restless and somewhat unhappy. They know something is missing in theirlives, and they are willing to try and change things.

So, there is a paradox here. There is every reason in the world to expect that positive

psychology exercises will be most effective for those who are already happy2—remember thatthis was one of Seligman’s original premises, that positive psychology should be concerned withfulfilling the lives of “normal” people—but it may be that someone needs to be a bit discontentedto try something out of the comfortable ordinary.

Some ExamplesMind you, not all positive psychology exercises work as intended, but enough do that the failuresare not discouraging but intriguing, and they can teach us as much as the successes. For example,let me contrast an exercise that worked with one that failed.

Gratitude Letters Versus Forgiveness Letters

American society seems to lack gratitude rituals: formal ways of expressing thanks to those whohave done well by us. Think of all the people—parents, friends, teachers, coaches, teammates,employers, and so on—who have been especially kind to you but have never heard you expressyour gratitude. This exercise tells us to write a gratitude letter to one of these individuals,describing in concrete terms why you are grateful. If possible, deliver it personally and have theperson read the letter in your presence. If this is not possible, then mail or fax the letter andfollow it up with a phone call.

Here is a letter sent by one of my colleagues to her favorite college teacher (L. M. Christie,personal communication, August 3, 2005):

Dear Ms. Carter:

It was back in 1979, and yet I still remember when you first walked into theclassroom to teach Southern Literature. You were ten minutes late. You sat down,lit a cigarette, poured yourself some coffee from a thermos, and apologized for the

delay. You couldn’t find your car keys. Then you couldn’t find the syllabus in thepile of papers in front of you. I thought: “This course is a bust. I’m going to have tosee if I can transfer into that Shakespeare class down the hall.” And then it all fellaway. You started to talk about the joy of studying great literature. You had beenteaching this particular course for seven years, and you never tired of it. Youcouldn’t wait to hear our impressions of William Faulkner, Harper Lee, and EudoraWelty, among others. Your enthusiasm was infectious. I wanted to delve right in.You went on to say that you were not going to waste our time on the plot andcharacter development of each book. Granted, they were critical elements, butyou’d rather focus on the universal themes of human emotion, thought, andexperience. These were the most valuable aspects of the written word. Lastly, youwelcomed complete honesty in the classroom. What did we love or hate about aparticular author’s work and why? Should you, as the teacher, choose differentbooks that better represented that person’s body of work next time around? (Somuch for first impressions. I wasn’t going anywhere, even for Shakespeare.)

The following year, I took two more courses with you. I was always impressedwith the breadth and depth of your knowledge. Clearly, you loved being a teacher,and you had so much to offer your students. I particularly appreciated your opendoor policy when it came to office hours. You’d say: “If I’m there, come in. If I’mnot, go be somewhere else.” I loved your humor and directness. And I loved howyou challenged me to work on my writing. You were never critical, alwaysbalanced in your critique of my papers, and it made me want to do better.

Before I graduated, I made an appointment with you to express my appreciation.You were late, and that made me smile. I’d grown fond of your idiosyncrasies andcouldn’t imagine you without them. When you finally came into the office, Ithanked you for all of your support and guidance. And I thanked you for deepeningmy love of literature and spurring me to continue my studies. With my speechbehind us, you graciously accepted my gratitude and started fishing through themound of papers on your desk. You had written me a letter of recommendation inhopes that I could use it for future employment. I hadn’t asked for one. I was deeplytouched by your kindness.

I read in the alumni newsletter that you retired in 2004. You surely had a richand distinguished career. I couldn’t attend your retirement party, but I heardthrough a friend that you entertained your guests with a dead-on impersonation ofTruman Capote. I wish I’d been there, but I’m sending this letter in lieu of hugs andcongratulations. Thank you again, for everything. You are a gifted teacher, Ann

Carter. And you are an accomplished scholar. I know that I am not alone in sayingyou are sorely missed in the English Department. But above all else, you are a goodperson.

In our experience with many dozens of gratitude letters like these, they “work” 100% of thetime in the sense that the recipient is moved, often to tears, and the sender is gratified as well.Letters are sent to mothers or fathers, friends or spouses, teachers or bosses, brothers or sisters.(Interestingly, college students rarely send them to their boyfriends or girlfriends. Perhaps thegratitude is obvious, or perhaps this is a lingering symptom of adolescent coolness.) The onlyhesitation we encounter is someone worrying that if he expresses his gratitude to his mother,then his father might feel slighted by implication. This does not happen, though, and Dad isalways happy when Mom is thanked.

In chapter 4, I describe our more-formal attempts to evaluate this and other positivepsychology exercises, and the evidence is clear that the good feelings (happiness) produced bysending a gratitude letter are reliably created (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005).However, the effects on happiness of a gratitude letter dissipate after a few weeks, which isneither surprising nor disappointing if you think about it. A gratitude letter is a dramatic eventbut not a life-changing one unless of course you make a point to send such a letter once a weekforever; then, you have changed your life and might expect permanent changes so long as you donot run out of recipients. Certainly, we know that the habitually grateful among us are happierthan those who are not (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 1999; Park, Peterson, &Seligman, 2004; Vaillant, 2002).

Encouraged by our experience with gratitude letters, I designed an analogous exercise thatentailed another positive emotion—forgiveness (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000).Forgiveness undoes our own hatred and frees us from the troubled past. Indeed, forgiveness hasbeen described as the queen of virtues—that is, those who forgive are much more serene thanthose who do not and display many other positive strengths. Forgiveness can be difficult, though,and despite its benefits, someone may have strong reasons not to forgive, which must berespected.

Accordingly, when I asked my students to craft a forgiveness letter, I told them to do sotentatively and not to send it unless they really wanted to do so and only if their forgivenesswere sincere. Otherwise, the instructions paralleled those for the gratitude letter:

Think of the people who have wronged you in the past whom you have neverexplicitly forgiven, although you desire to do so. Write a forgiveness letter toone of these individuals describing in concrete terms why you forgive him orher and what if anything you hope will happen between you in the future.

By the way, has this individual ever apologized? If so, how did you react?

Please do not send this letter unless you really want to do so and are sincere inyour forgiveness. Regardless, bring the letter to class and be prepared to discuss it.

This exercise was thoroughly unsuccessful because almost all of the students felt thatdelivering the letter to an individual who had never requested forgiveness would create morebad feelings than good ones. Upon reflection, they believed that in many cases they themselveshad contributed to the hurt (e.g., painful romantic breakups) and that “forgiving” the other partywould imply that they had been but innocent victims as opposed to co-conspirators. The 1student out of 20 who delivered the letter reports that she has yet to be forgiven for doing so.

This unsuccessful exercise was nonetheless informative and led to a spirited discussion of thenature of forgiveness. One consensus reached is that forgiveness is a dance that best begins withan apology. Accordingly, a more-fruitful exercise—which I have not yet tested but plan to insome future class—is to have my students write an apology letter.

One of my students made the wise observation that there are good apologies and badapologies (Lazare, 2004; C. D. Schneider, 2000). Consider a typical apology—a bad one—madeby public figures who have done something distasteful: “I apologize to anyone who wasoffended.” This sort of apology on the surface sounds good and may even be sincere, but itcontains an implicit message that all but undoes the apology: “But you should not have beenoffended.” In contrast, a good apology is one that says more simply: “I am sorry.” Along theselines, a good apology contains no excuses phrased in terms of youthful indiscretions, legalisticqualifications (“I didn’t inhale”), or wardrobe malfunctions. It is up to the recipient of an apologyto excuse the transgression, or not.

My colleague Karen Reivich has evolved the forgiveness letter exercise into a letting-go-of-grudges exercise. You can imagine the form that it takes. Letting go of grudges is a necessarilyinternal activity. You cannot—or at least should not—tell someone that he no longer annoys thehell out of you. You can only tell this to yourself—and then act differently if you really mean it.

Fun Versus Philanthropy

One of the solid findings of positive psychology is that an orientation to the welfare of others isin the long run more satisfying than an orientation to one’s own pleasure (chapter 4). Toillustrate this, Marty Seligman devised an exercise that he calls “fun versus philanthropy,” and itusually succeeds in making the point, even in the short run. The conclusion is inevitable that alifetime of altruism will replicate this lesson over and over again.

This exercise is introduced in class with a brief discussion of things that most people wouldagree to be pleasurable (fun)—hanging out with friends, watching a movie, or eating a hot fudge

sundae—and things that most people would agree to be helpful to others (philanthropy), likeshoveling the snow for elderly neighbors, helping a younger family member with his schoolwork,or doing the family laundry. Which sort of activity would students prefer doing? Everyonechuckles, because of course fun is more fun.

Regardless, they are asked in the next week to pursue one pleasurable activity of their ownchoice and one philanthropic activity of their own choice. (We have learned, by the way, that itis prudent when asking our young and even not-so-young students to do such exercises to beexplicit that they should not do anything physically dangerous, illegal, or exploitative of others—some fun activities can border on the dark side.) Flip a coin to decide which one to do first, andspend the same amount of time at each activity. Students are asked to write a brief papercomparing and contrasting their reactions to each activity.

With few exceptions, this exercise works in suggesting some lessons for life. Fun ispleasurable in the moment, but it is a fleeting pleasure. Philanthropy in contrast lingers. One ofour students told us of a marathon long-distance call in which she tutored her younger nephew inalgebra. Not a mathematics whiz herself, she found the task extremely difficult. She was not evensure that she had been helpful, but regardless, she felt wonderful for having given to him the giftof her time and concern: “I had a spring in my step. I felt more mellow that day. Things did notbother me.”

Marty Seligman (personal communication, September 12, 2000) loves to repeat the story toldby one of his students enrolled in the prestigious University of Pennsylvania Wharton School ofBusiness (Donald Trump’s alma mater), who found this exercise to be life altering.

I don’t particularly like my economics and accounting courses. I actually hate them.But I have always told myself that I am in Wharton so I can get a job with a greatsalary. Then I can do and buy things that will be fun. And then I will be happy. Itnever dawned on me that I can be happy right now and that high-priced fun isoverrated and at its core really selfish. I felt wonderful just helping someone else.

I have asked you to approach these exercises in the spirit of experimentation, and part ofexperimentation is an even-handed look at what the results of an exercise might actually mean.Can we really take at face value the apparent lesson of the fun-versus-philanthropy exercise, ordid we inadvertently bias the conclusions that our students fed back to us? Even 5 minutes intoour positive psychology course, our students know that it is not like being at the PlayboyMansion. Maybe our students are closet hedonists but are smart enough not to out themselves totheir instructors.

Maybe, although here is why I think we can take the results at face value. First, our studentsare never shy about saying what they mean, whether or not we approve, an apparently

increasing trend (Twenge & Im, 2005). All the time, I read stories about college students acrossthe nation who feel oppressed by teachers for their political opinions, and I marvel at what itwould be like to have students who actually could be cowed by what I happen to believe. Ohwell.

Second, more-rigorous research shows that philanthropy is associated with long-termfulfillment. In chapter 10, I describe longitudinal studies on charitable giving and volunteering,and the benefits for the giver (if not always the recipient) are indeed real.

Third, one of the defining features of pleasure (fun) is that it is fleeting because thepsychological apparatus responsible for its experience is governed by a principle of adaptation(chapter 3). Contrary to the behaviorist notion that we repeat—endlessly—those actions thatproduce reward (aka reinforcement) is the experiential fact that all such actions lose their zing,sometimes rather quickly. Years ago, I purchased a Nintendo game and played Space Invaders for8 straight hours, undaunted by the cramps produced along the way. The next day, I played for 3hours. Then an hour on the third day. And then not at all. Just the other week, I found theNintendo game in the back of my closet where it had resided for decades. I could only shake myhead. So, if our fun-versus-philanthropy exercise does no more than teach a lesson aboutadaptation to pleasure, then that is a valid and valuable lesson (chapter 3).

I acknowledge that we need to do a more-rigorous evaluation of the funversus-philanthropyexercise. In the meantime, you can try it yourself and arrive at your own honest reaction.

Although the exercise is presented as an X-versus-Y one, this only means a comparison andcontrast of the pure forms of the two experiences. In real life, we do not need to chooseexclusively between fun and service to others. In chapter 4, I introduce the notion of a full lifeand suggest the possibility that at least some activities can be both philanthropic andpleasurable.

Gift of Time

Remember the me-at-my-best story from earlier in the chapter? I have elaborated this into anexercise that I call the “gift of time.” What is the most valuable gift we can bestow on those welove?

In my positive psychology classes, I introduce this exercise by recounting O. Henry’s (1906)short story “The Gift of the Magi,” in which a young husband and wife give to each other a

present made possible only by the sacrifice of that which was personally most dear.3 Socialscientists debate whether there really is such a thing as altruism, if by that is meant activitiesthat only benefit others and that pay no personal dividend in the moment. I find this a tediousdebate because it fails to go out into the real world and find examples that would resolve it. Sure,

we can stand on our heads and argue—for example—that Christians who sheltered Jews in NaziEurope, putting themselves at risk for death, “really” were rewarding themselves in some non-obvious way. But is this as scientifically parsimonious as concluding that they were simply doingthe right thing given how they had been raised (Oliner & Oliner, 1988)?

Many of us are not in a position to put our lives on the line for a stranger. But we all have agift to give that is infinitely precious because it is thoroughly nonrenewable. That gift is our owntime. When I think of my best teachers or my best friends, common to them all is that they gaveof themselves over time. It was never what they gave to me that mattered but how they did it.Indeed, a few years ago, I wrote my own gratitude letter, and it was not until I was writing thissection that I realized I was grateful to a very dear friend in large part because she gives to meher time:

I am grateful that you are never too busy and that our friendship has never been puton hold while crises run their course.... It is said that what is seen lies only in the eyeof the beholder. But nothing good about you is in my eye; it is all in you and howyou live and what you give, and I am grateful to be a participant in this life so welllived.

A final frame for this exercise is to think about the yuppie expression quality time, used todescribe the 15 minutes per day that harried parents try to spend with their children. Withoutmeaning any disrespect, I suggest that quality time is at best an oxymoron and that a briefencounter with one’s child, no matter how genuine, cannot substitute for being there most, if notall, of the time.

The actual exercise is simple to describe:

Think of a person about whom you care. What might you be able to do for thisperson that entails nothing more than the giving of your time and indeed that takestime? Certainly, there are acts of kindness that entail gifts of money or goods, but inthis exercise, time is of the essence, as it were. Plan a gift of time for this person andgive it, whether it means doing something with them or something for them on yourown. Spend as much time as needed to do the favor well and do not take anyshortcuts. You might even consider taking off your wristwatch. Regardless, do nottell the recipient of your gift how much time you spent. Let the gift speak for itself.

This exercise has had checkered success. If it can be carried out according to the instructions,then most feel great about doing the favor. But all too often, the enemy is time itself: Someonedoes not have enough time to give time. Or in giving time in one arena of life, another arenanecessarily suffers. One of my colleagues gave the gift of time to one of her children—spending

an afternoon in a room without a clock with her older daughter and a coloring book. But she feltguilty about neglecting her younger daughter. Maybe she should have done something with thetwo of them, but then she would have worried that she was neglecting her husband. And so itgoes.

We cannot create time out of thin air. I can remember complaining once to a friend that I hadtoo many things to do. “So,” said my friend, playing psychologist, “you have a time managementproblem.” “No,” I countered, “I manage my time perfectly well. What I have is a time problem—not enough of it!” I suppose this is really the point of the exercise, and it means we need tochoose carefully how we deploy a resource for which deficit spending is not an option.

Three Good Things

Several different research groups have investigated the effects of asking people to stop and reflecton those things for which they are most grateful (Emmons & Crumpler, 2000; Emmons &McCullough, 2003; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005; Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson,2005). The details of this intervention differ across studies, but the results are always the same:Counting your blessings on a regular basis makes you happier and more content with life.

We call our own version of this exercise “three good things” because it entails writing downat the end of each day three things that went well (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). Weexperimented with these instructions and discovered—for example—that asking people to list tengood things did not work as well as asking for three and further that asking them to count theirblessings at the beginning of the day was not nearly as effective as asking them to do so at theend of the day. Irving Berlin was onto something when he advised us to count our blessingsinstead of sheep.

We also ask people to briefly explain why each event was a good one, and our rationale hereis simply that people may not be especially mindful about good events, even when theyenumerate them (chapter 5). For most people, “competence requires no comment” (Ryle, 1949),which means that we usually assume that good things are our due. Accordingly, we do not thinkmuch about them and miss the potential benefits of thoughtful (conscious) gratitude. Asking foran explanation leads to “deeper” thought.

Here are the instructions for this exercise:

At the end of each day, after dinner and before going to sleep, write down threethings that went well during the day. Do this every night for a week. The threethings you list can be relatively small in importance (“My husband picked up myfavorite ice cream for dessert on the way home from work today”) or relatively largein importance (“My sister just gave birth to a healthy baby boy”). After each positive

event on your list, answer in your own words the question “Why did this good thinghappen?” For example, you might speculate that your husband picked up ice cream“because he can be really thoughtful” or “because I remembered to call him fromwork and remind him to stop by the grocery store.” When asked why your sistergave birth to a healthy baby boy, you might explain, “God was looking out for her”or “She did everything right during her pregnancy.”

In our own investigation of this exercise, we found that counting one’s blessings increaseshappiness and decreases symptoms of depression for up to 6 months of follow-up. The fine printof this finding is that the long-term benefits occurred for participants who continued the exercisebeyond the suggested 1 week. This apparently was easy to do, because 60% of the participants inthe study reported that they were still counting their blessings 6 months later. Some of ourparticipants told us that they had made this a new routine in their marriage—sharing theirblessings with their partner at the end of the day. If you go to sleep happy, you are probably aptto wake up happy as well. And if you go sleep next to someone else who is happy, that is good,too.

Being a Good Teammate

Here is an exercise that underscores the importance and satisfaction of being a good teammateand more generally the satisfaction of social responsibility and citizenship. At least in thecontemporary United States, we are encouraged to be leaders but not followers, to heed our owndrummer, and to follow our own hearts. Loyalty and teamwork may be labeled as conformity orobedience and thereby marginalized if not condemned (Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1963). Whatresults, however, is a society which, at its worst, pits each against all (Hobbes, 1651/1982) andat its best is quietly empty at the center (Hardin, 1968). We are more likely as a people to bowlalone than to work for a common cause (Putnam, 2000), despite ample evidence that well-developed social interest benefits not just the group but the individual in the group (Peterson &Seligman, 2004).

How do we work against these trends and build good citizenship? One way to do so is byencouraging participation in groups by young people. Such early experiences—not necessarily asa leader but as a follower—set the stage for a lifetime of civic participation (DeMartini, 1983;Flanagan et al., 1998; McAdam, 1989).

Citizenship and teamwork can be rather abstract, but as a teacher I have approached them ata concrete and presumably interesting level by asking my students to think of their bestteammates or favorite group members. What do these people do that makes them notable? Areany lessons able to be abstracted from their examples?

Or I ask them to think about Michael Jordan, the greatest basketball player of our generation

and the winner of six professional titles during the 1990s. National Basketball Association andNike marketing strategies notwithstanding, Jordan did not win these titles by himself but insteadas a member of a team that included the ultimate sidekick, Scottie Pippen. In the 1990s, it wascommon to hear Pippen’s basketball skills dismissed with the observation that he never wonanything without Jordan. But in hindsight, it is just as true to observe that Jordan won littlewithout Pippen.

Few of us can be “like Mike” in any of our own venues, but it is not so farfetched to aspire tobe a Pippen. Accordingly, here is an exercise I have asked my students to carry out:

Choose one of the ongoing groups to which you belong but of which you are not aleader. Without fanfare, resolve to be the best group member (teammate) during thenext month that you can be. The characteristics of the group will dictate the detailsof how you should act, but one would think that being a good teammate requires:

showing up, literally and metaphorically

not whining or being disruptive or feeling jealous

doing more than your share

volunteering without being prompted

spreading praise4

helping the leader—and of course the group—accomplish goals Keep track of what you did,and how it made you feel.

A teachable moment occurs when students find themselves at odds with the group or thegroup leader. This exercise does not require blind obedience or participation in stupid and wrongactivities. Rather, good teammates dissent or disagree when appropriate, although they do so asa good group member. Consider the notion of comity (civility in discourse and disagreement) andthe equally quaint political term loyal opposition.

This exercise has always worked well among my students, who report that it is not only novelbut invigorating to think first of the team and how to advance its goals. Some of my studentschose a discussion class as their group and worked to make discussions “good” ones. Otherschose their part-time jobs, where they volunteered for the unpopular shifts. One of my studentswas the captain of her cheerleading squad, and she—with admitted reluctance—let a juniormember choose the cheers.

In many cases, my students’ embracing of Pippen-hood was acknowledged and appreciated bytheir teammates, but in a few other cases not. Even so, most of these students said that it did notreally matter that their efforts had been overlooked, because there had been a clear payoff for

them in the form of group success, solidarity, and morale. As the cheerleader captain said,knowing of my fascination with Kirsten Dunst, it was great that someone else was able to “bringit on.”

Honey Versus Vinegar: Being Nice as a Way to Cut Institutional Red Tape

One of the striking changes brought about by the modern world is the increased mobility of itscitizens. Whereas previous generations were born in a given place and lived out their lives there,people today make lots of moves. In the contemporary United States, for example, as many as30% of adults have moved from one state to another within the previous 5 years. Particularlylikely to move frequently are young adults and those with a college education. Even morefrequent are local moves, within the same town or state. When I was in college and graduateschool, I moved in September of every year and had eight different addresses between 1968 and1976.

Moving can be an adventure, but it also has a downside. You need to shut off the electricity,the gas, and the garbage pickup at the old place. You need to start them up at the new place. Youneed to change your driver’s license. Get a new license plate. Change your checking account. Geta new automated teller card. Change your phone—local and long distance. Get a new cell phone.Change your Internet provider. Stop your mail. Forward it. Oops—magazines are notautomatically forwarded, so you need to contact each distributor separately. Oh yes, and thenyou need to do all of this again when mistakes are made.

Even if you do not move frequently, you still have to battle bureaucracies on an ongoingbasis, at the Department of Motor Vehicles, the college registrar’s office, or the return desk atTalbot’s. And although I hope you grow old with grace, independent means, and perfect healthand that you never need to deal with Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, assisted living, apension fund, a will, or inheritance taxes, none of that is likely to happen, so your battles withbureaucracies will continue to death and beyond.

Accordingly, here is a positive psychology exercise devised by Marty Seligman that may help.The next time that you go to red-tape war, take a deep breath and resolve to be cheerful.Whether you are confronting a bureaucrat face to face or on the phone (after 20 minutes ofworking yourself through the automated telephone “help” system), start out by asking the personhow her day has been. What’s the weather like in Bombay? Marvel at his patience. Say that itmust be great to be in a position to help other people. As Patrick Swayze’s character in Roadhouseadvises the bar bouncers under his tutelage: “Be nice ... be nice ... be nice.” Treat the bureaucratas a person, and perhaps the favor will be returned.

You will probably be more successful in getting what you want if you use honey rather thanvinegar. The “bureaucrat” after all is a person, and being on the receiving end of constant

consumer anger can take a toll (Rupp & Spencer, in press). If you are nice, you may cheer up theperson, and we know that good moods facilitate helpfulness (Cunningham, 1979). If nothing else,you might at least feel better.

You can do this exercise as a true experiment. Flip a coin before each encounter. Heads: Benice. Tails: Kick some bureaucratic butt. After a few dozen trials, tally up the results, and draw aconclusion.

I alert you to two threats to being nice. First, some people—especially on the telephone—areon the clock, which means that they will be penalized for taking too long to resolve a request ordispute. You can figure this out pretty quickly, and in these cases, you need to be nice in aconcise way. Indeed, to be concise is to be nice to someone on the clock. Second, some peoplemay respond so well to your niceness that the two of you go off on some conversational tangentand neglect the actual reason for your encounter. For example, the last time I changed my long-distance provider, I had a wonderful conversation with “Fred” at AT&T about Allen Iverson ofthe Philadelphia 76ers and was so distracted that I forgot to ask when the service would begin,and my new friend forgot to tell me. I only discovered this when I received the next month’sphone bill, the first half of which charged me $1 million a minute (approximately) for my calls.Oh well.

One more objection. Are you being a phony? This question could be asked about any of thepositive exercises I have described and is one to which I have already alluded in describingpeople’s desire to have their happiness spontaneously happen rather than deliberately occur.(Never mind that we also want to “deserve” our happiness, which would seem to entail doingsomething to bring it about; Nozick, 1974.) All things being equal, we want to be true to our realself, but the dilemma is when our real self—at least at that moment—is an angry and resentfulself. Is it disingenuous to suppress these feelings and “be nice”?

Obviously, there is no simple answer. But a phone call to a customer service agent is hardlythe best occasion to be true to your most righteous self. I believe that niceness should beregarded as part of the social script for such encounters and that following this script does notmake you a phony any more than deliberately using your turn signals while driving makes you aphony.

There is a saying in Alcoholics Anonymous: “Fake it until you can make it.” One of the bestways to change the inner person is to change the outer person. What starts out as phony may endup being genuine (Kelly, 1955). It would be wonderful to be spontaneously cheerful withbureaucrats, but is it really so evil to feign some good cheer until the day when you might beable to do this more routinely?

EXERCISE Have a Good DayThis chapter contained a number of positive psychology exercises. Here is one more that invitesyou to design an exercise tailored to your own self. I especially hope that you try this one andthat you let me know how it worked.

“Have a good day” is a conversational gambit we hear all the time, but suppose we take theembedded wish seriously. What might we actually do to have a good day? Different people willhave different answers, and thus there are two steps to this exercise. First, you need to determinewhat makes a good day for you. Here you need to be a careful observer of your own days, thegood ones as well as the not-so-good ones, to see if you can identify the relevant features.Second, assuming that you can identify these, how can you change your future days to maximizethe enabling factors and minimize those that detract?

There is a simple assumption here about what makes a good day to which I call yourattention because it is at odds with the premise of much of the positive psychology researchdescribed in this book. The good life is often discussed in terms of the psychological states, traits,and habits that enable it, as well as the social and institutional settings in which these states,traits, and habits are most readily manifest.

But there is another route to the good life, and that is our mundane daily activity—ourbehaviors, as it were—regardless of our states, traits, habits, and larger settings. To be sure, theseall affect what we do and indeed are probably how they affect our happiness and well-being. Butin this exercise, I am suggesting that you go straight to the concrete activities. If you candetermine, for example, that a good day is one during which you talked to your mother on thephone (or not) or exercised or wrote in your journal, then there is a very practical lesson to belearned: Have more days in which you do these things and fewer days in which you do not. Duh.

What rescues this exercise from the banal is that we may never have stopped and thoughtabout what makes for a good day, and even if we have reflected on this in the abstract, ouranswers may not be the right ones in the concrete (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, &Stone, 2004). So, get a notebook or a pad of paper or create an Excel spreadsheet and keep trackof what you do during a day. Some people find it easy to journal on an hour-to-hour basis,whereas others prefer to parse their day in terms of its dominant activities. Regardless, at the endof the day, write down an overall rating:

10 = it was one of the best days of my life9 = it was an outstanding day8 = it was an excellent day7 = it was a very good day

6 = it was a good day5 = it was an average or typical day

4 = it was a subpar day3 = it was a bad day2 = it was a terrible day1 = it was one of the worst days of my life

Do this for at least 2 weeks and preferably a month.5 Do not review your record until you aredone, but then go back and look for the pattern across the days and weeks. Compare the gooddays with the bad days in terms of what you were doing (or not) on those days. Everyone whohas done this exercise reports that a pattern is readily apparent, and in some cases, it was onethat surprised them. In my own case, I discovered that a good day was one in which I finishedsomething that had been nagging at me, either at work (e.g., sending off letters ofrecommendation for a student applying to law schools) or at home (e.g., vacuuming my livingroom). Mind you, these activities did not spiral me into ecstasy, but they clearly contributed to agood day. In contrast, bad days were ones in which I finished nothing, no matter what else wasgoing on or how many praiseworthy projects I had begun.

I resolved, therefore, to finish something every day, and that strategy has done well foractivities that could be finished on a frequent basis. But I have been writing this book for the pastfew months and of course I cannot finish it in one day or on every day. But I can write 500 wordsa day, almost every day, and that is exactly what I have been doing, and I have had a lot of verygood days as a result, including this one.

I doubt that your own formula for a good day will be as task oriented as my own, but that isthe point of this exercise: to find your own formula and to devise your own strategy based on it.Once you find these, change your typical day, tempered of course by common sense. A glass ofwine with dinner may contribute positively to your assessment of a good day, but there is noreason to think that two liters in one sitting will make future days proportionately better.Similarly, a good night’s sleep might make for a good day, but that does not mean you shouldresolve to sleep your life away.

Have a good day!

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Linley, P. A., & Joseph, S. (Eds.). (2004). Positive psychology in practice. New York: Wiley.

Norcross, J. C., Santrock, J. W., & Campbell, L. F. (2000). Authoritative guide to self-help resourcesin mental health. New York: Guilford.

Krieger, E., & James-Enger, K. (2005). Small changes, big results: A 12-week action plan to a betterlife. New York: Crown.

Albom, M. (1997). Tuesdays with Morrie: An old man, a young man, and life’s greatest lesson.Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Articles

Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Can happiness be taught? Dædalus, 133(2), 80–87.

Rosen, G. M. (1987). Self-help treatment books and the commercialization of psychotherapy.American Psychologist, 42, 46–51.

Web Sites

http://www.reflectivehappiness.com. Requiring a paid subscription, this Web site providesexercises like those described in this chapter.

http://www.positivepsychology.org/teachingpp.htm. This Web site provides a variety ofresources for anyone teaching or studying positive psychology.

http://www.casel.org/home/index.php. The Collaborative for Academic, Social, and EmotionalLearning (CASEL) “synthesizes the latest empirical findings and theoretical developments andprovides scientific leadership to foster progress in [social and emotional learning] … researchand practice.”

http://www.actsofkindness.org. This is the Web site of the Random Acts of Kindness Foundation,“established in 1995 as a … resource for people committed to spreading kindness … [andproviding] … a wide variety of materials … including activity ideas, lesson plans, projectplans, teacher’s guide, project planning guide, publicity guide, and workplace resources.”

http://www.payitforwardfoundation.org. This is the Web site of the Pay It Forward Foundation,“established in … 2000 to educate and inspire young students to realize that they can changethe world, and provide them with opportunities to do so.”

http://www.kindnessproject.com/home.php. “The Kindness Project aims to prove that you canhave an exponential effect on the spread of kindness around the world. It’s simple—whensomeone does or says something kind, no matter how small, you give them a token. Taking afew seconds to pass on the token empowers you to brighten someone’s day. The tokens arepassed from person to person, again and again, turning the world into a kinder place.” Tokenscan be purchased from this Web site.

Films

My Fair Lady (1964)

Dead Poets Society (1989)

Mr. Holland’s Opus (1995)

Songs

“Reach Out of the Darkness” (Friend & Lover)

“The Rose” (Bette Midler)

“What a Wonderful World” (Louis Armstrong)

“What a Wonderful World” (Sam Cooke)

3Pleasure and Positive Experience

He must see life not as a vale of tears but as a happy time;He must take joy in his work, without regarding it as the end and all of living;He must be an alert man, an aware man, a man of taste, a man sensitive topleasure,A man who—without acquiring the stigma of the voluptuary or dilettante—can live life to the hilt.

Think about this characterization of the psychological good life, and guess who proposed it. NotAristotle. Not Confucius. Not Maslow, Seligman, or Csikszentmihalyi.

Rather, it was Hugh Hefner, who in 1956 articulated it as part of his Playboy philosophy.Many readers probably think that Playboy is silly in its obsession with naked young women. Butthese assertions are still a great way to begin this chapter because they mention many of thetopics studied by contemporary positive psychologists as they address positive experiences:happiness, joy, alertness, and pleasure. Living life to the hilt is what we mean by zest,exuberance, and vitality, and whether the hilt centers around breasts or something else is not thepoint.

That some of you find Hugh Hefner’s specific formula for pleasure to be off-putting is worthcomment as well, because it underscores the ambivalence many of us have about the senses andtheir so-called indulgence. Some pleasures simply seem wrong to most of us, and all pleasuresseem wrong to at least a few of us. The seven deadly sins specified centuries ago share a core of

pleasure, even if draped in shame or guilt.1

In this chapter, I discuss pleasure and related positive experiences, and I invite you to keep inmind the moral context of the psychological states that feel good. Positive psychology can becriticized for its ostensible focus on happy feelings, which is one of the reasons I went to suchlengths to say that positive psychology is a broader field than hedonism or happiology (chapter1). Pleasure nonetheless deserves to be studied, although in doing so, we have to ask if this leadsto the sanctioning of selfishness or a celebration of the shallow (Wallach & Wallach, 1983).

I start with a discussion of sensory pleasure and move to positive emotions—more protractedand complex than immediate good feelings but still with identifiable beginnings and endings.

Then I consider the stable disposition to experience positive emotions (called positive affectivity).And I close by looking at yet another positive subjective state—flow or engagement—that sharesa family resemblance with these other topics but is arguably nonconscious.

PleasurePleasure encompasses a family of subjective positive psychological states that range from the“raw feels” of the body (Ryle, 1949) produced by perfumes or back rubs to the “higher” pleasuresof the mind occasioned by Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony or the denouement of The Usual Suspectsto the pleasures of accomplishment produced by the victory of a favorite political candidate orlocal football team (Dunker, 1941). Pleasure can be intense, aroused, and sharp—we call it joy orecstasy in this case—or it can be quiet, mellow, and diffuse, and then we call it contentment orserenity. Contrast the experience of orgasm with the contemplation of a sunset on the PacificOcean. Regardless, pleasure feels good, and if we do not seek it relentlessly, at least most of usappreciate it greatly when it occurs, trying to maintain it or enhance it.

Rozin (1999) observed that the raw pleasures associated with sensations are generated along

the skin2 and specifically center on or about our body’s orifices—mouth, nostrils, genitals, andanus—all of which are involved with the exchange of material substances between the outsideand inside of the body. He speculated that these orifices are explicitly ambiguous in terms oftheir bodily location—are they inside or outside?—and perhaps pleasure arose as a way tomonitor, index, and even guide the ongoing transaction between the person and theenvironment. So, pleasure serves survival and perhaps even existence itself.

The higher pleasures are not so easily explained from a functional perspective. Why shouldwe have the capacity to enjoy music or sunsets, riddles or games? As psychologist BarbaraFredrickson (1998) phrased it, “What good are positive emotions?” Answers are emerging fromthe work of Fredrickson and other positive psychologists, and they converge on the possibilitythat the higher emotions signal safety and provide the opportunity to build and consolidatepsychological skills that can later be used to good effect (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).

This hypothesis was foreshadowed decades ago by the theorizing of ethologists (biologistswho study animals in their natural environments) about the function of play among the young ofmany mammalian species (Symons, 1978). The specific behaviors that these youngsters rehearseand perfect in their rough-and-tumble play are precisely those they later use as adults to hunt, toescape predators, and to establish a dominance hierarchy. Although we have been taught asobjective scientists not to attribute human motives to our animal cousins, it is nonethelessdifficult to watch kittens or puppies gambol about without concluding that they are having “fun”in the process. Suffice it to say that we derive pleasure from watching them.

With occasional exception, pleasure has been ignored by psychologists over the years, butthose who do grapple with it are almost always drawn to a position that emphasizes its role inthe biological evolution of our species (Buss, 2000). So, if positive psychology is the study ofwhat makes life most worth living, then the study of pleasure may additionally be the study ofwhat makes life possible. Consider the important survival tasks faced by our ancestors: eating,mating, and raising offspring. It cannot be just a coincidence that these activities providepleasure, making our ancestors more likely to do in the short run what they needed to do in thelong run to survive and thrive as individuals and as a species (chapter 10).

This is not to say that pleasure is just biology. Our physical bodies evolved, but so too did ourcapacity for culture, which means that human beings are at their essence social beings andparticipants in a shared culture that is transmitted across generations by processes ofsocialization. We should not be surprised that our culture has something to say about aphenomenon as biologically potent as pleasure, just as it does about other biologically potentoccurrences like birth and death. These pronouncements will differ across cultural groups, andthe range of cultural scripts is wide indeed. At one end, we have a wholesale distrust of pleasureand its enthusiastic renunciation, as among the Greek stoics and various ascetic traditions (Bell,1985). At the other end, we have the Greek hedonists and epicureans, the Haight-Ashburygeneration of the 1960s, and the over-the-top pleasure seekers celebrated in Robin Leach’s“Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous.”

Pleasure is so much a part of the human landscape that the handful of people who areincapable of experiencing it have earned their own label—anhedonic—and a research literaturehas grown up around these folks (Chapman, Chapman, & Miller, 1982). Although the

mechanisms responsible for anhedonia are not well understood,3 what is clear is that people whodo not experience pleasure fail to engage in a range of activities that other people pursue becausethey do not find anything to be rewarding.

The semantic antonym of pleasure is pain, although the psychological opposites of pleasureencompass as rich a set of feelings as pleasure itself, including of course pain but also anxiety,guilt, shame, and boredom. In keeping with a basic premise of positive psychology, pleasure isnot simply the absence of its opposites, whatever these may be. Accordingly, when positivepsychologists approach pleasure, they do so on its own terms and in its own right.

Here is some of what we know about pleasure (Rozin, 1999). For starters, pleasure is anexperiential quality and an experiential quantity. That is, there are different types of pleasures,each of which admits to degrees. Psychologists are often chided for asking research participantsto rate everything in the world along 7-point scales. In some cases, these are difficult if notimpossible distinctions for people to make, but few of us have any trouble rating experiencesalong a dimension of more versus less pleasurable. This is a natural way to think about pleasure.

Pleasure is multidimensional. Even though people can readily offer summary judgments ofpleasure, it is also true that we can simultaneously experience positive and negative feelings.Bittersweet describes a taste both bad and good and is an apt metaphor for many of ourexperiences. Indeed, sometimes the interplay between the positive and the negative produces ahigher-order experience, which we label as especially positive or especially negative. Why aresad songs so appealing or “tastes of honey” so tragic?

Pleasures can result from adding a stimulus or subtracting it. Contrast eating a cheeseburgerwith emptying your bladder. Both produce pleasure but of different sorts. Some term the latterpleasures those of comfort, and they tend to be more conspicuous in their absence. You may beold enough to remember the days when air conditioning was not routinely available and what agreat feeling it was on a hot and humid day to enter an air-conditioned room. Nowadays many ofus take air conditioning for granted, except of course when it is on the fritz. It has morphed froman explicit pleasure to a mere comfort.

Although we often focus on pleasure in the here and now, we also experience pleasure withrespect to the past (in terms of memories) and with respect to the future (in terms of hopes). Is ittoo farfetched to propose that most of the pleasure we experience is not in the here and now butinstead in the form of recollection or anticipation (Rozin, 1999)? An orgasm involves only a few

seconds of “online” pleasure,4 but how many of us spend more than mere seconds a day thinkingabout sex?

When we think about past pleasures, our memories are influenced by the intensity of theimmediate experience as well as how it ended, a formula dubbed peak-end theory by itsoriginator, psychologist Daniel Kahneman (1999). What peak-end theory reflects is the fact thatour recollection of pleasure is not a faithful summary of its individual moments.

Research participants have been studied in a variety of brief situations, some pleasant (e.g.,watching a funny movie) and some unpleasant (e.g., undergoing a painful medical procedure).While the experience is occurring, the participants evaluate its pleasantness versusunpleasantness on an ongoing basis; they also offer a summary evaluation when it is over. Theconsistent findings from studies like these support peak-end theory: People’s summaryevaluations closely reflect an average of the experience’s most-extreme rating and how it wasrated just before it ended (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, &Redelmeier, 1993; Redelmeier & Kahneman 1996; Varey & Kahneman, 1992). Essentiallyoverlooked is how long the experience—pleasant or unpleasant—lasted. Kahneman (1999) calledthis phenomenon duration neglect, and it is a recurring theme in psychology’s study of positiveexperience.

Peak-end theory reminds me of another line of research that investigates how people think

about and navigate physical spaces. Landmarks are critical (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982). When wethink of the city where we live, we do so in terms of its particular buildings, streets, andmonuments. They are regarded as especially prominent in size and distinctiveness, even if this isnot entirely accurate. Landmarks are also used to estimate distance. If point A and point B haveno landmarks between them, the distance is seen as shorter than the distance between point Cand point D, with numerous landmarks in between, even if the two distances are the same. Thepeak of pleasure and how it ends can be regarded as the landmarks of positive experience andthus determine how we remember and think about it.

There is an interesting implication of peak-end theory borne out by appropriate studies.Kahneman et al. (1993) had some people keep their hand in ice-cold water—unpleasant but notdangerous—for 60 seconds. Other research participants were asked to keep their hand in thesame water for the same amount of time and then to leave their hand immersed for an additional30 seconds. During this extra time, without the research participants being told, the water’stemperature was raised 1 degree, making it marginally less painful. Several minutes later, whenrating the overall experience, individuals in the second condition (90 total seconds of cold) ratedit as less unpleasant than did those in the first condition (60 seconds of cold) because theexperience ended differently and more pleasantly for them.

Kahneman (1999) called these results “discouraging” in the sense of showing people’sretrospective evaluations of experiences to be erroneous. But they are erroneous only if onebelieves—as does Kahneman—that true pleasure resides in the moment and that overall pleasuremust be the sum of these moments. As will be discussed in chapter 4, this is known as a bottom-up approach, and while it makes a great deal of sense, there is no reason to think that itnecessarily exhausts what pleasure and happiness mean. People live in the moment but also inthe past and the present. Pleasure exists in all of these temporal domains and apparently does soin different psychological terms. This is not discouraging but instead interesting.

The practical implication of these findings is that we should build in high points and goodfinales with respect to our pleasures, so that when we think about them later, our memories willbe “biased” (if that is the right word) in a particularly favorable direction. If these are thefeatures that matter most in memory, then they deserve more attention than those that do not—like the sheer duration of the experience. Think about how you might plan a vacation or a meal

in light of peak-end theory.5 Use some common sense, because a 20-minute vacation or a 60-second meal—regardless of their peaks and ends—are probably not going to be all thatenjoyable. And in the sexual domain, “duration neglect” has a different and decidedlydysfunctional definition.

Let us turn from the memory of pleasures to their anticipation. With respect to futurepleasures, research shows that we are not perfectly accurate in our predictions. This is an

important practical finding because we base many of our choices about how to act in the hereand now on predictions concerning our happiness in the there and then. Indeed, economists havecreated an entire science around such predictions, although what I am calling anticipatedhappiness, they more soberly term expected utility. Regardless, decisions are made in light of theexpected psychological payoffs of different options. What car should I purchase? What long-distance telephone provider should I choose? Where should I go to school? What career should Ipursue? Which job should I take? Whom should I marry? Many if not all of these decisions arebased on a judgment of how an option will make us “feel” in the future, a judgment that mayprove fallible.

In reviewing the research literature on the prediction of pleasure, George Loewenstein andDavid Schkade (1999, p. 86) acknowledged:

The great majority of predictions of feelings are reasonably accurate. People knowthey will feel bad if they lose their job, get rejected by a lover, or fail anexamination; that they will be stressed on the first few days of a new job; and thatthey will experience a post-jog “high.”

Keep this point in mind—that people are not completely clueless about future pleasure (chapter1)—but still appreciate that people make systematic errors in predicting how they will feel at alater date.

In some cases, these errors reflect psychological influences on pleasure of which people aresimply not aware. For example, the mere exposure effect refers to our tendency to “like” objectsto which we are frequently exposed, even if this exposure takes place subliminally (at levels

below conscious awareness). In a classic demonstration, psychologist Robert Zajonc6 (1968)flashed abstract stimuli on a screen more quickly than his research participants could consciouslydiscern them. However, when later asked to rate how much they liked these stimuli, the researchparticipants gave higher ratings to those they had “seen” more frequently. Accordingly,familiarity breeds liking and not contempt, even if we are not aware of the process.

The endowment effect refers to our tendency to like objects given to us, even if we did notespecially want or value them in the first place (Thaler, 1980). Studies show that individualsgiven an object like a coffee mug or a ballpoint pen want to be paid more money for selling itback to the experimenter than other individuals merely given a choice between receiving theobject or some amount of cash (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). No one predicts thisphenomenon, which is obviously silly from an objective perspective.

Such influences show that people’s predictions about future pleasure can be wrong, but theyalso suggest that people are pleased with what they have and with what is familiar. Maybe that is

for the net good. In chapter 4, I will emphasize that most people most of the time are happy, andperhaps processes like these contribute to the typical life satisfaction that researchers observe.

One of the best-documented mistakes that people make in predicting future pleasure is withrespect to how long good feelings will last—another instance of duration neglect. I alreadymentioned this phenomenon in chapter 1. Daniel Gilbert, Timothy Wilson, and their colleagueshave conducted a series of studies of people before and after important life events—like thebreakup of a romance, receiving tenure (or not) at a university, a gubernatorial election in whichthey had a favored candidate, applying for a job they wanted, and so on (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers,Gilbert, & Assom, 2000). The details of each study reflect the particular event upon which theyare focused, but in general terms, research participants are asked to forecast how they will feelpending the desirable or undesirable outcome in each case and how long these feelings will last.Their actual reactions are then ascertained after the event has occurred, allowing forecasts to bechecked against what really happened.

Results are clear and consistent across the studies. Although participants of course get it rightin the sense of knowing that desirable outcomes will make them happier than undesirableoutcomes, they consistently overestimate how long their reactions will last. The bad feelings donot last as long as they had expected, and neither do the good feelings. Think about your ownlife and the very good things and the very bad things that have occurred during the last year.Which of these events are still front and center in your mind and affecting your current mood,and which have been put aside by other life events?

Duration neglect may occur simply because people do not acknowledge yet another well-documented phenomenon about pleasure: We adapt to it. When we repeatedly encounter thesame pleasure-producing stimulus, we experience increasingly less pleasure in response.Adaptation is a familiar experience for all of us, even when it takes us by surprise. Perhaps we

hope that this pleasure will show no adaptation.7 Adaptation to pleasure is so widespread thattheorists have proposed that we live on a hedonic treadmill, meaning that we continually adaptto improving circumstances to the point that we always return to a point of relative neutrality(Brickman & Campbell, 1971).

One of the most frequently cited studies of adaptation is an investigation reported some yearsago by Phillip Brickman, Dan Coates, and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman (1978). These psychologistswere then at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, and the state of Illinois had started torun a lottery. The researchers interviewed 22 state lottery winners, each of whom had received atleast $50,000 during the past year and some as much as $1 million. The winners were asked torate their past, present, and future (expected) happiness on scales from 0 (= not at all happy) to5 (= very happy), as well as the pleasure they took in mundane activities like talking with a

friend, hearing a joke, and reading a magazine, again on 0–5 scales. Brickman and his colleaguesalso interviewed a group of 58 individuals who had not won the lottery but lived in the sameneighborhoods as the winners. The results showed that lottery winners were scarcely more happythan the comparison research participants in terms of their present happiness (4.00 versus 3.82)and future happiness (4.20 versus 4.14). And winners found less pleasure in everyday activitiesthan did nonwinners (3.33 versus 3.82).

These researchers also interviewed 29 individuals who in the preceding year had suffered anaccident that left their limbs permanently paralyzed. Their present life satisfaction was rated as2.96, lower than that of the lottery winners (4.00) but probably not as low as one might havepredicted. And their expected future happiness and their pleasure in everyday activities wereslightly higher than that of the lottery winners (4.32 versus 4.20 for future happiness and 3.48versus 3.33 for everyday pleasure).

These results imply that adaptation occurs both among those with good fortune and among

those without.8 But why do we adapt? Wouldn’t it be nice if pleasure-producing stimuli alwayshad the exact same effect, if honeymoons never ended, and if we only had to purchase oneGameboy cartridge?

Two related answers are plausible. First, adaptation protects us from being overwhelmed bythe external stimuli that produce our sensations. Pleasure can be as distracting as pain, and it isgood—survival-wise—that these experiences are brief and tempered and allow us to get back tothe rest of life (Barkow, 1997).

Second, adaptation makes us especially sensitive to changes in our environment, where thesurvival action is apt to be found. Indeed, many of our sensory systems show adaptation, not justthose that produce pleasure and pain. For example, we all adjust rather quickly to theillumination level in a room, to its background noise, and so on.

As you of course know, adaptation does not permanently alter our ability to experience agiven pleasure. If it did, we would only want to eat one cookie, read one poem, and see onesunset in our lifetime. Obviously, we keep coming back for more, once a sufficient amount oftime has passed. “Sufficient” here will vary greatly and idiosyncratically depending on thepleasure and the person, but as a rule of thumb, spreading out our pleasures over time maximizesthe satisfaction that each produces, whereas bunching them up does not.

Let me close with one more comment about pleasure, a joke recounted by Frederick andLoewenstein (1999, p. 307): “Sex is like pizza: when it is good, it is really good, and when it isbad, it is still pretty good.” The point is that many experiences are intrinsically pleasant andexperienced as such in their own right, regardless of what has come before. Processes ofadaptation of course influence our experience of pleasure but not to the point of abolishing it.

Kahneman (1999) observed that breakfast is almost always pleasant, no matter how routinized ithas become, whereas shaving cuts remain unpleasant even as we nick ourselves time and timeagain.

Positive EmotionsPsychologists have distinguished a whole family of positive feelings, from pleasurable sensationslike those just discussed, to affects, emotions, moods, and so on. The specific categories dependon the theorist, but all agree that feelings differ with respect to how long they last, theirattachment to specific stimuli or situations, and their complexity—that is, the degree to whichfew or many psychological processes are involved in their experience (Larsen & Fredrickson,1999). Pleasures are often brief, tied to specific stimuli and indeed specific sensory systems, andare rather simple; no one needs to learn that sugar is sweet.

Psychologists regard emotions as more complex in that they involve not just subjectivefeelings but also characteristic patterns of physiological arousal, thoughts, and behaviors. Theword emotion comes from the same root as motion, conveying the idea that emotions movethrough us and perhaps drive us. Emotions have beginnings and endings, but they are moreprolonged than fleeting sensations.

Scientific interest in emotions has long been guided by the perspective taken by naturalistCharles Darwin. In his 1872 book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwindrew parallels between animals and people in their emotional reactions to events. For example,dogs, cats, monkeys, and humans all bare their teeth when threatened (Brothers, 1990). Darwinsuggested that emotions increase chances for survival because they are appropriate responses inthe situations where they are experienced. For example, fear accompanies the avoidance ofdanger. It is obviously adaptive to be afraid when we are threatened, as opposed to indifferent,and so fear is experienced in threatening situations. As mentioned, fear shows itself not simply asa feeling but also in terms of arousal of the sympathetic nervous system, threat-relevant thoughts(“here there be danger!”), and specific behavior tendencies—fight or flight.

This approach still marks much of psychology’s approach to emotions, leading theorists andresearchers to focus on negative emotions like fear, sadness, disgust, and anger, the dangers towhich they alert us, and the reactions they produce (Plutchik, 1962, 1980). Theorists in thistradition also follow Darwin’s lead by emphasizing how people display emotions in their facial

expressions.9 Human beings are social creatures, and there is an obvious survival advantage inbeing able to communicate our feelings to others (Fridlund, 1991). Research finds that peoplearound the world recognize basic emotions expressed in facial photographs of people fromcultures other than their own (Izard, 1994). Even though cultures differ greatly in the words used

to describe emotions (Mumford, 1993), facial expressions across cultures are similar (Ekman,1993).

What about positive emotions? Theorists who catalog basic emotions usually include one ortwo positive ones—e.g., joy and sometimes surprise or curiosity—but their focus is mainly on thenegative (Fredrickson, 2004; Watson, 2002). Part of the reason for neglecting positive emotionsis the problem-focused nature of psychology in general; after all, “emotional problems” is asynonym for “psychological disorders” (chapter 1). A more specific reason is that emotiontheorists have usually tried to explain emotions per se, and because they started with negativeemotions like fear and anger, positive emotions were squeezed in after the fact. As it turns out,the fit is not a particularly good one.

A typical definition of an emotion is that it is linked to a specific behavioral predisposition;the jargon used here is specific action tendency. Fear makes us want to run; anger makes us wantto attack; and disgust makes us want to spit up. In contrast, positive emotions are not linked tosuch specific action tendencies. Positive emotions like joy may activate us, but in a much morevague and diffuse way.

Another dissimilarity is that negative emotions are experienced in life-threatening situations,whereas positive emotions of course are not. In making evolutionary sense of emotions, then, it isdifficult to find the survival payoff of a positive emotion in the here and now (Nesse, 1990).

Yet another dissimilarity is that researchers to date have been unable to distinguish amongthe different positive emotions with respect to their underlying physiological mechanisms. Again,a typical definition of an emotion is that it is associated with a given pattern of physiology, and

positive emotions have eluded this characterization (Tomkins, 1962, 1963, 1982).10 Along theselines, the facial expressions associated with various positive emotions are not nearly so distinct asthose signifying the various negative emotions (Bruyer, 1981). “Having a dopey grin on one’sface” seems to signal positive emotion, but which one in particular?

Finally, the Western world has long mistrusted emotions—consider the opposition of reasonand emotion that dates at least to Aristotle—which means that we have often overlooked thepossibility that there might be something positive about emotions other than the seductivesensations sometimes associated with some of them.

Psychology’s interest in positive emotions has been sparked by psychologist BarbaraFredrickson’s (1998, 2000, 2001, 2004) recent theorizing. Rather than trying to fit positiveemotions into the negative emotion scheme, she has argued that positive emotions like joy,interest, contentment, and love should be looked at in their own right. Positive emotions not onlyfeel different but function differently. As emphasized, negative emotions alert us to danger. Whenwe experience a negative emotion, our response options narrow, and we act with haste to avoid

whatever danger is signaled. In contrast, positive emotions signal safety, and our inherentresponse to them is not to narrow our options but to broaden and build upon them. Theevolutionary payoff of positive emotions is therefore not in the here and now but in the future.Perhaps it is advantageous to experience positive emotions because they lead us to engage inactivities that add to our behavioral and cognitive repertoires.

Research participants induced in the laboratory to experience a positive emotion showcognitive changes in accord with these predictions, e.g., broader attention, greater workingmemory, enhanced verbal fluency, and increased openness to information. In a representativestudy, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) showed to college students brief film clips known toproduce different emotions: amusement, contentment, anger, or anxiety. Then they tested theseresearch participants with a global-local visual-processing task which required them to matchabstract stimuli with one another; they could attend to local features (small details) or globalfeatures (large patterns). See Figure 3.1 for an example. The induction of positive emotions led tobroadened attention (i.e., greater attention to large patterns). In a second study, following thesame sort of induction, these researchers found that participants led to experience positiveemotions answered more diversely in response to an open-ended “20 questions” task.

Positive emotions undo the physiological effects of negative emotions (Fredrickson &Levenson, 1998; Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004).College students were given just 1 minute to prepare a brief speech on “why you are a goodfriend” that would—so they were told—be videotaped and evaluated by their peers. They did sowhile being hooked up to psychophysiological recording devices which ascertained their heartrate, peripheral vasoconstriction, and blood pressure—all indices of anxiety and specificallyarousal of the sympathetic nervous system. Following this preparation time, research participantssaw one of four different films: Two produced positive emotions (joy or contentment); one

produced feelings of sadness; and the last one was emotionally neutral.11 Interestingly, none ofthese films in and of itself had an effect on sympathetic arousal. However, following the speechpreparation exercise, research participants who then saw either of the positive emotion filmsshowed more rapid cardiovascular recovery (return to “normal”) than did those who saw the sadfilm or the neutral film. In other words, the experience of positive emotions undid the anxietythat had been induced in the research participants.

Figure 3.1. Local Versus Global Features Matching TaskResearch participants are asked to “match” the top figure with one of the

bottom figures. They can do so by attending to and emphasizing local details(the shapes of the individual figures); then, they match the top figure with

the one on the bottom right. Or they can attend to and emphasize the globalconfiguration (the arrangement of the individual figures); then, they match

the top figure with the one on the bottom left. As the text explains,individuals experiencing positive emotions are more likely to categorize in

global terms.

Laboratory experiments like these represent the most powerful strategies that researchershave for identifying possible causes. The specific film clip seen by a research participant wasdetermined randomly, which means that there were no differences among participants in thefour conditions except for the film that was shown. Accordingly, the differences observed incardiovascular recovery times were caused by the films.

The standard question about laboratory experiments is whether their results apply outside thelab (Mook, 1983). In the present case, it seems that they do, because Fredrickson’s experimentalresults converge well with studies of coping in “real” situations that document the benefits ofexperiencing positive emotions during stressful times (e.g., Folkman, 1997; Folkman &Moskowitz, 2000). Indeed, a century earlier, Freud (1905/1953a) talked about the phenomenonof gallows humor and how people use humor in the most dire circumstances to bolster theirspirits. Fredrickson’s research spells out a physiological mechanism for how this coping strategymight work (e.g., Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003).

Fredrickson (2001, 2004) alliteratively calls her approach the broaden-and-build theory,and it has attracted attention inside and outside of positive psychology circles. Broaden-and-buildtheory is notable for drawing explicit attention to the positive and showing that insights resultwhen we do something more than simply look at the absence of the negative. At the same time,Fredrickson’s work is respectable in scientific circles because of its reliance on laboratory

experimentation and psychophysiological assessment.

Finally, although Fredrickson herself has not undertaken interventions, broaden-and-buildtheory provides a ready rationale for them. Indeed, broaden-and-build theory has been embracedby all sorts of practitioners interested in doing something beyond the elimination of the negative.

I also suspect that broaden-and-build theory strikes a special chord among those of us whowere told during school or maybe yesterday at work not to have so much fun. This is, after all,serious business. Whatever. As a teacher, I try to be playful and make my classes enjoyable forstudents. I know that some of my colleagues look down on me behind my back, as if the funclassroom I try to create must necessarily be a brainless one. Broaden-and-build theory gives methe last laugh, implying that a grim classroom produces a grim student unlikely to acquire thesorts of skills needed for the serious business of life.

I do have several questions about broaden-and-build theory that I hope will be answered inthe years to come. First, in the laboratory work to date, different positive emotions are treated asequivalent at least insofar as their broadening and building potential. But can distinctions bemade among various positive emotions, like those that are more aroused (e.g., joy) and thosethat are more quiet (e.g., contentment)? Do they build different resources or the same onesthrough different processes?

Second, what about emotions that feel good but seem to do quite the opposite of broaden andbuild, at least for most of us. Consider lust. Being turned on sexually feels great, but sexualfeelings narrow our attention and limit our repertoire, sometimes drastically so. Ditto for themore public forms of pride. Are the seven deadly sins the seven important exceptions to broaden-and-build theory?

Third, broaden-and-build theory has been investigated most thoroughly in the laboratoryunder the assumption that positive emotions are equally available to all given the appropriatecircumstances: Just show them the right film clip. Outside the lab, we of course differ in theemotions readily available to us. In some cases, we can program how we feel by changing themusic on our Walkman or our iPod, but in other cases, we tend to experience some emotionsrather than others, and eventually broaden-and-build theory needs to make contact with theoriesof personality that address habitual individual differences. In the next section, I describe a line ofpersonality research that dovetails very nicely with broaden-and-build theory.

Positive Affectivity

Like many essential human traits, exuberance is teeming in some and not to becaught sight of in others. For a few, exuberance is in the blood, an irrepressible

life force. It may ebb and flow, but the underlying capacity for joy is as much apart of the person as having green eyes or a long waist. … Not so for mostothers. … The nonexuberant lack fizz … they need to be lifted up on theenthusiasm of others; roused by dance or drugs; impelled by music. They do notkindle of their own accord.—KAY REDFIELD JAMISON (2004)

The term mood sometimes refers to an attenuated emotion—“I was in the mood for it”—but anadditional and more substantive meaning of mood emphasizes its role as a barometer of generalwell-being. We speak about people being mellow or crabby, merry or cranky, good-natured orirritable, and we apply these terms to their entire personality. To use psychological jargon,moods in this sense are trait-like, whereas emotions are state-like. Moods are less likely to have aspecific object or meaning associated with them and less likely to be front and center inconsciousness. However, moods are more long-lasting than emotions, and they color all of whatwe think, feel, and do.

Psychology has probably given us more words to describe bad moods than good moods, butconsider terms like zest, vitality, ebullience, enthusiasm, and exuberance. These terms describeour very best moods, when we are literally cheer-full. Good moods infuse not just our minds butour very bodies. They put a spring in our step and a twinkle in our eye. In a good mood, we feelalive and enthusiastic about any and all activities. We describe people in perpetual positivemoods as vigorous and energetic, bright-eyed and bushy-tailed, bouncy and perky, peppy andhigh on life. They have joie de vivre. These sorts of good moods are not to be confused withhyperactivity, nervous energy, tension, or mania. Rather, good moods are experienced asfulfilling as they are brought to bear on life’s worthy activities.

Here is the by-now-familiar refrain in this book: When psychologists studied mood in decadespast, their attention was on the bad moods: irritability, boredom, generalized anxiety (akaneuroticism), chronic depression (aka dysthymia), and so on. A turning point, however, was thesuggestion by Paul Meehl (1975, p. 299) that “Clinicians and theoreticians ought to considerseriously the possibility that not only are some people born with more cerebral ‘joy-juice’ thanothers but also that this variable is fraught with clinical implications.”

Meehl dubbed the ability to experience positive feelings hedonic capacity and furthersuggested that it was a stable individual difference rooted in genetics. He further hypothesizedthat hedonic capacity was linked to the personality trait of extraversion—being outgoing andoriented to others. Finally, he argued that hedonic capacity was largely distinct from theexperience—habitual or not—of negative emotions like anger and anxiety.

Subsequent research has supported most of Meehl’s theorizing about hedonic capacity—nowreferred to as positive affectivity—the extent to which an individual experiences positive moods

like joy, interest, and alertness (Watson, 2002). Making this research possible was thedevelopment of simple questionnaires like the PANAS, an acronym for Positive and NegativeAffect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Respondents are presented with wordsdescribing positive moods (e.g., inspired) and negative moods (e.g., ashamed) and asked to rateeach according to the extent that it describes them. Instructions vary; they may ask for a ratingright now, or over the past few days, or simply in general. Regardless, the ratings are averagedseparately across the positive mood words and across the negative mood words.

Positive affectivity so calculated is independent of negative affectivity, meaning that peoplecan be high or low on one dimension whether they are high or low on the other. Positiveaffectivity and negative affectivity prove highly stable across weeks, months, years, and evendecades (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Grumpy old men may well have been testy young men,petulant youth, whiny toddlers, and difficult babies.

Another way to look at stability is to compare positive affectivity ratings across situations,and here again there is a great deal of convergence (Diener & Larsen, 1984). People who are ingood moods when alone are also in good moods when with others, and conversely. Aninteresting wrinkle about positive affectivity is not only that its mean level for an individual isconsistent across time and situation, but so too is its variability. That is, some folks show more ofa range in their good moods than do other folks, and they do so consistently (Larsen, 1987;Watson, 2000). In other words, their moods are more labile and—simply put—more moody.

As suggested by Meehl, positive affectivity is indeed more likely to be observed amongextraverted individuals, equally so among men and women (Watson, 2000). In general, peoplehigh in positive affectivity are socially active. They have more friends; they have moreacquaintances; and they are more involved in social organizations. Negative affectivity isunrelated to these indicators of social behavior.

People high in positive affectivity are more likely than those who are low to be married—especially happily so—and also to like their jobs. Stated so simply, these are chicken-and-eggfindings; it is unclear what causes what. However, studies that follow people over time suggestthat positive affectivity foreshadows marital and occupational satisfaction and does not simplyreflect it (e.g., Staw, Bell, & Clausen, 1986; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000).

People who describe themselves as religious or spiritual score especially high on positiveaffectivity (Clark & Watson, 1999). Here the more informative longitudinal investigations havenot been conducted, so we do not know whether positive affectivity leads one to religion or if itresults from the sense of purpose and meaning and/or the social communion that religionsprovide (chapter 11).

What about the genetic basis to positive affectivity hypothesized by Meehl? Psychologists

show that a characteristic is influenced by genetics by comparing the characteristic amongidentical twins (who have in common 100% of their genes) and fraternal twins (who are no moresimilar genetically than ordinary siblings—that is, 50% overlap). To the degree that pairs ofidentical twins are more similar to one another (both twins high, both medium, both low) thanare pairs of fraternal twins, one can argue for genetic influence. A further refinement is madewhen these twins are divided into those raised together (presumably in a similar environment)and those raised apart (presumably in dissimilar environments).

The degree to which identical twin similarity exceeds fraternal twin similarity is quantified asthe heritability of the characteristic in question: the proportion of its variation due to geneticfactors. The more a characteristic’s variation in a group of individuals is due to genetic factors,the greater its heritability (see Figure 3.2). For example, people’s intelligence shows moderateheritability, meaning that differences among people in measured IQ reflect differences in theirgenes. As you would imagine, height and weight are highly heritable.

Do not equate heritability with any simple notion of inherited. I did not say that intelligenceis inherited, passed directly from parents to children, and I did not say that height and weight aredirectly inherited. Heritability is a more-abstract concept, referring to a group of people, not toany individual. It refers to the variation in a characteristic across these people, not to the level ofthe characteristic for a given person. A greater than zero heritability estimate does not identifythe genes responsible for a characteristic, and it does not preclude the influence of theenvironment or learning.

According to twin studies, positive affectivity proves heritable—influenced by genetics—lessso than intelligence but to about the same degree as most personality traits (Finkel & McGue,1997; Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesley, 1998; Tellegen et al., 1988). This is an

interesting finding12 and an important one as we ponder how to cultivate the good life.

Figure 3.2. Heritability of Different CharacteristicsFrom multiple sources, but chiefly Bouchard (2004). Within a group of

people, heritability is the proportion of a characteristic’s variation that is dueto genetic factors (see text). Heritability estimates range from .00 (no geneticinfluence whatsoever) to 1.00 (only genetic influence). Note that the numberof fingers that people have has near-zero heritability because the variation inthis characteristic is almost entirely due to accidents and injuries, which are

nongenetic factors.

Everyday people may hear the phrase genetic influence and think “inevitable,” but this is notwhat the data actually mean. Heritable does not mean immutable—fixed forever at the momentof conception—and it certainly does not mean unchanged by life events. As already noted,intelligence is heritable, but intelligence nevertheless increases with good health, good nutrition,and educational opportunities and decreases in their absence. Depression is more heritable thanpositive affectivity but readily changed by therapy. Indeed, political attitudes are more heritablethan positive affectivity but also quite changeable, sometimes before our very eyes.

Thus, the moderate heritability of positive affectivity does not mean that we have apermanently fixed mood. According to the world’s leading expert on affectivity, David Watson(2002, p. 116), “The genetic and biological data should not induce a fatalistic resignation; westill are free to increase our positive affectivity.” Watson speculated that if we wish to improveour habitual mood, we should be more attentive to our actions than to our thoughts, that we

should appreciate that striving toward goals creates more good cheer than actually achievingthese goals, and that knowledge about moods and how they work can only help.

FlowI have met many interesting people through my association with positive psychology, and one ofmy favorites is psychologist Mihaly (Mike) Csikszentmihalyi. Born in Hungary in 1935 andcoming of age in wartorn Europe, Mike moved to the United States in the late 1950s. He went toschool at the University of Chicago and then taught there for many years before moving in 1999to the Claremont Graduate School.

Thoroughly unassuming, he is one of the most creative and productive people I have evermet. I remember a few years ago meeting with some of my fellow travelers in positivepsychology. We had not seen each other in a year, and we went around the table catching eachother up on our respective research activities. We all described the three or four projects thatwere consuming our time. Mike described seven or eight, which I knew was typical. It was onlylater that he offhandedly mentioned that his projects were books under contract that he waswriting. The rest of us had described circumscribed research projects that might—operativeword, might—result someday in a 15-page journal article.

When I speak to other psychologists about Mike, some of them do not know about whom I amtalking. They of course have seen his name but never knew how to pronounce it. Hence theycannot recognize it. I have learned to say, “You know, the flow guy,” and they immediately knowwhom I mean. Flow is his term for the psychological state that accompanies highly engagingactivities (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).

He first became intrigued by flow while studying highly creative painters (Csikszentmihalyi,1975/2000). When these artists were working on a painting, and their work was going well, theywere oblivious to hunger, fatigue, and discomfort. Once the painting was complete, however,they lost interest in it and moved on to another project. Csikszentmihalyi was struck by theintrinsic motivation that was behind the product. Painters did not paint with the externalproduct in mind and certainly not with the thought of any extrinsic reward when they weredone.

Although other researchers at that time were interested in intrinsic motivation and theinherent satisfaction associated with competent performance, none had taken a close look at thesubjective phenomenology of intrinsically motivated skillful activity (Deci, 1975; White, 1959).Accordingly, Csikszentmihalyi’s studies of flow began with interviews of people who cited“enjoyment” as their primary reason for pursuing some activity. He talked to chess players, rockclimbers, and dancers, among many others. What emerged was a characterization of engagement

that was highly similar across different activities. This characterization is what we now mean byflow.

During flow, time passes quickly for the engaged individual. Attention is focused on theactivity itself. The sense of the self as a social actor is lost. The aftermath of the flow experienceis invigorating. Flow is not to be confused with sensual pleasure. Indeed, flow in the moment isnon-emotional and arguably nonconscious. People describe flow as highly and intrinsicallyenjoyable, but this is an after-the-fact summary judgment, and joy is not immediately presentduring the activity itself.

Here is a description by professional basketball player Ben Gordon of the Chicago Bulls ofhow it feels to be “in the zone” while playing:

You lose track of the time, what quarter it is. You don’t hear the crowd. You don’tknow how many points you have. You don’t think. You’re just playing. Offensivelyeverything is instinctive. When the feeling starts going away, it’s terrible. I talk tomyself and say, C’mon, you gotta be more aggressive. That’s when you know it’sgone. It’s not instinctive anymore. (Kennedy, 2005, p. 29)

Flow can be described as the experience of working at full capacity (Nakamura &Csikszentmihalyi, 2002), which is why the concept figures prominently in positive psychology.Flow of course has existed for as long as there have been people (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988), but ittook the genius of Csikszentmihalyi to put a label on the experience, to articulate itsphenomenology, and to investigate its enabling conditions and consequences. Unlike manypositive psychology concepts, flow has been extensively investigated, using an experiencesampling method—also known as the beeper technique—which asks research participants tocarry a pager that goes off at random intervals (e.g., Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1978). They arethen asked to describe what they are doing and how they are feeling at the time.

From numerous studies of this sort, psychologists have learned that flow is most likely tooccur when there is an optimal balance between skill and challenge (Moneta & Csikszentmihalyi,1996). In other words, flow represents the coming together of a person and an environment. Thegood news is that one need not be an expert in a domain to experience flow. All that matters isthat the presented challenge meets one’s skills, and vice versa. Too much challenge disrupts theprocess, as does too little skill. The bad news is that the challenge of the flow activity necessarilychanges as one’s skills improve. All of us know how initially engaging activities eventually losetheir magic unless the bar is raised to meet our changes in expertise.

Flow can be experienced in all sorts of activities, at work or play, but usually among thoseactivities perceived as voluntary (Kleiber, Larson, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). For example,homework for most schoolchildren strikes a balance between challenge and skill, but because

homework is regarded as coerced, it rarely produces the flow state. Indeed, flow is rarelyexperienced by youth during any school activity. The other common activities of adolescents inthe United States—watching television or hanging out with friends—also fail to produce flow,because they fail to meet one or another of its enabling conditions.

Thus, we have a paradox unanswered to date by research: Why do people so infrequentlyengage in the activities that they know will produce flow, even as they acknowledge theexperience of flow as desirable? Why do we skim trashy novels rather than pore over greatliterature? Why do we chatter casually with our friends rather than talk about things that reallymatter? Why do we take the easiest path rather than the ones filled with challenge?

One possible resolution is provided by another experience that all of us can acknowledge—so-called junk flow or faux flow—with video games, reality TV shows, and idle gossip as primeexamples. These have some of the elements of flow (engagement and absorption), but they arenot especially challenging, and they certainly do not leave us feeling invigorated or satisfied. (Forthose readers energized by Survivor reruns, bless you, but I believe you are the exception and notthe rule.) One may be seduced by the ease of experiencing junk flow and thereby distracted fromthe more difficult but ultimately more rewarding experience of real flow.

We do know that people differ greatly in the frequency with which they have flow, for

reasons not well understood,13 and that young people who experience more flow duringadolescence show long-term desirable consequences, such as achievement in creative domains(e.g., Rathunde & Csikszentmihalyi, 1993). They may even be healthier (Patton, 1999, cited byNakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).

This phenomenon has been described as the building of psychological capital, and perhaps wecan wed flow research to positive emotions research to speculate that the aftermath of flow—positive emotions—is how psychological resources are created which are later deployed to goodeffect (Moneta & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Shernoff, Csikszentmihalyi, Shneider, & Shernoff,2003).

Flow has attracted the attention of numerous practitioners, from product designers at Nissanand Volvo to teachers at Montessori schools to architects to football coach Jimmy Johnson(Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). In some interventions, the environment is reshaped tofoster flow for all—or at least to make it less obstructed. In other interventions, an individual ishelped to find flow. What are his skills? Where can they be deployed in an appropriatelychallenging way?

Flow principles have even been used in the context of psychotherapy (Massimini & DelleFave, 2000). An individual’s daily life is restructured to allow more flow experiences. Common tomany psychological problems is a routinization of what is done, and if the routine is a rut, then

one is apt to stay in it. Consider watching television versus performing volunteer work. Do weever hear anyone say, “Damn, I’m getting good at watching TV! I can’t wait until tomorrow toperfect my technique.” But something like volunteer work can be challenging when it requires awhole host of skills that must be developed on an ongoing basis. Is it any surprise that adepressed or anxious person who spends more time helping others than watching televisionshows a reduction in symptoms (Delle Fave & Massimini, 1992)?

I also raise the possibility that psychological disorders—especially depression—might make itdifficult for someone to initiate a challenging activity, so it may not be enough to provide theopportunity for challenge (Allison & Duncan, 1988). One must also teach individuals how to riseto the occasion and meet the challenge. Well-established clinical lore holds that otherwise-depressed people who manage to keep busy—e.g., go to work or sustain a close relationship—arenot troubled by their symptoms as long as they are engaged. If this is a valid principle, it is worthour effort to figure out how to formalize it in an intervention.

Many discussions of flow, by Csikszentmihalyi and others, use examples like artistic creationor rock climbing, which make flow seem most common among solitary activities. But there isnothing in the concept that limits its experience to moments alone, and indeed, many of the mostfamiliar examples of flow are explicitly social—good conversations, playing ensemble music or ateam sport, coordinated efforts with others at work, and so on. Shared flow deserves more study,as does the phenomenon that Csikszentmihalyi (1975/2000) described as microflow, very shortduration activities that produce flow and may well have benefits for restoring attention. Doodlingis just one example (see Figure 3.3).

EXERCISE SavoringSavoring refers to our awareness of pleasure and our deliberate attempt to make it last. LoyolaUniversity psychologist Fred Bryant (2003) discussed what psychologists know about savoringand contrasted it with the psychology of coping.

Figure 3.3.Doodle done by Mike Csikszentmihalyi, January 7, 2004.

In coping, we experience a bad event that produces negative feelings—anxiety, sadness, and thelike—and attempt to “deal with” these feelings in a variety of ways (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).We may try to change the event itself or its consequences, or we may try to change ourselves sothat the negative impact of the event is decreased (chapter 9).

A poor evaluation at work makes any of us feel upset. We ask what is at stake, and it may beour continued livelihood, the respect with which we are treated by our fellow workers, and ourown sense of competence. One way to cope is to ask our work supervisor for advice about how todo better in the future, and we channel our efforts in this direction. Or we may look for anotherjob. We may decide that the job is not that important to us and that we should spend more timewith our family and friends. We may resolve to start each workday with 5 minutes of meditation.Perhaps we pray to God for help. Or we may distract ourselves from the hassles at work withdrugs and alcohol, certainly not an effective strategy in the long run but perhaps so in the shortrun. All of these are ways of coping.

Suppose instead that we receive an excellent evaluation at work accompanied by a pat on theback, a merit raise, and our name permanently etched on the employee-of-the-month plaque inthe office lobby. How do we “cope” with this event, its aftermath, and the good feelingsproduced? I hope you smiled at this question, because coping is not the right word, because whywould we want to minimize or undo something good?

The answer is that some of us in effect do cope with life’s triumphs and pleasures. We maytrot out an adage learned years ago that reminds us that pride goeth before the fall and thereby

rein in our happiness. We may worry that others will resent us. We may conclude that we arelucky or that our supervisor is lenient and that her praise means little. We may worry that wehave now set a standard impossible to maintain.

Not everyone is so quick to undo the good, and Bryant (2003) has determined that ourhabitual predisposition to savor or not is a relatively stable characteristic that can be reliablymeasured with a survey that asks people how frequently they derive pleasure through suchstrategies as anticipating positive events in the future, relishing them in the moment, andreminiscing about those in the past. Contrary to the worries of those who cope with the positive,those who habitually savor are indeed happier and more satisfied in general with life (chapter 4),more optimistic (chapter 5), and less depressed (chapter 9) than those who do not savor.

The conclusion follows that savoring is a good thing. So what can those of us who are low onthe savoring dimension do to add this useful habit to our psychological repertoire? We havedeveloped the following exercise, based on Bryant’s (2001, 2003, in press) discussion of specifictechniques that promote savoring.

In a classroom, we introduce this exercise with an example from our colleague Joe Veroffabout how he reads letters from his children, who now live far away:

I find a quiet moment when I can linger a bit with them, and read them in order andlet the words roll very slowly over me like a long warm gentle shower. I read eachone slowly. Sometimes they are highly sentimental, and I can’t hold back the tears.Sometimes they are profoundly insightful about what has been happening to themand the world around them, and I am amazed. I can almost feel the childrengathered in the room in which I am reading.

We analyze what Veroff is doing to enhance the pleasure produced by these letters, and ourstudents with little prompting identify his strategies. He takes his time to read the letters, and hedoes so without distraction. No multitasking here. He identifies how he is feeling, and he letsthese feelings emerge. Although he does not explicitly say so, we suspect that he keeps theseletters in a special place and rereads them frequently. We also suspect that he talks about theletters to his wife, and the two of them share their pride in the children they have raised so well.

This all seems obvious and the right way to read a welcome letter, an eagerly anticipated e-mail message, or a surprise birthday card. But don’t some of us miss the obvious by skimmingletters from our loved ones as we walk from the mailbox to our living room, by looking at thesame time at the bills and junk mail we received, and by tossing the rapidly read letter into ourrecycle bin? Maybe we turn on the television set while reading, or maybe we gobble down someleftovers. Maybe we take a phone call: “What’s new?” “Not much. Same old, same old.”

We ask our students to stop and notice the next time something good—pleasurable—occurs. Itcan be a letter or praise at work, but it can also be a good grade on a paper, a great meal, anengaging conversation, or a spontaneous adventure. Regardless, we ask the students to savor thisevent, and we suggest the following strategies:

Sharing With Others: You can seek out others to share the experience. If that is not possible,tell others how much you valued the moment.

Memory Building: Take mental photographs or even a physical souvenir of the event andreminisce about it later with others.

Self-Congratulation: Do not be afraid of pride. Tell yourself how impressed others are andremember how long you have waited for this to happen.

Sharpening Perceptions: Focus on certain elements of the experience and block out others.

Absorption: Let yourself get totally immersed in the pleasure and try not to think aboutother matters.

A few months before the writing of this chapter, I gave a brief talk to a group ofundergraduate psychology students at Michigan who were being recognized for their academicachievements, and I challenged them to use as many of these techniques as possible to savor thehonor they were receiving. Many of them were accompanied by friends and parents. That wasgood, at least if one thought to sit next to them during the ceremony. For those who showed upalone, I suggested that they call their parents on the phone or—how quaintly retro—write them aletter and describe what had happened. They could take a copy of the program home with themand look at it. They could give themselves an internal high-five. Bragging to others may beunattractive, but you after all are the only one inside your head. I even asked them to focus onmy talk (which was very brief) and the praise it contained for their years of productive study. Inparticular, I told them not to think about the football game they were missing in order to attendthe ceremony or the term paper they were not at that moment writing or whether their parkingmeter would run out before that damn professor would stop yapping about savoring. In short, Iurged them not to be a kill-joy, because it would only be their own joy that they were killing.

My experience in asking people to do this exercise is that it invariably works as intended,whether or not someone is high or low on positive affectivity. Pleasure is available to almost all,and so too is the ability to enhance it. The real challenge is to make savoring a habit and not justsomething done on a one-time basis following a prompt like this exercise. To this end, I suggestbeing proactive and anticipating pleasures and how you will respond to them. I offer aprovocative hypothesis, one I have not tested formally but that seems worth an experiment. Donot stack up your pleasures and try to experience them simultaneously. Have them one at a time,and relish each in its own right.

Think about weddings and honeymoons: an affirmation of love, a blessing by a higher power,a gathering of friends and families, beautiful bridesmaids wearing really ugly dresses aboutwhich they cannot complain, gifts, wonderful food, toasts, a limousine ride, three days in aCaribbean resort, and—if you are not stressed out by everything that has come before—somemoments of physical intimacy. And then the honeymoon ends.

Is it heresy to propose that this is a terrible way to begin married life because it violateseverything that we know about how to savor pleasure by jamming together so many good thingsthat nothing in itself can be all that good?

I doubt anyone will hire me as a wedding planner, so let me end with a more modestsuggestion about the next occasion in which gifts are exchanged, whether it is Christmas, abirthday, a wedding anniversary, or a retirement celebration. Give one gift only, and receive onegift only, and savor it.

If even this idea is not modest enough, try this one the next time you go out to a nicerestaurant. Do not order a wonderful appetizer, a wonderful entrée, a wonderful wine, and awonderful dessert. Choose one and only one to be the focus of your meal and savor it withoutflooding your taste buds with all the others. If nothing else, your wallet and waistline will beespecially happy, but so too might you.

GLOSSARYadaptation: after repeated exposure to the same emotion-producing stimulus, the tendency to

experience less of the emotion

broaden-and-build theory: theory that positive emotions broaden psychological and behavioralrepertoires and build psychological resources

comfort: positive subjective experience more conspicuous in its absence than its presence

duration neglect: tendency of people in thinking about an emotional event to overlook howlong it lasts

emotion: psychological state defined by subjective feelings but also characteristic patterns ofphysiological arousal, thoughts, and behaviors

endowment effect: tendency to like objects given to us, even if we did not especially want orvalue them in the first place

flow: psychological state that accompanies highly engaging activities

hedonic capacity: ability to experience positive feelings

hedonic treadmill: continual adaptation to emotional circumstances, resulting in an ongoing

return to a point of relative neutrality

heritability: proportion of variation in a characteristic due to genetic factors; roughly,“influenced by genetics” as opposed to “inherited”

intrinsic motivation: undertaking of activities because of their own appeal and not because ofexternal rewards or punishments

mere exposure effect: tendency to like objects to which we are frequently exposed, even if thisexposure takes place subliminally

mood: general emotional state of an individual

peak-end theory: theory of how emotional experiences are remembered, as a joint function oftheir greatest intensity and how they end

pleasure: positive subjective experience

positive affectivity: extent to which an individual habitually experiences positive moods likejoy, interest, and alertness

savoring: awareness of pleasure and deliberate attempts to make it last

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Kahneman, D., Diener, E., & Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (1999). Well-being: The foundations of hedonicpsychology. New York: Russell Sage.

Jamison, K. R. (2004). Exuberance: The passion for life. New York: Knopf.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York: Harper & Row.

Guiliano, M. (2005). French women don’t get fat: The secret of eating for pleasure. New York: Knopf.

Articles

Fredrickson, B. L. (2003). The value of positive emotions. American Scientist, 91, 330–335.

Brickman, P., & Campbell, D. T. (1971). Hedonic relativism and planning the good society. In M.H. Appley (Ed.), Adaptation-level theory (pp. 287–305). New York: Academic.

Web Sites

http://www.authentichappiness.org. This Web site is associated with Martin Seligman’s (2002)trade book on positive psychology, Authentic Happiness, and contains happiness surveys thatcan be taken on-line.

http://webscript.princeton.edu/~psych/psychology/research/kahneman/index.php. This is the

Princeton University Web site of psychologist Daniel Kahneman, the 2002 Nobel Prize-winnerin economics and a central figure in the study of pleasure and pain.

Films

Cocoon (1985)

Groundhog Day (1993)

La Vita è Bella (Life Is Beautiful) (1997)

ABC News’s 20/20: “Chocolate” (1999)

Chocolat (2000)

Songs

“59th Street Bridge Song” (Simon & Garfunkle)

“December 1963 (Oh What a Night)” (Four Seasons)

“Do You Believe in Magic” (Lovin’ Spoonful)

“Good Vibrations” (Beach Boys)

“I Dig Rock and Roll Music” (Peter, Paul, & Mary)

“I Feel Good” (James Brown)

“Joy to the World” (Three Dog Night)

4Happiness

Pleasure usually comes when called, but not happiness.—MASON COOLEY (1990)

Happiness is of concern to positive psychology because it is of concern to people in general (King& Napa, 1998). The U.S. Declaration of Independence proclaims that all are entitled to life, toliberty, and to the pursuit of happiness. We tell our children, our friends, and ourselves that whatcounts most is to be happy with the choices made and avenues pursued. Happiness is whatphilosophers call an ungrounded grounder, a rationale that requires no further rationale.

Let me nonetheless ground happiness by describing two recently reported studies, both ofwhich began many years ago. Each implies that happiness has striking long-term consequencesfor well-being.

The first study looked at yearbook photos from Mills College, a private school for women inOakland, California. Like many high schools and colleges, Mills College every year publishes ayearbook containing pictures of graduating seniors. If you are like me, you dreaded your highschool or college yearbook picture but comforted yourself with the thought that it did not meanall that much. Think again.

Berkeley psychologists Lee Anne Harker and Dacher Keltner (2001) analyzed 114 picturesfrom the 1958 and 1960 yearbooks. All but 3 of the young women were smiling, but the smilesvaried. Remember from chapter 1 the notion of a Duchenne smile: a genuine, full-facedexpression of happiness indexed by the degree to which the muscles surrounding one’s eyes arecontracted—crinkled, as it were. On a 10-point scale reflecting the Duchenne-ness of theseyearbook smiles, the average rating was 3.8.

The researchers chose these particular pictures for analysis because the women in them wereparticipants in a long-term study of important life events (Helson, 1967). Specifically, theresearchers knew—decades after their yearbook photos—whether the women were married andif they were satisfied with their marriages. As it turns out, the Duchenne-ness of their yearbooksmiles predicted both of these outcomes. Young women who expressed positive emotions(happiness) in yearbook photos, and presumably in other venues of their lives, as middle-agedwomen had better marriages.

The skeptic might wonder if these results reflect the operation of some confound like physicalattractiveness. Leaving aside the fact that physical beauty is not much of a route to happiness forpeople in general (Argyle, 2001), prettiness did not account for the results in this particularsample. Harker and Keltner rated how attractive the pictures were, and this rating—largelyindependent of the Duchenne-ness rating—did not predict who had a satisfying marriage.

So, what can you tell from a picture? If you focus on the happiness expressed, you can tellwhether someone will have a good life.

The second study analyzed the emotional content of autobiographical essays written by nunsin the American School Sisters of Notre Dame, a U.S. teaching order. In 1930, each sister hadbeen asked by her Mother Superior to write a short autobiographical essay about her childhood,the schools she had attended, her religious experience, and her reasons for taking vows. Thesewere only several hundred words long and are analogous to the personal statement you mayhave written if you applied to college. Like your yearbook photo, you probably agonized at themoment you were crafting your personal statement but then put it out of your mind as not allthat important. Once more, think again.

The brief autobiographies by the nuns were no doubt read at the time they were written butthen were filed away for decades. In the meantime, their order committed itself to helping thescientific community and specifically to assisting researchers in unraveling the mysteries of

Alzheimer’s disease. They opened their lives, their records, and—literally1—their brains toinvestigators, and much has been learned from the generosity of these women (Snowdon, 2001).Catholic nuns are good research subjects from the viewpoint of medical and psychologicalscience because so much about their lives is constant: income, diet, education, access to healthcare, habits (no pun intended), and the like. Psychological influences on health can emergeunmasked by other considerations.

Deborah Danner, David Snowdon, and Wallace Friesen (2001) at the University of Kentuckyread the essays of 180 sisters born before 1917 and scored them for emotional content simply bycounting the number of sentences in each essay that contained positive emotion words and thenumber of sentences that contained negative emotion words. Here are examples (p. 806). Thefirst is largely descriptive and neutral in its emotional tone, whereas the second is brimming withhappiness.

Sister 1. I was born on September 26, 1909, the eldest of seven children, five girlsand two boys. … My candidate year was spent in the Moth-erhouse, teachingChemistry and Second Year Latin at Notre Dame Institute. With God’s grace, I intendto do my best for our Order, for the spread of religion and for my personalsanctification.

Sister 2. God started my life off well by bestowing upon me a grace of inestimablevalue. … The past year which I have spent as a candidate studying at Notre DameCollege has been a very happy one. Now I look forward with eager joy to receivingthe Holy Habit of Our Lady and to a life of union with Love Divine.

By the 1990s, about 40% of the sample had died, and the researchers investigated whetherthe emotional content of the essays written 6 decades earlier had any relationship to survival.Positive emotional content (happiness) was strikingly related to longevity, whereas negativeemotional content was unrelated. The happier nuns (those in the upper 25% of the essay writers)lived on average 10 years longer than their less-happy counterparts (those in the bottom 25%).For context, whether or not one smokes yields a 7-year difference in life expectancy, a substantialperiod of time to be sure but obviously less than the effect of happiness.

So, what can you tell from a personal statement? If you focus on the happiness expressed, youcan tell whether someone will have a long life.

Neither of these studies is fine-grained, so we do not know the process which led from theapparent happiness of the young women to their long and satisfied lives. We can suspect thatthese effects were not wrought by magic but rather by their mundane day-to-day activities, withthe happy women slowly building good lives one smile and one word at a time. The unhappywomen just as gradually failed to do this, and their lives went slip-sliding away.

Then again, maybe happiness is irrelevant to these results, a misleading byproduct of somethird variable—perhaps one rooted in genetics—that is itself responsible for how one’s lifeunfolds. The way the game of science is played, however, is for skeptics to do more than objectto the interpretations put forth by researchers. The burden of proof shifts to the skeptics to show—with their own evidence—that the interpretations they favor are more-reasonable ones.Accordingly, I will take the Mills College investigation and the nun study at face value until Ihave reason to do otherwise. I will conclude that happiness is not just a feeling in the momentbut an important influence on the future. In sum, these studies ground the ungrounded grounder.

The Meanings of HappinessHappiness matters, but what does happiness mean? There is a casual tendency to equatehappiness with pleasure in the moment, to the tickling of our senses by chocolate or caresses.Pleasure as discussed in chapter 3 is certainly part of happiness, but philosophers over themillennia have carefully examined the meaning of happiness and arrived at an impressivelybroad conception that often goes beyond fleeting feelings (Guignon, 1999; Russell, 1930, 1945).Often they propose a sovereign principle to be followed in order to be happy.

The doctrine of hedonism—maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain—was articulated

thousands of years ago by Aristippus (435–366 BCE), who championed immediate sensorygratification (J. Watson, 1895; chapter 3). Hedonism was elaborated by Epicurus (342–270 BCE)into the edict of ethical hedonism, which holds that our fundamental moral obligation is tomaximize our experience of pleasure. Early Christian philosophers denounced hedonism asinconsistent with the goal of avoiding sin, but Renaissance philosophers such as Erasmus (1466–1536) and Thomas Moore (1478–1535) argued that it was God’s wish that people be happy, solong as they did not become preoccupied with “artificial” ways of achieving pleasure.

Later, British philosophers like David Hume (1711–1776) and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)used the doctrine of hedonism to lay the foundation for utilitarianism, which was ushered intopsychology as the underpinning of psychoanalysis and all but the most radical of thebehaviorisms. Hedonism is alive and well today in the name of a new field: hedonic psychology(Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999). At least in the modern Western world, the pursuit ofpleasure is widely endorsed as a way to achieve satisfaction: “Don’t worry, be happy.”

Standing in contrast to hedonism is another venerable tradition that can be traced toAristotle’s (384–322 BCE) notion of eudaimonia—being true to one’s inner self (demon).According to this view, true happiness entails identifying one’s virtues, cultivating them, andliving in accordance with them (Aristotle, 2000). Aristotle considered sensual pleasure as toutedby the hedonists to be vulgar. Similar positions were advanced by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and undergird more modern psychological notions such asRogers’s (1951) ideal of the fully functioning person, Maslow’s (1970) concept of self-actualization, Ryff and Singer’s (1996) vision of psychological well-being, and Deci and Ryan’s(2000) self-determination theory. Uniting eudaimonic emphases is the premise that peopleshould develop what is best within themselves and then use these skills and talents in the serviceof greater goods—including in particular the welfare of other people or humankind writ large.Again, in the modern world, the pursuit of a meaningful life is widely endorsed as a way toachieve satisfaction: “Be all that you can be,” and “Make a difference.”

As implied, different psychological traditions have addressed these two principles ofachieving satisfaction. Often these traditions have proceeded independently from one another,with confusion introduced by the tendency of those working within each tradition to claim“happiness” as a label for their subject matter and to deny—if only implicitly—its use by those inthe other camp. Sometimes the debate becomes explicit, and we see investigators playing off themerits of pleasure and eudaimonia as routes to the psychological good life (e.g., Compton, Smith,Cornish, & Qualls, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Waterman, 1993).

Some of our own recent research suggests that eudaimonia can trump pleasure as a predictorof life satisfaction (Huta, Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005; Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005b).Using different samples and different methods, we found that those who pursue eudaimonic goals

and activities are more satisfied than those who pursue pleasure. This finding is robust, occurringacross the adult years, for males and for females, and for residents of the United States, Canada,and other nations. He who dies with the most toys may or may not win, but he will not do so ashappily as he who dies after a life of helping others.

This is not to say that hedonism is irrelevant to life satisfaction, just that all things beingequal, hedonism contributes less to long-term happiness than does eudaimonia. However, oneneed not always choose between them. Indeed, I believe that the full life is characterized by bothand further that these orientations can be synergistic with respect to life satisfaction. The wholecan sometimes be greater than its parts. At the same time, the whole can also be less than thesum of its parts; individuals who are neither hedonistic nor eudaimonic in their pursuits aredramatically dissatisfied with their lives.

The bottom line appears to be that people need at least one route to happiness in order to besatisfied. Seligman (2002) recounted the story of his friend “Len,” who illustrates this point. Inthe language of chapter 3, Len was extremely low on positive affectivity, and he seldom laughed,smiled, or teased. Although sensitive to others, he still came off as cold. Len had a career that hehad pursued with dedication and success, and he was financially very well off. He also hadhobbies that engaged him—like playing bridge and following sports. He had several good friends.According to Seligman, Len was handsome and considered by all a nice guy.

Good for Len, but he had a long-standing problem because women did not find him attractive.Len was not a fun guy, and who wants to be with someone who never acts like he is enjoyinghimself? You could take it personally and think that you are unattractive because you cannotrouse Len from his chilly state. Actually, so the story goes, it was women from the United Stateswho found Len unattractive. Women from Europe, with different notions of what makes a manattractive, saw beyond his emotional restraint to his substantive characteristics, all of which werelaudable. Len eventually married a woman from Europe—and happily, I might note.

What is the lesson of Len? Not that he needed therapy or medication. Nothing about himneeded to be “fixed.” He simply was low on positive affectivity and as a result did not presenthimself as a bubbly hedonist. This route to well-being was not open to him. He had otherpathways available, though, and for him, the good life was achieved by following them.

The more-general point, which the half of you who are below average on positive affectivitycan well appreciate, is that your life can be quite a good one except insofar as other people nagat you to cheer up, to have fun, and to smile more. I have been on the receiving end of suchcomments, and if nothing else, theorizing and research about eudaimonia arms me against thethought that there is something wrong with me when I fail to bounce down the sidewalk.

Hedonism and eudaimonia may not exhaust the routes to happiness. Consider yet another

orientation: the pursuit of engagement. Remember Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) writings on flow,the psychological state that accompanies highly engaging activities (chapter 3). Flow differs fromhedonism, in which positive emotional experience is front and center (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).At least at any given point in time, flow and pleasure may even be incompatible. And althoughthe pursuit of a eudaimonic life can at times produce flow for some individuals—e.g., thosevolunteering in a hospice or a soup kitchen—not all flow-producing activities are meaningful inthe sense of connecting an individual to a greater good (consider playing bridge or Scrabble), andnot all meaningful activities entail the total absorption that defines flow.

More recently, Marty Seligman (January 21, 2005, personal communication) has suggested tome that yet another possible route to happiness entails the pursuit of victory—winning atwhatever matters most to us, whether these be literal contests (sports and games) or moremetaphorical ones (work and love). I am not yet convinced that a life of victory belongs with thelives of hedonism, eudaimonia, and engagement just discussed. It may not be as widelyrecognized or celebrated (McClelland, 1961), and it may not be fully distinct from the otherroutes. But it is undeniable that at least some people constantly compete and measure themselves—and their own well-being—on the scorecard of life. Whether the pursuit of victory is linked tolife satisfaction and whether it is more or less important than the other orientations are questionswe are in the process of exploring.

Whatever we discover, happiness and its pursuit will remain complex. Seligman, Steen, Park,and Peterson (2005) acknowledged this complexity by suggesting that happiness is best reservedas the name of a field within positive psychology, just as cognition or motivation are names offields within business-as-usual psychology. One cannot study happiness per se but only particularmanifestations of it, defined in specific ways and measured accordingly.

Explaining and Measuring HappinessPositive psychologists are thus concerned not only with abstract definitions of happiness butadditionally with how it can be ascertained in the concrete, thereby making research possible.How can we tell that one person is happier than another, or that one group of people is happierthan another group? How can we tell if happiness is increasing, decreasing, or holding steady forthe same individual?

In thinking about how to measure happiness, the following distinctions are useful, drawnfrom a discussion of approaches to explaining happiness by Seligman and Royzman (2003). Theydistinguished three traditional theories of happiness. Each has its own assessment implications.

Traditional Theories of Happiness

The first has already been mentioned: hedonism. It holds that happiness entails raw feelings frontand center in our conscious experiences. A happy life is one in which the good feelings (pleasure)are maximized, and the bad feelings (pain) are minimized. By this view, happiness is the sumover the lifetime of all of these specific feelings, what Kahneman (1999) has described as abottom-up approach to explaining happiness. To be sure, there are some needed subtleties. Thepattern of pleasure and pain across one’s life certainly matters (Velleman, 1991). “We canimagine two lives that contain the same exact amount of momentary pleasantness, but one lifetells a story of gradual decline (ecstatic childhood, light-hearted youth, dysphoric adulthood,miserable old age), while another is a tale of gradual improvement (the above pattern inreverse)” (Seligman & Royzman, 2003).

Think high school quarterback versus revenge of the nerds.

Think of the old joke: “Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?”

Or think about the studies by Kahneman and his colleagues described in chapter 3 thatsupport peak-end theory: What matters in how we remember hedonic episodes is how they end.

There are two methodological implications of this bottom-up view of happiness and itsneeded qualification. First, one excellent way to measure happiness is in the moment—on-line—and here positive psychologists favor the experience sampling method (ESM; Larson &Csikszentmihalyi, 1983), mentioned briefly in previous chapters. Research participants are givenan electronic device not much larger than a pack of cigarettes. They carry it around with them,and at randomly determined intervals, it gives off a signal—beep! Then they complete aquestionnaire, describing where they are, what they are doing, how they are feeling, and whatthey are thinking. The most high-tech version of experience sampling allows researchparticipants to respond by entering responses on a tiny keyboard, but a pencil and paper usuallysuffice.

For instance, Harlow and Cantor (1994) used experience sampling to map out how concernwith academic activities by college students could spill over into their social activities. Thisphenomenon usually took the form of a student asking her friends for reassurance aboutacademic pursuits. If done too frequently, individuals report lower social satisfaction, becausenot all of their friends provide the desired reassurance, and indeed some may become frustratedwith them.

ESM avoids problems with memory (Stone, Shiffman, & deVries, 1999). Research participantsneed not think about what they usually do; they need only report what is going on at themoment. The immediacy of the procedure allows the researcher to make conclusions abouteveryday thoughts, feelings, and actions. Another benefit of experience sampling is that it allowsthe researcher to take the participant’s immediate surroundings into account. Current thinking in

psychology accords great importance to the setting in which our behavior occurs. ESM gives theresearcher a glimpse at the subject’s environment, although beepers do not work too well inswimming pools, nightclubs, churches, or neighborhoods in which police officers are patrollingon the lookout for drug sales (Hormuth, 1986).

Second, just as important as bottom-up assessment is asking people for an overall summary ofthe trajectory and pattern of their lives. Not to do so would miss the forest for the trees andignore the critical sequencing of momentary pleasures. For an extreme example, consider the lifeof noted philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. By all accounts, for all of his brilliance, he was highlyself-critical and relentlessly dysphoric. But at the very end of his life, as he lay dying inCambridge, his final words were reportedly, “Tell them I have had a wonderful life” (Monk,1990).

A second theory of happiness is desire theory, which holds that happiness is a matter ofgetting what you want, whether or not it involves pleasure (Griffin, 1986). Again, the best way toascertain happiness according to this view is to ask the person, because what a person wants isleft up to him to define. Desire theory and hedonism often agree, because we may desire morepleasure than pain, but they part company when we are indifferent to pain or—indeed—areattracted to it for whatever reason. Moreover, pleasure and pain do not exhaust what we mightdesire.

Philosopher Robert Nozick (1974) proposed the following thought experiment. Imagine thatan experience machine has been invented that allows you to spend your entire life safelyimmersed in a tank, your brain wired to a device that allows any experience you desire to takeplace by stimulating whatever parts of your brain might be responsible for it. These experiencesare vivid, intense, prolonged, pleasurable if you wish, and indistinguishable in the moment from“real” ones. The prospect of such an experience machine sounds intriguing, and I can onlyassume that Microsoft is working feverishly to create one. But according to Nozick, people rejectthese hypothetical experiences because they want to “earn” their pleasures by virtue of theiractions and character—just as the protagonists in The Matrix movies reject the computersimulation that most people unknowingly experience as reality. Critical to what we desire is a lifewith integrity as opposed to one created by illusions of brain chemistry.

Suppose what we want strikes others as shallow or inconsequential? A third approach toexplaining happiness has therefore emerged known as objective list theory (Nussbaum, 1992;Sen, 1985). By this view, there really are truly valuable things in the world, and happinessentails achieving some number of these: freedom from disease, material comfort, a career,friendships, children, education, knowledge, and so on. Consider thugs and hooligans who arerelentless pleasure seekers and get much of what they want—cheap thrills in the form ofpromiscuous sex, drug highs, and the casual exploitation of suckers. Most of us would not want

to say that these folks are “really” happy, although they perfectly meet the criteria set forth byhedonism and desire theory.

The methodological implication of objective list theory is that we need to ascertain whetherthese truly valuable things have been attained by an individual. The problem is of coursedeciding what these things are. I believe there is more consensus than a strict relativist mightassert, but there are still gray areas and difficult tradeoffs among the items on anyone’s list ofwhat is objectively good.

Consider education, valued in virtually all circles within the United States and elsewhere (M.C. Waters, 1990). As a faculty member at a big-time academic school as well as a big-time sportsschool, I frequently hear debates about our student-athletes and the tradeoffs they are forced tomake between schoolwork (getting a degree) and sports (preparing for a lucrative career as aprofessional athlete). A less-than-elite athlete has no objective conflict and should always opt foreducation because a professional career is a pipe dream. But what about a truly skilled collegeathlete participating in a money sport?

Some years ago, a student of mine who was a football star for the Wolverines asked me whatwould happen if he skipped the final exam for our course. I checked his grades and found that ifhe took the exam and did minimally well, he would pass the course, receive credit, and—so heinformed me—earn his degree and make his mother very happy. If he did not take the exam, hewould not pass the course.

Why would he even consider missing the exam? He had an unavoidable conflict with aNational Football League testing combine, which if he attended and then performed to hisability, would improve his draft position and make a literal difference of a million dollars in hissalary over the next few years. One would think that might make his mother happy as well. Sowhat is the objective good here? Getting his college degree or financially setting up his familyand himself for life? The best he could do was score one out of two. The point is that objectivelist theory is not foolproof as an explanation of happiness, and it also requires us to return to anindividual’s own overall evaluation of his feelings and wishes.

This story may be too unusual to provide a compelling objection to objective list theory.Ponder, therefore, the following patterns in the United States and indeed the world as a whole.By any and all criteria, objective goods have increased for the typical person over the decades.Literacy rates are higher; life expectancy is longer; information is more available; and materialgoods that provide safety and comfort are much more abundant. But self-reported happiness hasnot increased in pace with these objective goods. According to survey research, people in theUnited States today are no happier than their counterparts 40 or 50 years ago. Gregg Easterbrook(2003) has dubbed this phenomenon the progress paradox, and David Myers (2000) drew the

same conclusion in arguing that we have lost our spiritual bearings as we have accumulatedmore objective goods (Jung, 1933).

Perhaps there is no paradox: In reporting happiness, people are simply offering a relative andnot an absolute judgment, which means that we should not expect an ever-increasing trendtoward more happiness. As I will discuss shortly, this is part of the resolution, but there is moreafoot than how survey respondents react to numerical scales. For reasons not well understood,severe depression has also increased dramatically over the past half century, in the United Statesas well as in other industrialized nations, so that younger adults today may be 10 times morelikely to have a full-blown depressive episode at some point in their lives than were their parentsor grandparents—who not only had fewer objective goods but also lived through the GreatDepression and World War II (Robins et al., 1984). Clinical depression is not simply howsomeone responds to a survey.

Objective list theory requires that we dismiss what people say about their happiness if it is atodds with their objective goods. What counts is what they have, but this makes no sense in theface of the epidemic of depression.

The best theory may be one that somehow combines these different explanations ofhappiness. The best assessment of happiness would rely on a battery of measures, somecompleted by the individual and others by informed and objective observers. No such batteryexists at present, although Ed Diener and his colleagues are working to create one and encourageits use to gauge the psychological well-being of entire nations (Diener, 2000; Diener & Seligman,2004).

In the meantime, researchers usually measure by surveying or interviewing people and takingwhat they report at face value. This approach to measuring happiness as a subjective experiencehas much to recommend it because it resonates with how most of us think about happiness.Happiness is a personal experience and indeed an idiosyncratic one. We may find it bizarre thatfolks are happy with how they pursue their lives—as stamp collectors, as fans of the ChicagoCubs, or as interstate truck drivers—but we allow that happiness is after all their business, andwho are we to say that they are not happy? We would in turn object if they vetoed our ownconception of happiness.

The following terminology has emerged among researchers (Diener, 1984). Quality of life isan overarching label that includes all of the emotions, experiences, appraisals, expectations, andaccomplishments that figure into the good life. Subjective well-being is a more-specific notionusually defined as relatively high levels of positive affect, relatively low levels of negative affect,and the overall judgment that one’s life is a good one. This latter appraisal is often identified aslife satisfaction.

These terms are often used interchangeably in the research literature, and in morepopularized presentations, happiness is introduced as an everyday synonym of this family ofconcepts (e.g., Argyle, 2001; Baker & Stauth, 2003; Lykken, 2000; Myers, 1993; Seligman, 2002).Researchers have often preferred measures of life satisfaction because these tend to be stableover time but still sensitive enough to capture changes in life circumstances (Pavot & Diener,1993; Schuessler & Fisher, 1985). However, there is a growing trend to identify all of these assubjective well-being or even happiness measures (Diener & Seligman, 2002), and the empiricalfact is that different measures—whatever their labels—usually agree rather substantially.

Researchers are attracted to self-report surveys and interviews for an additional reason: They

make measurement simple and straightforward, not to mention inexpensive.2 One need merelyask people a handful of standardized questions to ascertain whether or not they are happy.Usually a time period is specified—right now, during the past 4 weeks, or “in general”—andresearch proceeds accordingly. Most of the research described in this chapter and elsewhere inthis book concerning happiness and well-being uses this strategy of measurement.

The objection to this approach, despite its popularity, is twofold. First, self-report is notalways foolproof, even about subjective experience. Although positive psychologists do notautomatically distrust what people say about themselves, neither do they treat all self-reports asinfallible (Park & Peterson, in press a). Depending on the context in which assessment occurs,someone may shade their answers—deliberately or inadvertently—in one direction or another.Consider these extreme examples. A plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit will emphasize his painand suffering and minimize his reports of feeling well and doing well. An employee speaking toher boss about a merit raise will mention the things she loves about the job. More subtly,especially in the United States where being happy is so highly valued, research participants withno explicit incentive to exaggerate their well-being may still end up doing so because this is anexpected and socially desirable response (Diener & Suh, 2000).

Some years ago, one of my students always made me shake my head. When I would ask her,as a conversational gambit, “How are you doing?” she would always respond with an enthusiastic“great” or “wonderful” or “spectacular.” To be sure, this made her a low-maintenance individualbecause she never needed soothing, but because I knew her well, I did not always believe her.When she was ill, or having problems with her boyfriend, or being thwarted in her work, she wasstill doing great, no better than in other circumstances but never any worse, all of which led menot to take her self-reports too seriously.

Was she deliberately dishonest? I think not. This was who she was, but I still believe that lateat night, when she was alone with her thoughts, she admitted to some gradations in hersubjective experience. But she would never reveal these to anyone else, or at least not to me.

Where does this leave a researcher? If my student is a typical person, not in a good place,because it means that self-report questionnaires about happiness produce studies of social scriptsas opposed to investigations of more deeply rooted psychological characteristics.

Schwarz and Strack (1999) wrote an interesting piece on what people actually do when theyrespond to surveys that ostensibly measure happiness or global life satisfaction. They argued thatpeople are not literally introspecting on some stable thing within themselves that we can callhappiness. Instead, they are making a judgment at that particular point in time, and like anyjudgment, this one results from psychological processes susceptible to numerous influences, somequite annoying from the perspective of a researcher.

All things being equal, wrote Schwarz and Strack, people base their judgments of overall lifesatisfaction on how they are feeling at the present moment. Flushed with a momentary triumph orthrown for a loop by a recent setback, people may accordingly report that life per se is good orbad. More generally, these writers argued that a happiness judgment is based only on theinformation readily available to people at the moment the judgment is solicited, and what issalient at the moment is easily manipulated. So, if a survey asks young adults about their datingfrequency, and then follows immediately with a question about their overall life satisfaction, thecorrelation is quite high (Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988). People who indicate that they date alot—and thus have this “fact” front and center in their minds—go on to report that overall theyhave a good life. And the converse is true for people who have just reminded themselves thatthey do not date a lot. If these questions are simply reversed, so that a reminder of one’s datingfrequency is not so recent, the correlation with life satisfaction becomes much smaller (althoughit still remains positive).

I am drafting these paragraphs in January 2005, as stories abound in the media of the terribledevastation wrought by the tsunami in the Indian Ocean. There is dirty snow on the groundoutside; I have a sore throat; and I am not fully prepared for the beginning of the winter semester(in 90 minutes), but I think my life is pretty good. It is very salient to me that I live in Ann Arborand not Sumatra. Absent the tsunami, my overall judgment would be more muted and might wellreflect the local hassles just mentioned.

Furthermore, according to Schwarz and Strack, respondents to survey questions about lifesatisfaction are rendering a relative judgment. How does that vaudeville joke go?

How’s your wife?Compared to what?

The joke may not be all that funny, but it conveys a deeper truth that we often make judgmentsby comparing. In the case of well-being, we have lots of candidates for comparison. We cancompare our lives to what is, to what was, or to what will be. We can even compare our lives to

what is not—so-called counter-factual thinking, as exemplified by the downward socialcomparison of cancer patients mentioned in chapter 1. None of these influences on judgmentmakes the process of assessing well-being capricious, but together they introduce problems ofinterpretation if we overlook them.

Asians tend to report lower levels of life satisfaction than people in other parts of the world(Diener, Suh, Smith, & Shao, 1995). This is a robust phenomenon that admits to differentexplanations, but perhaps the simplest is in terms of the Asian norm of not standing out fromone’s peers. According to a Japanese proverb, “The nail that stands up gets pounded down.” (Inthe United States, the nail that stands up gets its own television show.) Perhaps an Asianrespondent to a survey does not want to say that his life is better than anyone else’s life; hence,he uses the middle of the rating scale.

This explanation does not trivialize the result, by the way, because if such a norm isoperating, it is not at work just when people respond to surveys. Perhaps Asians across the boardhold themselves more in check vis-à-vis happiness, its expression, and perhaps even itsexperience.

Schwarz and Strack (1999) described numerous studies of other influences on well-beingjudgments, ostensibly trivial factors that nonetheless have demonstrable impacts. So, if aresearcher simply includes a general well-being question on the same page as other questionsabout life, answers to these influence the well-being answer (and vice versa). People may followthe norm to provide “new information” in the context of a sustained conversation. If we asksomeone about his marital satisfaction, and then about his overall life satisfaction, he mayconstrue the latter question as “Other than your marriage, how is your life going?” If these twoquestions are on separate pages of the survey package, in what seem to be separatequestionnaires (because they are formatted differently), the answers do not spill into or play offone another to the same degree.

As you might suspect, Schwarz and Strack concluded that general happiness measures are notvalid because of all these influences. They recommended instead the use of ESM, measuringhappiness on-line and aggregating responses.

I take their arguments seriously, but I do not fully buy them. First, this critique assumes thatpeople are really stupid, even about a topic as important and as transparent as their own well-being and life satisfaction. As explained in chapter 1, this negative view of human nature is aphilosophical stance and not one compelled by the data. To be sure, people’s judgments can beshoved around by appropriate variations of the phrasing and formatting of questions, but therobustness of such manipulations is debatable (Eid & Diener, 2004; Schimmack, Boeckenholt, &Reisenzein, 2002).

Second, if the business of measuring global life satisfaction and well-being by self-report is sofraught with problems, why are the resulting scores reliable and stable? Why are they related toso many objective life outcomes, like in the yearbook study and the nun study? Why are thesescores demonstrably heritable (influenced by genetics)?

Third, for every demonstration that global judgments are influenced by bottom-up processes,there is another demonstration that specific judgments are influenced by top-down processes(Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Schwarz and Strack argued that one’s judgment of overall well-being canbe determined by how one feels at the moment. True enough, but how one feels at the momentcan be determined by one’s overall well-being (Schimmack, Diener, & Oishi, 2002). With somecolleagues, I did a study of optimism among college students and how they viewed their ongoinglives. Optimistic students saw their daily lives filled with challenges and opportunities, whereaspessimistic students saw their lives filled with hassles and frustrations (Dykema, Bergbower, &Peterson, 1995). The same event—for example, having to take care of a neighbor’s cat over aweekend—could be a source of amusement for an optimist but a looming disaster for a pessimist.

In any event, that self-report measures of well-being are flawed does not mean that they arehopelessly flawed.

How’s your measure of well-being?Compared to what?

One of the ways that self-report surveys of general life satisfaction have been validated is byseeing how well they agree with ESM results. The agreement is substantial (Sandvak, Diener, &Seidlitz, 1993). Perhaps the most important way to judge the adequacy of a measure is to seewhere it leads us in terms of research results. Are they coherent, sensible, and interesting? Yoube the judge as I turn next to some of these results.

Self-Report Measures of Happiness

Psychology’s interest in happiness and well-being goes back almost 100 years (Angner, 2005).The earliest self-report measures were single items included in surveys (e.g., Bradburn, 1969;Campbell, 1981; Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976; Cantril, 1965). Some of these surveyitems ask for judgments about life in general, and others are called domain-specific measuresbecause they ask people to describe their happiness in a given venue of life: work, health, family,leisure activities, and so on. Often the general and specific measures line up. People who aresatisfied with one domain of life are satisfied with other domains and with life in general, but theagreement is not so high as to imply complete redundancy. Thus, we can ask about thedifferential contributions of satisfaction with various venues to overall life satisfaction.

For example, Park and Huebner (2005) did such a study among adolescents in the United

States and Korea. In both nations, satisfaction with one’s family was strongly and equally linkedto overall life satisfaction, not a surprising finding. But in the United States, satisfaction with theself was more strongly associated with general life satisfaction than in Korea, whereassatisfaction with school contributed more to overall life satisfaction among Korean youth thanamong U.S. youth. These patterns make sense in terms of the different cultural values andemphases that prevail in these nations.

Along these lines, Diener and Lucas (2000) also reported cross-national comparisons aboutdomain-specific life satisfaction measures and overall life satisfaction. In the United States, thebest predictor of overall satisfaction is how one judges the domain in which one is most satisfied.One may be unhappy with one’s work, with one’s marriage, and with one’s physical health. Butone’s children are great, and therefore overall life is splendid. In Japan, a different pattern isfound. Overall satisfaction is best predicted by the domain with which one is least satisfied. So,work, marriage, and health may all be going well, but if the children are wretched, so too isoverall life.

These are broad generalizations to which exceptions certainly exist, and each of you has yourown life satisfaction calculus. Some of you may be the sum of your parts. Others of you may beless than the sum (the Japanese pattern) or more than the sum (the U.S. pattern).

Contemporary researchers use a variety of measures of general well-being, life satisfaction,and happiness (e.g., Fordyce, 1977; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999; Peterson, Park, & Seligman,2005b; Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). One especially popular measure is the LifeSatisfaction Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). It contains the following five itemsrated on 7-point scales, from 1 (= strongly disagree) to 7 (= strongly agree). Answers aresummed and range from 5 to 35.

______ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.______ The conditions of my life are excellent.____ I am satisfied with my life._____ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life._____ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

If you answer these questions (please do not think about your dating frequency) and then add upyour responses, here is a rough interpretation suggested by the creators of the measure: 31–35 =extremely satisfied, 26–30 = satisfied, 21–25 = slightly satisfied, 20 = neutral, 15–19 =slightly dissatisfied, 10–14 = dissatisfied, 5–9 = extremely dissatisfied.

There are well-being measures suitable for children and adolescents (e.g., Park, 2004b) andeven for very young children, who are asked to point to the face that expresses how they arefeeling:

Regardless of the measure, each assigns a quantitative score to someone reflecting “howmuch” happiness or satisfaction they report. These are measures of what psychologists callindividual differences, and the key word is differences. Measures that do not vary across people arenot especially useful for this sort of research.

To evaluate the adequacy of measures of individual differences, psychologists determine eachmeasure’s internal consistency or reliability (do different questions ostensibly measuring thesame notion yield answers that agree for a respondent) and its stability or test-retest reliability(does the same person score the same across periods of time). By both of these criteria, measuresof happiness and subjective well-being fare quite well and are certainly as consistent and asstable as measures of creativity, values, political attitudes, and basic personality traits likeextraversion and conscientiousness.

The thornier but even more important issue has to do with the validity of these measures, amatter already touched upon in my discussion of the annoying influences on self-report. Dohappiness surveys truly measure what they intend to measure? If there were an objectivemeasure of happiness, we could simply check the surveys against this criterion and see if theyagree. Then we would know if the survey questions were valid or not.

In medicine, measures of an illness based on the self-report of symptoms can often be checkedagainst laboratory tests determining the presence (or not) of the relevant germ. When this ispossible, we speak of having a hard diagnostic test, although a moment’s reflection tells youthat even in medicine there is no such thing in an ultimate sense because even the hardest oftests is imperfect. There are inevitable mistakes and errors. Regardless, matters are much morechallenging in psychology research because there are rarely even candidates for hard tests.

I suspect that for many psychological characteristics, hard diagnostic tests may not exist evenin principle. If they did exist, they would presumably take the form of checking the psychologicalcharacteristics against an objectively measured biological or physical characteristic. Supposesomeone touts a hormonal assay or a given neuroimaging pattern as the hard measure ofhappiness. Suppose that in most cases, self-report surveys agree with this test. There would stillbe some exceptions. Some people would satisfy the hard criterion but still say that they areunhappy, whereas other people would not meet the criterion but nonetheless say they are happy.Would we want to say they are wrong, as we would in the case of people who believe they havecancer or AIDS when all lab tests point to the opposite conclusion? I think not. The more generalpoint is that psychological characteristics are best measured at their own level of meaningbecause they are not reducible to another level.

In the absence of hard diagnostic tests against which to check their measures, whatpsychology researchers must do to evaluate validity is painstaking. They must use a measure inresearch along with other measures and then look for overall patterns (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).Do the (theoretically) expected associations occur? And just as important but sometimesoverlooked, do (theoretically) expected lack of associations not occur? It may take many yearsand hundreds of studies to arrive at a judgment concerning the relative validity of a givenmeasure. And the theory behind the measure must be a reasonable one, because it determines theground rules for this judgment (MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948).

Measures of happiness and well-being have been studied frequently enough to allow theconclusion that they have at least a modicum of validity. Different tests tend to agree with oneanother rather well. And the story they tell in terms of their patterns of association with othervariables is a coherent one, to which I now turn. Indeed, the story is coherent enough that evensurprising findings are not used to dismiss the measures but rather to correct our intuitions andtheories about happiness.

Who Is Happy?Probably the most striking and consistent finding from happiness research is that the majority ofpeople are rather happy (Diener & Diener, 1996). Regardless of the measure, and regardless ofthe sample of research participants, most folks live somewhere north of neutral—above the scalemidpoint. I wish that my colleagues who believe that life is so tragic and that people are somiserable would grapple with this fact about happiness (chapter 1).

Happiness surveys have been conducted in many nations, and the results are usuallypresented to highlight differences (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Inglehart & Klingemann,

2000). Differences are interesting,3 but they should not obscure the essential happiness of mostpeople, whether they are multimillionaires in the United States (Diener, Horwitz, & Emmons,1985) or pavement dwellers in Calcutta (Biswas-Diener & Diener, 2001).

Because subjective well-being research began with surveys of the general population, it standsapart from psychology’s other lines of studies, which have relied on young adults enrolled inuniversity courses. The range of people studied by well-being researchers is much wider, andthus they know a great deal about who is more versus less happy.

Given a sample of potential research participants, the studies are simple to do: Include ameasure of well-being or life satisfaction in a survey along with other questions, and then seewhat goes with what. Across different studies using different measures, a consensus has emerged,not only of the factors linked to happiness (life satisfaction, subjective well-being) but also thosethat are not. Table 4.1 summarizes this consensus, based on reviews by Argyle (1999, 2001);

Diener (1984, 1994); Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith (1999); Myers (1993); Myers and Diener(1995); and W. Wilson (1967).

I have organized these findings in terms of the strength of the correlation between the factorin question and the well-being measure. A correlation coefficient (usually abbreviated as r) is aquantitative index of the degree to which two variables, if graphed, fall along a straight line.Positive correlations range from 0 to 1 and describe scatter plots in which a high value for onevariable is associated with a high value for the other variable. Negative correlations range from 0to –1 and describe scatter plots in which a high value for one variable is associated with a lowvalue for the other variable. The larger the magnitude of the correlation (the further it is from 0),the greater the association between the two variables. Zero correlations occur when there is noassociation, and the scatter plot looks like buckshot.

Table 4.1. Positive Correlations With Happiness and Life Satisfaction

The magnitude of a correlation coefficient does not have an intuitive meaning (Estepa &Sánchez Cobo, 2001). We readily grasp what is meant by a correlation coefficient of 0 and just asreadily what is meant by a correlation coefficient of ± 1. But in practice, researchers neverencounter correlations this stark. Instead, the strongest correlation found among psychologicalvariables is usually about 0.3, and over the years, there has been spirited debate about whether

correlations of this magnitude are worth taking seriously.4

Some decades ago, Walter Mischel (1968) published an influential critique of personalityresearch hinging on his assumption that a correlation of 0.3 was trivial in size. This argumentoccasionally resurfaces (e.g., Doris, 2002; Ross & Nisbett, 1991), but current thinking is that acorrelation of 0.3 is worth taking seriously (Peterson, 1992). The problem is more one ofperception; a correlation of 0.3 does not seem like an impressive association because it is closer to0 than to 1.

Suppose you have a serious medical condition that results in death in 65% of the cases. Nowsuppose that there is a treatment available that reduces your chances of dying to 35%. Would

you want to receive this treatment? Of course you would, and the likelihood of its success—whilenot a guarantee—is not exactly in the ballpark of desperation or a miracle. The point is that ifyou recast this hypothetical example as a correlation between receiving the treatment (or not)and recovering from the illness (or not), the resulting coefficient is exactly 0.3 (Rosenthal &Rubin, 1982). Or consider the following familiar associations expressed as correlation coefficients(Meyer et al., 2001):

aspirin and reduced risk of death by heart attack: r= 0.03

chemotherapy and survival with breast cancer: r= 0.03

smoking and lung cancer: r= 0.08

antihistamine use and reduced nasal congestion: r= 0.11

college grades and job performance: r = 0.16

We take all of these correlations quite seriously. If we are at risk for a heart attack, weswallow a daily aspirin. If we have breast cancer, we seek aggressive treatment. If we smoke, weknow that we should stop. If we have a congested nose, we reach for antihistamines. If we arehiring a recent college graduate, we want to know her grade point average. As Meyer et al.concluded, a correlation approaching 0.3 is something about which a researcher should bepleased and not dismayed.

In describing the magnitude of correlation coefficients, researchers often use the followingverbal labels. A “small” correlation is between 0 and ±0.2; a “moderate” correlation is in theballpark of ±0.3; and a “large” correlation exceeds ±0.5. I repeat that a moderate correlation isusually as robust as it gets in the social sciences.

Look at Table 4.1, which I have organized in terms of small, moderate, and large correlationsas just explained. Let me summarize for you. First, demographic factors like age, gender,ethnicity, education, and income—usually strong determinants of how people live their lives—are all associated with happiness but at low levels. One way to make sense of these findings is toconclude that happiness is available to all.

Second, among the more-robust determinants of happiness are social or interpersonal factors—number of friends, marriage, extraversion, and gratitude. Other more-robust correlates includereligiousness, leisure activities, and employment (although not income per se), which often havethe effect of bringing people into contact with others.

Other people matter, and there may be no happy hermits (chapter 10). In support of thisconclusion, Diener and Seligman (2002) compared happy people to very happy people, adifferent comparison than those reflected in Table 4.1, which are correlations along the fullhappiness-unhappiness continuum. What Diener and Seligman found is that even the more-robust

correlates in Table 4.1 fell away at the upper end of the happiness scale, with one strikingexception: good relationships with other people. Of the very happy people in their sample, allhad close relationships with others. Psychology research documents very few necessary orsufficient conditions for anything, but it looks like good social relationships may be a necessarycondition for extreme happiness.

Third, several personality traits—optimism, extraversion, conscientiousness, self-esteem,internal locus of control (believing that you have control over what happens to you)—havemoderate to strong correlations with avowed happiness, as do low scores on neuroticism. Onepossible explanation is that these correlations reflect a way of talking or presenting oneself—what researchers call a common methods factor: Happy people attribute other positivecharacteristics to themselves, whereas unhappy people do not. I suspect this accounts for some ofthe results, but they still are obtained when “personality” is measured in ways other than self-report, like by observer rating. I think these results show that happiness can be a product of theperson and his outlook.

Some further qualifications are in order about the correlations summarized in Table 4.1.Many of the factors listed are themselves linked with one another, which means that in makingsense—for example—of the correlation between religiousness (measured, let us say, by churchattendance) and well-being, we need to remember that physical health may be dragged into thefinding: Seriously ill people after all may have difficulty attending church. Those in the lowereconomic classes have less education, less access to health care, and fewer opportunities forleisure. And so on.

Some of these relationships are small ones when expressed as a linear (strictly straight-line)correlation, but become more robust with a closer look. Consider the correlation between incomeand happiness, overall associated weakly but much more robustly if we look only at the lowerend of income. There, the correlation becomes a larger one, which of course makes sense. Onemust meet basic needs to be happy. Beyond that, income does not much matter.

So What? The Consequences of HappinessThe most important qualification about Table 4.1 is that it presents correlations, and one of thetruisms in social science research is that correlation does not imply causation. That is, two variablesmay be associated without any causal link between them.

Nonetheless, when we see correlations like those in Table 4.1, we want to interpret them incausal terms. In some cases, we want to conclude that these factors “cause” happiness, and inother cases, we may want to conclude that happiness leads to these factors. Up to a point,common sense helps us sort through different interpretations. After all, happiness cannot cause

age, but it is plausible to wonder if happiness leads to marriage, friendship, or good health or ifthese lead to happiness. Or there could be what social scientists call third variables afoot—pesky confounds in the research that are unmeasured but responsible for the apparent association

between two variables that are measured.5

Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) grappled with this chicken-and-egg problem byreviewing specifically two sorts of studies of happiness: those that measure variables across time(longitudinal studies) and those that deliberately manipulated positive moods and ascertainedthe consequences (experimental studies; see also Argyle, 2001). These sorts of studies strengthenthe inference that happiness does (or does not) actually lead to an outcome with which it iscorrelated.

They concluded that happy individuals experience later success in many domains of life,including:

marriage

friendship

employment

income

work performance

mental health

psychological health

In later chapters of this book, I will describe many of the specific studies that they summarized.Suffice it to say that happiness is not just a marker of the good life but may also be one of itscauses.

I do want to comment, however, on one study that implies just the opposite. My colleaguesLauren Alloy and Lyn Abramson (1979), while graduate students at the University ofPennsylvania, did a series of laboratory experiments investigating what has come to be known asdepressive realism. They recruited college students—some mildly depressed and others not—and gave them a simple task. In front of each research participant was a button to be pressed anda green light that flashed on and off. Participants were asked to determine the relationshipbetween pressing the button and the flashing of the light. In one of the experimental conditions,there was no relationship—the light flashed regardless of the button pressing—but theparticipants were not told this.

The intriguing finding is that the depressed students more accurately apprehended the lack ofany relationship than did the nondepressed students. In other words, the depressed researchparticipants were more apt to say correctly that nothing they did mattered. The nondepressed

participants in contrast advanced complex but incorrect hypotheses: “The light flashed when Ipressed the button twice—first for 2 seconds and then for 5 seconds.”

These results have attracted a great deal of attention because they are at odds with theoriesholding that depressed people are irrational and out of touch with reality (Beck, 1967; Jahoda,1958). Alloy and Abramson (1979) published their studies in an article subtitled “Sadder butWiser,” and their conclusions have been widely reported and—indeed—widely generalizedbeyond the details of their experimental procedure.

In the present context, such generalization leads to the conclusion that happy people arestupid and that if we want to know about the real world, we should not trust what happy peoplehave to say about it. These conclusions fly in the face of the results I have been discussing, whichimply that happiness has all sorts of benefits.

What is the resolution? I do not quarrel with the basic findings of Alloy and Abramson(1979), but we can ask how widely we want to generalize them (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991;Haaga & Beck, 1995). Implying that their studies addressed wisdom does not mean that theyreally did, and indeed, no theories of wisdom reduce this complex phenomenon to the ability todetect patterns between pressing buttons and flashing lights (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000;Sternberg, 1998).

That depressed individuals more readily entertain the possibility of their own ineffectuality isa conclusion closer to the data, and when the situation in which depressed individuals findthemselves happens to be one in which ineffectuality is the correct answer, then of course they

are more likely than the nondepressed to be accurate. This remains a provocative finding,6 butwe should not overlook its necessary qualifications. Even stopped clocks tell the right time twicea day. If we happen to consult them only on those occasions, we might be led to the conclusionthat stopped clocks are preferable to those that are consistently a few seconds slow or fast.

In sum, the evidence that sadness is associated with more-realistic perceptions of reality isbounded and does not argue against the conclusion that happiness is often associated with highlydesirable outcomes in a variety of life’s venues.

Boosting HappinessGiven that happiness has many desirable consequences, can we boost it in a lasting way? Here,there is a lot of pessimism, and researchers often point to the hedonic treadmill as setting a limiton what an intervention might do. Or they point to the heritability of happiness to argue thatthere is a genetically determined set-point for happiness, above which one cannot rise. Forexample, Lykken and Tellegen (1996) did a twins study of happiness and found evidence forsubstantial heritability. In presenting their findings, they touched on the issue of boosting

happiness and offered the dour conclusion7 that “[t]rying to be happier is as futile as trying to betaller” (p. 189).

Let me leave aside the fact that some components of happiness (like positive affectivity) aremore heritable than others. Let me leave aside the fact that the hedonic treadmill is a metaphor

that explains hedonic inertia and is not a biological fact.8 Let me simply repeat the point made inchapter 3 that high heritability does not mean immutability.

Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade (2005) offered the following heuristic for thinking aboutthe determinants of happiness:

happiness = set-point + life circumstances + volitional activity

I have mentioned the notion of set-point, which if we take seriously is a constant for a givenindividual. Table 4.1 lists many of the life circumstances relevant to happiness. Volitional activityis the interesting part of the equation, and it echoes a point that I made in chapter 1 that positivepsychology converges with humanistic approaches in acknowledging at least some role of willand choice. Happiness is not solely the product of will, but will is a component at least insofar as

it leads us to do things that will result in more versus less happiness.9

This is the premise behind the have-a-good-day exercise described in chapter 2: Identify thosesituations or circumstances that make for a good day—I assume that for most of us, a good day isa happy day (King & Napa, 1998)—and deliberately create more of these situations (Buss, 1987).At least some of the factors in Table 4.1 are matters we can choose to pursue.

So, we can make more friends, and we can spend more time with them (chapter 10). We canfind leisure activities that engage us, and we can find a job that lets us do what we do best(chapter 11). We can embrace a religion if we are so inclined (chapter 11). We can improve ourhealth and fitness (chapter 9). We can experience more pleasures (chapter 3). We can see atherapist to help us banish anxiety or depression (chapter 9). We can become more optimistic(chapters 5).

If these possibilities seem too daunting, here are some very simple activities that entail—literally—doing nothing. Do not fret over your attractiveness or how much education you have. Ifyou are able to pay your bills, do not fret over your salary. Do not fret about getting older.

There have been relatively few scientific attempts to boost happiness, but when researchershave occasionally mounted such efforts, they seem to work rather well (e.g., Argyle, 2001). It isinteresting that the success of happiness interventions receives little publicity, whereas studies ofthe heritability of happiness receive massive media attention. Regardless, let me end this chapterby mentioning some research I did at the University of Pennsylvania that investigated whetherhappiness could be increased in a lasting way (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005).

Notable about our research, I believe, is that it used 50 years of lessons learned frompsychotherapy research about how to answer the question about the effectiveness of anintervention. Decades ago, one could read that therapy was ineffective—indeed even harmful(Eysenck, 1952). The problem back then was that research methods were not sophisticatedenough to give the matter a fair test. Over the years, researchers have added one methodologicalrefinement after another to their repertoire—e.g., formal diagnosis of participants, comparisongroups, placebo controls, random assignment of participants to conditions, “objective”assessment of outcomes, long-term follow-up, calculation of the robustness of effects—and nowwe can say with certainty that psychotherapy is effective (Nathan & Gorman, 1998, 2002).

Happiness intervention research need not go through the same 50-year process because theserefinements can be applied just as well to studies that try to increase happiness as to studies thattry to decrease anxiety and depression.

Our initial interest in boosting happiness was sparked by our experience teaching positivepsychology courses and our fortunate discovery that exercises could have apparently powerfuleffects on the satisfaction and fulfillment of our students (chapter 2). As intriguing as theseeffects seemed to be, they were suggestive but not definitive. So, we set about more rigorousexamination. First, we collected interventions suggested over the centuries, from the Buddhathrough Tony Robbins (1992), which claimed to increase happiness. Where possible, we distilledthem into replicable and teachable forms. Which really worked, and which were at best placebos,capitalizing on a participant’s expectation of effectiveness as opposed to any inherent value?

For initial testing, we focused on five exercises, each of which took 1 week. Briefly, theseexercises were:

Gratitude Visit (write and deliver a letter of gratitude; see chapter 2)

Three Good Things (every day for a week, write down three things that went well that dayand explain why; again, see chapter 2)

You at Your Best (write a story about an event that brought out the best in you; review thisstory every day for a week)

Identifying Signature Strengths (take our on-line measure of strengths of character and noteyour highest scores; use these strengths more in the following week; chapter 6)

Using Signature Strengths in a Novel Way (take our on-line measure of strengths ofcharacter and note your highest scores; use these strengths “in novel ways” during thefollowing week; again, see chapter 6)

Participants were recruited from the Internet through a link identified as “HappinessExercises.” They were told they would be assigned to one condition only, which might or might

not have an effect on them. They were told as well that they might receive an inert (placebo)exercise. Each exercise took 1 week to do. Participants completed measures of happiness anddepression before and after the exercise, and up to 6 months later. All of this was done via theInternet (Prochaska, DiClemente, Velicer, & Rossi, 1993).

We created a plausible placebo control exercise: asking participants to write in detail for aweek about their early memories. We had no reason to think that doing so would make peoplehappier, but given everyday stereotypes about psychotherapy and its great interest in childhoodevents, we thought that research participants would accept this request as the sort of thing thatpsychologists ask of people.

Research participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions (five exercises plusplacebo). This random-assignment placebo-controlled design that we used is considered the royalroad for answering questions about the effectiveness of medication or psychotherapy, and in thepresent case, it led to some clear answers about boosting happiness.

First, relative to the pretest, the placebo exercise increased happiness (and decreaseddepression), but only in the extreme short term, immediately after the exercise was done.Second, the largest overall effect on happiness resulted from the gratitude visit, but this effect allbut vanished after 1 month. As noted in chapter 2, this is not a surprising effect. Third, lastingeffects on happiness—evident at 6 months of follow-up—were found for three good things andfor using signature strengths in novel ways. Fourth, the lasting effects of these exercises were inparticular reported by those people who continued to use them beyond the initial 1-week period.Fifth, the strength of these effects is what statisticians term “moderate” and are at least as robustas the effect sizes of psychotherapy and medication for the reduction of psychological problems.

I want to underscore the finding that continued use of an exercise led to its continued success.This repeats the important lesson about weight loss through dieting: The real challenge is nottaking weight off—almost any diet will do that—but in maintaining weight loss. The morebizarre the diet in the first place, the harder it is to stay on it for the rest of one’s life. Ditto fordoing things to be happier. To have a lasting effect, these must be integrated into one’s life.Counting one’s blessings and using one’s signature strengths in new ways seem to have thisproperty. To return to Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) happiness equation, the results of our studysuggest that their volitional activity should be expanded to read sustained volitional activity,which is enabled to the degree that the activity fits one’s life circumstances.

Although 6 months is far from “happily ever after,” our results suggest that enduringhappiness might be possible even outside fairy tales. An important question left unanswered byour research to date is whether more is better when it comes to happiness interventions. Giventhat several exercises were individually effective, does it make sense to assign them all to the

same person who wishes to be happier? And if so, is there an optimal sequence?

EXERCISE What Is Your Happiness Profile?In this chapter, I described four possible routes to happiness: through pleasure, throughengagement, through meaning, and through victory. Here is a questionnaire that measures eachof these four possible ways to be happy (Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005b).

Instructions

All of the questions reflect statements that many people would find desirable, but answer only interms of whether the statement describes how you actually live your life. Please be honest andaccurate.

1. My life serves a higher purpose.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

2. Life is too short to postpone the pleasures it can provide.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

3. I seek out situations that challenge my skills and abilities.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

4. I keep score at life.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

5. Whether at work or play, I am usually “in a zone” and not conscious of myself.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

6. I am always very absorbed in what I do.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

7. I am rarely distracted by what is going on around me.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

8. I have a responsibility to make the world a better place.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

9. My life has a lasting meaning.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

10. No matter what I am doing, it is important for me to win.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

11. In choosing what to do, I always take into account whether it will be pleasurable.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

12. What I do matters to society.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

13. I want to accomplish more than other people.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

14. I agree with this statement: “Life is short—eat dessert first.”

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

15. I love to do things that excite my senses.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

16. I love to compete.

Very much like me

Mostly like me

Somewhat like me

A little like me

Not like me at all

Scoring

Assign 5 points for a “very much like me” response, 4 points for a “mostly like me” response, andso on, through 1 point for a “not like me at all” response. Your Orientation to Pleasure score isthe sum of points for questions 2, 11, 14, and 15; your Orientation to Engagement score is thesum of points for questions 3, 5, 6, and 7; your Orientation to Meaning score is the sum of pointsfor questions 1, 8, 9, and 12; and your Orientation to Victory score is the sum of points forquestions 4, 10, 13, and 16.

Interpretation

What is the highest score of the four? (See Figure 4.1.) This is your dominant orientation. Andwhat is the configuration of your scores? That is, are you “high” (>15) on all four orientations?If so, you are oriented toward a full life and are likely to be highly satisfied. Or are you “low” (<9) on all four orientations? If so, you may have a more empty life and are likely to bedissatisfied. You might consider doing something different—anything!—in your life. And if youare high on one or two orientations, chances are that you are satisfied with life, although youmight seek further opportunities for pursuing your signature way of being happy.

Figure 4.1. My Own Happiness ProfileScores on each orientation to happiness can in principle range from a low of

4 (“not like me at all”) to a high of 20 (“very much like me”). As can beseen, I am high on orientations to meaning and victory and especially highon an orientation to engagement, but I am quite low on an orientation to

pleasure.

GLOSSARYcorrelation coefficient (r): quantitative index of the degree to which two variables, if graphed,

fall along a straight line.

depressive realism: theory proposing that depressed people see the world more accurately

desire theory: theory that happiness is a matter of getting what one wants, whether or not itinvolves pleasure

engagement: involvement in activities that produce flow

eudaimonia: idea that true happiness entails identifying one’s inner self (demon), cultivatingone’s strengths and virtues, and living in accordance with them

experience sampling method (ESM): research method that uses an electronic beeper to signalresearch participants at random intervals, indicating that they should stop whatever they aredoing, describe it, and respond to questions

happiness: everyday synonym for subjective well-being, life satisfaction, and the like

hard diagnostic test: foolproof measure, like for a disease

hedonism: doctrine emphasizing the maximizing of pleasure and the minimizing of pain

internal consistency (reliability): degree to which different measures of the same notion yieldanswers that agree

life satisfaction: overall cognitive appraisal that one’s life is a good one

objective list theory: theory that happiness entails achieving objectively good things in theworld, e.g., freedom from disease, material comfort, a career, friendships, children, education,knowledge, and so on

quality of life: overarching term for the emotions, experiences, appraisals, expectations, andaccomplishments that figure into the good life

set-point (for happiness): genetically determined level of happiness, to which one returns afterpositive or negative emotional experiences

stability (test-retest reliability): degree to which a measure administered at different points intime yields answers that agree

subjective well-being: relatively high levels of positive affect, relatively low levels of negativeaffect, and the overall judgment that one’s life is a good one

third variables: unmeasured factors that produce apparent but spurious associations betweentwo variables

validity: degree to which a measure actually ascertains what it purports to measure

victory: winning at whatever matters most

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Myers, D. G. (1993). The pursuit of happiness. New York: Avon.

Magem, Z. (1998). Exploring adolescent happiness: Commitment, purpose, and fulfillment. ThousandOaks, CA: Sage.

Lykken, D. (2000). Happiness: The nature and nurture of joy and contentment. New York: St.Martin’s.

Argyle, M. (2001). The psychology of happiness (2nd ed.). East Sussex, England: Routledge.

Cloninger, C. R. (2004). Feeling good: The science of well-being. New York: Oxford University Press.

Journal of Happiness Studies

Social Indicators Research

Articles

Diener, E., & Diener, C. (1996). Most people are happy. Psychological Science, 7, 181–185.

Myers, D. G., & Diener, E. (1995). Who is happy? Psychological Science, 6, 10–19.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999). If we are so rich, why aren’t we happy? American Psychologist, 54,821–827.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research onhedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 141–166.

Peterson, C., Park, N., & Seligman, M. E. (2005). Orientations to happiness and life satisfaction:The full life versus the empty life. Journal of Happiness Studies, 6, 25–41.

Web Sites

http://www.nunstudy.org. “The Nun Study is a longitudinal study of aging and Alzheimer’sdisease funded by the National Institute on Aging. Participants are 678 American members ofthe School Sisters of Notre Dame religious congregation who are 75 to 106 years of age.”

http://www.authentichappiness.org. This Web site is associated with Martin Seligman’s (2002)trade book on positive psychology, Authentic Happiness, and contains life satisfaction surveysthat can be taken on-line.

http://www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness. “The World Database of Happiness is an ongoingregister of scientific research on subjective appreciation of life. It brings together findings thatare scattered throughout many studies and provides a basis for synthetic studies.”

http://www.psych.uiuc.edu/~ediener. This is the University of Illinois Web site of Ed Diener,one of the world’s leading investigators of life satisfaction and happiness.

http://www.cob.vt.edu/market/isqols. This is the Web site of the International Society forQuality-of-Life Studies, “an international society whose purpose[s] are to promote andencourage research in the field of quality-of-life (QOL) studies.”

Films

A Christmas Carol (1951)

Dr. Seuss’s How the Grinch Stole Christmas (1966)

Gandhi (1982)

Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control (1997)

ABC News Special: “The Mystery of Happiness: Who Has It … How to Get It” (1998)

Songs

“Don’t Worry, Be Happy” (Bobby McFerrin)

“Girls Just Want to Have Fun” (Cyndi Lauper)

“Memories Are Made of This” (Dean Martin)

“Oh Happy Day” (Edwin Hawkins Singers)

“Walking on Sunshine” (Katrina & the Waves)

“With a Little Bit of Luck” (from My Fair Lady)

5Positive Thinking

The difficult is done immediately; the impossible takes just a little longer.—UNOFFICIAL MOTTO OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS

It is time to move from an examination of how we feel to how we think. The topics of hope andoptimism have been of interest to positive psychologists from the beginning and helped to set thestage for this new field. For many years, my own work as a psychologist focused on theconsequences of positive (and negative) thinking. Let me describe two of the studies I conducted.

The first began in the mid-1980s, when I flew from Roanoke, Virginia, to Boston to Hanover,New Hampshire. My destination was Dartmouth College and, more specifically, the research

archives of psychiatrist George Vaillant.1 Vaillant for years had been responsible for guiding aunique investigation: the Harvard Study of Adult Development. It began in the late 1930s whenresearchers received funding from the Grant Foundation to study people who are well and whodo well (Heath, 1945). Such a goal was as unusual then as it would have been anywhere untiljust a few years ago when positive psychology arrived on the scene to make a generic argument

in favor of such investigations.2

Through the matchmaking of our mutual colleague Marty Seligman, I was fortunate enoughto be invited by George Vaillant to use the study archives to investigate how styles of thinkingearly in life might be related to physical health later in life. There is plenty of speculation aboutsuch relations, and mind-body interaction has today reached clichéd status as something that“everyone knows” (chapter 9). But in the mid-1980s, as I gritted my teeth for my airplane flights,it was not so obvious that such relations existed or that they could be documented. If they wereto be found, however, the Harvard Study archive was the best place to look.

The original researchers were at Harvard University, and they turned to the college deans tonominate the best and the brightest of the young men attending their elite school. Approximately3% passed this test, and they were given extensive batteries of psychological and physical tests.They were interviewed about their childhoods. Information was carefully recorded.

These men have been followed ever since, with an attrition rate of essentially zero except fordeath. Although one can lament that the original sample was not more diverse—Harvard of the

1930s and 1940s after all had no female students and little demographic variety among its youngmen, who were mostly WASPs from the northeastern United States—the fact remains that thereare almost no other prospective studies of how life unfolds over the adult decades. The HarvardStudy has been a unique source of information about coping, wisdom, aging, mental health, andspirituality, among many other topics (e.g., Vaillant, 1977, 1983, 1995, 2002).

Almost all of the participants served in the U.S. armed forces during World War II. Somefinished college first, and others interrupted their college studies to ship out to Europe or thePacific. Regardless, most returned alive at the end of the war. In 1945, each responded to aquestionnaire asking him to describe in his own words the “difficult wartime experiences” he hadencountered.

It was these essays that I wanted to analyze because they were exactly the sort of writtenmaterial that would allow me to describe the writer as more versus less optimistic. I read theessays of a randomly selected 99 young men—which were usually several hundred words long,uniformly sincere, often eloquent, and (I must say) highly legible—on the lookout fordescriptions of bad events: setbacks, failures, frustrations, and disappointments. Everyone ofcourse reported such events, but my attention was directed at how each writer explained theircauses.

Did he do so by pointing to inherent flaws within himself and to factors that were chronic andpervasive? If so, I scored his essay at the pessimistic end of thinking. “I was not happy in theservice [because of my] … intrinsic dislike for the military.” Or did he explain bad events bydistancing himself from their causes and circumscribing them? “I was in danger during themilitary attack [because] ... I was not assigned a specific task that kept me in a single position.”If so, I scored his essay at the optimistic end of thinking. Appreciate that these ratings capturewhether a person believes that the future is something that can be different from the negativepast (optimism) or simply its relentless reincarnation (pessimism).

For days, I sat alone in a room reading and coding these essays. I knew nothing else about theresearch participants, although this information was of course available to Vaillant, who latercombined my ratings (after verification by my own research team back in Virginia) with hisratings of the health of the essay writers based on physical exams conducted every 5 years by theindividuals’ own doctors.

The results were straightforward and quite exciting. Thinking “good” as a young adultpredicted being “well” 35 years later. The more optimistic young men were more likely to be ingood health decades later (Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988). The correlation betweenoptimism and good health was not immediately evident, appearing first when the men were 40years old and reaching its most-robust level at age 45 (r= 0.37).

This study was my initial foray into positive psychology. It convinced me that attention to thepositive—in this case, positive thinking—could provide insight into life and more specificallythat people who were optimistic (cheerful, hopeful, sanguine) were not buffoons but people whomight have figured out something important about how to live the psychological good life(Peterson & Bossio, 1991).

My second foray into positive psychology solidified these conclusions. This was a researchproject headed by Harold Zullow at the University of Pennsylvania (Zullow, Oettingen, Peterson,& Seligman, 1988; Zullow & Seligman, 1990). The study was carried out as the U.S. presidentialrace of 1988 was heating up. In case you do not remember, this election pitted Vice PresidentGeorge H. Bush against Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis.

The question of interest was whether the professed optimism of a presidential candidatewould influence voters and the outcome of an election. At this point, we were thinking thatoptimism was often a beneficial stance for an individual, so this particular study promised to beintriguing because it tested whether optimism was contagious (in a good way) throughoutsociety. We coded as optimistic or pessimistic the acceptance speeches by all major candidates attheir party conventions in the previous presidential elections throughout the 20th century, aswell as the degree to which negative events were a focus in these speeches. From 1900 (Mc-Kinley versus Bryan) through 1984 (Reagan versus Mondale), the candidate who focused less onnegative events and expressed more optimism won 18 out of the 22 elections.

Honesty compels me to say that we did the same coding for Bush the Elder versus Dukakis,and we predicted before the election—based solely on our ratings—that Dukakis would win. So,make that 18 out of 23 elections won by the moreoptimistic candidate. This is still a strikingpattern that attracted a great deal of attention including I suspect from those who managepresidential campaigns. I have no inside information, but conspicuous about Bill Clinton circa

1992 was his upbeat and optimistic message to the American public:3 “I’m from a place calledHope.” In 1996, Bob Dole tried to counter with his own message: “I’m Bob Dole, and I’m themost optimistic man in America,” but hopefulness rolled easier off Clinton’s tongue.

Our attempts to distinguish presidential candidates based on their professed optimism hassince been a total failure (e.g., Peterson & Lee, 2000). Each loudly proclaims himself to be anoptimist and certainly more of an optimist than his opponent. Each says the sorts of things inspeeches that end up being scored by us as hopeful. Again, I wonder if the results of our earlierstudy had anything to do with this new way of campaigning. Regardless, the conclusion followsthat all things being equal, U.S. voters prefer an optimist over a pessimist as their leader, aconclusion consistent with the results of many other studies of everyday people leading theirlives (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993).

Cognitive PsychologyLet me place research on optimism in a broader context within psychology, starting with someterminology and a little history. Cognitive psychology is the field that studies how peopleacquire, retain, transform, and use knowledge (Sternberg & Smith, 1988). Among its centralconcerns are processes like attention, perception, learning, memory, judgment, decision making,and problem solving. Over the years, psychology has flip-flopped with respect to the importanceit has accorded cognition. The very first psychologists defined psychology as the study of themind—an inherently cognitive endeavor. But the influential approach of behaviorism dismissedthe importance of cognition and made psychology lose its mind (J. B. Watson, 1913).

Cognitive psychology is alive and well today because psychologists could not escape theimportance of cognition. It is impossible to speak about human beings without referring to theircapacity for knowledge. Even the simplest habits have mental aspects. Cognition underlies muchof what we regard as uniquely human: language, personal identity, and culture. These processeshelp us cope with the demands of the world in various ways.

Cognition regained a prominent place within psychology during the 1960s, so forcefully thatits reemergence has been dubbed the cognitive revolution (H. Gardner, 1985; Hilgard, 1987).Many place the beginning of modern cognitive psychology in 1967, when Cornell Universitypsychologist Ulric Neisser published his groundbreaking Cognitive Psychology.

Even someone as brilliant as Neisser did not invent a field from scratch, and as moderncognitive psychology took form, it fell into a way of describing the mind that had existed in theWestern world for thousands of years, at least since the Athenian philosophers. Many believedthat the mind was composed of a small number of rather independent faculties (e.g., memory,judgment, logic), each of which operated according to its own general principles regardless of the

specific content or subject matter.4 So, when psychologists studied learning and memory, theyasked research participants to memorize and recall lists of nonsense syllables; when they studiedjudgment, they asked for opinions about trivial matters. If content is irrelevant, then why notmake it simple?

There is one problem with this approach: Content does matter. Cognitive psychologists todaybelieve there to be few content-free or content-independent psychological processes. Instead, themind is composed of numerous cognitive modules each linked to a specific content and obeyingits own sorts of rules (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). For example, the processes responsible formemory differ according to the type of information to be recalled—faces, odors, or narrativesequences—and also how and when the information was initially encountered.

I am providing this background to explain why positive thinking has only recently receivedserious attention from research psychologists. Whether the content of thought was positive,

negative, or neutral was not deemed to be relevant—thinking was simply thinking—and thusresearchers often studied how people thought about innocuous (neutral) topics. However, one ofthe most important properties of the content of thought is whether it concerns positive ornegative matters, pleasant or unpleasant stimuli, good or bad topics. Even when researchers didnot go out of their way to find such effects on cognition, a huge number of findings nonethelessaccumulated showing that the hedonic tone of thought is a potent determinant of all sorts ofcognitive processes.

The Pollyanna Principle

In 1978, Margaret Matlin and David Stang summarized findings like those presented in Table5.1. As you can see, positive versus negative is a pervasive way of organizing the content ofthought and guiding cognitive processes. Often the positive seems to be the default. Apparently,in our minds, we are all residents of Lake Woebegone, where everyone and everything is aboveaverage.

Matlin and Stang termed this striking positive selectivity in thought the Pollyanna Principle,elevating Boucher and Osgood’s (1969) earlier “Pollyanna hypothesis” to a full-blown law of themind in recognition of the ubiquity of such findings. Whether this is really a principle is besidethe point. Suffice it to say that pleasantness predominates in thought.

Table 5.1. Evidence in Support of the Pollyanna Principle

People seek out positive stimuli and avoid negative stimuli.

People take longer to recognize what is unpleasant or threatening than what is pleasantand safe.

People report that they encounter positive stimuli more frequently than they actually do.

People believe that good events are more likely to occur than negative events, even whenthe objective probabilities are the same.

Pleasant stimuli are perceived as larger in size than unpleasant or neutral stimuli, evenwhen they are not.

People communicate good news more frequently than bad news.

In English, pleasant words have higher frequencies of use than negative words.

In English, the positive member of an antonym pair (e.g., optimism) entered the languagebefore the negative member (e.g., pessimism).

The positive member of antonym pairs is likely to be linguistically more basic.

In free association (when one is asked to say whatever comes into one’s mind in responseto a cue), people are more likely to respond with a positive word than a negative one.

When making lists of items—spewing them out—pleasant items appear before negativeones. For example, if we are asked to list people we know, we list our friends before ourenemies.

In such lists, people list more positive items than negative ones.

People are more accurate in recalling positive events than negative events.

People are more accurate in learning and recalling positive words than neutral or negativewords.

As time passes, events are remembered as increasingly pleasant.

People make the judgment “good” more rapidly to pleasant items than the judgment “bad”to unpleasant items.

People believe that most of the events in their lives are positive ones.

Most people believe that they are above average on positive traits like intelligence, drivingability, sense of humor, attractiveness, and optimism.

In general, people render positive judgments about most individuals, groups, topics, things,and circumstances. Even distilled water, which has no chemicals to trigger taste buds, israted by most people as being “rather pleasant” in its taste.

From Matlin & Stang, 1978

Selective Attention to the Negative

The predominance of the positive in cognition per se should not be confused with another“principle” of thought: the selective attention to the negative that often characterizesconsciousness. Psychologists usually define consciousness as awareness of one’s currentenvironment and mental life. A precise definition is elusive because awareness after all is asynonym for consciousness. Most theorists nevertheless agree that consciousness includesawareness of particular sensations, perceptions, needs, emotions, and thoughts. Cognition incontrast is a moreinclusive term that includes those thoughts of which we are aware at anymoment but also all of the processes that underlie our thoughts, some of which can be brought

into awareness and some of which cannot (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

Ornstein (1988) called consciousness the front page of the mind. Like a newspaper,consciousness contains what is new, surprising, and important to us. In normal wakingconsciousness, each of us monitors our ongoing experience. When something notable occurs, webring it front and center into awareness. Not everything makes it into consciousness, however,and normal waking consciousness is therefore characterized by selective attention (Johnston &Dark, 1986). Many of the tasks we perform during the day are automatic, and we perform themwithout being fully aware. Consider driving your car down an interstate highway. You driveperfectly well, but you are not attending to everything going on about you. Oops, watch out!There is an abandoned car on the shoulder up ahead. Suddenly your consciousness is engaged.There is a problem to be solved. You check your rearview mirror, put on your turn signal, andswing into the passing lane. The potential crisis is averted, and you return to what you werethinking about—which may have been nothing.

The appeasement of doubt is the motive for thought, wrote philosopher Charles Peirce (1878)more than a century ago, meaning that consciousness is engaged when something puzzlingoccurs. Many of these puzzling occurrences are negative and indeed urgent. Dennett (1991)followed this line of reasoning to sketch how the capacity for consciousness might have evolvedin the first place. Imagine an animal that focused its sensory systems on threats and thenmobilized its resources to deal optimally with them. Natural selection would presumably favorsuch orientation and mobilization, not just to specific stimuli but more generally. An animal thatprovided itself with occasional updates about its environment and internal state would have asurvival advantage over an animal that did not. Periodic vigilance of this sort would eventuallygive rise to regular exploration of the outer and inner worlds, obtaining information for its ownsake, because it might someday be valuable.

What has resulted in the modern human being is a creature much more aware of what isgoing wrong or could go wrong than what is going well. Another philosopher, Gilbert Ryle(1949), observed that competence requires no comment. We do not frequently stop and make theconscious observation that things are as they should be. Meanwhile, the default to the positiveplays itself out on a nonconscious level and is shown in all the ways described by the PollyannaPrinciple. Perhaps our selective attention to the negative explains why positive psychology is notsuch an obvious field and why some people think that life is tragic and that most individuals areflawed (chapter 1). Think about it.

In the rest of this chapter, I discuss positive thinking—optimism and hope—but keep in mindthe tension in thought that I have just sketched. If by positive thinking we mean thoughts thatare front and center in consciousness, positive thinking often shows itself about negative topics.To study optimism and hope, it is often useful to see how people think and respond in the wake

of challenge, setback, and failure.

What Is Optimism?Over the years, optimism as a style of thinking has had at best a checkered reputation. FromVoltaire’s (1759) Dr. Pangloss, who blathered that we live in the best of all possible worlds, toPorter’s (1913) Pollyanna, who celebrated every misfortune that she and others faced, tocontemporary celebrities who spin embarrassing news into something wonderful, so-calledoptimism has often given thoughtful people pause. Connotations of naïveté and denial haveadhered to the notion. In recent years, thanks to research by positive psychologists, optimismoccupies a more respected position, even among the sophisticated.

Indeed, as exemplified in the Harvard Study described earlier, optimism has demonstrablebenefits, and pessimism has drawbacks. Optimism, conceptualized and assessed in a variety ofways, has been linked to positive mood and good morale; to perseverance and effective problemsolving; to academic, athletic, military, occupational, and political success; to popularity; to goodhealth; and even to long life and freedom from trauma. Pessimism, in contrast, foreshadowsdepression, passivity, failure, social estrangement, morbidity, and mortality. These lines ofresearch are surprisingly uniform, so much so that an optimism bandwagon has been created,within positive psychology and among the general public. There is growing interest in howoptimism can be encouraged among the young and how pessimism can be reversed among theold.

Let me start with a review of what we have learned about optimism, but my eventual purposehere is to discuss its future both as a research interest of positive psychologists and as a socialvalue. I believe that these futures are entwined. Optimism as a research topic began to flourish inthe contemporary United States precisely when people in general started to become more hopefulabout the future.

The danger of this coupling is twofold. First, some of the documented benefits of optimism—at least as typically studied—may be bounded. In some circumstances, it can have costs, althoughcontemporary researchers rarely look for these qualifying conditions. Second, even if it needs tobe contextualized, optimism as a research topic deserves to be more than a fad. A sophisticatedoptimism can be most beneficial to individuals in trying circumstances, and it behoovespsychologists to learn as much as possible about the topic right now, so that these lessons can bedeployed in other times and places where they can do the most good.

A useful definition of optimism was offered by anthropologist Lionel Tiger (1979): “a moodor attitude associated with an expectation about the social or material future—one which theevaluator regards as socially desirable, to his [or her] advantage, or for his [or her] pleasure” (p.

18). An important implication of this definition, one drawn out by Tiger himself, is that there canbe no single or objective optimism, at least as characterized by its content, because what isconsidered optimism depends on what the individual regards as desirable. Optimism ispredicated on evaluation—on given affects and emotions, as it were.

Contemporary approaches usually treat it as a cognitive characteristic—a goal, anexpectation, or a causal attribution—which is sensible so long as we remember that the belief inquestion concerns future occurrences about which individuals have strong feelings. Optimism isnot simply cold cognition, and if we forget the emotional flavor that pervades optimism, we canmake little sense of the fact that it is both motivated and motivating. People may well need tofeel optimistic about matters. We should not be surprised that optimism and pessimism can havedefensive aspects as well as ego-enhancing ones (Norem, 2001; Norem & Cantor, 1986).

Along these lines, we can ask whether people can be generically optimistic, that is, hopefulwithout specific expectations. Although at odds with conventional definitions, the possibility offree-floating optimism deserves scrutiny. Some people readily describe themselves as optimisticyet fail to endorse expectations consistent with this view of themselves. This phenomenon maymerely be a style of self-presentation, but it might additionally reflect the emotional andmotivational aspects of optimism without any of the cognitive aspects. Perhaps extraversion or

positive affectivity is related to this cognitively shorn version of optimism.5

Optimism as Human Nature

Discussions of optimism take two forms. In the first, it is posited as an inherent part of humannature, either to be praised or decried. Early approaches to optimism as human nature weredecidedly negative. Writers as diverse as Sophocles and Nietzsche argued that it prolongs humansuffering: better to face the hard facts of reality. This negative view of positive thinking lies atthe heart of Sigmund Freud’s influential writings on the subject.

In The Future of an Illusion, Freud (1927/1953c) decided that optimism was widespread butillusory. For Freud, optimism helps to make civilization possible, particularly wheninstitutionalized in the form of religious beliefs about an afterlife. But it comes with a price: thedenial of our instinctual nature and hence the denial of reality. Religious optimism compensatespeople for the sacrifices necessary for civilization and is at the core of what Freud termed the“universal obsessional neurosis” of humanity.

Freud proposed that optimism is part of human nature but only as a derivative of the conflictbetween instincts and socialization. Some individuals—Freud mentioned the educated and, inparticular, neurologists—did not need the illusion of optimism, although the masses were bestleft with their “neurosis” intact and the belief that God was a benevolent father who wouldshepherd them through life and beyond. Only with this belief and its associated fear that God

would retaliate against them if they transgressed would people be law abiding. According toFreud, a rational prohibition against murder is not compelling to the masses. It is morepersuasive to assert that the prohibition comes directly from God.

As psychodynamic ideas became popular, Freud’s formula equating (religious) optimism andillusion had widespread impact. Although no mental health professional asserted that extremepessimism should be the standard of health—pessimism of this sort was presumably due tofixation at an early psychosexual stage—most theorists pointed to the accurate perception ofreality as the epitome of good psychological functioning: “The perception of reality is calledmentally healthy when what the individual sees corresponds to what is actually there” (Jahoda,1958, p. 6). Similar statements were offered by the entire gamut of influential psychologists andpsychiatrists from the 1930s through the 1960s: Allport, Erikson, Fromm, Maslow, Menninger,and Rogers, among many others (see Snyder, 1988, and S. E. Taylor, 1989, for thoroughreviews).

Never mind that one cannot know what is “actually there” in the future until it happens, andnever mind that Freud acknowledged that an illusory belief was not necessarily a false one.“Reality testing” became the hallmark of the healthy individual, and psychotherapists took astheir task the need to expose people to reality, however painful it might be. This is reasonable asfar as it goes, especially when applied to here-and-now reality, but the twist is that only the mostmodest expectations about the future could pass muster as realistic, and anything else wasregarded as denial (Akhtar, 1996).

Matters began to change in the 1960s and 1970s in light of research evidence showing thatmost people are not strictly realistic or accurate in how they think. Cognitive psychologistsdocumented an array of shortcuts that people take as they process information (Kahneman &Tversky, 1973). And as already described, Matlin and Stang (1978) surveyed hundreds of studiesshowing that language, memory, and thought are selectively positive.

The skeptical fan of a harsh reality might dismiss these findings as demonstrating only howwidespread optimistic illusions are, but it proved more difficult to dismiss results showing thatpsychologically healthy people in particular showed the positivity bias. Richard Lazarus (1983)described what he called “positive denial” and showed that it can be associated with well-beingin the wake of adversity. Aaron Beck (1967) began to develop his influential cognitive approachto depression and its treatment, a cornerstone of which was the assertion that depression was acognitive disorder characterized by negative views about the self, experience, and the future—that is, pessimism and hopelessness.

At least early in the course of his theory development, Beck was still influenced by theprevailing view of mental health as grounded in the facts of the matter because he described

depressives as illogical. By implication, nondepressives are logical—i.e., rational informationprocessors—although there was no good reason for this assumption. Part of cognitive therapy isthe design of experiments to “test” negative views, but the procedures are geared to guaranteeingthe results of these experiments. Furthermore, cognitive therapists never attempt to falsify theoccasionally positive view that a depressive might bring to therapy (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery,1979). In any event, Beck (1991) later modified his theory by acknowledging that nondepressedindividuals were not necessarily “logical” in their thinking, because they can bring a positive biastoward their ongoing experiences and expectations for the future.

Anthony Greenwald’s (1980) statement likening human nature to a totalitarian regime wasanother turning point in how optimism was regarded by psychologists. According to Greenwald,the self can be regarded as an organization of knowledge about one’s history and identity. Thisorganization is biased by information-control strategies analogous to those used by totalitarianpolitical regimes. Everyone engages in an ongoing process of creating and revising her ownpersonal history (McAdams, 1993). The story each of us tells about ourselves is necessarilyegocentric: Each of us is the central figure in our own narratives. Each of us takes credit for goodevents and eschews responsibility for bad events. Each of us resists changes in how we think. Insum, the ego maintains itself in the most self-flattering way possible, and it has at its disposal allof the psychological mechanisms documented by Matlin and Stang (1978).

Yet another turning point in the view of optimism was Shelley Taylor and Jonathan Brown’s(1988) literature review of research on positive illusions. They described a variety of evidenceshowing that people in general are biased toward the positive, the exceptions being those whoare anxious or depressed. Taylor (1989) elaborated these ideas in her book Positive Illusions,where she proposed that the pervasive tendency to see oneself in the best possible light is a signof well-being. She distinguished optimism as an illusion from optimism as a delusion: Illusionsare responsive, albeit reluctantly, to reality, whereas delusions are not (Taylor, Collins, Skokan,& Aspinwall, 1989).

The strongest statement that optimism is an inherent aspect of human nature is found inTiger’s (1979) book Optimism: The Biology of Hope. He located optimism in the biology of ourspecies and argued that it is one of our most defining and adaptive characteristics. Tigerproposed that optimism is an integral part of human nature, selected for in the course ofevolution, developing along with our cognitive abilities and indeed the human capacity forculture.

Tiger even speculated that optimism drove human evolution. Because it entails thinking aboutthe future, it first appeared when people began to think ahead. Once people began to thinkahead, they could imagine dire consequences, including their own mortality. Something had todevelop to counteract the fear and paralysis that these thoughts might entail, and that something

was optimism. By this view, optimism is inherent in our makeup, not a derivative of some otherpsychological characteristic. Tiger went on to characterize optimism as easy to think, easy tolearn, and pleasing—what modern evolutionary psychologists describe as an “evolvedpsychological mechanism” (Buss, 1991, 1995).

Optimism as an Individual Difference

At the same time that optimism as human nature was being discussed in positive terms bytheorists like Lazarus, Beck, Taylor, and Tiger, other psychologists who were interested inindividual differences began to address optimism as a characteristic which people possess tovarying degrees. These two approaches are compatible. Our human nature provides a baselineoptimism, of which individuals show more versus less. Our experiences further influence thedegree to which we are optimistic or pessimistic.

There are numerous treatments of optimism as an individual difference. A definitive historyof their antecedents is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Peterson & Park, 1998), but certainlyI should acknowledge several intellectual precursors, starting with Alfred Adler’s (1910/1964,1927) “fictional finalism,” which is based on Vaihinger’s (1911) “as-if” philosophy. Kurt Lewin’s(1935, 1951) field theory and George Kelly’s (1955) personal construct theory providedinfluential frameworks for understanding how beliefs—optimistic, pessimistic, or whaever—channeled people’s behavior. Julian Rotter’s (1954, 1966) social learning theory and especiallyhis generalized expectations (locus of control and trust) legitimized an approach to personality interms of broad expectancies about the future.

Also important was the waning of traditional stimulus-response (S-R) approaches to learningand their replacement with cognitive accounts which emphasized expectancies (Peterson, Maier,& Seligman, 1993). According to S-R accounts, learning entails the acquisition of particularmotor responses in particular situations. Learning by this view entails the forging of associationsbetween stimuli and responses, and the more closely these are linked together in experience(contiguity), the more likely learning is to occur. Under the sway of behaviorism, learning wasthought to have no central (cognitive) representation.

Arguing against S-R views of learning were findings that the associations acquired inconditioning are strengthened not by contiguity per se but by contingency: the degree to whichstimuli provide new information about responses (Rescorla, 1968). S-R theory stresses onlytemporal contiguity between the response and the reinforcer, viewing the individual as trappedby the momentary co-occurrences of events. If a response is followed by a reinforcer, it isstrengthened even if there is no real (causal) relationship between them. In contrast, thecontingency view of learning proposes that individuals are able to detect cause-effectrelationships, separating momentary noncausal relationships from more enduring true ones

(Wasserman & Miller, 1997).

So, learning at its essence entails the discovery of “what leads to what” (Tolman, 1932).Because learning of this sort necessarily extends over time, it is sensible to view it in central(cognitive) terms. Although there is disagreement about the fine details of these centralrepresentations, it is clear that contingency learning is a critically important psychologicalprocess, linked to subsequent motivation, cognition, and emotion. Most theorists in this traditionhave opted to regard the representation of contingency learning as an expectation, in order toexplain how it is generalized across situations and projected across time. As I will explain shortly,most approaches to optimism as an individual difference adopt this approach, regardingoptimism as a generalized expectation that influences psychological processes in which learningis involved.

I will now briefly survey several of the currently popular approaches to optimism as anindividual difference. Not by coincidence, each has an associated self-report questionnaire thatallows efficient research. The correlates of these cognates of optimism have therefore beenextensively investigated. Optimism, however measured, is usually linked to desirablecharacteristics, like happiness, perseverance, achievement, and good health.

Most studies are cross-sectional, but the demonstrated correlates are usually interpreted asconsequences of optimism (chapter 4). Researchers have paid relatively little attention to theorigins of this individual difference and in particular to the possibility that its putative outcomesare alternatively or additionally its determinants. They have also paid little attention to thelarger web of belief in which optimism resides (Quine & Ullian, 1978). And the same lack ofattention is evident with respect to why optimism has such a wide array of correlates. Indeed,optimism is what I call a “Velcro construct.” Everything sticks to it for reasons that are notalways obvious.

Dispositional OptimismPsychologists Michael Scheier at Carnegie-Mellon University and Charles Carver at the Universityof Miami (1992) have studied a personality variable that they identify as dispositionaloptimism: the global expectation that good things will be plentiful in the future and bad thingsscarce. Scheier and Carver’s overriding perspective is in terms of how people pursue goals,defined as desirable values. To them, virtually all realms of human activity can be cast in goalterms, and people’s behavior entails the identification and adoption of goals and the regulation ofactions vis-à-vis these goals. They therefore refer to their approach as a “self-regulatory model”(Carver & Scheier, 1981).

Optimism enters into self-regulation when people ask themselves about impediments to the

achievement of the goals they have adopted. In the face of difficulties, do people nonethelessbelieve that goals can be achieved? If so, they are optimistic; if not, pessimistic. Optimism leadsto continued efforts to attain the goal, whereas pessimism leads to giving up.

Scheier and Carver (1985) measure optimism (versus pessimism) with a brief self-reportquestionnaire called the Life Orientation Test (LOT). Representative items, with whichrespondents agree or disagree, include:

1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.

2. If something can go wrong for me it will. (reverse-scored)

Positive expectations are usually combined with (reverse-scored) negative expectations, and theresulting measure is investigated with respect to health, happiness, and coping with adversity(e.g., Carver et al., 1993; Carver & Scheier, 2003; Scheier & Carver, 1987, 1992; Scheier, Carver,& Bridges, 2001; Scheier et al., 1989, 1999; Strack, Carver, & Blaney, 1987). Results show thatdispositional optimism is moderately linked to desirable outcomes and in particular to active and

effective coping (Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986).6

Explanatory StyleWith my colleagues, I have approached optimism in terms of an individual’s characteristicexplanatory style—how one explains the causes of bad events (Buchanan & Seligman, 1995). Asdetailed earlier when I described the Harvard Study of Adult Development and the presidentialelection study, people who explain bad events in a circumscribed way—with external, unstable,and specific causes—can be described as optimistic, whereas those who favor internal, stable,and global causes can be described as pessimistic.

The notion of explanatory style emerged from the attributional reformulation of the learnedhelplessness model (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Briefly, the original helplessnessmodel proposed that following experience with uncontrollable aversive events, animals andpeople become helpless—passive and unresponsive—presumably because they have “learned”that there is no contingency between actions and outcomes (Maier & Seligman, 1976). Thislearning is represented as a generalized expectancy that future outcomes will be unrelated totheir responses. It is this generalized expectation of response-outcome independence thatproduces later helplessness.

Explanatory style was added to the helplessness model to better account for the boundaryconditions of human helplessness following uncontrollability. When is helplessness general, andwhen is it circumscribed? People who encounter a bad event ask “why?” Their causal attributiondetermines how they respond to the event. If it is a stable (long-lasting) cause, helplessness ischronic. If it is a pervasive (global) cause, helplessness is widespread. If it is an internal cause,

self-esteem suffers.

All things being equal, people have a habitual way of explaining bad events—an explanatorystyle—and this explanatory style is posited as a distal influence on helplessness followingadversity (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Explanatory style can be measured with a self-reportquestionnaire called the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ), which gives respondentshypothetical events involving themselves and asks them to provide “the one major cause” of eachevent if it were to happen to them (Peterson et al., 1982). Respondents then rate these providedcauses along dimensions of internality, stability, and globality. The ratings are combined,separately for bad events and good events. Explanatory style for bad events is usuallyindependent of explanatory style for good events. Explanatory style based on bad events usuallyhas more robust correlates than explanatory style based on good events, although correlationsare typically in the opposite direction (Peterson, 1991).

A second way of measuring explanatory style is with a content analysis procedure—the CAVE(an acronym for Content Analysis of Verbatim Explanations)—that allows written or spokenmaterials to be scored for naturally occurring causal explanations (Peterson, Schulman, Castellon,& Seligman, 1992). Researchers identify explanations for bad events, extract them, and presentthem to judges, who rate them along the scales of the ASQ. The CAVE technique makes possiblelongitudinal studies after the fact, so long as spoken or written materials can be located fromearly in the lives of individuals for whom long-term outcomes of interest are known.

Remember that the generalized expectation of response-outcome independence ishypothesized as the proximal cause of helplessness, even though research in this tradition hasrarely looked at this mediating variable. Rather, researchers measure explanatory style andcorrelate it with outcomes thought to revolve around helplessness: depression, illness, and failurein academic, athletic, and vocational realms. Invariably, an optimistic explanatory style isassociated with good outcomes (Peterson & Park, 1998), with one apparent exception: Relative topessimists, those with an optimistic explanatory style underestimate the likelihood of future bad

events7 (Peterson & Vaidya, 2001). Optimists believe that they can forestall such events throughtheir own actions, and—as other research shows—sometimes they are right (Peterson & de Avila,1995).

As explanatory style research has progressed and the theory has been modified, theinternality dimension has seen less emphasis. It has more inconsistent correlates than do stabilityor globality; it is less reliably assessed; and there are theoretical grounds for doubting that it hasa direct impact on expectations per se (Peterson, 1991). Indeed, internality may well conflateself-blame and self-efficacy, which would explain why it fares poorly in empirical research. In amodification of the helplessness reformulation, Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989)emphasized only stability and globality.

The most important recent chapter in helplessness research was the reframing of explanatorystyle by Marty Seligman (1991) in his book Learned Optimism, in which he described how hislifelong interest in what can go wrong with people changed into an interest in what can go right(Seligman, 1975). Research on helplessness was flipped into an interest in what Seligman calledoptimism, although he could have called it mastery, effectance, or control. His terminology isjustified by the central concern in helplessness theory with expectations, but it is worthemphasizing yet again that these expectations tend not to be explicitly studied. The Nikki Storynotwithstanding (chapter 2), perhaps the real origin of positive psychology dates to Seligman’sreframing of explanatory style years earlier.

Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) asserted that everything learned about helplessness(pessimism) informs what we know about optimism, but this statement is glib and at odds withpositive psychology as we have since articulated it. Optimism is not simply the absence ofpessimism, and well-being is not simply the absence of helplessness. Research on learnedoptimism (i.e., optimistic explanatory style) will not be as substantial as it might be if it remainsclosely tied to helplessness theory. I will return to this point later in the chapter.

On one level, the Scheier and Carver approach is congruent with our approach. LOTcorrelates and ASQ/CAVE correlates are strikingly similar, and measures of the two constructstend to converge when they are—rarely—examined together in the same study. However, acloser look reveals some critical differences. The LOT is a pure measure of expectation—veryclose to the dictionary definitions of optimism and pessimism. An optimistic expectation leads tothe belief that goals can be achieved, although it is neutral with respect to how this will happen.In contrast, the ASQ measures perceived causality, so it is additionally influenced by people’sbeliefs about how goals are brought about. Said another way, optimistic explanatory style is moreinfused with agency than is dispositional optimism.

HopeThese two visions of optimism—expectation and agency—are integrated in a third approach,studies of hope by psychologist Rick Snyder (1994) at the University of Kansas. Snyder tracedthe origins of his thinking to the earlier work of Averill, Catlin, and Chon (1990) and of Stotland(1969), in which hope was cast in terms of people’s expectations that goals could be achieved.According to Snyder’s view, goal-directed expectations are composed of two separatecomponents. The first is agency, and it reflects someone’s determination that goals can beachieved. The second is identified as pathways: the individual’s belief that successful plans can begenerated to reach goals. The second component is Snyder’s novel contribution, not found in anyother formulation of optimism as an individual difference.

Hope so defined is measured with a brief self-report scale (Snyder et al., 1991).Representative items, with which respondents agree or disagree, include:

1. I energetically pursue my goals. (agency)

2. There are lots of ways around any problem. (pathways)

The responses are combined by averaging, and scores have been examined with respect to goalexpectancies, perceived control, self-esteem, positive emotions, coping, and achievement. Thetypical results show that hope is beneficial, as expected (Snyder, 2000, 2002).

Issues in OptimismLet me turn to the future of optimism, focusing on issues that deserve attention both by positivepsychologists and by people in general. To set the stage for this discussion, let me introduce adistinction between two types of optimism (Tiger, 1979).

Little Optimism Versus Big Optimism

Little optimism subsumes specific expectations about positive outcomes: “I will find aconvenient parking space this evening.” Big optimism refers—obviously—to larger and less-specific expectations: “Our nation is on the verge of something great.” The big versus littleoptimism distinction reminds us that optimism can be described at different levels of abstractionand that it may function differently depending on the level. Big optimism may be a biologicallygiven tendency filled in by culture with a socially acceptable content; it leads to desirableoutcomes because it produces a general state of vigor and resilience. In contrast, little optimismmay be the product of an idiosyncratic learning history; it leads to desirable outcomes because itpredisposes specific actions that are adaptive in given situations.

Said another way, the mechanisms linking optimism to outcomes might vary according to thetype of optimism on focus. For example, one of the striking correlates of optimism is good health.This link seems to reflect several different mediators, including immunological robustness(Kamen-Siegel, Rodin, Seligman, & Dwyer, 1991; Scheier et al., 1999; Segerstrom, Taylor,Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998; Udelman, 1982), absence of negative mood (Weisse, 1992), and health-promoting behavior (Peterson, Seligman, Yurko, Martin, & Friedman, 1998). The big versus littledistinction helps us to understand which pathways are involved in given instances of well-being(Peterson & Bossio, 1991). The trajectory of severe illnesses such as AIDS or cancer may be betterpredicted by big optimism working through the immune system and mood, whereas the onset ofdisease and the likelihood of traumatic injuries might be more influenced by little optimismworking through behavior and concrete lifestyle (Peterson et al., 2001).

What exactly is the relationship between little and big optimism? Empirically, the two are no

doubt correlated, but it is possible to imagine someone who is a little optimist but a bigpessimist, or vice versa. It is also possible to imagine situations in which big optimism hasdesirable consequences but not little optimism, or vice versa. The determinants of the two maybe different, and encouraging them therefore requires different strategies.

Researchers need to approach the big versus little distinction more deliberately. On the faceof it, the dispositional optimism measure of Carver and Scheier and the hope measure of Snydertap big optimism because they ask people to respond to generalizations about the future. Incontrast, measures of explanatory style—especially the CAVE technique—tap a smaller optimismbecause the focus is on specific causal explanations for concrete events. Studies to date haverarely included more than one optimism measure at a time, and those that do have been moreinterested in how measures agree than with the possibility that they have different patterns ofcorrelates.

Again, What Is Optimism?

In addition to the little-big distinction, there are other theoretical issues that need to beaddressed. Let me repeat that optimism is not just a cognitive characteristic; it has inherentemotional and motivational components (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Researchers often seem toregard emotion and motivation as outcomes that are separate from optimism per se. At least inthe case of big optimism, this assumption may not be warranted.

We ask different questions if we see emotion and motivation as part of big optimism. Howdoes optimism feel (Peterson, 1999)? Is it happiness, joy, mild mania, or simply contentment? Isthe optimistic person in flow, actively engaged in what she is doing but not self-consciouslymindful (chapter 3)? Positive psychologists have argued that positive emotions broaden aperson’s cognitive and behavioral repertoire (chapter 3). Is this true as well for big optimism? Weknow that optimism is linked to perseverance, but is it associated as well with a good choice ofgoals, those that lend themselves to pursuit and eventual attainment? As Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser,and Deci (1996) discussed, not all goals are of equal merit for different individuals, given theirparticular psychological makeup and context. Is optimism therefore associated with the choice ofgoals that facilitate authenticity in this sense?

There are probably activities that satisfy a person’s need to be optimistic but are—ultimately—pointless, the psychological equivalent of junk food. Are video games, the Internet, mysterynovels, gambling, and collecting thimbles or match-books analogous to empty calories, activitieswhose pursuit consumes time and energy because they engage optimism but eventually leave uswith nothing, individually or collectively?

Optimism and Pessimism

Another issue has to do with the relationship between optimism and pessimism. They are usuallyregarded as mutually exclusive, but surprisingly there is evidence that they are not. For example,the optimism and pessimism items in Scheier and Carver’s LOT prove somewhat independent ofone another. This lack of correlation can be regarded as a methodological nuisance, but it isworth considering the possibility that some people expect both good things and bad things to beplentiful. Such individuals could be described as having hedonically rich expectations as opposedto misbehaving on a questionnaire. Are they living life fully, or are they ambivalent andconfused? Distinguishing between optimism and pessimism allows an intriguing question to beinvestigated: Are there effects of optimism above and beyond those of the absence of pessimism(Robinson-Whelen, Kim, MacCallum, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1997)?

Along these lines, as I have already noted, explanatory style derived from attributions aboutbad events is usually independent of explanatory style based on attributions about good events.The former is usually identified as the optimistic explanatory style, in part because the correlatesare stronger, but a step back reveals this to be curious. Attributions about bad events(presumably linked to expectations about such events) are identified as optimistic or pessimistic,whereas attributions about good events are not. One would think it should be just the opposite, apoint made by Snyder (1995) when he described explanatory style as a strategy of excusemaking. This criticism is blunted—but only somewhat—when internality-externality is removedfrom the meaning of the construct.

The concern of helplessness theorists with attributions about bad events is explained by theoutcomes of historical interest: depression, failure, and illness. Optimism is correlated with theirabsence, and pessimism with their presence. Explanatory style research has led to increasedunderstanding of these problematic states. But appreciate that the zero point of these typicaloutcome measures signifies, respectively, not being depressed, not failing, and not being ill. If wewant to extend findings past these zero points to offer conclusions about emotional fulfillment,achievement, and wellness, we may or may not be on firm ground. Perhaps explanatory stylebased on attributions about good events would then be more relevant. In any event, positivesocial science needs to study not just independent variables that pertain to strength but alsoappropriate dependent variables (chapter 1).

As you know, optimism research helped to usher in positive psychology, but perhaps it is timefor positive psychology to shape how optimism research unfolds. Psychological well-being cannotbe viewed simply as the absence of distress and conflict, any more than good health is theabsence of disease (chapter 9). Discussions of what well-being entails are ongoing in variousresearch and theoretical literatures (e.g., Barsky, 1988; Seeman, 1989; Vaillant, 2003), and theseneed to inform lines of inquiry concerned with optimism. I believe that big optimism might be amore potent influence on well-being than little optimism.

In the typical demonstration of learned helplessness, animals or people exposed to aversiveevents which they cannot control show deficits at problem solving relative to research subjectsexposed to aversive events which they can control and to subjects given no prior experience withaversive events; these latter two groups do not differ from one another (Peterson, Maier, &Seligman, 1993). Prior experience with controllable events confers no apparent benefit. Perhapsthis is because the baseline assumption is that control exists, or to say it another way, individualsare optimistic unless there is a reason not to be.

If the test tasks are changed, however, prior experience with controllable events does have ademonstrable effect: enhanced persistence at a difficult or unsolvable task. Theorists havediscussed this opposite manifestation of learned helplessness under such rubrics as learnedhopefulness, learned industriousness, learned mastery, learned relevance, and learned resourcefulness(e.g., Eisenberger, 1992; Mackintosh, 1975; Rosenbaum & Jaffe, 1983; Volpicelli, Ulm, Altenor, &Seligman, 1983; Zimmerman, 1990). Outcome measures have to allow the benefit to be manifest.

In choosing appropriate measures, it behooves optimism researchers to examine the literatureon resilience (Anthony & Cohler, 1987). Here we see an interest in children growing up in direcircumstances who not only survive but thrive. Their resilience is only evident if we choosemeasures that reflect thriving. Resilience depends critically on a supportive relationship withanother person. Could the same be true of optimism in the face of adversity? Much of theoptimism literature is curiously asocial. Researchers do not even distinguish between privateversus public (socially communicated) optimism, which would seem to be an importantdistinction. The emphasis is quite individualistic, but optimism may be as much an interpersonalcharacteristic as an individual one.

The Reality Basis of Optimism

One more important issue is the relationship between optimism and reality. Optimism can havecosts if it is too unrealistic. Consider “unrealistic optimism” as described by Weinstein (1989)with respect to people’s perceptions of their personal risk for illnesses and mishaps. When peopleare asked to provide a percentage estimate in comparison to their peers that they will somedayexperience an illness or injury, most underestimate their risks. The average individual seeshimself as below average in risk for a variety of maladies, which of course cannot be.

This phenomenon is appropriately lamented because it might lead people to neglect the basicsof health promotion and maintenance. More generally, optimism in the form of wishful thinkingcan distract people from making concrete plans about how to attain goals (Oettingen, 1996).Unrelenting optimism precludes the caution, sobriety, and conservation of resources thataccompany sadness as a normal and presumably adaptive response to disappointment andsetback (Nesse & Williams, 1996).

For another example, consider the personality variable of “John Henryism” (James, Hartnett,& Kalsbeek, 1983; James, LaCroix, Kleinbaum, & Strogatz, 1984). Inspired by the railroad workerof folklore, who won a contest against a steam hammer but died thereafter of a heart attack, thisindividual difference reflects the degree to which African Americans believe that they can controlall events in their lives solely through hard work and determination. Individuals who score highon the John Henryism measure but are low in socioeconomic status are apt to be hypertensive(James, Strogatz, Wing, & Ramsey, 1987).

Constant striving for control over events without the resources to achieve it can take a toll onthe individual who faces an objective limit to what can be attained regardless of how hard sheworks. If optimism is to survive as a social virtue, then the world must have a causal texture thatallows this stance to produce valued rewards. If not, people will channel their efforts intounattainable goals and become exhausted, ill, and demoralized. Or people may rechannel theirinherent optimism into attainable but undesirable goals.

Positive social science should not become so focused on optimism as a psychologicalcharacteristic that it ignores how it is influenced by external situations, including other people.This danger is clear in the case of little optimism, where we can easily decide that a given beliefis wrong. It is less easy to see in the case of big optimism, but even here we can use the broadervantage of history or aggregate data to realize that some widely shared big goals are just asunrealistic as the expectation that someone can lead a life free of illness and injury.

Simply put, people should be optimistic when the future can be changed by positive thinkingbut not otherwise. This advice reflects what Seligman (1991) called a “flexible or complexoptimism,” a psychological strategy worth exercising when appropriate as opposed to a reflex orhabit over which we have no control:

You can choose to use optimism when you judge that less depression, or moreachievement, or better health is the issue. But you can also choose not to use it,when you judge that clear sight or owning up is called for. Learning optimism doesnot erode your sense of values or your judgment. Rather it frees you to … achievethe goals you set. … Optimism’s benefits are not unbounded. Pessimism has a role toplay, both in society at large and in our own lives; we must have the courage toendure pessimism when its perspective is valuable. (p. 292)

Particularly in the case of little optimism, people need to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of thebelief in question.

When there is room for doubt, people should fill the gap with hope. Big optimism can bemore hopeful than little optimism, which has a greater press to be accurate. I assume that bigand little optimism are redundant for many people. Positive psychologists should think about

how to help people disaggregate the two in a useful way, to teach them how to have dreams butnot fantasies—illusions without delusions. The prior question, of course, is what otherpsychological characteristics need to be in place for an individual to exercise flexible optimism?

The Cultivation of Optimism

Despite the cautions I have just raised, there is abundant reason to believe that optimism—big,little, and in between—is useful because positive expectations can be self-fulfilling. How can weset optimism in place for the young? Gillham, Reivich, Jaycox, and Seligman (1995) created anintervention—the Penn Resiliency Program (PRP)—using strategies from the cognitive-behavioral therapy realm to teach grade-school children to be more optimistic. Results to datesuggest that this kind of training makes subsequent episodes of depression less likely. I point outagain that the absence of depression should not be the only outcome that interests us. We alsowant to know if optimistic children end up happy and healthy, wealthy and wise, with rich socialnetworks and rewarding pursuits.

If big optimism is truly part of human nature, then we need to be concerned with somewhatdifferent matters. First, how can optimism be channeled in one direction rather than another? AsI will discuss shortly, optimism in the United States has long been entwined with individualism.Is there any way to harness our inherent optimism to include a concern with the commons? Canoptimism about one’s neighbor ever be made as satisfying as optimism about oneself?

Religion can provide some answers. Indeed, Tiger (1979) argued that religions arose at leastin part to tap the biologically given need of people to be optimistic. Religious thought lends itselfparticularly well to big optimism because of its certainty. Tiger observed, much as Freud(1927/1953c) did decades earlier, that religion is more amenable to optimism than is science,which is explicitly tentative and probabilistic in its pronouncements.

Secular social scientists interested in optimism often ignore the close link between optimismand religion, with the exception of an investigation by Sethi and Seligman (1993) which studiedthe causal explanations contained in religious texts. Across Christian, Jewish, and Muslim texts,conservative tracts were more optimistic than liberal ones. Can we generalize from this result,juxtaposing it with research on the benefits of optimism, and conclude that fundamentalists arebetter off than their reformed colleagues? This possibility deserves further investigation. We canonly hope that researchers will be willing to follow the data where they might lead (Schumaker,1992).

Second, how can we prevent optimism from being thwarted? Here there is no mystery. Stressand trauma of all sorts take their toll on optimism, and to the degree that people can lead less-terrible lives, optimism would be served. We do not want to create a life without challengebecause perseverance can only be encouraged when people meet and surmount difficulties, but

we need to make sure that difficulties can indeed be surmounted.

Also contributing to optimism is social learning. I assume that optimism can be acquired bymodeling—vicariously, as it were—so we need to be attentive to the messages our childrenreceive about the world and how it works. Explanatory styles of parents and children converge,and although part of the reason for this may be shared experiences or genetic predispositions, itcould also reflect the wholesale transmittal of belief systems via modeling (Seligman et al.,1984). And what about messages from the popular media, which are as mixed vis-à-vis optimismas they are on any other subject? Rags-to-riches stories—unrealistic parables suggesting thatanything and everything wonderful is possible—are juxtaposed on the evening news with storiesabout the horrors that lurk around every corner (Levine, 1977).

Third, what can we do to rekindle optimism that has been thwarted? We know that cognitivetherapy as developed by Aaron Beck effectively targets pessimistic explanatory style in such away as to alleviate depression and prevent its recurrence (Seligman et al., 1988). Again, studieslike this need to be enriched by additional outcome measures. Does cognitive therapy merely getthe person back to a nondepressed mode, or does it further enrich the individual? Does it affectbig optimism as much as little optimism?

The human potential movement began in the 1960s by using “therapy” techniques withnormal people in an attempt to make them supernormal (Tomkins, 1976). Whether thissucceeded is debatable, but is there some equivalent here with respect to optimism training?What happens when cognitive-behavioral therapy is used with nonpessimistic people? Dosuperoptimists result, and what are they like? Are they the epitome of well-being or caricaturesof positive thinking like Dr. Pangloss and Pollyanna? You can find out for yourself by trying theexercise at the end of this chapter.

Optimism and Society

Do cultures or historical eras differ in their characteristic optimism? The answer is probably noinsofar as our focus is on the biggest optimism. Big optimism makes society possible, and apessimistic civilization cannot survive for long. Indeed, societies make available to peoplecountless ways of satisfying their need to be optimistic about matters:

One of the recurrent themes of human culture has to do with contests—with playwhich is given an effortful structure and in which some more or less entertainingactivity takes place but with an uncertain outcome. Countless humans affiliate withteams, boxers, billiard players, gymnasts, skaters, racers, runners, divers and cheerfor them to win and feel despondent when they lose. … Contests have a great deal todo with the matter of optimism and they may well be one of the commonest

expressions of a way of behaving which … is common anyway. Contests are usuallyoptional. … Certainly no one is required to take the fan’s role. (Tiger, 1979, p. 250)

But of course many of us do take on this role, and even fans of the Chicago Cubs find a way to beoptimistic about next season, when of course everything will be different (McAdams, 2005).

Virtually all societies have contests, but striking differences exist across societies in terms ofmost other ways of feeling and being optimistic. As noted, the goals considered desirable willvary from person to person, group to group, culture to culture. Other than a nebulous belief inprogress and some human universals like contests, there is considerable variation across culturesin the content of optimism (e.g., Chang, 1996; Heine & Lehman, 1995; Lee & Seligman, 1997).Here is another fruitful topic for examination by researchers and members of a given society.What are the goals that a society holds up as most desirable, and how optimistic are members ofthat society vis-à-vis those goals?

In the United States, the biggest goals of most people include individual choices, individualrights, and individual fulfillments. Americans are greatly occupied with what they can andcannot accomplish in their everyday lives and in particular with what they can acquire. In acapitalist society, people’s acquisition of material goods and their concomitant fascination withthe money that allows them to do so represent a socially sanctioned way of satisfying theoptimistic force that organizes the entire culture. The downside of optimism satisfied in this wayis the stranglehold of greed.

In the United States today, we live with shallow materialism (chapter 7). People even turnthemselves into commodities. We want to be marketable, to keep our options open, to cash in onwhat happens to us, even our misfortunes. “Because it will look good on my resume” is arationale I increasingly hear from my students as an explanation for why they are pursuing someseemingly selfless and good activity. No wonder people are alienated, and no wonder depressionis on the rise among young adults (Robins et al., 1984).

Only the crassness of this rationale is new. There has long been a tradition in the UnitedStates of self-help books promising people success if only they think positively (Starker, 1989).As emphasized, though, optimism need not be attached just to selfish concerns, and it need notpertain just to individual agency (Wallach & Wallach, 1983). Collective agency—collectiveoptimism, if you will—would seem a desirable goal to add to those associated with individualoptimism (Snyder, Cheavens, & Sympson, 1997). A resurgence of traditional religion,volunteerism, or philanthropy would facilitate this change, so long as people do not ask what isin it for them (Seligman, 1988).

In his book The Positive Thinkers, Donald Meyer (1988) traced the history of a uniquelyAmerican brand of optimism by discussing its influential proponents: Phineas Quimby, Mary

Baker Eddy, Dale Carnegie, Norman Vincent Peale, and Ronald Reagan, among others:

The popular psychology of positive thinking … flourished among people able, forreasons of culture and politics, to imagine that the only thing wrong with their liveswas within themselves. If they could learn how to manage their own consciousness… the world outside would prove positive in its response. Of course this world wasalways that of the United States, not of mankind, but the sense of God’s abundancewaiting only to be received … had always taken for granted the greater readiness ofAmericans, and hence America, for such grace. (p. 382)

What Meyer identified is a very big optimism, rich and fuzzy in its meaning. Numerous otherisms adhere to this politically laden form of American optimism, notably capitalism, materialism,and individualism, as I have already discussed.

“Positive thinking” as examined by Meyer (1988) has additionally been defined by what itopposes: Catholics, women, minorities, the lower classes, intellectuals, homosexuals, and evengovernment itself. Victim blaming is common (W. Ryan, 1978). And pessimists are singled out asespecially objectionable: Some of you may remember former Vice President Spiro Agnew’salliterative attacks on the “nattering nabobs of negativism.” It would be wise for positivepsychologists to anticipate that segments of the general public may hear pronouncements aboutthe importance of optimism in terms of these unfortunate political connotations, as aninadvertent code for exactly the opposite of what is being conveyed. I hope that I have made onepoint clear: Optimism and its benefits exist for all of us, as long as we approach it in anevenhanded way.

EXERCISE Learning Optimism on the Hot SeatAlthough there are ample reasons to be optimistic, urging you to be more hopeful is as empty astelling you “don’t worry, be happy.” What you additionally need are strategies for putting thisadvice into action. In this chapter, I mentioned Aaron Beck’s cognitive therapy, which teachesthe depressed to be more optimistic in order to alleviate their depression, and the PennResiliency Program, which similarly teaches nondepressed children to be more optimistic inorder to prevent depression in the future.

Each of these interventions takes place over an extended period of time—weeks or months—and is embedded in what clinicians call a “therapeutic alliance” with a trusted clinician orfacilitator, who leads the individual through the necessary steps, devising and evaluatinghomework assignments in which various strategies for thinking more optimistically are perfected.Learning optimism is hard work and takes practice to perfect. The good news is that the pertinenttechniques are well specified and demonstrably effective.

The following exercise presents you with one such technique that you might want to try out ifyou are the kind of person who gets thrown for a loop whenever you face failure ordisappointment. Chances are that what spirals you into a bad mood or worse following a setbackis a pessimistic style of thinking about the setback that you then carry into the future where itdemoralizes you in other situations.

You need to interrupt your immediate reaction to a setback and then to think about it in aless-pessimistic way. Suppose your boss or teacher passes you in the hallway without saying helloor even acknowledging you. That of course makes you feel bad, but then what? A pessimisticperson might start to ruminate:

She hates me.I deserve to be hated.I am—after all—a complete loser, and she knows it.I am going to be fired (or flunked).If only I were smarter, this would not happen to me.I will never be able to support myself.I will die miserable and alone.

Let us leave aside the possibility that this is a realistic appraisal.8 Let us assume that you haveperformed well enough in the past at work or at school that you are not a complete loser. Whatyou need to do in this case is to head off your ruminative spiral before it goes too far. Are theredifferent—more optimistic—ways to make sense of being ignored?

She was having a bad day.She was in a hurry.She was thinking about something else.I like her, but what a space cadet!She wasn’t wearing her glasses, which are really thick ones. Maybe she didn’t seeme.

I just got a radically different haircut.I’m so good-looking that I intimidate people.

Maybe this last interpretation is as pathological as making a catastrophe out of the incident, butyou get the general idea about how to reinterpret hurtful but ambiguous events so that they donot do psychological damage.

One of the PRP techniques is designed to help you offer benign (optimistic) interpretations inthe moment (Reivich, Gillham, & Shatté, 2004; Reivich & Shatté, 2003). It is called the hot seat

technique or, alternatively, the rapid-fire technique. Its purpose is to teach you how to disputerapidly pessimistic thoughts. It is a powerful strategy for learning optimism but one that developsonly through practice. No one is a natural disputer, and you will learn to do this with speed bytrying it out.

You can practice the hot seat technique best if you enlist the help of a friend, but you can doit yourself if you have some index cards that you can shuffle. In either case, make a list of severaldozen common events that push your buttons and bum you out. I chose the being-ignored-in-the-hallway example because it used to be something that would upset me for the rest of the daywhenever it happened. Give the list to your friend, or write each event on a separate index card.

Then have your friend choose at random one upsetting event and present it to you, or pull outone of your index cards and read aloud what is written on it. Try to identify the immediate,automatic, and pessimistic thoughts that the event triggers. Then, as rapidly as you can, do one ofthese three things:

evaluate the evidence for the pessimistic thought: “Am I going to get fired? Probably not,because I just got a good raise last week.”

think of an alternative explanation: “My boss is not one for small talk.”

put the thought in perspective: “The people I work with are not my family, and besides, myMom really loves me.”

Say out loud your response. Then do this again with a second event, and a third, and so on. Overtime, you will get better at this technique, even to the point of making it automatic.

There are some caveats here. I have already stressed one: the possibility that your pessimisticreaction contains a kernel of truth. If your boss or teacher looks you square in the face and says,“You are a complete loser,” reminding yourself that your Mom doesn’t think so may not be theright response. Instead, you should ask for a more specific evaluation.

A related pitfall in developing and using this technique is that you may minimize the badsituation to the point that you deny its significance. Although part of optimistic thinking is not tocatastrophize an event, there really are bad things in the world. You should not deny them ortheir import when they occur.

Finally, although many of the optimistic examples just offered appropriately turn the eventback on other people or circumstances, being optimistic is not the same thing as shirkingresponsibility. Remember the point in this chapter that the internality (my fault) versusexternality (their fault) of causal beliefs is not nearly as important as whether you generalizethem over time and situations, so when you think of alternative explanations, try to think ofcircumscribed interpretations rather than externalized ones. In my case, I learned to handle the

being-ignored-in-the-hallway event by thinking, “I didn’t say hello first.” Now, I greet people Iknow in a loud voice, and I receive a return greeting 100% of the time. No one ignores me in thehallway any more, because I don’t let them.

GLOSSARYbig optimism: expectations about highly general—even vague—positive outcomes

cognition: thoughts of which we are aware at any moment as well as all of the processes thatunderlie our thoughts

cognitive psychology: field that studies how people acquire, retain, transform, and useknowledge

cognitive revolution: 1960s return to prominence within psychology of cognition

consciousness: awareness of one’s current environment and mental life; particular sensations,perceptions, needs, emotions, and thoughts

dispositional optimism: global expectation that good things will be plentiful in the future andbad things scarce

explanatory style: tendency to believe that different events have the same sorts of causes

hope: determination that goals can be achieved coupled with beliefs that successful plans can begenerated to reach goals

little optimism: expectations about specific positive outcomes

optimism: mood or attitude associated with the expectation of a desirable, advantageous, orpleasurable future

Pollyanna Principle: pervasive positive selectivity in thought

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Tiger, L. (1979). Optimism: The biology of hope. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Taylor, S. E. (1989). Positive illusions. New York: Basic.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1991). Learned optimism. New York: Knopf.

Gillham, J. E. (Ed.) (2000). The science of optimism and hope: Research essays in honor of Martin E.P. Seligman. Radnor, PA: Templeton Foundation Press.

Peterson, C., & Bossio, L. M. (1991). Health and optimism. New York: Free Press.

Seligman, M. E. P., Reivich, K., Jaycox, L., & Gillham, J. (1995). The optimistic child. Boston:Houghton Mifflin.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory approach tohuman behavior. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Snyder, C. R. (Ed.). (2000). Handbook of hope: Theory, measures, and applications. San Diego, CA:Academic.

Piper, W. (1930). The little engine that could. New York: Platt & Munk.

Articles

Peterson, C., (2000). The future of optimism. American Psychologist, 55, 44–55.

Peterson, C., Seligman, M. E. P., & Vaillant, G. E. (1988). Pessimistic explanatory style is a riskfactor for physical illness: A thirty-five-year longitudinal study. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 55, 23–27.

Zullow, H., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1990). Pessimistic rumination predicts defeat of presidentialcandidates, 1900 to 1984. Psychological Inquiry, 1, 52–61.

Web Sites

http://www.psy.miami.edu/faculty/ccarver and http://www.psy.cmu.edu/faculty/scheier. Thesetwo Web sites describe the studies of dispositional optimism by Charles Carver at theUniversity of Miami and Michael Scheier at Carnegie-Mellon University, leading investigatorsof optimism and its consequences

http://www.positivepsychology.org/research.htm. This Web site describes our research onoptimistic explanatory style.

http://www.psych.ku.edu/faculty/rsnyder/hoperesearch.htm. This is the Hope Research Webpage at Kansas University and describes the work of C. Rick Snyder, one of the leadinginvestigators of positive thinking.

http://www.wish.org. This is the Web site of the Make a Wish Foundation, which grants “thewishes of children with life-threatening medical conditions to enrich the human experiencewith hope, strength, and joy.”

Films

Pollyanna (1960)

Rocky (1976)

Mask (1985)

Forrest Gump (1994)

The Shaw shank Redemption (1994)

Apollo 13 (1995)

A&E Biography: “Thomas Edison” (2000)

ABC Primetime: “63 Reasons to Hope: The Babies of 9/11” (2002)

Seabiscuit (2003)

A Very Long Engagement (2004)

Songs“I Will Survive” (Gloria Gaynor)

“My Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades” (Timbuk 3)

“This Night Won’t Last Forever” (Sawyer Brown)

“Wishin’ and Hopin’” (Dusty Springfield)

6Character Strengths

Happiness is the aim of life,[But] virtue is the foundation of happiness.—THOMAS JEFFERSON (1819)

At the Positive Psychology Center at the University of Pennsylvania, my unofficial title is directorof virtue, which sounds Orwellian. But the title should be taken at face value, because it refers toan ongoing project I have been conducting on character strengths and virtues—positive traits likecuriosity, humor, kindness, leadership, and religiousness.

“How can we help youth to realize their full potential?” The project began with this questionposed by representatives of the Mayerson Foundation. Positive psychology seemed an idealperspective from which to answer it, given the field’s concern with the promotion of what is bestamong people, as opposed to the prevention of what is most problematic (Seligman, 2002;Seligman & Csikszent-mihalyi, 2000). As I have taken pains to explain (chapter 1), the pastconcern of psychology with human problems is of course understandable and will not beabandoned any time in the foreseeable future, but psychologists interested in promoting humanpotential need to pose different questions from their predecessors who assumed a disease model(Peterson & Park, 2003). Among the most critical tools for positive psychologists are avocabulary for speaking about the good life and assessment strategies for investigating itscomponents.

Under the auspices of Marty Seligman at the University of Pennsylvania, a conference washeld in 1999, where youth development practitioners from around the United States describeddifferent programs designed to encourage healthy development. Despite the merits of theseindividual programs, it became clear that they lacked common ways of characterizing optimaldevelopment and agreed-upon strategies for assessing the effectiveness of their interventions.Without comparable concepts and measures, it was impossible to generalize across programs toidentify active ingredients that could be deliberately embodied in further interventions. Criticallyneeded was a common vocabulary as well as related measurement tools.

The Values in Action (VIA) Institute1 was therefore created by the Mayerson Foundation in2000 to provide the conceptual and empirical means of describing positive youth development.

The decision was made to focus on good character in light of ongoing societal concerns with thetopic (Hunter, 2000). What does “good character” mean, and how can it be measured?

These goals framed the VIA project from its very beginning, when I joined with MartySeligman to assemble a team of social scientists to produce the VIA Classification of CharacterStrengths (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). We remain greatly interested in positive youthdevelopment (e.g., Park, 2004a, 2004b; Park & Peterson, 2004), but we now believe that ourproject has even wider applicability. It can guide program design and evaluation not only in theyouth development field but in any arena in which optimal development is the goal (Peterson &Park, 2004). We further believe that the information provided by the research guided by the VIAproject is worth taking seriously by philosophers interested in virtue (Darwall, Gibbard, &Railton, 1992).

At one time, psychologists were greatly interested in character—what it meant and how itcould be cultivated (McCullough & Snyder, 2000). But the topic fell out of favor. First, there wasa growing sophistication among psychologists about how personal values could unintentionallypervade “objective” research and theory. This made researchers shy away from pronouncementsconcerning the psychological components of the good life.

Second, Gordon Allport, the major personality trait theorist in 20th-century U.S. psychology,banished the term “character” from academic discourse concerning personality (Nicholson,1998), arguing that character was a philosophical matter rather than a psychological one(Allport, 1921, 1927; Allport & Vernon, 1930). The traits he urged psychologists to study werepresumably objective entities stripped of moral significance and linked to “adjustment” but notimbued with inherent value.

Allport’s argument reflected the positivism sweeping social science and its rigid distinctionbetween fact and value. Fact was the province of science, and value was the province ofphilosophy. Traits were therefore part of psychology, whereas character was not. AlthoughAllport’s argument won the day, not all of his contemporaries agreed. John Dewey (1922/1998),in particular, thought that psychology’s empirical methods could profitably inform discussions ofcharacter and value by philosophers. The VIA project falls squarely within the Dewey vision.

Basic Issues in Studying Good CharacterFor our work on the VIA project to begin, important issues needed to be resolved. First was howto approach good character. Is character defined by what someone does not do, or is there a moreactive meaning? Does character—however we define it—exist in degrees, or is it just somethingthat one happens to have or not? Is character a singular characteristic of an individual, or is itcomposed of multiple aspects?

We decided to regard good character as a family of positive dispositions, characteristics likeperspective, teamwork, kindness, and hope. To convey the plurality of good character, we took tocalling its components character strengths. We assumed that the various character strengths arein principle distinct from one another, that a person can be high on one strength yet low ormiddling on others. We assumed that character strengths are trait-like in the sense of beingindividual differences with a modicum of stability and generality. However, we did not assumethat they are fixed or necessarily grounded in immutable biogenetic characteristics. In keepingwith a fundamental premise of positive psychology, we assumed that good character is more thanbad character negated or minimized. Rather, character strengths must be defined and assessed intheir own right.

Second, because good character and its components are morally esteemed, we worried thatwe were entering a domain so value-laden that our project was doomed from the start. Perhapsgood character is little more than a social construction, existing in the eye of the beholder andfunctioning mainly as a projection of someone’s idiosyncratic likes and dislikes. A less-extremebut still daunting objection is that the valued components of character are so thoroughlycontextualized that generalizing across important social contrasts like age, gender, social class,national origin, and ethnicity is impossible. To handle these legitimate challenges, we remindedourselves of the stance taken by positive psychology: that human goodness and excellence are asauthentic (as “real”) as distress and disease (chapter 1). If we are willing to regard problems assomething more than a dysphoric world view, we should be just as willing to assume thatstrengths of character have bases in the actual conduct of people.

Once we accepted that character indeed exists in the world, it became an empirical questionwhether or which strengths of character are culturally bound. Some are of course recognizedonly in some settings; punctuality as a positive trait has no meaning in a culture that lacks widelyavailable and reliable means of keeping time. But in other cases, the possibility that there may beuniversal values and virtues deserved to be taken seriously (e.g., Bok, 1995; Comte-Sponville,2001; MacIntyre, 1984; S. H. Schwartz, 1994).

Our own surveys of widely influential religious and philosophical traditions (i.e.,Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Athenian philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, andIslam) found that certain core virtues were widely endorsed (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman,2005). Specifically, within these traditions, there was near-universal recognition and praise ofthe virtues of wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. Biswas-Diener(in press) confirmed in focus groups that the nonliterate Maasai (in western Kenya) and Inughuit

(in northern Greenland) recognized and celebrated these same core virtues.2 We wereencouraged that a nonarbitrary classification of ubiquitously valued character strengths waspossible.

A third issue we confronted was whether to wed our emerging classification to an a prioritheory of good character, drawn from philosophy or psychology. We found Aristotle’s (2000)account of virtue in The Nicomachean Ethics a powerful one, and we were similarly impressed byJahoda’s (1958) monograph on positive mental health and Erikson’s (1963, 1982) well-knownaccount of psychological maturity in terms of psychosocial virtues (chapter 9). Also intriguingwere evolutionary accounts of “the moral animal,” which is us (e.g., Wright, 1994). However, wedecided not to adopt any given theory as our explicit framework because none of these could befully evaluated in light of hard evidence. As I have already explained, our project was triggeredin part by the lack of empirical tools.

We therefore labeled the project a classification as opposed to a taxonomy. The technicaldistinction is that a classification tries to be descriptive—demarcating a domain and describing itsinstances—whereas a taxonomy is based on a deep theory that explains relationships among theseinstances (Bailey, 1994). Positive psychology may someday produce a theory of good characterthat can undergird a classification like the one we created, just as Darwinian theory eventuallywas used to make sense of Linnaean classification, but this is a future goal.

A fourth issue we addressed was how detailed we wanted the entries in our classification tobe. Our identification of core virtues suggested that we might opt for only six entries, but theseproved too abstract given our measurement goals. Although these core virtues each define acoherent family of character strengths, there is acknowledged heterogeneity within each family.For example, the virtue of humanity includes character strengths that we identify as kindness andas love. We can imagine people who epitomize one strength but not the other. So, despiteconceptual overlap, these distinctions are possible and important.

Along these lines, we found that people spontaneously talked about the components of goodcharacter in more-specific terms like curiosity, fairness, and religiousness and not in the more-abstract terms of core virtues (e.g., wisdom, justice, and transcendence). The “natural concepts”used to describe good character are strengths of character and not core virtues (Rosch, Mervis,Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Finally, there already existed research literatures thataddressed many of the strengths of character that we eventually included in the classification,and by focusing on this more-specific level, we were able to benefit from what had already beenlearned.

Identification of Character StrengthsAfter taking positions on these issues, we set about creating the entries for our classification. Wereviewed pertinent literatures that addressed good character—from psychiatry, youthdevelopment, character education, religion, philosophy, organizational studies, and of course

psychology—with the goal of identifying candidate strengths. We also looked at the characterstrengths explicitly mentioned in an array of cultural products: popular songs, greeting cards,bumper stickers, obituaries and testimonials, mottoes and credos, and personal ads innewspapers. We identified virtue-relevant messages in Saturday Evening Post covers by NormanRockwell, graffiti, Tarot cards, the profiles of Pokémon characters, and the Hogworts residencehalls in the Harry Potter books.

Our goal was to leave no stone unturned in assembling an exhaustive list of characterstrengths. From the many candidate strengths identified, we winnowed the list by combiningredundancies and applying criteria like these. The character strength

is ubiquitous: is widely recognized across cultures

is fulfilling: contributes to individual fulfillment, satisfaction, and happiness broadlyconstrued (chapter 4)

is morally valued: is valued in its own right and not for tangible outcomes it may produce

does not diminish others: elevates others who witness it, producing admiration, not jealousy(Keltner & Haidt, 2003)

has a nonfelicitous opposite: has obvious antonyms that are “negative”

is trait-like: is an individual difference with demonstrable generality and stability

is measurable: has been successfully measured by researchers as an individual difference

is distinct: is not redundant (conceptually or empirically) with other character strengths

has paragons: is strikingly embodied in some individuals

has prodigies: is precociously shown by some children or youth

can be selectively absent: is missing altogether in some individuals (Peterson, in press)

has enabling institutions: is the deliberate target of societal practices and rituals that try tocultivate it (Park & Peterson, in press d)

Space does not permit a strength-by-strength discussion of how these criteria are met, but youcan find a detailed presentation in Peterson and Seligman (2004).

The VIA Classification of Character Strengths and VirtuesThe VIA Classification contains 24 strengths of character organized under the six core virtuesalready described. Here are sketches of the virtues and the strengths.

Strengths of wisdom and knowledge include positive traits related to the acquisition anduse of information in the service of the good life. In psychological language, these are cognitive

strengths. Many of the strengths in the classification have cognitive aspects—e.g., socialintelligence, fairness, hope, humor, and religiousness—which is why many philosophersconcerned with virtue consider wisdom or reason as the chief virtue making all others possible.However, there are five character strengths in which cognition is especially salient:

1. creativity: thinking of novel and productive ways to do things; includes artistic achievementbut is not limited to it

2. curiosity: taking an interest in all of ongoing experience; finding all subjects and topicsfascinating; exploring and discovering

3. love of learning: mastering new skills, topics, and bodies of knowledge, whether on one’sown or formally; obviously is related to the strength of curiosity but goes beyond it todescribe the tendency to add systematically to what one knows

4. open-mindedness: thinking things through and examining them from all sides; not jumpingto conclusions; being able to change one’s mind in light of evidence; weighing all evidencefairly

5. perspective: being able to provide wise counsel to others; having ways of looking at theworld that make sense to the self and to other people

Strengths of courage entail the exercise of will to accomplish goals in the face of opposition,external or internal. Some philosophers have regarded virtues as corrective because theycounteract some difficulty inherent in the human condition, some temptation that needs to beresisted, or some motivation that needs to be checked or rechanneled. It is debatable whether allcharacter strengths are corrective in one or more of these senses, but the following four strengthsin the classification clearly are:

6. authenticity: speaking the truth but more broadly presenting oneself in a genuine way; beingwithout pretense; taking responsibility for one’s feelings and actions

7. bravery: not shrinking from threat, challenge, difficulty, or pain; speaking up for what isright even if there is opposition; acting on convictions even if unpopular; includes physicalbravery but is not limited to it

8. persistence: finishing what one starts; persisting in a course of action in spite of obstacles;“getting it out the door”; taking pleasure in completing tasks

9. zest: approaching life with excitement and energy; not doing things halfway orhalfheartedly; living life as an adventure; feeling alive and activated

Strengths of humanity include positive traits manifest in caring relationships with others,what Taylor et al. (2000) described as dispositions to tend and befriend. The entries in this virtueclass resemble those identified as justice strengths, with the difference being that strengths of

humanity are brought to bear in one-to-one relationships, whereas those of justice are mostrelevant in one-to-many relationships. The former strengths are interpersonal, the latter broadlysocial. Three of the strengths in the classification exemplify positive interpersonal traits:

10. kindness: doing favors and good deeds for others; helping them; taking care of them

11. love: valuing close relations with others, in particular those in which sharing and caring arereciprocated; being close to people

12. social intelligence: being aware of the motives and feelings of other people and the self;knowing what to do to fit into different social situations; knowing what makes other peopletick

Strengths of justice are broadly social, relevant to the optimal interaction between theindividual and the group or the community. As the group shrinks in size and becomes morepersonalized, the strengths of justice converge with the one-on-one strengths of humanity. Wemaintain the distinction by proposing that strengths of justice are strengths among, whereas thoseof humanity are strengths between, but the difference is perhaps more of degree than kind.Regardless, three of the positive traits included in the classification fit nicely under the virtueclass of justice:

13. fairness: treating all people the same according to notions of fairness and justice; not lettingpersonal feelings bias decisions about others; giving everyone a fair chance

14. leadership: encouraging a group of which one is a member to get things done and at thesame time fostering good relations within the group; organizing group activities and seeingthat they happen

15. teamwork: working well as a member of a group or team; being loyal to the group; doingone’s share

Strengths of temperance are positive traits that protect us from excess. What are the typesof excess of special concern? Hatred—against which forgiveness and mercy protect us. Arrogance—against which humility and modesty protect us. Short-term pleasure with long-termconsequences—against which prudence protects us. And destabilizing emotional extremes of allsorts—against which self-regulation protects us.

It is worth emphasizing that the strengths of temperance temper our activities, rather thanbringing them to a complete halt. We may be highly forgiving, but we can still defend ourselveswhile being pummeled. Modesty does not require falsehood—just authentic acknowledgment ofwho we are and what we do. A prudent course of action is still a course of action. Optimal self-regulation of emotions does not mean suspending our feelings, good or bad, but only takingcharge of them.

16. forgiveness/mercy: forgiving those who have done wrong; giving people a second chance;not being vengeful

17. modesty/humility: letting one’s accomplishments speak for themselves; not seeking thespotlight; not regarding oneself as more special than one is

18. prudence: being careful about one’s choices; not taking undue risks; not saying or doingthings that might later be regretted

19. self-regulation: regulating what one feels and does; being disciplined; controlling one’sappetites and emotions

I could have included some or all of the strengths of courage under this virtue but did not doso because the strengths of courage lead us to behave in positive ways regardless of temptationsto the contrary (e.g., fear, sloth, inauthenticity, fatigue), whereas the defining feature oftemperance lies in tackling head on the temptation at hand. Strengths of temperance maytherefore predispose strengths of courage, but they are still distinct.

Temperance strengths are defined in part by what a person refrains from doing, and theymight be more apparent to observers in their intemperate absence than in their temperatepresence. Indeed, in our attempts to measure this class of strengths, we have found that amongpeople in the mainstream United States, strengths of temperance are infrequently endorsed andseldom praised. Perhaps in cultures in which the middle path of Buddhism or other teachingsabout balance and harmony are influential, these particular strengths are more frequentlycelebrated. Regardless, the strengths of temperance are important. They are included in virtuallyall philosophical and religious discussions of virtue, and they have a rich array of consequencesfor the psychological good life.

Strengths of transcendence may at first glance seem a mixed lot, but the common theme isthat each allows individuals to forge connections to the larger universe and thereby providemeaning to their lives. Almost all of the positive traits in the classification reach outside theindividual—character after all is social in nature—but in the case of the transcendence strengths,the reaching goes beyond other people per se to embrace part or all of the larger universe. Theprototype of this strength category is spirituality, variously defined but always referring to abelief in and commitment to the transcendent (nonmaterial) aspects of life—whether they becalled universal, ideal, sacred, or divine.

How do the other strengths classified approach this prototype? Appreciation of beauty is astrength that connects someone directly to excellence. Gratitude connects someone directly togoodness. Hope connects someone directly to the dreamed-of future. Humor—admittedly themost controversially placed entry—connects someone directly to troubles and contradictions in away that produces not terror or anger but pleasure.

20. appreciation of beauty and excellence: noticing and appreciating beauty, excellence, andskilled performance in all domains of life, from nature to art to mathematics to science toeveryday experience

21. gratitude: being aware of and thankful for the good things that happen; taking time toexpress thanks

22. hope: expecting the best in the future and working to achieve it; believing that a goodfuture is something that can be brought about

23. humor: liking to laugh and tease; bringing smiles to other people; seeing the light side;making (not necessarily telling) jokes

24. religiousness/spirituality: having coherent beliefs about the higher purpose and meaning ofthe universe; knowing where one fits within the larger scheme; having beliefs about themeaning of life that shape one’s conduct and provide comfort

I hasten to add that there are other positive traits that a positive psychologist might wish tostudy among people—ambition, autonomy, gravitas, and patience, to name but a few—and theirabsence in our classification reflects only our judgment that these do not meet the criteria setforth. They may not be as widely valued across cultural groups as the included entries; they mayreflect blends of more-basic strengths; they may fail the test of a nonfelicitous opposite; and soon. The VIA Classification is but a descriptive tool.

The overall usefulness of this classification does not depend on exactly under which virtueeach of its 24 strengths is classified, and I would not be surprised if a future grouping ofcharacter strengths is revised, expanded, or contracted. If appreciation of beauty is discovered tobe the province mainly of the expert who has studied a given domain for years, then it probablybelongs with other strengths of wisdom and knowledge. If gratitude and humor as characterstrengths play themselves out mainly between two people (and not between a person and thelarger world), they probably belong with the other strengths of humanity. Or maybe humor will

seek the company of vitality, among the strengths of courage.3 I think that hope andreligiousness will stay allied, given the strong historical link between them (Tiger, 1979).

It is worth noting that the entries in the VIA Classification overlap considerably with those intwo other contemporary classifications arrived at in very different ways. First, Frenchphilosopher André Comte-Sponville (2001) surveyed classical and contemporary Westernphilosophical traditions for mention of the “qualities that constitute the excellence and essence ofhumankind” (book dust-jacket). He included politeness and gentleness (which we did notbecause they seem prerequisites for more-substantive strengths) and excluded several of the VIAstrengths (e.g., appreciation of beauty, curiosity, and zest), but otherwise there is substantialagreement.

Second, Marcus Buckingham and Donald Clifton (2001) of the Gallup Organization described“workplace themes” that emerged from focus groups with thousands of individuals about thetraits that contribute to excellent performance at work (chapter 8). They included some strengthsthat are culturally bound (e.g., competition) as well as strengths that strike us as complex blendsof more-basic strengths (e.g., communication), but again there is substantial agreement.

What About Talents?To say that a strength is morally valued is an important qualification, because there existindividual differences that are widely celebrated, contribute to fulfillment, and qualify assignature characteristics, but still fall outside of our classification. Consider intelligence, perfectpitch, or athletic prowess. These talents and abilities are cut from a different cloth than characterstrengths like valor or kindness, but what is the difference?

We have devoted considerable thought to the distinction between character strengths and

virtues, on the one hand, versus talents and the abilities, on the other4 (chapter 8). Many talentsand abilities on the face of it seem more innate, more immutable, and less voluntary thanstrengths and virtues. These of course are matters of degree. So, the talent of perfect pitch isalways discussed as if it were more innate than the strengths of kindness or modesty, but theability to read train schedules certainly is not. And suppose it turns out that the characterstrengths in the present classification prove to be heritable (chapter 4)? All other investigatedindividual differences seem to have some basis in genetic variation, so why not curiosity, forexample, or even spirituality or leadership?

To be sure, no one will ever discover single genes that code for specific moral virtues, and anybiogenetic account of character will ultimately be phrased in terms of heritable raw ingredientsinteracting with specific environments and experiences. But the same account already exists formany talents and abilities, so where is the distinction?

I am left, somewhat reluctantly, with the conclusion that character strengths differ fromtalents and abilities because they fall into the moral domain. This is a less-than-satisfactoryconclusion because we must cede the designation of a character strength to the larger society andculture. During my early efforts in creating this classification, I worried that I would create a listof characteristics that reflected only my own take on the good life. I think that I have avoidedthis problem. I did not include characteristics valued only at the turn of the new century by anupper middle-class, agnostic, European American, male academic.

There are two further distinctions between character strengths and other dimensions ofvirtuosity. First is the role played by effort and will in the exercise of these characteristics.Basketball player Michael Jordan was revered for his athletic ability but also for his refusal to

lose. In both cases, the innate talent/strength was practiced and nurtured, but those of us whoare not delusional recognize that we can never soar through the air like Michael, with or withoutthe shoes he endorsed. We can imagine, however, that we might arise from our sickbed to do ourjob as best we can, as Jordan did in a 1997 playoff game against the Utah Jazz, in which only histemperature (1030) exceeded his point total (38). This storied performance represented themelding of a talent with a character strength, yet it is the latter that we value morally.

This chapter is not the right forum for a discussion of free will and determinism, so I will justnote in passing my strong suspicion that positive psychology, as the field evolves, will necessarilylead social scientists to grapple anew with the crucial role that choice plays in human activity. Amorally praiseworthy action is chosen in a way that a merely skilled action is not. All people canaspire to have strong character in a way that they cannot aspire to be good-looking or physicallyresilient.

A second distinction between character strengths and talents is that the latter seem valuedmore for their tangible consequences (acclaim, wealth) than are the former. Someone who “doesnothing” with a talent like a high IQ or musical skill courts eventual disdain. Witness the ridiculedirected at Michael Jordan when he abandoned basketball to pursue a baseball career or thedismay we experience when extremely talented individuals like Judy Garland, John Belushi, KurtCobain, Elvis Presley, or Darryl Strawberry are overwhelmed by drug problems. In contrast, wenever hear the criticism that a person did nothing with her wisdom or kindness. Said anotherway, talents and abilities can be squandered, but strengths and virtues cannot.

Assessment of Character StrengthsWhat distinguishes the VIA Classification from most previous attempts to articulate goodcharacter is its simultaneous concern with assessment, and I turn now to our measurement work.Some social scientists have responded with suspicion when they hear this goal, reminding me ofthe pitfalls of self-report and the validity threat posed by social desirability—the tendency ofresearch participants to convey a positive impression of themselves whether or not it is strictlyaccurate (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). I do not dismiss these considerations, but their premise isworth examining from the vantage of positive psychology. We seem to be willing, as researchersand practitioners, to trust what individuals say about their problems. With exceptions likesubstance abuse and eating disorders, in which denial can be an inherent part of the problem, thepreferred way to measure psychological disorders relies on self-reports, through questionnaires orinterviews. Why not ascertain wellness in the same way? Perhaps we accept self-reports aboutthe negative but not the positive because we do not believe that the positive exists. That is theassumption that positive psychology urges us to reject (chapter 1).

Suppose that people really do possess moral virtues. Most philosophers emphasize thatvirtuous activity involves choosing virtue in light of a justifiable life plan (Yearley, 1990). Inpsychological language, this characterization means that people can reflect on their own virtuesand talk about them to others. They may of course be mistaken, but virtues are not automaticallybeyond the realm of self-commentary (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Furthermore, characterstrengths are not “contaminated” by a response set of social desirability; they are sociallydesirable, especially when reported with fidelity.

Consider the results of previous research that measured positive traits with self-reportquestionnaire batteries (e.g., Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000; Green-berger, Josselson, Knerr, &Knerr, 1975; Ryff & Singer, 1996). In no case did a single methods factor emerge from the data.Different clusters of strengths were always apparent. External correlates were always sensible.These conclusions converge with what we have learned from our own attempts to measure theVIA strengths with self-report questionnaires. We acknowledge the possibility that some strengthsof character lend themselves less readily to self-report than do others. Almost by definition,strengths like authenticity and bravery are not the sorts of characteristics usually attributed tooneself. But this consideration does not preclude the use of self-report to assess other strengths ofcharacter. And all of them can be assessed by asking about their behavioral indicators. Someonemay be reluctant to describe herself as brave, but she will more readily say that she takes anunpopular public stance or that she endures chronic illness without complaint.

As a critical aspect of our project, we commissioned literature reviews by expert socialscientists of what was known about each of the 24 strengths included in the classification(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). These experts followed a common format, touching upondefinition, theory, enabling factors and causes, consequences, and correlates. Each expert alsosummarized previous efforts to assess each strength as an individual difference. Again, spacedoes not permit a strength-by-strength summary of the assessment, so here are the majorconclusions:

In most cases, there exist reliable and valid ways of measuring each strength as anindividual difference, not a surprising fact considering that we included strengths already ofinterest to psychologists.

However, there are some exceptions. Modesty and humility have eluded reliable assessment,although nomination procedures have been used to identify modest/humble paragons. Andthere seem to be no extant self-report measures of bravery, although again nominationprocedures have been used by previous researchers.

In most cases, the assessment strategy of choice is a self-report questionnaire, althoughthese existing measures are often lengthy and would not be practical to combine into an

inclusive battery.

With these insights as a starting point, my colleagues and I set about creating our ownmeasures that would allow the character strengths in our classification to be assessed amongEnglish speakers in the contemporary Western world: surveys, interviews, and informant reports(Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005a). We are also undertaking translations of our surveymeasures into some of the world’s major language groups—e.g., Chinese, Spanish, Japanese, andGerman—but we began with English-language versions. Our first goal was to create face-validand reliable measures; then we turned to the equally important matter of construct validity.

The assessment strategy we have most extensively developed to date entails self-reportsurveys able to be completed by respondents in a single session. We have devised separateinventories for adults and for young people (ages 10–17). These include scales that assess each ofthe 24 strengths.

The VIA Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS) is intended for use by adults and has beencompleted in five different incarnations by almost 350,000 individuals from more than 200

different nations.5 It is a face-valid questionnaire that measures the degree to which respondentsendorse items reflecting the various strengths of character in the classification (from 1 = verymuch unlike me to 5 = very much like me). There are 10 items per strength (240 total). Forexample, the character strength of forgiveness is measured with items such as “I always allowothers to leave their mistakes in the past and make a fresh start,” “I believe it is best to forgiveand forget,” “I am unwilling to accept apologies” (reverse-scored), and “I hold grudges” (reverse-

scored).6

Developed by Nansook Park, the VIA Inventory of Strengths for Youth (VIA-Youth) isintended for use by young people (ages 10–17; Park & Peterson, 2005, in press b). Like the VIA-IS, it is a face-valid questionnaire that measures the degree to which respondents endorse itemsreflecting each of the 24 strengths of character in the VIA Classification (1 = not like me at all, 5= very much like me). The VIA-Youth was developed by writing age-appropriate items thatreflected each of the strengths. The current version contains 5–9 items per strength (198 total), asmaller number of questions than in the VIA-IS to reduce the burden on our youthfulrespondents. The VIA-Youth has been completed by thousands of young people across the UnitedStates, both as a paper-and-pencil survey and as an on-line measure. In the latter case, parents orguardians need to contact us first to give permission for their child to help with our research.

Developed with the help of Tiffany Sawyer, the VIA Structured Interview identifies what wecall “signature strengths” by talking to someone about the situations in which these strengths aremost likely to be shown (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Certain strengths are evident only whensomeone “rises to an occasion” that presents itself. One cannot be brave except in frightening

circumstances. One cannot be forgiving unless trespassed against. In contrast, the other strengthscan be displayed in a generic and ongoing way. So, except perhaps for the presence of otherpeople, there are no special circumstances in which to display kindness or playfulness.

The VIA Structured Interview takes about 30 minutes to complete. The interviewer asks arespondent how he usually acts in a given setting vis-à-vis the character strength on focus; ifappropriate, the setting is detailed, and in the case of tonic strengths, and otherwise, thesituation is described as “everyday life.” If people describe displaying the strength the majority ofthe time, follow-up questions ask: (i) how they name the strength; (ii) if the strength howevernamed is really who they are; and (iii) whether friends and family members would agree that thestrength is really who they are. Our studies to date show that adults usually have between twoand five signature strengths. For these strengths, the corresponding VIA-IS scores are—notsurprisingly—elevated.

The drawback of the structured interview, as I see it, is that it does not quantify anindividual’s character strengths, which is at odds with my conceptualization of strengths asexisting along dimensions. The off-setting benefit is that the VIA Structured Interview allows usto say that a strength is (or is not) selfconsciously owned by an individual. We have theoreticalreasons for believing that owned strengths may be qualitatively different in their effects thannonowned strengths (Seligman, 2002). For example, I have some skill at transactional leadership—taking charge of a group and making sure that its trains run on time. But I do not enjoy thesetasks, nor do I consider the strength of leadership part of my core identity. However successfullyI complete the tasks, I am left exhausted and unfulfilled. In contrast, I gladly embrace otherstrengths, like humor and kindness, and when I exercise them, I feel exhilarated. We needadditional research to test more systematically these speculations about signature strengths, andthe VIA Structured Interview will be a crucial tool.

I want to describe one more way to assess strengths that relies on content analysis ofspontaneous spoken or written descriptions of someone. Developed by Nansook Park, thestrengths content analysis technique was originally intended to study the earliest precursors ofcharacter strengths among children too young to complete the VIA-Youth, which is sometimesable to be used with children as young as 8 years old but more typically requires that arespondent be at least 10 years old. In our initial study, hundreds of parents were asked to useseveral words to describe one of their children between the ages of 3 and 9 (Park & Peterson, inpress c). These brief descriptions were rich in character language and readily able to be coded formention or not of each of the strengths in the VIA Classification.

The starting point of the coding scheme was the strength names and their obvious synonyms.For example, the character strength of kindness was recognized of course as kindness but also asgenerosity, nurturance, care, compassion, or niceness. We elaborated the coding scheme to

capture the ways that parents describe various strengths among their children. For instance, noone described a child as zestful, vital, or ebullient, but parents did describe their children as fullof life, enthusiastic, a live wire, or “raring to go” every morning. These words and phrases wereconsidered indicators of the character strength of zest. In some cases, the coding scheme wasbroadened to include behavioral trends that reflected the strength of concern. For example,parents rarely described their children as religious or spiritual, but they would say, “she loves herGod,” or “he says his prayers regularly.”

In relying on “spontaneous” descriptions of children, we avoided putting words in the mouthsof our parent informants. Regardless, the descriptions were simple to code. On average, threestrengths were explicitly mentioned for each child. If it is possible to speak of a typical child, asseen by her parents, the typical child is one who is loving, kind, creative, humorous, and curious.Infrequently mentioned strengths—e.g., authenticity, gratitude, modesty, forgiveness, and open-mindedness—fit with theoretical speculation and common sense that some strengths of characterrequire psychosocial maturation to be evident (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

The research value of the strengths content analysis technique extends beyond the study ofchildren. It can in principle be used to assess strengths of all sorts of people—the quick, theunwilling, and the dead—who are unavailable or unable to complete a survey or interview. Allwe need is some written or spoken record, by them or about them, that has been left behind. Forexample, my colleague Fiona Lee at the University of Michigan is using this technique toascertain character strengths mentioned in obituaries and in popular songs, and Nansook Park(2005) looked at character strengths mentioned in the official citations of Medal of Honorrecipients (Highland Publishers, 2002). Bravery is a given, granted the meaning of this award,but in a number of cases, character strengths of perseverance, self-regulation, teamwork, andleadership are evident as well. There is additional evidence that Medal of Honor recipientsexhibit humility (Collier, 2003). Taken together, these findings provide a rich view of heroicbravery (Becker & Eagly, 2004). Bravery must be located in an immediate social context andtypically involves the exercise of well-learned skills (Rachman, 1990).

Empirical FindingsBoth the VIA-IS and the VIA-Youth are demonstrably reliable (i.e., items converge), valid (i.e.,self-ratings of character strengths agree with reports by informed others), and stable over at least6 months (e.g., Park & Peterson, 2005, in press b; Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005b; Peterson &Seligman, 2004). Here I wish to mention some of the empirical findings to date, which strike meas interesting and which illustrate the value of an empirically informed approach to goodcharacter.

First, my colleagues and I have discovered a remarkable similarity in the relativeendorsement of the 24 character strengths by adults around the world and within the UnitedStates (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, in press). The most commonly endorsed (“most like me”)strengths, in 54 different countries, from Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe, are kindness, fairness,authenticity, gratitude, and open-mindedness, and the lesser strengths consistently includeprudence, modesty, and self-regulation (Figure 6.1). The correlations of the rankings from nationto nation are all very strong, usually in the 0.80+ range, defying cultural, ethnic, religious, andeconomic differences.

The same ranking of greater versus lesser strengths also characterized all 50 U.S. states—except for religiousness, which is somewhat more evident in the South—and held across thecontrasts of gender, age, education, and whether one lived in a state that voted Republican orDemocratic in recent presidential elections. These results may reveal something about universalhuman nature and/or the character requirements minimally needed for a viable society (Bok,1995).

Figure 6.1. Mean VIA-IS Scores in a U.S. Sample

Second, a comparison of strengths profiles between U.S. adults and U.S. adolescents revealedoverall agreement on ranking, yet a noticeably lower agreement than that found between U.S.adults and adults in any other nation we have studied (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). Hope,teamwork, and zest were more common among U.S. youth than among U.S. adults, whereasappreciation of beauty, authenticity, leadership, and open-mindedness were more commonamong adults (Figure 6.2). As our attention turns to the deliberate cultivation of characterstrengths, we should be as concerned with how to keep certain strengths from eroding on thejourney to adulthood as with how to build others from scratch (Park & Peterson, in press d).

Third, although part of the definition of a character strength is that it contributes tofulfillment, strengths “of the heart”—zest, gratitude, hope, and love—are more robustlyassociated with life satisfaction than the more-cerebral strengths like love of learning (Park &Peterson, 2005, in press b, in press c; Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004, 2005). We find this

pattern among adults, youth, and even very young children as described by their parents.7 Wealso have some longitudinal evidence that these heart strengths foreshadow subsequent lifesatisfaction (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). As we have seen in previous chapters, otherpeople matter mightily. Character strengths that orient us toward others in turn make us happy.

Figure 6.2. Strengths Profiles for Youth (N= 250) Versus Adults (N=83,576) in the United States

Fourth, when VIA-IS scores for U.S. residents completing the survey on-line in the 2 monthsimmediately post-9/11 were compared to those doing so before 9/11, the character strengths offaith (religiousness), hope, and love showed increases, a pattern not evident among Europeanrespondents (Peterson & Seligman, 2003a). These strengths comprise the theological virtuesidentified by Thomas Aquinas (1966) and sung about by Alan Jackson in his award-winningcountry music anthem about 9/11, “Where Were You?” One way to make sense of these data iswith terror management theory, which holds that people “manage” the terror of their ownmortality by increasing identification with culturally salient values (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &

Solomon, 1986).

Fifth, as initial steps toward studying people at their best, we did three parallel studies ofadults with respect to good character and its correlates at work, love, and play (Peterson &Seligman, 2004). Rather than asking our respondents about current jobs, current relationships,and current recreational activities (the typical research strategy when these topics are ofconcern), we asked them to think of their most-fulfilling job, their truest love, their best friend,and their most-engaging hobby, whenever these were present in their lives. (We also gaverespondents the option of saying “does not apply,” which some small number of them, invariablyyoung adults, exercised.)

Interestingly, respondents did not always describe their current jobs, relationships, or leisurepastimes. The clichéd standards by which people seem to judge and even to choose amongoptions in these domains—like salary, status, or geographical location for jobs; good looks orfinancial security for relationships; and unalloyed sensory pleasure for leisure activities—did notcharacterize what our respondents reported as the best they ever had. Instead, what people mostvalued was a job, a relationship, and a hobby congruent with their own strengths of character.For instance, those with the character strength of kindness especially enjoyed jobs where theycould mentor others; those with the character strength of curiosity preferred romantic partnerswho were “adventurous”; and those with the character strength of love of learning were happilyfound gardening in their spare time.

Sixth, we have begun some studies to look at the effects on character strengths of previous lifecrises (e.g., Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2006). When positive psychology was first delineated,Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) speculated that it was a field that made sense for a societythat was peaceful and prosperous. Its goal was moving people not from–5 to 0 but from + 2 to+ 6 (chapter 1). Accordingly, positive psychology would seem to have little to do with distressand pathology—the typical concerns of business-as-usual psychology (Peterson, in press).

The thinking of many positive psychologists has changed since the events of 9/11, whichreminded us that what is best in people can be shown when they rise to an occasion (Brokaw,1998). Crisis may or may not be the crucible of character, but it certainly allows the display ofwhat virtue ethicists refer to as “corrective strengths of character” (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

Anecdotal evidence is ample that such crises—at least when surmounted—leave a person witha fresh appreciation of what really matters in life and perhaps the readiness to act in accordancewith this appreciation. More systematic research under the rubrics of resilience andposttraumatic growth documents that at least some people emerge from crises less damaged thantypical theories might predict (e.g., Bonnano, 2004; Linley & Joseph, 2004a; Masten, 2001; S. E.Taylor, 1985; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995), but what remains unclear is the frequency with which

people actually benefit from a difficult experience by finding or building strengths of character.

There are barriers to definitive conclusions. One is the common cultural script, at least in theUnited States, of redemption, which leads people to regard a bad experience retrospectively as agood one (McAdams, 1993, 2005). Self-definition as a survivor becomes an important aspect ofone’s identity and colors how one responds to direct questions about the aftermath of a crisis. Iam not cynical enough to suggest that this identity is inauthentic, but I do believe thatcomparisons with people who have not experienced the crisis in question are needed to confirmthe self-affirmation and rule out such mundane confounds as maturation.

Our research sidestepped these barriers. Although our studies had a retrospective design andrelied on self-report, we did not ask about previous crises until the very end of the survey that weadministered. Thus, our research participants were not explicitly primed to respond in terms of asurvivor identity. We have done three such studies, first administering the VIA-IS to measurecharacter strengths and then asking respondents about physical illnesses, psychological disorders,or traumatic events like assaults. In each case, those who experienced the crisis showed elevatedlevels of certain character strengths relative to those who had not experienced the crisis. Forexample, serious physical illness—if one had recovered from it—was associated with bravery,kindness, and humor. These strengths in turn were associated with higher life satisfaction. Theultimate implication of the present results is that deliberate interventions targeting thesestrengths may help people not only survive but flourish following a crisis.

A final line of research that I have just begun with Nansook Park takes a look at thepreviously unquestioned assumption that one can “have it all” in a character sense. That is, inour work to date, we have identified strengths of character, measured them, and started to mapout their correlates and consequences, which—not surprisingly—are often positive in nature. Theimplication is that we should develop and use as many strengths of character as possible.

But is this really possible? Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe (in press) took the VIAClassification project to task for ignoring the tradeoffs that sometimes need to be made amongcharacter strengths as we live our everyday lives. “Do I look good in this dress?” is how theystarted their critique. Most of you are probably smiling because you know that those who askquestions like this often suspect that something is amiss. So, how does one respond to thisquestion? Perhaps with kindness—as in “you look marvelous.” Perhaps with honesty—as in “youlook terrible.” Or perhaps with prudence—as in “green is a good color.”

There is no universally right solution to this dilemma, although Schwartz and Sharpe arguedthat social intelligence—which they dubbed “practical wisdom”—helps us to choose an answer ina concrete situation that takes into account all sorts of subtleties. Does she have time to changethe dress? Does she even have another dress? And so on. The point is that sometimes someone

cannot simultaneously be kind and honest. A tradeoff must be made.

We suspect that people make these tradeoffs in characteristic ways. All things being equal,some of us will tend to be kind, whereas others of us will tend to be honest. If this is the case, wewould expect to see certain strengths of character as measured by the VIA-IS stand in a reciprocalrelationship with one another—i.e., being high on one strength should be correlated with beinglow on others, and vice versa. The structure of these tradeoffs might reveal something about howthe real world allows good character to present itself.

Using statistical procedures that allow these sorts of conclusions,8 we indeed found tradeoffsamong strengths as well as a simple interpretation. Figure 6.3 depicts the relationships amongthe strengths along two dimensions in a circumplex model, used by psychologists in differentfields (like perception, emotion, and personality) to depict theoretical or empirical relationshipsamong concepts in terms of their placement around a circle.

The X axis corresponds to a focus of the strength on the self (e.g., creativity, curiosity) versusothers (e.g., teamwork, fairness), and the Y axis corresponds to strengths that entail intellectualrestraint (e.g., open-mindedness, prudence) versus emotional expression (e.g., love, gratitude).Two strengths close together on the graph comfortably co-occur, but two strengths that are farapart are more likely to be traded off. These tradeoffs are not inevitable, of course, but they doimply that people display good character in habitually different ways.

Figure 6.3. Tradeoffs Among Character StrengthsThe farther apart are two strengths, the less likely it is that the same person

habitually shows both.

EXERCISE Using Signature Strengths in New WaysI believe that people possess signature strengths akin to what Allport (1961) identified decadesago as personal traits. These are the strengths of character that a person owns, celebrates, andfrequently exercises. In our interviews with adults, we find that almost everyone can readilyidentify a handful of strengths as very much their own, typically between two and five. Here arepossible criteria for a signature strength (Peterson & Seligman, 2004):

a sense of ownership and authenticity (“this is the real me”) vis-à-vis the strength

a feeling of excitement while displaying it, particularly at first

a rapid learning curve as themes are attached to the strength and practiced

continuous learning of new ways to enact the strength

a sense of yearning to act in accordance with the strength

a feeling of inevitability in using the strength, as if one cannot be stopped or dissuaded fromits display

the discovery of the strength as owned in an epiphany

invigoration rather than exhaustion when using the strength

the creation and pursuit of fundamental projects that revolve around the strength

intrinsic motivation to use the strength

My hypothesis is that the exercise of signature strengths is fulfilling, and these criteria convey themotivational and emotional features of fulfillment with terms like excitement, yearning,inevitability, discovery, and invigoration.

The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, identify your signature strengths by taking theVIA-IS online at www.authentichappiness.org or at www.viastrengths.org. These Web sitesprovide instantaneous feedback about the strengths for which you scored highest. Look at yourtop scores in light of the criteria just described for a signature strength and decide which of thetop strengths qualify as signature strengths—as the real you.

Second, take one of the signature strengths you have identified, and for the following week,use the strength in a new way every day. As you may remember from chapter 4, this is one of theinterventions we have systematically tested and shown to have long-term positive effects onhappiness (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). The critical ingredient is using the strength

in a new way. You can probably think of new ways on your own, but here are some suggestionsbased on lists generated by Jonathan Haidt (2002) and by Tayyab Rashid and Afroze Anjum(2005):

appreciation of beauty

visit an art gallery or museum with which you are unfamiliar

start to keep a beauty journal in which you write down every day the most beautifulthings you saw

at least once a day, stop and notice an instance of natural beauty, e.g., a sunrise, a flower,a bird singing

authenticity

refrain from telling white lies to friends (including insincere compliments)

think about your most important values and do something every day that is consistentwith them (chapter 7)

when explaining your motives to someone, do so in a genuine and honest way

bravery

speak up for an unpopular idea in a group

protest to the appropriate authorities about a clear injustice that you observe

do something that you ordinarily would not because of fear

creativity

enroll in a pottery, photography, sculpting, drawing, or painting class

choose some object in your home and find another use for it rather than its typical use—no fair using your exercise bike as a clothes rack

send a card to a friend that includes a poem you have written

curiosity

attend a lecture on a topic about which you know nothing

go to a restaurant featuring cuisine unfamiliar to you

discover a new place in your town, and learn about its history

fairness

at least once a day, admit a mistake and take responsibility for it

at least once a day, give due credit to someone you do not especially like

hear people out without interrupting them

forgiveness

let a grudge go every day

when you feel annoyed, even with justification, take the high road and do not tell anyonehow you feel

write a forgiveness letter; do not send it (chapter 2), but do read it every day for a week

gratitude

keep track of how many times you say “thank you” during the day, and increase thenumber every day for a week

at the end of every day, write down three things that went well (chapter 2)

write and send a gratitude letter (chapter 2)

hope

think of a past disappointment and the opportunities it made possible

write down your goals for the next week, the next month, and the next year; then makeconcrete plans for accomplishing these goals

dispute your pessimistic thoughts (chapter 5)

humor

make at least one person smile or laugh per day

learn a magic trick and perform it for your friends

make fun of yourself, if only by saying, “there I go again”

kindness

visit someone in a hospital or nursing home

when driving, yield to pedestrians; when walking, yield to cars (this latter suggestion alsocounts as an act of prudence)

perform an anonymous favor for a friend or family member

leadership

organize a social get-together for your friends

take responsibility for an unpleasant task at work and make sure that it gets done

go out of your way to make a newcomer feel welcome

love

accept a compliment without squirming; just say “thank you”

write a brief note to someone you love, and leave it where it will be found during the day

do something with your best friend that he or she really enjoys doing

love of learning

if you are a student, read something that is “recommended” but not “required”

learn and use a new word every day

read a nonfiction book

modesty

for an entire day, do not talk about yourself at all

dress in a way that does not call attention to yourself

think of something that a friend does much better than you do, and compliment him orher about it

open-mindedness

in a conversation, play the devil’s advocate and take a position at odds with your privateopinion

every day, consider some strong-held opinion, and think about how you might be wrong

listen to a radio show or read a newspaper that espouses the “other” political line

perseverance

make a list of things to do, and do one thing on the list every day

finish an important task ahead of schedule

work for several hours straight without interruptions, e.g., no television in thebackground, no phone calls, no snacks, no checking e-mail

perspective

think of the wisest person you know, and try to live one day as if you were that person

offer advice only if asked, but then do so as thoughtfully as you can

resolve a dispute between two friends, family members, or coworkers

prudence

think twice before saying anything other than “please” or “thank you”

when driving, stay 5 miles per hour under the speed limit

before you eat any snack, ask yourself, “Is this worth getting fat for?”

religiousness

every day, think about the purpose of your life

pray or meditate at the start of every day

attend a religious service of a faith unfamiliar to you

self-regulation

start an exercise program and stick with it every day for a week

refrain from gossiping or saying mean things about others

when tempted to lose your temper, count to 10; repeat as needed

social intelligence

make someone else feel at ease

notice when friends or family members do something that is difficult for them, andcompliment them

when someone annoys you, understand his or her motives rather than retaliate

teamwork

be the best teammate you can be (chapter 2)

spend 5 minutes every day picking up litter on the sidewalk and putting it in a trashcan

volunteer your time to a charitable group

zest

every day for at least a week, go to sleep early enough that you do not need to set analarm, and eat a nutritious breakfast when you do wake up

say “why not?” three times more frequently than you say “why?”

do something every day because you want to and not because you need to

GLOSSARYcharacter strengths: positive traits; individual differences such as curiosity, kindness, and

gratitude

circumplex model: depiction of concepts around a circle according to their relative similarity ordissimilarity

courage, strengths of: positive traits entailing the exercise of will to accomplish goals in theface of opposition, external or internal

humanity, strengths of: positive traits manifest in caring relationships with others

justice, strengths of: broadly social positive traits relevant to the optimal interaction between

the individual and the group or the community

signature strengths: positive traits that a person owns, celebrates, and frequently exercises

strengths content analysis: technique for identifying the 24 strengths in the VIA Classificationfrom spoken or written text

temperance, strengths of: positive traits that protect us from excess

transcendence, strengths of: positive traits that allow individuals to forge connections to thelarger universe and thereby provide meaning to their lives.

VIA Classification of Character Strengths: classification of 24 positive traits

VIA Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS): self-report survey for adults that measures the 24strengths in the VIA Classification

VIA Inventory of Strengths for Youth (VIA-Youth): self-report survey for youth that measuresthe 24 strengths in the VIA Classification

VIA Structured Interview: interview for determining which of the 24 strengths in the VIAClassification qualify as individual signature strengths

wisdom and knowledge, strengths of: positive traits related to the acquisition and use ofinformation in the service of the good life.

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook andclassification. New York: Oxford University Press; Washington, DC: American PsychologicalAssociation.

Comte-Sponville, A. (2001). A small treatise on the great virtues (C. Temerson, Trans.). New York:Metropolitan.

Aristotle. (2000). The Nicomachean ethics (R. Crisp, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Buckingham, M., & Clifton, D. O. (2001). Now, discover your strengths. New York: Free Press.

American Behavioral Scientist. Special issue (December 2003).

Articles

Cawley, M. J., Martin, J. E., & Johnson, J. A. (2000). A virtues approach to personality.Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 997–1013.

Dahlsgaard, K., Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2005). Shared virtue: The convergence ofvalued human strengths across culture and history. Review of General Psychology, 9, 209–213.

Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2003). Character strengths before and after September 11.Psychological Science, 14, 381–384.

Park, N., Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (in press). Character strengths in 54 nations and all50 U.S. states. Journal of Positive Psychology.

Becker, S. W., & Eagly, A. H. (2004). The heroism of women and men. American Psychologist, 59,163–178.

Web Sites

http://www.viastrengths.org. This is the Web site of the Values in Action (VIA) Institute anddescribes our ongoing research on strengths and virtues. Here you can take the VIA Inventoryof Strengths and receive feedback about your signature strengths of character.

Films

The Wizard of Oz (1939)

The Diary of Anne Frank (1959)

Roots (1977)

The Elephant Man (1980)

Witness (1985)

Glory (1989)

The Hunt for Red October (1990)

Braveheart (1995)

Courage Under Fire (1996)

ABC News’s 20/20: “Emotional IQ” (1996)

PBS Biography: “Benjamin Franklin” (2002)

ABC News’s Nightline: “Whistleblower” (2004)

Songs

“Abraham, Martin, and John” (Dion)

“True Colors” (Cyndi Lauper)

“The Wind Beneath My Wings” (Bette Midler)

7Values

To know the good is to do the good.—PLATO (~360 BCE)

One of the questions raised about our work on character strengths is whether these strengths canbe used for wrong purposes. Although a character strength is by definition morally valued, adespot can be an effective leader, a suicide bomber can be brave, and a bitingly sarcastic personcan be humorous. None of these individuals exemplifies moral goodness, but the characterstrength is still apparent. Said another way, a trait can be a strength without the person whodisplays it being praiseworthy.

We need other considerations to deem a person good, and these include the larger goal towhich his strengths of character are directed. So, one can muster leadership skills to organizehurricane relief or to amass a fortune by marketing violent video games. One can be brave bystarting a fight or by walking away from one. One can be funny in bringing people together or indriving wedges between them. It is the aim of the behavior that ultimately determines itsgoodness.

Accordingly, part of the good life is the articulation and pursuit of those goals that we deemworthy; these are values. Values are often moral, religious, or political in nature, and they figuremightily in the lives that we lead or should lead. According to a 1999 survey by Public Agenda,adults in the United States cited not learning values as the most important problem facing today’syouth, more so than drugs and violence.

In presenting most topics in positive psychology, I worry that my own preferences intrude todetermine what I deem to be positive (chapter 1). The study of values is different because itstarts with the perspective of what others deem worthy, and virtually all people have beliefsabout these matters. It is the task of positive psychologists to study these beliefs and the rolesthey play in people’s lives and to refrain from endorsing some of these values and not others.

Sometimes what we learn about values is surprising. For instance, the research bySwarthmore College psychologist Barry Schwartz (2004) shows what happens when aninvestigator follows the data to where they may lead. He concerned himself with choice, a valuethat most of us would regard as a virtual motherhood—an unalloyed good.

The way he tells the story, his interest was piqued by a visit to a clothing store to buy a pairof blue jeans, a purchase he had made every few years for decades. This had always been asimple enough chore: Remember his size, buy jeans in that size, break them in, and wear themfor as long as they held together and probably a bit longer. But in between his last trip topurchase jeans and this one, the blue jeans industry had discovered choice, and what confrontedhim at the store were countless options besides size and Levi’s versus Lee jeans: stonewashed,faded, loose fit, relaxed, boot cut, tapered, and so on and so forth. And “blue” jeans of coursecould now be black or green or gray, and maybe even teal or periwinkle or desert rose (to namea few colors that I am thoroughly unable to identify). Schwartz was overwhelmed with theoptions, and it took him a long time to buy a pair of pants. He fretted afterward that he had notmade the right choice, all the while acknowledging that this was just a pair of jeans.

Choice and the freedom to make choices are bedrock values in much of the world andcertainly in the United States, a country that from its very beginning has embraced individualrights and autonomy. Freedom to choose among religions, careers, residences, friends, andromantic partners is a cherished American right.

But Schwartz went beyond social consensus to summarize a series of experiments asking ifchoice has any downside, and the data confirmed his own experience buying jeans. As thenumber of options we confront increases, so too does the amount of time we spend makingdecisions, even trivial ones, as does our after-the-fact regret over what we chose. “What-ifs”intrude as choices increase. So, two or three options may be more satisfying than one, but thereis little good gained—psychologically—when there are more than a handful.

According to further research by Schwartz and his colleagues (2002), many people show aconsistent style in how they make choices when confronted with a variety of options. At one end,we find those who want to make the very best choice among alternatives; at the other end wefind those who are content to make a good-enough choice. Borrowing terms from the NobelPrize-winning theorist Herbert Simon (1956), Schwartz called the former people maximizersbecause their goal is to optimize whatever payoff presumably follows from a choice and thelatter people satisficers because their goal is to make a choice that is satisfactory.

No one is a pure maximizer or a pure satisficer, of course, but people can be arrayed alongthe implied continuum according to their agreement with statements like the following(Schwartz, 2004, p. 80):

I never settle for second best.

No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right for me to be on the lookout forbetter opportunities.

When shopping, I have a hard time finding clothing that I really love.

People’s responses predict how they make actual choices and the psychological aftermath. As wewould expect, maximizers take longer to arrive at a decision, but more interestingly, they alsoexperience less satisfaction with their decisions, even if these seem “better” than the quickerdecisions made by satisficers.

Schwartz studied graduating college students as they looked for their first jobs. Maximizerstook longer to settle on a job than did satisficers, but these jobs on average paid much bettersalaries. That might be a good tradeoff. However, follow-up with these graduates showed thatthe maximizers were less satisfied with their jobs than were the satisficers, despite the higherpay. In general, maximizers have lower life satisfaction than do satisficers (chapter 4). Hence theparadox of choice. We want it, and the more the better, but increased choices do not necessarilymake us more happy.

You can ponder the further implications of this line of research by taking an objective look atyourself and how you make decisions. If you are a relentless maximizer, you might experimentby letting go of that style in minor consumer domains, as suggested in the exercise at the end ofthis chapter. But the take-home message from this discussion is that values can have both costsand benefits.

Functions of ValuesAre values themselves valuable? There is the theoretical possibility of individuals or groups thatfunction perfectly well without values (Scott, 1963). But they seem not to exist. Whether this isan arbitrary happenstance of social history or one rooted in a deep human nature, I do not know,but values are nearly universal (Wright, 1994). Most theorists use the ubiquity of values to arguefor their functional significance at both the individual and the group level. All of these functionscan contribute to the good life, although we should not automatically equate the good life withwhat is easy or pleasurable. We want to do the right thing—however we define it—because it isthe right thing to do.

For the individual, values not only suggest goals of action but also the criteria by which thesegoals are evaluated (Williams, 1951). Values go beyond what we prefer to describe what weshould prefer. As ideal standards, values are not always achieved, and we should not be surprisedwhen people’s concrete behaviors do not map neatly onto what they profess, although there isusually a modest empirical association between values and behaviors.

Indeed, an enduring research question asks: When are values and behaviors most likely to becongruent? Here is a summary of the circumstances in which we can expect someone’s beliefs tobe reflected in their actions (Peterson, 1997):

The circumstances under which a person originally acquires a value. Values stemming from

direct experience are more consistent with our behavior than those acquired secondhand.

The degree to which a value helps to define a person’s self-image. If who you are is tied up in agiven value, then you usually act quite consistently.

Whether people are self-conscious while they are behaving. Sometimes people need to reflect ontheir values before they behave consistently with them. People who are not thinking aboutthe meaning of their actions—e.g., those who are mindlessly enacting social scripts—tendto behave inconsistently.

A person’s evaluation of the particular behavior that supposedly reflects the value in question. Ifthere is a strong norm for or against acting in a particular way, one’s value exerts littleinfluence on behavior. Here the individual is not inconsistent with values so much asconsistent with the expectations of others.

The generality of the value with regard to the behavior that is being examined. Highly generalvalues about beauty, for instance, do not predict given behaviors like returning aluminumcans as well as do more specific beliefs about the virtue of recycling.

The scope of the behavior relevant to the value. The correlations between what one believesand how one acts are boosted considerably if behaviors are measured in various ways onrepeated occasions. Said another way, behaviors are more likely to reflect values if we lookat the total of what someone does.

When we do behave in accordance with some value, we liberate ourselves from the proximalcauses of behavior in our environment or our biological makeup. Religious values, for example,may lead us to turn the other cheek when provoked or to refrain from certain foods or sexualactivities regardless of our desires. Seen in this way, values allow us to sustain our activitiesagainst the immediate causal grain and to be independent.

Values are expressive. They tell the world—and ourselves—who we are and what is mostimportant about us. We plaster value-relevant bumper stickers on our cars or tattoo value-relevant icons on our biceps. We have favorite mottoes that embody our values which we repeatto others and to ourselves (Burrell, 1997). Again, whether we always adhere to a motto is not thepoint; the motto is how we want to present ourselves. Nonetheless, we feel righteous when welive up to our values and shame or guilt when we do not even try. A final function of values is toprovide justifications for what we do and feel (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994).

Values also have social functions. People in the same group profess the same sorts of values,at least insofar as the values are relevant to the group’s purpose. A shared sense of what isdesirable may even be a defining characteristic of a viable group because it explains why thegroup exists in the first place, why people should join the group, and why the group shouldcontinue (chapter 11). So, the New York Times’s motto, “all the news that’s fit to print,” conveys

all of these notions in one pithy phrase. Excellence in journalism is expected of reporters andpromised to readers.

Shared values regularize behavior within a group in an efficient way by articulating a generalrule that applies broadly, so group members are spared the ongoing reinvention of standards andtheir justifications. “The parents are always right” is a value held within many traditionalfamilies, and “the children are always right” is a value apparently held by many yuppie families,or at least those seated next to us in restaurants. Regardless, shared values reduce conflict withinthe group. “That’s the way we do things around here; it’s the right thing to do. If you don’t likeit, leave.”

Shared values justify sanctions against deviants, and they help to muster the collectiveindignation of the group against an offender. Punishment becomes possible without arousing thesympathetic opposition of the group. Firing someone because he showed up to work 5 minuteslate seems cruel and harsh, but firing him because he did not respect the rules or his fellowworkers sounds much more reasonable, even if his specific infraction was showing up for work 5minutes late.

Values held by group members also allow them to judge other groups—for better or worse—and to decide how to treat them. So, are Jews, Christians, and Muslims all children of Abraham,or are they locked in inherent conflict? The value someone holds about the breadth of therelevant moral circle—sometimes called universalism—dictates how this question is to beanswered (P. Singer, 1981, 1993).

Like at the individual level, group values are a public statement. How does one’s group wantto be known to the world? Most U.S. states have mottoes (Burrell, 1997), and it is no coincidencethat the mottoes of the 13 original states convey sentiments justifying the 1776 revolutionagainst England. The New Hampshire slogan is “Live Free or Die,” and the Rhode Island slogan is“Hope.” In Delaware, we have “Liberty and Independence,” and in New Jersey, “Liberty andProsperity.” In Pennsylvania, the motto is “Virtue, Liberty, and Independence.” TheMassachusetts motto is a mouthful that makes the same point: “By the sword we seek peace, butpeace only under liberty.” My own state of residence, Michigan, is a newer addition to the UnitedStates. Our motto has little to do with freedom and apparently more to do with tourism: “If youseek a pleasant peninsula, look around you.” (The Michigan motto is more impressive whenrendered in Latin: Si Quaeris Peninsulam Amoenam Circumspice.)

Shared values are not just a means of social control and a way to protect the status quo.Change is also possible because of values, and one of the rallying points for social activism of anystripe is to make some plan into a cause by phrasing it in the language of values.

The Peace Corps was established in 1961 to promote world peace, understanding, and

friendship. Nowadays, the Peace Corps may also provide a way for young Americans to see theworld, to learn a language other than English, and to decide what they want to do for a career,but these motives—not in themselves objectionable—do not provide the moral oomph to havesustained the efforts of more than 180,000 Peace Corps members over the decades.

I will now describe what psychologists have learned about values. What are they, and—just asimportant—what are they not? How can we identify and assess values? Is it possible to speak ofuniversally recognized values? What are the tradeoffs among different values? Where and howdo they originate? Is value change possible, and if so, with what effects?

What Are Values?One hears a great deal about values—family values, American values, cultural values, and thelike. In general terms, a value is an enduring belief that some goals are preferable to others(Rokeach, 1973, 1979). People and societies of course differ in their values, with importantconsequences for behavior.

Unlike many other topics of interest to positive psychology, values have long been the subjectof research and indeed a focus within all social science disciplines, including anthropology,economics, political science, sociology, and of course psychology (F. Adler, 1956; Barth, 1993;Dukes, 1955; W. F. Hill, 1960; Hull, 1945; Kluckhohn, 1951; Scitovsky, 1993; Sherif, 1936;Vernon & Allport, 1931). Here I will privilege the study of values by psychology because of itsconcern with their underlying processes and meanings. Psychological approaches treat value notsimply as a noun but also as a verb. How do we arrive at preferred goals (Rohan, 2000)?

One of my graduate school professors at the University of Colorado, William Scott (1963),extensively studied values and grappled with how they might be defined and measured. ProfessorScott was very much an empirical scientist, and to study values, he started by talking to people(Scott, 1959). His interview strategy entailed establishing rapport with a series of warm-upquestions and then cutting to the chase:

Think about the various people you admire, and try to reflect on what it is aboutthem that is admirable. Now consider the general question: What is it about anyperson that makes him [or her] good? What personal traits would you say areparticularly admirable? … Please [think about] the traits you have mentioned. …Which ones do you think are inherently good, and should properly be regarded asgood by all people? (Scott, 1963, p. 17)

Scott deliberately chose the word admire to capture what people valued without raising anyone’shackles by using more loaded terms such as right and wrong. However, as subsequent questions in

the interview revealed, most people showed little hesitation in labeling admired traits morallyright.

Scott used these open-ended descriptions to arrive at a fuller definition of a value as apreferred goal that one regards as (a) inherently good: being an ultimate goal; (b) absolutelygood: holding in all circumstances; and (c) universally good: applying to all people. To be sure,there were individuals who offered more-qualified responses (“it depends”), but the majorityregarded values in these terms. Indeed, most interview subjects believed that all right-minded

people should see things as they did and therefore should have the same values.1

Although Scott’s interview started with questions about admired traits and thus sounds likean investigation of character strengths like the one described in chapter 6, note the difference.He asked about characteristics we admire in others, whether or not we embody thesecharacteristics in our own actions.

Scott’s interview subjects were college students from two generations ago, and he did notsuggest that the admired characteristics they identified were exhaustive or universal.Nonetheless, here are the values that emerged from his interviews, and you can see that theyhave a degree of generality:

achievement

creativity

honesty

independence

intellectualism

kindness

loyalty

physical prowess

religiousness

self-control

social skills

status

Most, if not all, of these values are ideals that everyone endorses, which illustrates anotherimportant point about values. They are usually regarded by most people as positive; all are foundsomewhere north of neutral. When we say that people have different values, the more precisestatement is that people have different value priorities. We order our values and use this orderingto adjudicate conflicts as they arise (Tetlock, 1986). Yet another important point is that almost

all of us have a value system composed of several values.

All things being equal, loyalty to one’s group is a value that everyone endorses. Try toimagine a group not on a reality television show that celebrates treachery and fickleness. In thereal world, though, loyalty may butt up against honesty, another widely endorsed value. Somefolks resolve the conflict by being loyal (e.g., not criticizing the group even when the criticism isaccurate), and others by being honest (e.g., saying that the emperor has no clothes). In neithercase should we presume that the subordinated value is unimportant, just that it is less importantat that time than the primary value.

Later in this chapter, I will discuss how psychologists measure values, and one of theproblems posed by their general positivity is the creation of what researchers call ceiling effects.The endorsement of values usually bunches up at the higher end of a rating scale, which meansthat distinctions among them can be difficult to measure reliably or meaningfully.

I should emphasize again that values are also social. Groups can be described as sharingvalues (because their individual members tend to agree about what are desirable goals). Sharedvalues are one of the defining characteristics of a group and serve to distinguish them from mereaggregations—collections of people who happen to be in the same place at the same time(chapter 11).

Scott (1963) showed, for instance, that many groups differ, as we would expect, with respectto their shared values. So, members of college thespian societies value creativity more than doundergraduates in general. Fraternity and sorority members especially value social skills andloyalty. Seminarians value religiousness. Honors students value academic achievement. Athleticand outdoorsy groups value physical prowess. And in a comparison that makes me smile, hestudied members of a University of Colorado student group that prided itself on its deviance andfound that they shared values of independence and nonconformity (but apparently not vis-à-visone another).

Scott also showed that college students join groups that hold values congruent with theirown, and further that group members are evaluated by their peers in terms of their similarity ordissimilarity to the shared values of the group. Interestingly, there was little evidence in hisresearch that belonging to a college group moved any member over time to be more similar tothe shared values, although it should be remembered that these were voluntary organizations,and there may have been little room for further movement. Later in this chapter, I discuss someof the origins of values, and theorists agree that social institutions such as the family and thelarger culture create and shape values. The social context of values should always be kept inmind, even if it recedes into the background of a given discussion (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004).

In sum, values are beliefs held by individuals and shared by groups about desirable ends; they

transcend specific situations; they guide how we select actions and evaluate others and ourselves;and they are ordered by their relative importance (S. H. Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Furthermore,values are not held in a vacuum; they are part of someone’s larger ideology about the world andhow it should be (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 2003).

What Are Values Not?Most commentators observe that the term value has been used promiscuously to refer to all sortsof entities: interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, goals,needs, and orientations. I have tried to be clear what values are, but given the sprawling use ofthe notion, it is also worth mentioning what they are not.

Values are not attitudes, although a slippery slope connects the two. Values are abstract

ideals, whereas attitudes are favorable or unfavorable evaluations of a specific object or issue.2

If we believe that people should be kind toward others, that is a value. If we believe that driversshould use their turn signals, that belief more closely resembles an attitude because it is muchmore specific. And if we despise drivers in SUVs who do not use their turn signals in heavytraffic, that is unambiguously an attitude.

Abstract values subsume specific attitudes, although the mapping is not perfect, and its detailsvary across people. The value of equality may translate itself into strong support for affirmativeaction programs, but it may also lead to equally strong opposition to such programs. Someonewho values “life” may be opposed to abortion, but someone else who equally values “life” maybe opposed to war or the death penalty. As you well know, at least in the United States, thesesomeones are rarely the same people. The devil—or at least the attitude—is always in the details.

It is worth noting that those who champion a given value usually do so in the affirmative—echoing the premise of the Pollyanna Principle that the positive is more basic and memorable(chapter 5). So, those who favor the right to abortion describe their position as pro-choice. Thosewho favor the death penalty speak of law and order and accountability. Those opposed to gaymarriage say that their goal is to protect the traditional family.

There are further distinctions between values and attitudes. Most values are more central toan individual’s self-concept than are most attitudes (Hitlin, 2003). “I hate Brussels sprouts” maybe a strongly held attitude, but it will rarely define how a person thinks about herself (Hitlin &Piliavin, 2004). At the same time, abstract values are less related to specific behaviors than arespecific attitudes (S. H. Schwartz, 1996). Those who hate Brussels sprouts probably do not eatthem, but those who value hedonism may or may not eat Brussels sprouts, no matter how weirdthey taste. Finally, longitudinal research shows that values are more stable across the lifespanthan are attitudes (Konty & Dunham, 1997).

Values are not traits, even though identical terms can be used to describe each3 (chapter 6).Traits are dispositions to think, feel, and act in consistent ways, whereas values are beliefs aboutdesirable goals which—as already noted—may not map neatly onto specific or consistentbehaviors. Some traits are positive (e.g., kindness) and others negative (e.g., neuroticism), butmany are simply neutral (e.g., introversion or extraversion). We use our own values but not ourown traits to judge the conduct of others.

Values are not norms, although both embody a sense of oughtness (Marini, 2000). Thedifference is that norms are thoroughly situational—shared beliefs that one should act in certainways in certain circumstances. Wedding guests should bring wrapped presents. Values, incontrast, cut across situations. People shouldbe polite to everyone, including brides and groomsbut also parking lot attendants, waiters, and limousine drivers.

Another difference, at least for some of us, is that we chafe under norms and feel that theyconstrain who we really are (R. H. Turner, 1976). “I do not want to buy a present for someonejust because I am expected to do so.” In contrast, we do not experience our values as constrainingus. They are, after all, who we are, and it is when we fail to express our values in our actions thatwe feel discomfort or disappointment.

Values are not needs, although both influence how we behave. Needs have a biologicalconnotation—e.g., hunger, thirst, sex—and function as motives. They move us to behave in waysto satisfy them. Values enter into the process by providing socially acceptable ways of

articulating needs.4 They dictate desirable or undesirable ways to gratify a given need. Sexualdesire is rarely satisfied indiscriminately. Marriage is a valued institution revolving around thesatisfaction of sexual needs (among other things), whereas prostitution is a crime revolvingaround the satisfaction of sexual needs (among other things).

I hope that I have distinguished values from attitudes, traits, norms, and needs. I should noteas well that values are not mere tastes or idiosyncratic preferences. Personal interests are veryimportant to us and have a place in positive psychology because we pursue them with vigor anduse them to define who we are (chapter 8). But personal interests are simply that and carry withthem little expectation that others should have the same interests. Indeed, we assume variationacross people and probably prefer it, because variation serves our own sense of uniqueness. Someof us like Pepsi and others Coca-Cola. Some like the Chicago Cubs and others the White Sox.Some of us hang toilet paper over the top and others down the wall. We may tease one anotherabout our respective tastes, preferences, and interests, and some of the “get a life” folks among usmay turn them into larger moral issues. But for the most part we do not. Values are of coursedifferent. People on opposite sides of value conflicts are not known to chide each other gentlynor to find the values of others a source of amusement.

Cataloging ValuesThe number of values we might espouse is finite but still potentially very large. How might wesift through them to arrive at a set big enough to capture the range of what people believe aboutdesirable goals but small enough to be scientifically wieldy?

Some psychologists simply rely on their own intuitions, experiences, and hunches to identifya core of important values. Milton Rokeach (1973), one of the pioneering researchers in thestudy of values, relied largely on his own notions of what people value to distinguish what hecalled terminal values, beliefs about ideal states of existence:

a comfortable life

an exciting life

a sense of accomplishment

a world at peace

a world of beauty

equality

family security

freedom

happiness

inner harmony

mature love

national security

pleasure

salvation

self-respect

social recognition

true friendship

wisdom

Rokeach also articulated what he called instrumental values, beliefs about ideal modes ofconduct that presumably aid and abet terminal values, but his instrumental-terminal distinction(means versus ends) does not hold up in practice (e.g., S. H. Schwartz, 1994).

Other psychologists, like William Scott, have been more systematic and use interviews orfocus groups to identify people’s values. And still others turn to existing theories to deduce a set

of values that deserves study.

For example, an early and still influential catalog of values was proposed years ago byHarvard psychologist Gordon Allport and his colleagues (Allport, 1937; Allport, Vernon, &Lindzey, 1960; Vernon & Allport, 1931). Their starting point was an even earlier theory aboutthe basic “types” of people (Spranger, 1928). Although contemporary psychologists do not so

readily assume that people fall into discrete psychological clumps5 (cf. Haslam & Kim, 2003), onecan still make distinctions among their beliefs and then describe actual people in terms of howclosely their beliefs resemble the prototypes captured by each distinction. Allport et al. followedthis strategy in proposing six basic values:

theoretical: valuing truth and its discovery

economic: valuing what is useful and practical

aesthetic: valuing what is beautiful and harmonious

political: valuing power, influence, and renown

social: valuing other people and their welfare

religious: valuing transcendence and communion with the larger universe

Another example of a value catalog based on a previous theory is political scientist RonaldInglehart’s (1990) use of Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs to specify the goals that groups ofpeople most value. As you may know, Maslow believed that human motives could be arranged ina hierarchy reflecting the order in which we attend to them.

At the bottom are biologically based needs, such as hunger and thirst. We cannot leave theseneeds unsatisfied for too long, because our lives are at stake. Only when these needs are met doesthe need to be free from threatened danger arise. Maslow called this need one of safety—bothphysical and psychological. We need to believe that the world is stable and coherent. Next in thehierarchy is attachment, which leads us to seek out other people, to love, and to be loved. If wesuccessfully satisfy this need for attachment, then we need to feel esteemed, by ourselves and byothers. Maslow grouped our needs for knowledge, understanding, and novelty together ascognitive needs, and proposed that they are next in his hierarchy. Then we find aesthetic needs:the desire for order and beauty. Near the top of his hierarchy is self-actualization: “the full useand exploitation of [one’s] talents, capacities, potentialities” (Maslow, 1970, p. 150). Maslowargued that we must satisfy lower needs before we seek the satisfaction of higher needs. Theneed for self-actualization is in particular difficult to achieve because it only becomes relevantwhen the needs that fall below it have been successfully addressed.

Although Maslow’s theory is about needs and not values, Inglehart recast each need as an endstate that people might regard as desirable, thereby arriving at a catalog of values. He

distinguished between survival values (those corresponding to needs at the bottom of Maslow’shierarchy) and self-expressive values (those corresponding to needs at the top), and has beeninvolved in research that measures instances of such values in a variety of nations around theglobe. In keeping with Maslow’s basic premise, nations that become more affluent over timeusually show the predicted progression from survival to self-expressive values.

Another use of theory to deduce values is by philosopher Sissela Bok (1995), who tried toidentify universally held values. Her insight was that the level of abstraction matters in deemingvalues to be universal or not. In very general terms, people in all times and places must endorsethree sets of values: (a) positive duties of mutual care and reciprocity; (b) negative injunctionsagainst violence, deceit, and betrayal; and (c) norms for rudimentary fairness and proceduraljustice in cases of conflict regarding positive duties and/or negative injunctions. Bok called theseminimalist values—a term I do not especially like because it conjures up images of sparseness(think Yugos or generic cigarettes)—but her intended meaning is that these values embody theminimal requirements for a viable society. In the absence of even one of these values, it isdifficult to imagine a society continuing.

There are also maximalist values, as it were, more numerous, extensive, elaborated, andculturally situated: e.g., the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church with respect tocontraception and abortion. Any given cultural group of course endorses both minimalist andmaximalist values and usually has no reason to distinguish between them. But if one wishes tospeak across groups—like when members of the United Nations make pronouncements to theentire world about human rights—it behooves one to keep them straight.

A final example of the use of theory to demarcate important human values is found in thework of psychologist Shalom Schwartz and his colleagues (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1996; Schwartz& Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Like Bok, they started with a vision of what wasuniversally required for individuals and groups to survive and thrive, pointing specifically to the(a) biologically based needs of the individual; (b) requirements for social coordination andinteraction; and (c) institutional demands concerning group welfare. Into this scheme, they fitmore specific values, relying to a large degree on the list of values proposed by Rokeach.

I note in passing that some theorists have proposed more-circumscribed value catalogs,intended to be relevant to given groups but not necessarily to others. So, William Scott (1963)studied U.S. college students and in particular social fraternities and sororities. Geert Hofstede(2001) concerned himself with values in the workplace. Given the meaning of a value as trans-situational, it is not surprising that the values included in even these deliberately focusedendeavors are rather general and see use by theorists and researchers whose interest goes beyondGreek organizations or work sites.

As lists of values accumulated, the most typical strategy used to identify important values hasbeen for a psychologist to consolidate, elaborate, and tweak these earlier efforts (e.g.,Braithwaite & Law, 1985). Most psychologists agree, not surprisingly, that there are a dozen orso important values recognized by most people in most places.

The problem with this approach is that it fails to recognize the emergence of a new valueamong people because of its reliance on extant theorizing about old values. For instance,Timothy Kasser (2005) drew psychology’s attention to an emerging value in some segments ofthe population that he called “time affluence”: valuing a life in which there is enough time to dowhat one really wants to do. He juxtaposed and contrasted time affluence with the more-familiar

value of material affluence,6 finding in his research that they might be incompatible and furtherthat time affluence is a more-robust predictor of well-being than is material affluence. Rememberthe finding cited in chapter 4 that one of the stronger correlates of life satisfaction is the amountof time one spends at leisure activities? Valuing time affluence may set the stage for a satisfiedlife and thus deserves more attention by positive psychologists. More generally, think of yourown group or society. Are there emerging values not captured in past and present value catalogs?

Measuring ValuesGiven some set of values that we think worthy of study, how do we actually go about this? As Ihave discussed in previous chapters, researchers must come up with concrete ways to assess theabstract concepts in which they are interested. Although there are occasional discussions of

“unconscious” values7 (S. Epstein, 1989), researchers for the most part have assumed that peopleknow what they think is desirable and hence can report their values. By far the most typical way

of measuring values relies on self-report8 (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). Within this strategy,though, there is considerable variation.

Some researchers ask respondents about specific attitudes and behaviors that presumablyreflect a given value. From the pattern of responses, the value is inferred. So, we might concludethat you have a strong religious value to the degree that you report attending religious servicesregularly, pray on a daily basis, consult religious texts for guidance, and so on. I have alreadyimplied the problem with this strategy: Although behaviors and attitudes are of course related tomore general values, the relationship is not one of perfect redundancy. You may attend churchbecause of the social needs thereby satisfied, because it confers status in your community, orsimply because there is no other game in town. Or you may attend church because you valuereligion. How do we know what is behind your behavior? We are clueless if we inquire onlyabout these concrete and fallible indicators of religiousness (Allport, 1950). A related problemwith this approach is that it makes it impossible to investigate the degree to which behaviors and

attitudes are congruent with values or the circumstances that determine this congruence.

Earlier values researchers were of course mindful of these issues, and they opted for theindirect strategy of assessment only because they believed that general questions about abstractvalues might not be valid. More-recent researchers have found that people can offer abstractjudgments about their values that prove scientifically useful—reliable and valid—so long as thequestions do not stray too far into the stratosphere (S. H. Schwartz et al., 2001).

Given that people can be directly asked about their values, what do we ask them? Again, wefind considerable variation. Some researchers ask for a simple yes-no endorsement of particularvalues. Other researchers ask for more finegrained distinctions, using psychology’s familiar 5-point or 7-point scales of agreement or endorsement. This has the benefit of spreading outresponses although, as already mentioned, most values remain north of neutral.

In some approaches to value measurement, only one question per value is asked, a strategythat is efficient but suspicious. When researchers pose different questions about the same value,answers converge but not perfectly, implying the prudence of trying to measure the same notion

in different ways and then combining answers.9

An altogether different approach to measurement asks respondents to rank order differentvalues. The rationale for this strategy is that value ranking reflects how people actually usevalues in everyday life. Ranking builds into measurement the hierarchy thought to characterize

value systems.10 So, the Rokeach Value Survey provides research participants with the 18 valueslisted earlier and asks that they be placed in order. People are given separate cards or labels foreach value and asked to rearrange them physically.

The ranking strategy yields what are known as ipsative scores for each individual: theposition of each value held by the individual relative to other values (Cattell, 1944). Withipsative scores, we cannot make absolute comparisons across people. We can imagine arespondent whose ipsative rank for freedom is 1 who nonetheless values freedom in an absolutesense less than someone else whose ipsative rank for freedom is 2 or 3 or even lower.

Another drawback to the ranking approach is that it limits the number of items that can beconsidered by a research participant at the same time. Providing 18 different values to be rankordered can be unwieldy. I have myself tried to use such an approach by giving people indexcards to be physically arranged, and what results is sometimes more slapstick than science. Myresearch subjects drop the cards or lose them; they bend, they fold, they spindle, and theymutilate. They create a big mess.

The good news is that ranking methods, at least when used by researchers more skilled thanme, yield much the same results about the relative importance of values as those that rely onrating methods. This allows researchers to rely on the simpler strategy of rating. If ipsative scores

are of theoretical interest, they can be calculated after the fact from ratings (Park, Peterson, &Seligman, 2004).

A Universal Structure of Human ValuesI have noted that the value catalogs proposed by different psychologists over the years agreesubstantially. This conclusion is buttressed by the research of Shalom Schwartz, who set outdeliberately to identify what he hoped to be universally recognized human values by studyingvalue endorsement in dozens of countries around the world. His work is also notable because headdressed the relationships among different values—what he called their “structure”—and thusstudied not just individual values but entire value systems.

This approach is scientifically laudable because it allows nuanced conclusions about theconsequences of holding certain values rather than others. In emphasizing one value, we may bedeemphasizing another, and it is not always clear what is responsible for a given empiricalfinding. So, Kasser (2002) found that materialists are unhappy, but is this because the pursuit ofmaterial goods in itself lowers life satisfaction or because materialistic individuals often do notvalue other people so much and as a result miss out on the interpersonal sources of happiness?

As mentioned, Shalom Schwartz started with the Rokeach list of terminal values, which heasked research participants to rank order in importance. He then had them go back to their ranksand fine-tune them by rating how similar or dissimilar two adjacently ranked values were interms of personal importance. By using sophisticated statistical procedures, the details of whichneed not concern us here, Schwartz looked first at the values which people distinguished andsecond at how these distinguished values were related to one another. He and his colleagueswent on to repeat these studies in 70 different nations, finding much the same results in eachsample.

Ten different values are consistently distinguished around the world:

achievement: personal success through the demonstration of competence in accordance withsociety’s standards, e.g., ambition

benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of others in one’s immediatesocial circle, e.g., forgiveness

conformity: restraint of actions that violate social norms or expectations, e.g., politeness

hedonism: personal gratification and pleasure, e.g., enjoyment of food, sex, and leisure

power: social status, prestige, dominance, and control over others, e.g., wealth

security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, e.g., law and order

self-direction: independent thought and action, e.g., freedom

stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life, e.g., variety

tradition: respect for and acceptance of one’s cultural or religious customs, e.g., religiousdevotion

universalism: understanding, appreciating, and protecting all people and nature, e.g., socialjustice, equality, environmentalism

These values are structured along two basic dimensions, as shown in Figure 7.1. This figure isanother example of a circumplex model, discussed in the previous chapter in the context oftradeoffs among character strengths (p. 157). If two values are close to one another on the circle(like achievement and power), then they are compatible, and the same people tend to endorseboth. If two values are on opposite sides of the circle (like benevolence and achievement), thenthey tend to be incompatible and not likely to be held by the same people. Remember, though,that all values lie north of neutral. These pronouncements about the relationships among valuesdescribe relative emphases—conclusions about value priorities. Someone who strongly valuessecurity does not believe, for example, that stimulation is a bad thing, just that it is less valuablethan security. By the way, conformity and tradition are depicted as they are in Figure 7.1because they are distinguished by people yet related similarly to other values, with traditionbeing more extreme than conformity.

Figure 7.1. Tradeoffs Among ValuesThe farther apart are two values, the less likely it is that the same person

strongly endorses both.

A theorist tries to make further sense of a circumplex model by specifying its underlying

dimensions. In the case of Schwartz’s circumplex, these seem rather obvious. One dimension—asshown in Figure 7.1—is whether the values revolve around self-enhancement (achievement,power) or around self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence). We could also label thisdimension self versus other, agency versus communion, individualism versus collectivism, orindependence versus interdependence (Helgeson, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis,1995). Or we could use Inglehart’s distinction between survival values and self-expressive values.Each of these sets of labels has slightly different connotations, but together they capture the ideathat people’s value priorities can reflect an emphasis on what is good for themselves asindividuals or an emphasis on what is good for other people and groups with which they havecommerce.

The second dimension underlying the value structure in Figure 7.1 is anchored on one end byconservation (conformity, tradition, security) and on the other by openness to change (hedonism,stimulation, self-direction), a dimension which I could also label conservatism-liberalism if youpromise not to interpret these terms in a narrowly political way. Another set of labels for thiscontrast is traditional versus secular (Baker, 2005), and Rohan (2000) suggested priority onorganization versus priority on opportunity.

Whatever we call its two dimensions, Schwartz’s circumplex model helps us to make sense ofsomeone’s value system as a whole and the tradeoffs that often result within it. Rohan (2000)gave the example of human rights activists, who presumably place a high value on equality, oruniversalism in Schwartz’s scheme. We can expect that most activists value the adjacent value ofself-direction. Because the power value is in direct opposition to universalism, we can furtherexpect human rights activists to make few status distinctions among their ranks, to avoid stayingat luxury hotels when at a political rally, and to react negatively to a show of police strength.

Similarly, think about other value-relevant events that attract attention and debate. I amdrafting this paragraph amid news stories about Federal Communications Commissioncensorship, the privatization of Social Security, and the Terry Schiavo life-support case. Whateveryour position with respect to any of these issues, you probably frame it in terms of some value ofimportance to you, and your related positions can likely be predicted from the circumplex modelof Schwartz.

Origin of ValuesOnce we arrive at our values, we hold them rather tenaciously. But where do they originate?Theorists over the years have invariably pointed to processes of socialization and learning. Thefine detail of their explanations reflect whatever psychological theory was prevailing at the time.

In the 1940s and 1950s, when reinforcement theories were popular in psychology, the

acquisition of specific values was explained in terms of reward and punishment (Hull, 1945). Ageneration later, with the advent of social learning theory à la Rotter (1954) and Bandura (1969)and its emphasis on other people as the primary source of what we learn, the acquisition ofspecific values was explained in terms of modeling: emulating what influential others say anddo. When the cognitive revolution swept through psychology (chapter 5), legitimizing cognitiveexplanations of any and all phenomena, values acquisition was explained in terms of inherent

tendencies to be consistent in what one believes.11

From the vantage point of positive psychology, I speculate that people may also acquirevalues by a deliberate process of asking what is the right thing and choosing an answer whichthen becomes a value. This process does not reduce value acquisition to the automatic operationof reward, modeling, or consistency seeking. To be sure, the deliberate embracing of valuepriorities might be occasioned by events in our lives that trigger scrutiny. For instance, manypeople who have had a brush with death say that they now “know” what is most important. Inmy own studies of character strengths, I have found that people who have recovered from a life-threatening illness show elevated levels of appreciation of beauty, curiosity, fairness, forgiveness,gratitude, humor, kindness, love of learning, and spirituality, and as virtues slide into values,perhaps we have another instance of how values change (Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2006).

As I described in the last chapter, immediately after 9/11, Americans were more likely toemphasize behaviors reflecting core values of faith, hope, and love (Peterson & Seligman,2003a). These changes were not permanent, and as lives more or less returned to normal, so toodid the emphases on these values.

But in other cases, changes are more long-lasting. My own valuing of human equality waspermanently forged during my college years as my circle of friends expanded beyond thesuburban kids with whom I had grown up. Even as the larger society in general and socialscience in particular recognize and stress “diversity” among people, I still strongly believe thatfolks are more similar than they are different, and the implied value of equality infuses how I act.

A more-striking example of value conversion is the story of John Newton, an 18th-centuryship captain involved in the trafficking of slaves. After a storm in which his ship was almost lost,he examined his life and became a minister and—by some reports—an abolitionist. Why do weknow his story? Following his brush with death, Newton wrote “Amazing Grace,” which twocenturies later became one of the anthems of the U.S. civil rights movement:

Amazing grace! How sweet the soundThat saved a wretch like me!I once was lost, but now am found;Was blind, but now I see.

—John Newton (1779)

All of these processes—reward and punishment, modeling, cognitive consistency, and self-examination—work in tandem to explain how we acquire given values. For instance, honesty is avalue I learned as a child. Part of my learning was bottom-up in the sense that I was spanked fortelling specific fibs and praised, after a fashion, for ‘fessing up after specific misdeeds. From thispattern of discipline, I arrived at the conclusion that honesty was usually a good policy.

My parents were also excellent models for this value, not only because they themselvesconsistently told the truth but also because they endorsed honesty in more-general terms.“Always tell the truth so you do not have to remember what you said” was one of the wry familymottoes that I remember to this day. Rhetoric about generation gaps notwithstanding, parentsand their children often profess similar values, implying that the modeling of values transcendssuperficial cohort differences in musical preferences, hairstyles, and the like (Alessandri &Wozniak, 1989; Kohn, 1983; Kuczynski, Marshall, & Schell, 1997).

Cognitive consistency entered the scene as I became a teenager and was bombarded withnews stories that morally undressed people whom I thought were heroes. The only way I couldrationalize these kinds of stories, which always left me feeling empty, was to recognize that allpeople have flaws, even my heroes, but that the ultimate flaw is false righteousness—lying aboutone’s transgressions even when they are incontestable. Anyone who lied stopped being my hero.Honesty for me became a way of resolving what otherwise seemed to be impossiblecontradictions.

Honesty is a good policy but not always an easy one to enact, at least for me. I also have astrong value concerning benevolence, which means that I like to please other people. That oftenmeans telling them what they want to hear. Sometimes benevolence in these terms runs at cross-purposes to honesty, and on more than a few occasions, I have needed to take deliberate stock ofhow I interact with others and to speak the unpleasant truth as I see it.

Rokeach (1971) elaborated this strategy of value self-confrontation into a means ofdeliberately changing someone’s values. Earlier in the chapter (see fn. 7, p. 179), I mentionedvalues clarification, based on the gentle premise that people may need help in recognizing thevalues they already hold. Rokeach’s intervention has a bolder rationale: People may placeinsufficient emphasis on a particular value because they have not confronted the contradictionamong their value priorities. His strategy entails confronting people with their value priorities,explicitly interpreting the contradictions, and seeing what happens. In the vast majority ofstudies testing value self-confrontation, change in the expected direction occurs (Grube, Mayton,& Ball-Rokeach, 1994).

Originally, Rokeach attributed value change to the operation of cognitive consistency, but

later he made a slightly different argument in terms of people’s desire to think well ofthemselves. That is, if someone believes that a morally competent person should hold value X,and if it is pointed out that she does not hold this value, then change occurs.

This sort of intervention has been tested in experiments, usually with two conditions. In thevalue confrontation condition, respondents are asked to rank their values, and the results are fedback to them. They are also shown how other groups of people rank the same set of values. Asimple comment by the researcher directs the individual’s attention to discrepancies. So, in theparadigm case of this intervention, done with U.S. research participants in the 1970s when thecivil rights movement was at its height, college students were shown that their peers ratedfreedom very highly as a value but equality much lower. Their own ratings usually reflected asimilar discrepancy. Then they were told, “It appears that college students in the United Statesvalue their own freedom more than they value the equality of others.” The conclusion—unstatedbut presumably obvious—is that they themselves were espousing a contradiction, like themajority of their peers. In a comparison condition, other research participants were asked to ranktheir own values, but without any of the subsequent self-confrontation.

Follow-up showed that participants in the confrontation condition not only changed theirvalue priorities but did so in lasting fashion. Furthermore, when later given the opportunity todisplay their values—like joining the National Association for the Advancement of ColoredPeople—they were more likely to do so than those in the comparison condition.

Similar studies have been done with other values—e.g., about the environment—always withthe same results. And in an audacious experiment, this intervention was even delivered on atelevision show in the northwestern United States; viewers in different regions were assigned todifferent conditions, again with the same results (Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, & Grube, 1984).

These studies seem almost too powerful to be true, and the skeptic within me wonders if

demand characteristics had anything to do with what was found.12 Counting against thiscriticism are the behavioral checks that validated the intervention. Another consideration is oneprovided by Rokeach himself in his observation that this technique only works with thosepredisposed to change their values in the implied direction (Rokeach & Grube, 1979). So, thevalue self-confrontation technique has not been used to encourage members of groups with long-standing antipathies to embrace each other: Turks and Armenians, Israelis and Palestinians, andthe like. Increased emphasis on equality was successfully encouraged among college students butnot Ku Klux Klan members.

Assuming that it actually works, is value self-confrontation Orwellian? Rokeach has stressedthat this intervention is done with everyone’s eyes wide open. There is no deception. Participantsare told what the purpose of the experiment is, and it would probably not work if done in a

sneaky way or indeed with the goal of moving values in arbitrary directions.

Let me switch the level of discussion. Given that psychological processes are at work when weacquire specific values, the question remains about the pool of possible values from which welearn to favor some over others. Our larger culture and its priorities set the table, and here thework by University of Michigan political scientist Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues isinstructive. For years, they have worked on the World Values Survey, an ambitious study thatperiodically surveys people around the world with respect to their attitudes, beliefs, and values(Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998). Questions range from the mundane (“Is throwing awaylitter ever justified?”) to the sacred (“How often do you think about the meaning and purpose oflife?”).

The World Values Survey stands apart from related projects for the large number of nationssampled—81 different countries containing 85% of the world’s population—and because therespondents in each nation are representative samples, that is, they represent the range ofindividuals across important contrasts like age, gender, education, occupation, and the like. Mostsamples studied by social scientists and certainly psychologists in contrast are conveniencesamples, recruited by the researcher from conveniently available individuals: students in acollege course, surfers on the Internet, children at a local daycare center, and so on. The hope ineach case is that the convenient sample somewhat resembles the larger population to which one

wishes to generalize results, but this is an ideal more than an actuality.13 If one is studying whatare broadly human characteristics—like how our sensory organs work—a convenience sample islikely no different from a representative sample. But in other cases, a representative sampledeserves to be taken very seriously.

Here is a summary of what Inglehart (1990, 1993) has learned about value priorities indifferent nations:

The values emphasized in a nation are strongly associated with its political and economicinstitutions.

As nations develop industrially, specialized and educated labor forces emerge, and theseeconomically advantaged individuals value autonomy and self-expression in all spheres oflife, including politics.

Accordingly, with industrialization comes trends toward democracy and the endorsement ofvalues that are liberal and secular.

When a nation shows value changes, it is usually through a process called generationalreplacement and not because given individuals change what they value. That is, youngerpeople who come of age under different circumstances than their parents or grandparents

have different value priorities, and they eventually replace the older generation.14

By the way, within nations, whether people hold traditional or secular values is unrelated totheir reported happiness, but the value difference is reflected in what they say is mostimportant in determining their own happiness (Inglehart & Klingemann, 2000).

One of the conclusions that emerges from the World Values Survey is that the United States isan anomaly: the most-affluent nation on the planet yet one that remains highly traditional in itsvalue priorities, especially with respect to religion and nationalism. For example, other thancitizens of mainline Islamic nations like Indonesia, Iran, and Pakistan, people in the United Statesare more likely to attend religious services regularly than people elsewhere. The most secularnations, according to their value priorities, are Japan, China, Germany, Sweden, and Norway.

Baker (2005) explained the anomalous value priorities of the United States in terms of theunique history of this nation and its settling by religious refugees from Europe. Virtually everyother nation has a common language, a common history, and a common ethnicity to unite itscitizens. The United States has only a common value system, which may explain the tenacity oftraditional values. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, there are few value differences across U.S.generations, unlike the cohort differences found in some other parts of the world. In other words,there is less generational replacement in the United States than elsewhere.

Although the United States may abound with cultural contradictions, I think it goes beyondthe actual data to say that this country is the battleground for a cultural war. That would requirediscrete sides, and there is no good evidence that the nation is neatly divided. Most Americansshare the same values and typically endorse moderate attitudes with respect to even the mostcontentious issues (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005). Even when there are demonstrabledisagreements, they do not map onto the red-blue (Republican/Democrat) state partition ofwhich political pundits seem so fond (e.g., S. B. Greenberg, 2004; J. K. White, 2003). I think the“cultural war” metaphorically rages more within each individual American than it does betweenAmericans.

Let me close by noting the ongoing societal debate about the role of the media—television,radio, movies, newspapers, and the like—in shaping values. Are the people featured in the media—athletes, Hollywood actors, teen idols, news anchors, generic celebrities—role models in thesense of displaying values that we the people then embrace as our own?

The issue obviously comes down to whether the media and its characters create our valuepriorities or merely reflect them. Should we regard MTV as the root cause of everything wrong insociety or simply a sensitive barometer of what actually is wrong? Perhaps the truth is a little bitof both, with the specific answer depending on the value, on the person, and on a host of otherconsiderations. Muddying any interpretation is the fact that people exercise considerable choiceover the media and messages to which they expose themselves (Ball, 1976). Countless surveys

show that people listen to news with which they already agree.

We do know something about media effects in the aggregate. For example, many socialscientists today agree that exposure to media violence leads people on average to be more violentthemselves and certainly on average to be more inured to violence (Eron, Huesmann, Lefkowitz,& Walder, 1972; Huesmann, Moise, Podolski, & Eron, 2003). But when a teenager takes a gun toschool and shoots his classmates, we have no basis for saying that his specific actions resultedfrom a movie he saw or a video game he played. Neither can we say that the media had nothingto do with his actions. Sometimes the ability of social science to speak to the individual case islimited (Runyan, 1981). Regardless, the positive psychology perspective implies that the mediashould fairly represent the world, what is good about it, and what is less so, thereby supplying arange of embodied values to which to aspire (Cohn, 2004). In particular, violent role modelsshould be balanced with those who can elevate and inspire us (Keltner & Haidt, 2003).

EXERCISE Choosing When and How to ChooseWhen I moved to Philadelphia in 2000, I sold my car and did not replace it because I could availmyself of public transportation. Upon returning to Ann Arbor in 2003, I needed a car, butwithout a car with which to look for a car, I was forced to make a quick and efficient purchase.In short, I was put in a position where I needed to be a satisficer, and that worked in my favor. Ilearned something and confirmed Barry Schwartz’s (2004) ideas in my own life.

I took a taxi to a local car dealer on the outskirts of Ann Arbor, where I spent 30 minuteslooking at used (excuse me, previously owned) cars. I found one that seemed satisfactory, and Iimmediately wrote a check for the sticker price. Did I pay more than I might have? Yes. Did I getthe best car in town? No. Am I satisfied with the car? Absolutely.

Let me contrast my experience with that of a friend elsewhere who took a prolonged—and Imust say tortured—approach to replacing his car. He researched what Consumer Reports had tosay, scoured the local newspapers, and searched the Internet. He spent a lot of time on thetelephone and even more time driving to check out potential vehicles. He bargained with severalsellers over a period of time. Finally, he made a decision, after spending several hours a day forseveral months. I suspect he found one of the better cars within 150 miles of where he lived, andI am sure he paid a reasonable price. Is he satisfied with the car? Not remotely. “The one that gotaway” still haunts him.

Despite his studies showing that satisficers are in general happier than maximizers, Schwartzdid not advocate becoming a satisficer in all domains of life. Consider raising children. Do weever hear a parent say, “I found a good-enough pediatrician for my child?” Rather, Schwartzsuggested that people learn to choose when to satisfice and when to maximize, much as I

suggested in chapter 5 that we should learn when to be optimistic and when to be more cautious.

In short, we need to choose when and how to choose. In the spirit of this suggestion, here isan exercise for you to try. Review some of the recent decisions you have made, from simple onesto more-complex ones. How much time, research, and worry went into each decision, and howsatisfied are you at present with each decision?

If it turns out that choosing a birthday card for your second cousin was as involved a processas deciding to get married or which house you and your spouse should purchase, I dare saysomething is out of whack. If finding what you hoped was the “perfect” card did not result in anecstatic reaction from your distant relative, then why did you agonize so? Or if you spent 20hours making a purchase that perhaps saved you $3, and you are still fretting that you did notsave $5, take a step back and reflect on the minimum wage rate. What does your decisionprocess imply about how you value your own time?

Schwartz proposed that you identify the minor consumer domains where decision makingproves to be an ordeal. Then impose an arbitrary restriction on how you make decisions in thesedomains. Visit no more than two stores. Devote no more than 15 minutes to making anypurchase less than $10. Buy only items that are blue.

Make your decisions irreversible, which may cut down on the regret and the what-ifs thatplague maximizers. Go to stores with a no-return policy. Throw out your receipts. Makepurchases while far from home on vacation or business.

Finally, be grateful for what you have, not wistful about what you do not have. You may evenwant to write down three good things about each purchase that you have made (chapter 2).

Try these steps out with respect to your next several choices in some problematic decisiondomain. Then take stock of the aftermath. Were your decisions quicker and easier? Are yousatisfied with what you decided? Most important, do you see that your decision style issomething that you can choose? You may decide that being a maximizer is something that youwant to be, but if so, you should choose this style forthrightly.

GLOSSARYattitude: favorable or unfavorable evaluation of a specific object or issue

ceiling effect: bunching up of scores at the upper end of a rating scale

convenience sample: sample of research participants chosen for study because they are readilyavailable

generational replacement: changes in a society over time as young people come of age underdifferent circumstances than did their parents or grandparents

hierarchy of needs: arrangement of human motives into a hierarchy reflecting the order inwhich people typically attend to them.

instrumental value: belief about ideal modes of conduct that presumably aid and abet terminalvalues

ipsative scores: measurement in which comparisons are made only with respect to the sameindividual

maximizer: individual who typically chooses the “best” option in order to optimize an outcome

minimalist values: values minimally necessary for a viable society

modeling: emulation of what powerful or respected others say, do, and believe

need: biological motive that moves us to behave in ways to satisfy it, e.g., hunger, thirst

norm: shared belief that one should act in a certain way in a certain circumstance

representative sample: sample of research participants that resembles the larger population towhich a researcher wishes to generalize

satisficer: individual who typically chooses a good-enough or merely satisfactory option

self-expressive values: values corresponding to one’s need to express talents, capacities, andpotentialities

survival values: values corresponding to one’s pressing biological needs

terminal value: belief about an ideal state of existence

trait: disposition to think, feel, and act in a consistent way

value: goal about what is morally desirable

value self-confrontation: deliberate strategy of changing one’s values by exposing them tocontradiction among one’s value priorities

values clarification: self-help techniques for helping people to identify values they hold

World Values Survey: ongoing research project that periodically ascertains the values of peoplein dozens of countries around the world

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Bok, S. (1995). Common values. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Schwartz, B. (2004). The paradox of choice: Why less is more. New York: HarperCollins.

Burrell, B. (1997). The words we live by. New York: Free Press.

Shi, D. E. (1985). The simple life: Plain living and high thinking in American culture. New York:Oxford University Press.

Kasser, T. (2002). The high price of materialism. Cambridge, MA: Bradford.

de Graaf, J., Wann, D., & Naylor, T. H. (2001). Affluenza: The all-consuming epidemic. SanFrancisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Twitchell, J. B. (1999). Lead us into temptation: The triumph of American materialism. New York:Columbia University Press.

Gleick, J. (2000). Faster: The acceleration of just about everything. New York: Vintage.

Articles

Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and content of human values?Journal of Social Issues, 50(4), 19–45.

Rokeach, M. (1971). Long-range experimental modification of values, attitudes, and behavior.American Psychologist, 26, 453–459.

Web Sites

http://wvs.isr.umich.edu. This is the Web site for the World Values Survey, “a worldwideinvestigation … carried out [with] representative national surveys of the basic values andbeliefs of publics in more than 65 societies on all six inhabited continents, containing almost80 percent of the world’s population.”

http://www.hartmaninstitute.org. This is the Web site for the Robert S. Hartman Institute,devoted to the study of values. It contains examples of value measures.

Films

Citizen Kane (1941)

Cheaper by the Dozen (1950)

Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? (1967)

In the Heat of the Night (1967)

Patton (1970)

Sling Blade (1996)

American History X (1998)

ABC News’s 20/20: “Affluenza” (2000)

Songs

“Everyday People” (Sly and the Family Stone)

“My Favorite Things” (from The Sound of Music)

“My Way” (Frank Sinatra)

“Where Were You?” (Alan Jackson)

8Interests, Abilities, and Accomplishments

Do you get to do what you do best every day?—GALLUP ORGANIZATION, AS CITED IN BUCKINGHAM & CLIFTON, 2001

The Gallup Organization is famous for its public opinion polls, but most of what Gallup does isadvise work organizations about how to improve their operations. Their clients include a who’swho of the world’s best-known companies—Disney, Wells Fargo, Toyota, Best Buy, and the U.S.Postal Service, among others.

Gallup has learned that posing the simple question to workers: “Do you get to do what you dobest every day?” provides powerful information. Ask yourself this same question about your dailylife at work or at school. If your answer is no, you are in the majority. No more than 20% ofworkers in the United States believe that their jobs allow them on a regular basis to do and betheir best. My own questioning of college students over the past few years yields even fewer yesanswers. Often what I hear is incredulity: “What’s school got to do with me at my best?”

For the handful of you who can answer this question with a yes, you already know theconclusion reached by Gallup from studying many thousands of workers. A job where you canregularly do what you do best is a job that you love. A company filled with people allowed to dotheir best not only performs well in terms of its financial bottom line but also has low rates ofabsenteeism and turnover, along with high levels of morale and loyalty.

The practical implication is that all of us would be better off if companies matched peoplewith jobs that they can do well, precisely the approach Gallup recommends. This strengths-basedphilosophy seems commonsensical, but it flies in the face of how most people and work

organizations approach things, which is to focus on weaknesses and how to correct them.1

According to Gallup, we can most improve by strengthening what we already do well.Consider someone who writes beautifully but speaks poorly. Are she and her work organizationbetter served by giving her increased opportunities to write memos, letters, and manuals or byhaving her take remedial classes in public speaking? The Gallup answer is that the formerstrategy would lead to an even more outstanding writer, and the latter strategy—at best—wouldproduce a mediocre speaker.

This strengths-based philosophy of course needs to be implemented with common sense.2 Forany job, there are some skills that must be present above a minimal level (Warr, 1987). A workerwho is thoroughly inarticulate when speaking is not going to be valued regardless of how wellshe can write. Anyone indifferent to punctuality will find it difficult to offset that weakness withstrengths in other areas.

So far I have discussed happiness, hope, strengths of character, and values. If you have thesein place, are you leading the good psychological life? Not exactly, because something critical ismissing: what you do with these laudable characteristics. We all behave in the course of life, andwe can do what we do well, or not. The Gallup Organization reminds us that we need to be in aposition that allows us to excel. And we additionally have to know what our interests and talentsmight be so that we can capitalize on optimal situations and accomplish something important.These are the topics of concern in the present chapter: interests, abilities, and accomplishments. Iwill discuss what positive psychology has learned about these aspects of a life well lived.

Some psychologists shy away from these topics—or at least their manifestation in the form ofintelligence, genius, giftedness, and the like—because they smack of elitism. Past studies ofhuman excellence have indeed become mired in debates that are more political than scientific—e.g., are Whites and Blacks inherently different in their intelligence, do women have the “rightstuff” to excel at mathematics and natural science, are genius and madness closely allied (Gould,1981; Jamison, 1993; Lynn, 1994). However, there is more to the study of excellence than these

worn arguments.3

There are two themes that run throughout this chapter. First is the importance of the contextin determining who does or does not excel at some endeavor. Second is the plurality of talents.While we might on occasion identify someone who has no interests and is no damn good atanything (e.g., our brother-in-law), in point of fact it proves difficult to find someone devoid ofall interests and skills (Travers, 1978). It is our task to identify these interests and skills, tonurture them, and following the Gallup Organization’s lead, to place people in settings—occupational or otherwise—where they can shine.

InterestsI once had a friend named Jack, a 30-something high school teacher who was married with asmall child. Invariably, when I introduced him to someone, the innocent question would arise,“So, Jack, what do you do?” I was always taken aback when he would say, “I play second base.”He could have said he was a teacher. He could have said he was a husband. Or a father. Forgoodness’ sake, he could have said he was my friend.

But his lifelong passion was the American pastime, and specifically playing second base. He

was always a decent player in his circle of schoolmates and friends, but he was not that good. Hehad played Little League baseball as a child but was never an all-star, even in leagues wherealmost all players received some sort of award. He did not make his high school team. None ofthis he denied, and as he became older, he switched from baseball to softball and then to theslowpitch variant played in Chicago with a 16-inch ball and no gloves.

At first I thought Jack was trying to be funny when he described himself as a secondbaseman, but I eventually decided that he was presenting himself truthfully. To his credit, ifsomeone did not pick up the thread of conversation about softball, he would discuss other thingslike his work, his family, politics, or the weather.

Very familiar to all of us but sometimes overlooked by psychologists is that we all haveinterests—passions, if you will—that define who we are. For some, it is a recreational activitylike Jack’s softball. For others, it is something for which they are paid; they are said to have aprofessional calling (Wrzesniewski, Mc-Cauley, Rozin, & Schwartz, 1997). For others, it is theirfamily. Or cats. Or dolphins. Or romance novels. Or National Public Radio. Or the New YorkTimes. We are our passions, and part of the good life is understanding what these might be andthen developing and indulging them. Hence their inclusion in this book on positive psychology.

Some passions are very private, but others are shared. “Common interests” seem to be acritical aspect of friendship (Rubin, 1973), and if the other person is the subject of your interest,then you probably have abiding friendship or true love.

We need to be careful not to privilege some passions over others, even though many can beclassified as low culture versus high culture. Someone may have a passion for Milwaukee beerover French wine, for Sousa marches over Italian operas, for flapjacks over foie gras, for movieswith Adam Sandler over those by Ingmar Bergman, or for novels by Sue Grafton over sonnets byWilliam Shakespeare. In psychological terms, I think these diverse passions function much the

same.4 The bottom line is that we all have activities to which we are drawn.

Why are we drawn to such activities? The answer is deep within human nature. Almost 50years ago, psychologist Robert White (1959) introduced the notion of competence, arguing thatpeople are motivated to behave in a competent way, regardless of what they are doing. Whitewrote at the height of behaviorism, which held that we do what we do because of prevailingrewards and punishments that presumably satisfy our biological needs (chapter 7). Butcompetence is a different sort of motive because it is never sated in the way that hunger or thirstcan be. We experience pleasure in doing things well regardless of what else our behaviorproduces (Meier, 1993; Pittman & Heller, 1987). Remember the first time you figured out how totie your shoelaces, drive a car, or send an e-mail message? All of these simply felt good. Orremember when your young children learned to crawl, walk, or speak? You did not need to

reward them for their efforts. Their growing competence was enough to sustain their efforts, andthey did these things over and over until they became second nature.

Competence may be fulfilling because it produces the flow state (chapter 4), which providesinsight into the sorts of activities that often attract us. They must afford degrees of skilledperformance and thus allow improvement. Something we can do perfectly well the first time wetry it is not likely to become a lifelong passion.

Philosopher John Rawls (1971, p. 414) elaborated this idea into what he called the

Aristotelian Principle:5

Other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realizedcapacities … and thus enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or thegreater its complexity.

Think of your favorite activities, at work or at home. Do they fit this principle of greaterenjoyment as your knowledge and ability increase?

Some interests entail physical activity—hiking, climbing, running—and other interests aremore cerebral, like working crossword puzzles, reading poetry, surfing the Internet. TheAristotelian Principle applies in either case.

When psychologists have studied interests, they have focused on three topics: leisureinterests, school interests, and work interests, and I focus on these in this section.

Leisure and Recreation

Much of the research investigating leisure and recreation is descriptive, cataloging what peopledo when they are not working, going to school, or keeping house (e.g., Scott & Willits, 1998).Several findings consistently emerge.

The first is that almost everyone reports doing something during their down time. Workaholicstereotypes notwithstanding, it is virtually impossible to find an actual person whose life entailsnothing but working, eating, and sleeping.

Second is the incredible variety of activities that people most enjoy doing when they are notworking. For example, a 2001 Harris poll of more than 1,000 adults in the United States foundthat the leisure activities most frequently mentioned were (H. Taylor, 2001):

reading (28% of respondents)

watching television (20%)

spending time with the family (12%)

fishing (12%)

gardening (10%)

swimming (8%)

computer activities (7%)

going to the movies (7%)

walking (6%)

playing golf (6%)

Respondents in the telephone poll could mention up to three different activities, so it is strikingthat no single activity came close to being popular among the majority of adults. Even the mostcommonly pursued activities—reading and watching television—are broad categories withinwhich people have specific preferences. It is doubtful that people like reading per se or watchingtelevision per se. Instead, they like to read novels but not short stories. They like soap operas butnot crime dramas.

A third finding to note is that the amount of time people devote to their leisure activitiesvaries greatly (Argyle, 1996). On average, women have less leisure time than do men, especiallyif they have full-time jobs or children, or both. As you well know, housekeeping and childrearingduties fall disproportionately to women.

Available leisure time does not differ on average between those in the lower class and thosein the middle class, but lower-class individuals uniformly do fewer things—except for watchingtelevision—than do middle-class individuals. Those in the lower class have more physicallydemanding jobs, less money, and fewer opportunities to develop recreational interests. Argyle(2001) speculated that college, more likely to be attended by children of the middle class, ifnothing else opens the door to diverse recreational activities that can be pursued for the rest ofone’s life. Tell that to your parents when they receive the $37,000 tuition bill.

Retired individuals obviously have more time for recreation than those still in the workforce,but few take up new interests after retirement. Here is a very practical lesson about youreventual retirement: Develop the interests now that you envision pursuing once you stopworking.

Fourth, as mentioned in chapter 4, one of the strong predictors of life satisfaction is howmuch time someone devotes to leisure activities (Argyle, 2001). Keeping that in mind, thinkabout the following. Pollsters have regularly asked U.S. respondents how much time they spendat work and how much time they have available for leisure. In recent decades, two trends are

clearly apparent: more hours spent at work and fewer hours available for leisure6 (Figure 8.1).

Why is leisure so strongly related to life satisfaction? Besides the intrinsic satisfaction

produced by exercising one’s skills7 and the fact that many leisure activities directly produce

pleasure, we can point to additional pathways, depending on the activity in question.

Figure 8.1. Work Hours and Available Leisure Hours Per Week of U.S.Adults (H. Taylor, 2001)

Physical activities like swimming, walking, golfing, exercising, and playing team sportsincrease positive emotions and specifically feelings of vitality (Thayer, 1989). People who engagein regular aerobic exercise report better mental health and a reduced response to stressful lifeevents (Crews & Landers, 1987; McCann & Holmes, 1984). This comes as no surprise. Thebenefits of exercise on physical health and longevity are well known (Paffenbarger, Hyde, &Dow, 1991).

Those who like to listen to music report more positive moods, both of the quiet kind(contentment) and the more-aroused kind (excitement; Hills & Argyle, 1998). Again, this is notsurprising. Researchers regularly use music to “induce” different emotions in their laboratoryexperiments (chapter 4), and many of us at one time or another have deliberately used music toregulate how we are feeling. High-pitched sounds with regular rhythms and an upward trend areregarded as happy, whereas slow, low, and falling sounds are experienced as sad (Scherer &Oshinsky, 1977).

Any recreational activity that brings us into contact with other people carries all the benefitsassociated with social communion and companionship (chapter 10). Indeed, one of the reasonsfor recreation is that it provides a reason and a means to interact with other people. Men’sfriendships often revolve around shared activities, whereas women’s friendships are more likelyto entail simply talking to one another (Elkins & Peterson, 1993). But in either case, social needs

are served, and social benefits are accrued.

Argyle (2001) used the term leisure world to describe the culture that develops aroundshared leisure activities, from birdwatching to sailing. Those residing in a leisure world havetheir own values, traditions, history, and sometimes their own costumes—think Trekkies orOakland Raiders fans. The group may meet regularly, publish a newsletter, and elect officers.This is just like real life, except more fun.

A recreational interest I developed only in the past few years is playing Scrabble. I am notthat good, so motives for achievement or competence have not driven my interest. Instead, it ismy opponents who keep me going back to Scrabble clubs, to tournaments, and to games on theInternet. In some cases, I simply like the other players; they are smart, funny, interesting, orotherwise attractive. In other cases, I think the other players are weird and therefore intriguingin a different—very different—way (Fatsis, 2001). Regardless, Scrabble has brought me intocontact with all sorts of people outside my regular travels, and I am the happier for it.

Not to be overlooked is that recreational activities can provide someone a positive identity, aswe saw for my friend Jack, and this identity is a way to belong and to matter. Recreationalidentities may be especially important during adolescence, a period in which identity formationis thought to be the critical developmental task (Erikson, 1963). Most adolescents are students,but not all of them are excellent or even good students. It is obviously beneficial when

alternative identities are made available through extracurricular and after-school activities.8 As itturns out, adolescents who participate in these sorts of activities usually perform better asstudents than those who do not, and they avoid teen pitfalls like pregnancy, dropping out, anddrug use (Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney & Cairns, 1997; Mahoney & Stattin, 2000, 2002; Mahoney,Stattin, & Magnusson, 2001). But the benefits of these activities extends beyond what theypreclude. Given that the typical job does not allow people to do what they do well, recreationalactivities can take on huge psychological significance (Eccles & Gootman, 2002).

Well-Developed Individual Interests

Whether or not you liked school in general, you still had a favorite subject.9 A student’sattraction to a given academic field—such as mathematics, literature, or physics—is called awell-developed individual interest when it is marked by a deep intellectual and emotionalinvolvement (Renninger, 1990, 2000). Those with such an interest are incessantly curious aboutthe subject and driven to learn ever more about it. Their learning is intrinsically motivated andmarked by a dogged persistence, even in the face of setbacks and failures (Krapp & Fink, 1992;Prenzel, 1992; Renninger & Hidi, 2002; Renninger & Leckrone, 1991). Students with a well-developed individual interest may or may not show any immediate achievement, but in the longrun, few excel in a field without passion for what they do. Well-developed individual interests set

the stage for expertise in any venue and certainly sustain people—in and out of school—over the

many years it takes to become an expert.10

If you have them, identifying your well-developed personal interests is no mystery, but thinkabout your various school subjects and ask yourself how much you agree with the followingstatements (Peterson & Seligman, 2004):

I can’t do this ____________ task now but I think I will be able to do it in the future.

I like to learn new things about ____________.

I will do whatever it takes in order to do a ____________ task correctly.

Learning about ____________ is a great experience.

I care more about doing a thorough job at ____________ than whether I receive a good grade.

Because personal interests lead you to create articulate structures of knowledge, you wouldprobably agree with these statements about your favorite school subject:

Relative to the other things that I know, I know a lot about ____________.

Relative to the other things that I like, I like ____________ a lot.

I spend as much of my time doing ____________ as possible.

Working on ____________ is hard work, but it never really feels like it.

I know that if I put my mind to it, I can figure out how to do ____________ really well.

Consider Linnea, a 10th-grader in a blue-collar public school outside a large U.S. city(Peterson & Seligman, 2004, pp. 161–162):

Linnea signed up to take Latin because she liked mythology. During Language Monthat school, she showed up in class dressed as a goddess. Her teacher described herbehavior as wonderful, in character, and eccentric. “Linnea likes the idea of doingLatin,” her teacher reports. “She speaks Latin with me. Who does that?!”

The other students took in stride the fact that she showed up dressed as agoddess. In fact, each day when students in the Latin class recount the “Latinmoments” that they have had since the last class meeting—references to a Latinword, the history and/or mythology of Rome and Ancient Greece, and so on—Linnea typically recounts about 17 of them, almost always connected to movies shehas just seen. The other students in the class roll their eyes as Linnea goes down herlist, but because they like her, they listen with good humor.

Linnea feels good about learning Latin and is confident that she can master itsnuances. She feels supported in her efforts to learn, despite a school culture in

which doing homework and pursuing the study of Latin are uncommon, to say theleast. Interestingly, although she earns good grades in her other classes, she has notthrown herself into them, and she feels like she retains little of what she learns.

What is special about Latin? Perhaps it is the encouragement that she hasreceived from the teacher to engage fully the subject matter. Perhaps it is the wayin which she has made Latin her “own” by creating or identifying out-of-classresources that further her learning. Perhaps it is the success she has had in learninga great deal about Latin, a base of information that fuels her further curiosity.

For teachers and parents, the vexing question is why some students develop an interest inLatin or mathematics, whereas others turn their backs on school and find their passions in videogames or the shenanigans of teen idols. Rather than railing against popular culture, we shouldinstead ask why business-as-usual school is so boring (Noddings, 2003).

What makes a pursuit interesting is not its tangible outcomes. Objectively, learning Latin is asuseless for most teenagers as playing a Gameboy. One must look to the inherent properties ofactivities, and among those that make a pursuit interesting are its novelty, complexity, anduncertainty (Berlyne, 1960). There comes a point where an activity can be too confusing orambiguous to be interesting, but good education includes finding the optimal levels with whichto introduce a topic to a student. The 1812 Overture is more “interesting” to musical neophytesthan a Bach fugue (Murray, 2003). Dinosaurs are more “interesting” than pond scum. And blessmy parents, who taught me how to read via comic books and how to do addition via blackjack.Once the basics are established, specific knowledge evokes further interest, and an upward spiralensues (Loewen-stein, 1994).

Also critical in sparking and sustaining academic interests are teachers or mentors, as we sawin the case of Linnea. Well-developed personal interests may be intrinsically rewarding, but theydo not emerge in a vacuum. While a sophomore in college, I took an introduction to psychologycourse reputed to be easy while I was pursuing a demanding (and boring) major in aeronauticalengineering. Not only did I find the subject of psychology fascinating, but the teaching assistantwho led my discussion section was an engaging fellow with a genuine interest in my learning. Iswitched my major to psychology, and here I am today as a psychologist.

Well-developed personal interests, if they are to be sustained, must be nurtured (Fried, 1996,2001). Teachers impart not just information and instruction but also challenge and support(Renninger, 2000). Peers must also be supportive, as we saw in the story of Linnea, and it is ofcourse helpful when parents are on the same page as well. When I was growing up, there was nota lot of money available for a lot of things, but there was always enough money for books.

The kind of support that a student needs differs with age. Very young children need little

encouragement to throw themselves into learning (Piaget, 1950). But as they get older,constraints emerge, and more-explicit support for learning becomes critical. In general, academicinterest wanes as students enter middle school (P. Gardner, 1985; Wigfield, Eccles, MacIver,Reuman, & Midgley, 1991). The features of the school may be the culprit here, e.g., limitedcourse options, competitive grades, and dysfunctional pedagogical practices (Fölling-Albers &Hartinger, 1998; Hoffmann, 2002). Once a student has a well-established interest, it needs lessgeneric support, but specific instruction is still crucial.

Even though academic interests are intrinsically motivated, they can have distant payoffs. Theobvious result is eventual accomplishment in the specific field of study. There are more genericbenefits as well. Greater engagement in education early in life may protect against cognitiveimpairment later in life (Katzman, 1973). The ability to sustain interest and develop newinterests is associated with healthy and productive aging (Krapp & Lewalter, 2001; Renninger &Shumar, 2002; Snowdon, 2001). Individuals in the workforce with a greater love of learning arebetter at meeting challenges (McCombs, 1991). More generally, the degree to which individualsexperience interest and enjoyment as they learn translates into decreased stress (Sansone, Wiebe,& Morgan, 1999), which over the long haul should result in greater physical and emotional well-being (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Helson & Srivastava, 2001).

Vocational Interests

“What do you want to be when you grow up?”

Children as young as 3 years old have a ready answer to this question, although their answersare usually drawn from their world of fantasy, e.g., they want to be a princess or a lion(Gottfredson, 1981). Occupational fantasies can persist into adolescence or beyond, with“professional athlete” cited as a career goal by a surprisingly large number of teenagers,especially males (Helwig, 1998).

Be that as it may, most of us eventually become more realistic. The problem is that we mightstill fail to grasp the range of possibilities—after all, there are more than 30,000 different jobs inthe United States alone (U.S. Department of Labor Statistics, 2004)—and we can fumble aboutwhen we first enter the workforce. The jobs taken by adolescents are usually not goodpreparation for adult work. They are rigidly split into boy jobs and girl jobs: lawn mowing versusbabysitting. Not only are these jobs boring, but they rarely bring young workers into contact

with adults11 (Steinberg, 1985).

In years of advising college students about jobs and careers, the most important thing I havelearned is that they should try out as many jobs as possible during the summer, as interns, or aspart-time volunteers. Along these lines, they should talk to adults about what jobs really entailand the positive roles they can play in one’s life. The points made about leisure interests and

school interests apply as well to vocational interests. Knowledge begets curiosity and interest,which lead to further knowledge, expertise, and accomplishment. Again, mentors mattermightily.

In the best of all worlds, we would have sampler plates for jobs at which our children couldnibble and decide that they like some but not others. This is not possible, although psychologyprovides an approximation in the form of interest inventories (Hansen, 1990, 1994). These arequestionnaires used by vocational counselors to “fit round pegs into round holes” by matching aperson’s expressed interests with those apt to be satisfied by a particular job (Zytowski, 1973).

The Strong Vocational Interest Blank (SVIB) is probably the best known of the interest

inventories12 (D. P. Campbell, 1971). You may have completed this questionnaire at some pointin your life; it has been around since 1927. The format and underlying logic of the SVIB aresimple. Respondents are presented a list of hundreds of activities (e.g., visiting an art museum,collecting stamps, playing golf) and asked to indicate if they like it, dislike it, or are indifferent.

The individual’s profile of responses is then compared to the average responses of otherpeople who have worked successfully in different occupations. The greater the match—calculatedby a variant of a correlation coefficient (chapter 4)—the more seriously the respondent mightconsider exploring that occupation.

The SVIB embodies what psychologists label a cookbook procedure or an actuarial approachbecause the development, scoring, and interpretation of the test follow simple and objectiverules. One of the best-known tests in all of psychology—the MMPI (Minnesota MultiphasicPersonality Inventory)—uses the same actuarial approach (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham,Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989; Hathaway & McKinley, 1943). The MMPI helps clinicians todiagnose individuals by matching their responses on the MMPI to those of other individualsknown to meet the diagnostic criteria for a given psychological disorder. Items may or may notbe transparent—i.e., interpretable—but the rationale underlying a cookbook approach does notrequire them to be. So, one of the MMPI items used to ask whether Washington or Lincoln wasthe greater U.S. president. A person’s choice nudges him toward one diagnosis or another, but Idefy anyone to infer what these might be.

The SVIB matches people to occupations in which they might be interested and steers themaway from others. If one is interested in an occupation, one is more likely to stay in it and toperform well (Reeves & Booth, 1979). It is worth pointing out that the SVIB does not measureability. I might be interested in dentistry, for example, but if I lack the physical dexterity to fill orextract teeth, then this is not a good field for me. Or consider something I see with frequencyamong my undergraduate psychology students: They are “interested” in psychological disordersand therefore want to be clinical psychologists, overlooking the requisite skills of patience,

empathy, and appropriate detachment, not to mention the years of graduate training required tobecome a clinical psychologist and the fact that troubled people are of course troubling. Some ofmy students have a rude awakening when they follow their interest into a career.

Interest inventories like the SVIB nonetheless provide useful information. Scores are highlystable over time (Johansson & Campbell, 1971), and they predict the professions that peopleactually enter (Hansen, 1984). Furthermore, the interest profiles associated with manyoccupations have stayed the same over decades. Despite all of the changes in the world, chemiststoday express much the same likes and dislikes as did chemists in the 1930s.

The biggest problem with the SVIB and related inventories is that they use already-existinggroups to provide the norms. They are necessarily tied to the status quo, and their reliance on acookbook procedure means that they reflect inadvertent confounds. If most chemists are Whitemales, how reasonable is it to use the SVIB to counsel a Black female if she is consideringchemistry as a career? Traditionally, separate questionnaires for men and women have been usedto solve this sort of problem, but this strategy falls short if an insufficient number of women (or

men) work at a particular profession.13

The more-general shortcoming of interest inventories is that jobs themselves may change.Indeed, jobs emerge all the time that did not exist before. If the interests associated with futurejobs overlap with those of past jobs, and if we understand the overlap, then interest inventorieswill help to steer people toward these new occupations. But if future jobs combine interests innovel ways, then these questionnaires will not help respondents to choose them.

Many interest inventories lack a theoretical basis—that is the cost of their cookbook approach—which means that it is difficult for them to be changed deliberately or to be generalized. Anotable exception is the work by John Holland (1966, 1985), which is based on an explicittheory. Holland’s work falls within the tradition of personality psychology (Peterson, 1992) butadds a creative twist. Usually, a personality psychologist interested in occupations will take ageneral measure of personality dispositions and then try to correlate scores on these withpeople’s occupational choices or performances. Holland instead started with the jobs, under theassumption that what most people do more than 40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year, from ages 18to 65+, is their personality.

From numerous studies of interest inventories and vocational preferences, Holland identifiedsix basic types of people in terms of their work-relevant interests and the kinds of jobs at which

they excel:14

realistic types: people who prefer the manipulation of objects, tools, machines, and/oranimals, e.g., mechanic, contractor

investigative types: people who prefer to observe and investigate physical, biological, and/or

cultural phenomena, e.g., scientist, journalist

artistic types: people who prefer to create art forms, e.g., novelist, musician

social types: people who prefer to work with other people, informing, training, developing,curing, or otherwise enlightening them, e.g., social worker, teacher

enterprising types: people who prefer to work toward organizational goals and/or economicgains, e.g., salesperson, stockbroker

conventional types: people who prefer the systematic manipulation of data and the keepingof records, e.g., accountant, librarian

A worker’s satisfaction is highest and his performance best when his type matches his jobrequirements (e.g., Smart, 1982), which you may recognize as the premise of the GallupOrganization with which this chapter began.

AbilitiesAs I have emphasized, interests are not the same thing as abilities, although an interest may leadus to spend the time and acquire the instruction needed to develop a talent. Psychologists havestudied abilities in their own right, so let us turn now to this topic. An ability is shown whenpeople differ in their performance of some behavior for which there is an objective standard.Sprinters can run fast or slowly, as measured by a stopwatch. Students can spell obscure wordscorrectly or incorrectly, as judged against a dictionary. Composers can create music that moveslisteners to tears or to yawns.

Psychologists have introduced all sorts of terms to describe the ability domain: talent, skill,aptitude, capacity, and—notably—intelligence. These terms do not have identical connotations, andone recurring contrast is whether the term in question refers to what people have actually doneor to what they have the potential to do. So, when students apply to college, they forward to theadmissions committee their high school transcripts and their SAT scores. Transcripts presumablymeasure their academic accomplishment, whereas the SATs presumably measure their potentialfor accomplishment. Sometimes this distinction is described as one between achievement andability.

There is a long-standing and legitimate debate about how valid this distinction actually is,given that ability must be inferred from some sort of performance. I prefer to sidestep the debateby using all of these terms as rough synonyms and by privileging what people actually do. For

example, one common use of the term genius is to describe a person with an extremely high IQ,15

but I prefer to define a genius as someone whose actual accomplishments have exerted aprofound influence on contemporary and subsequent generations (Simonton, 1984). Aristotle,

Confucius, Leonardo da Vinci, Ludwig Beethoven, and Charles Darwin are geniuses, whereas thegenius jury is still out on Poindexter and his perfect score on the SAT.

You have likely figured out from previous chapters that psychologists enjoy making lists,although we give them high-sounding scientific names like classifications, nosologies,taxonomies, or typologies. The psychological study of abilities is no exception. Early effortsenumerated those things at which people are presumably skilled or not so skilled, relying on the“faculties” proposed centuries ago to underlie human rationality: attention, logic, memory, andthe like (Nunnally, 1970). They are heavily tilted toward the abstract and the intellectual, a pointto which I will shortly return.

If we take a step back, we see that there are hundreds or thousands or even millions ofabilities that people have, with new ones emerging all the time as the world changes to affordnew skills. For example, when I was growing up, I had never heard of multitasking, much lessregarded it as an ability to cultivate and celebrate. Things of course are different today. For manyof us, multitasking is a more-useful skill than the ability to add or subtract numbers in our head.

To say that there may be millions of abilities does not get us very far, so psychologists try togroup them together into smaller sets of basic skills. An ongoing issue is how parsimonious thisgrouping can be while still doing justice to the diversity of abilities. Accordingly, a great deal ofattention has been paid to whether intelligence (ability) is one thing, several, or many.

General and Specific Intelligence

One venerable point of view holds that intelligence is singular: a highly general characteristicwidely exhibited across different areas (Galton, 1869). A century ago, psychologist CharlesSpearman (1904), a pioneer investigator of skilled performance, was struck by the finding thatwhen a group of people were given tests measuring different abilities (such as tests of knowledgeof the classics, mathematics, and French), their test scores often correlated with each other.Those who scored high on one test tended to score high on the others, and those who scored lowon one test scored low on the others as well. From findings like these, Spearman argued for theexistence of general intelligence, abbreviated as g. For Spearman, g is whatever underlies thefact that tests tend to correlate with each other, and g is the factor common to all instances ofskilled performance. By this view, people are generically skilled or not, and it is a matter ofchance whether the talented make their mark as economists, cinematographers, or footballcoaches.

However, different tests do not show perfect consistency. Spearman therefore concluded thatbesides g, there are also specific intelligences that influence a person’s performance onparticular tests. A specific intelligence is abbreviated as s. So, someone’s performance on anygiven test reflects a combination of her general intelligence and her specific intelligence for

whatever that test measures.

Spearman proposed that if two different tests correlated, it was because they both reflect g.By definition, they cannot reflect the same s. But this is not the only way to make sense of thesedata, and indeed, many disagree with Spearman. Two tests might correlate because they bothreflect the same s. It is a matter of judgment whether a test of French and a test of classics do ordo not reflect anything in common except general intelligence. Spearman’s tests were not aninfinite sampling of areas in which people perform—there is no way that they could be—so weshould not be surprised that he was unable to convince everyone that intelligence was singular.

In contrast to Spearman, other psychologists have emphasized s over g, suggesting thatintelligence is composed of a set of abilities and capacities largely independent of one another.For instance, in 1938, L. L. Thurstone proposed that intelligence spanned a handful of distinctabilities, such as being able to perform arithmetic operations, to define words, to recognizeobjects rotated in space, and to recall information. Another vision of intelligence as plural wasproposed by J. P. Guilford (1967). He argued that the number of separate abilities and skillstypically subsumed under intelligence exceeds 100. By this view, people are best described ashaving profiles of skills, and one achieves best when one’s skills are brought to bear in a domainwhere these fit. Accordingly, we would not know the names of John McEnroe, Keith Jennings,and Howard Stern were it not for tennis, “Jeopardy,” and talk radio. Again, we see the premise ofthe Gallup Organization exemplified.

Multiple Intelligences

The best-known contemporary statement about the plurality of abilities is Howard Gardner’s(1983) theory of multiple intelligences. He distinguished seven basic abilities:

linguistic: sensitivity to the meanings and functions of language; exhibited by orators, poets,and lyricists

logical-mathematical: competence at organizing ideas in abstract ways; evident in the workof mathematicians and theoretical physicists

spatial: capacity for visual or spatial imagery, including the ability to transform images;shown by navigators, billiard players, and sculptors

musical: ability to produce and organize sounds according to prescribed pitch and rhythm;displayed by musicians

bodily: kinesthetic mastery over body movements; present in dancers, surgeons, and athletes

personal: ability to access one’s own feelings; shown by introspective novelists

social: ability to understand other people and what motivates them; displayed by politicians,religious leaders, clinicians, and salespeople

The first three types of intelligence are the abstract and intellectual skills usually measured byintelligence and ability tests, but Gardner felt that the others are just as important, despite thehistorical fact that psychologists neglected them.

To Gardner, intelligence is a set of problem-solving skills that allows the individual to resolvedifficulties that he encounters. He speculated that the abilities enumerated in his theory arose inthe course of evolution. Hence, they are based in biology. These skills are presumablyindependent of each other. A person can be high or low on one type of intelligence yet low orhigh on another type.

It is important to consider someone’s profile and how different intelligences are blendedtogether. We can discuss the seven intelligences individually, but as Gardner (1993b, p. 9)himself observed, “[They] can be seen in pure form only in individuals who are, in the technicalsense, freaks.” Sigmund Freud well exemplified personal intelligence, for example, but he wasalso a brilliant writer (linguistic intelligence) and highly skilled at attracting followers andcapturing the interest of the general public (social intelligence; Gardner, 1993a).

How did Gardner go about identifying these seven types of intelligence from the manypossible candidates? He employed several criteria, including whether or not a particular set ofskills is selectively isolated by brain damage. If damage to nervous tissue selectively attacks orspares a given competence, then one can argue that it has a biological basis. Gardner also lookedfor a distinctive developmental history for a set of skills, an associated set of symbols that people

use in exercising these particular skills, and the existence of prodigies16 who excel at them. Whenall of these criteria pointed to the same ability, he labeled it a basic intelligence.

Gardner (1993b) described the origin of his theory in a critique of theorizing bydevelopmental psychologist Jean Piaget (1950), who proposed that abstract linguistic and logicalskills are the ideal to which all human thought strives. Gardner proposed instead that there was arange of ideals. In his own words (pp. xi-xii):

Had I simply noted that human beings possess different talents, the claim wouldhave been uncontroversial—and my book would have gone unnoticed. But I made adeliberate decision to write about “multiple intelligences”: “multiple” to stress anunknown number of separate human capacities … “intelligences” to underscore thatthese capacities were as fundamental as those historically captured within the IQtest.

He further commented that he did not anticipate the excitement his theory would generateamong the general public as well as among educators. Perhaps he tapped into widespreaddiscontent with the tyranny of IQ tests and its vision that there is but one way to be talented.

I can still remember my 1955 first-grade class, where we were divided into two groups basedon how well we could read. And I kid you not, the groups were named the Jets and the Gliders.Guess which group read at the higher level? Guess which group was privileged in every possibleway throughout our elementary and secondary school years? The point, echoing Gardner, is notthat we should do away with distinctions. We should make more distinctions. Of course studentshave different reading abilities, but this particular skill should not be automatically used to sortout students in art, music, and physical education.

Howard Gardner may or may not regard himself as a positive psychologist, but he certainlyhelped to set the stage for the field by his attention to excellence in a way that did not diminishanyone. For the past two decades, he has devoted much of his attention to the educationalimplications of his theory.

How can the different intelligences be assessed? Gardner (1991a) argued against what hecalled “formal assessment”—all of the students in a school taking the same written test of abilityor achievement on the same day at the same time, which is then scored according to a simplerubric to yield a single quantitative score. These scores are then used to evaluate students andschools, to steer students into some courses and away from others, and—subtly but mostimportant—to decide what should be emphasized by the school and larger society. Subjectmatters that lend themselves to efficient formal assessment, like mathematics and science, arevalued more than other disciplines that resist formal assessment, like the arts.

Gardner’s (1991a) alternative to formal assessment is assessment in context, which relies oninformation about individuals’ abilities obtained in the course of their everyday activities. Astudent’s artistic ability can be assessed by looking at the drawings and paintings he produces.Another student’s athletic ability can be assessed by seeing how she performs in games. Gardnerlinks assessment in context to strategies used over the millennia by master craftspeople to trainand evaluate their apprentices. The young person would observe and help the master, slowlyentering the practice of the trade. Assessment was ongoing, constant, individualized, andobviously based on the apprentice’s demonstration of the precise skills of interest. Assessment incontext has the methodological virtue of ecological validity, which means that inference isminimized.

Depending on the skill, different types of assessment are needed. Assessment in context istherefore as multiple as people’s actual abilities. Gardner (1993b) suggested that students—and,by implication, those in the workforce—present not just SAT scores or GPAs to admissions orhiring committees but also portfolios of their actual projects and accomplishments. Artists andmusicians already do so as a matter of course, and I can imagine the day when I am on acommittee to hire a college teacher, and we review videotapes of actual classroom lectures.

The nurturance of talents needs to be as multiple as the talents. Not only do people startschool with different skills and styles of learning, the day is long past when we can expectanyone to master most of the world’s knowledge or even a representative sampling of it(Gardner, 1991b). A uniform curriculum serves an impossible goal. The school of the futureshould be student centered—not in the sense that students run the show but in the sense thatwhat a given student learns is tailored to her proclivities and abilities. The fact that intelligencesare to be used in everyday life should be kept in mind, especially as everyday life changes. If theonly rationale for including a subject matter in a school’s curriculum is historical, then that ispale justification.

Accomplishments

A story is told about the medieval stone masons who carved the gargoyles thatadorn the great Gothic cathedrals. Sometimes their creations were positionedhigh upon the cathedral, hidden behind cornices or otherwise blocked fromview, invisible from any vantage point on the ground. They sculpted thesegargoyles as carefully as any of the others, even knowing that once the cathedralwas completed and the scaffolding was taken down, their work would remainforever unseen by human eye[s]. It was said that they carved for the eye of God.That, written in a thousand variations, is the story of human accomplishment.—CHARLES MURRAY (2003)

Interest and ability—with a large dose of perseverance—are the recipe for accomplishment,whether it occurs on a small scale or a large one (Murray, 2003). I conclude this chapter bydiscussing remarkable achievements. I have two reasons for this focus. First, accomplishments forthe ages are interesting and—indeed—awe inspiring. And second, an important point aboutpositive psychology is thereby illustrated. If our interest is in people at their best, we shouldstudy the most-talented people, and we should study them in settings and circumstances thathave allowed them to do their best.

These settings can be described as the “natural homes” for positive psychology, and theyinclude places in which virtuosity is recognized, celebrated, and encouraged (Peterson &Seligman, 2003b). Among the obvious examples that qualify as natural homes are the workplace,sports, the performing arts, friendships and romances, childrearing, and school—exactly the sortsof settings mentioned in this chapter and throughout the book.

Studies in such settings are often segregated as applied psychology, but in the present context,this is a curious label if it implies that basic psychology can stay away from these places. I findthe applied-basic partition profoundly false. Positive psychology must seek its subject matter

where it is most likely to be found.17 These places may not always include the typical sources ofresearch participants: psychology subject pools and psychiatric clinics. Along these lines, positivepsychologists cannot rely simply on convenience samples of callow youth or troubled souls.Without putting too fine a point on it, studies of college students are somewhat suspect if ourinterest is with general psychology and downright bizarre if our interest lies in positivepsychology.

To study the most-accomplished people, we can focus on exceptional individuals and conductcase studies, as Howard Gardner (1993a, 1997) has done in his extended examinations of thelives of luminaries like Albert Einstein, Martha Graham, Pablo Picasso, Igor Stravinsky, andVirginia Woolf. It is worth emphasizing that psychological case studies go beyond merebiographies to create and evaluate theories that can be applied to other people, including the restof us leading our more-mundane lives.

Gardner proposed that there are four ways to be extraordinary: by being a master of somedomain of accomplishment (e.g., Mozart and musical composition); by being a maker of anentirely new field (e.g., Freud and psychoanalysis); by being an introspector and exploring innerlife (e.g., novelist James Joyce); and by being an influencer (e.g., Gandhi and politics). Again wesee the theme of plurality of excellence. I hope you also see that this particular typology can beapplied as readily to supervisors at our own places of work as to the world’s most-esteemedgeniuses.

Another research strategy is to look at larger numbers of eminent people. Here, studies havethe look and feel of more-conventional psychological investigations that assess the characteristicsof a large sample of folks and determine the antecedents and consequences of thesecharacteristics. The difference of course is that calling these people research “participants” ismisleading because they did not agree to participate in a given study but instead participated inlife, doing so in such a way that a public record was left behind. It is the public record that isstudied (Smith, 1992).

The drawback of this approach is that the researcher is a victim of the historical record, whatwas entered into it in the first place, and what has survived. Some of the most-notable humanaccomplishments—written language, deliberate agriculture, animal domestication, and the wheel—were no doubt created by some individual, but we do not know who these geniuses happenedto be. And there is always the legitimate worry that the historical record reflects a bias because itis usually written by those with power.

Be that as it may, what has been learned from these at-a-distance studies of eminentindividuals provides ample food for thought. Psychologist Dean Simonton (1984, 1994, 1997,2000) is the best-known practitioner of such investigations. He has devoted his career to ways of

reliably coding variables of interest from historical material, starting of course with relative

eminence.18 He has studied several samples of historically intriguing individuals: politicalleaders, writers, artists, generals, composers, and even famous psychologists.

What does Simonton conclude? Accomplishment in any given field never has a singledeterminant but instead always reflects a complex of psychological, social, and historical factors.Some generalizations are possible. Being the firstborn in a family is modestly correlated with thedegree of later attainment, as are intellectual flexibility and the personality traits of dominanceand extraversion. Skill in the field, formal instruction, and the presence of a role model areusually the most-important determinants of accomplishment.

Furthermore, as I keep emphasizing, one must be in the right place at the right time for one’saccomplishments to be influential. For instance, Simonton (1992) studied female writers in Japanover the last 1,500 years. Within any given era, the impact of these women depended on societalideologies about male superiority. A similar point can be made about the achievements ofwomen in the United States (Mowrer-Popiel, Pollard, & Pollard, 1993).

A recently published book by Charles Murray19 (2003) extends the kinds of studies thatSimonton has done to the largest possible landscape: the greatest human accomplishments of the

ages and the people who made them. Murray focused on a number of fields of endeavor20—art,astronomy, biology, chemistry, geology, literature, mathematics, medicine, music, philosophy,physics, and technology—and, within each, quantified eminence by counting the amount ofspace devoted to individuals in different encyclopedias and handbooks prepared bycontemporary scholars from around the world. In each case, the agreement across sources aboutthe eminence of an individual was as substantial as the reliability of any psychological measure(chapter 4). Bias of course exists in the historical record, but it is widely shared.

Although Murray discussed accomplishments in each of the fields on which he focused, hereare some of the conclusions he advanced about accomplishment in general, based oncomparisons among the “top” several hundred individuals in each field:

Polymaths. Those eminent in more than one field requiring arguably different skills areexceedingly rare, with Aristotle and Leonardo da Vinci as the best and perhaps onlyexamples.

Hard work is critical; the most eminent put in much longer hours and produced much morethan the merely eminent.

Mentors are critical.21

It is helpful to be in the right place at the right time; societies that are prosperous (but notnecessarily those at peace) have more eminent citizens, as do cities that are political or

financial centers and home to an elite university.

Eminence is most likely to occur in a culture that believes life to have a transcendentpurpose (chapter 4) and where individuals believe in their own efficacy (chapter 5).

These conclusions seem to apply to the rest of us and indeed have been suggested throughoutthe chapter. To do your best, you need to identify your interests and skills, choose an endeavorwhere these fit, find a mentor, put in lots of time, and believe in the significance of what you aredoing and in your own autonomy.

EXERCISE Recrafting Your Work to Capitalize on Your Interests andAbilitiesThe exercise in chapter 6 asked you to recraft your everyday life at school or at work byidentifying your signature strengths of character and using them in new ways. The exercise hereis similar in spirit and asks you to identify your interests and abilities and use them in new waysat school or at work.

This exercise will fail if you are too literal or too concrete in identifying your interests orabilities. If your only avowed interest is topiary gardening, and you work as an investmentbanker in a downtown office building, then I am not sure how you can bring this specific interestto bear on your work unless you commandeer the lobby of the building and start planting trees.But if you can recast your interest in broader terms, e.g., as symmetry, and likewise your ability—e.g., the talent to see long-term potential—then maybe you can be a topiary investorspecializing in diversified and conservative retirement accounts.

To identify your interests, I suggest you keep track for a week of how you spend your leisuretime. Then try to identify themes that underlie your leisure activities that can be brought to bearon your job.

To identify your abilities, I suggest you first take honest stock of yourself and what you dowell in terms of Gardner’s (1983) seven multiple intelligences (p. 211). Remember his emphasison actual accomplishments, so pay attention to what you have achieved so far in your life. If ananswer is not immediately evident, follow through on an idea that Gardner suggested: Peoplewith a given intelligence are attuned to its display in others. So, think of movies you have seen,television shows you have watched, or books you have read in which a given character hasstruck you as memorable or admirable. Look beyond their good looks and intriguing lives to seeif there is a common intelligence. For me, this exercise leads quickly to the identification of

linguistic intelligence22 as the one to which I am most attuned and—by implication—what maybe my most-developed ability. Or you might go through the yearly issue of Time magazine thatlists the 100 most influential people on the planet. Which of these people most intrigue you, and

do they have a common intelligence?

Once you have identified an interest or an ability, ask yourself how you can use it at work orat school in a novel way. Follow through every day for at least 1 week—and, I hope, longer. Doyou do better at work or school by capitalizing on your strengths? Are you happier than youwere before starting the exercise?

GLOSSARYability: skill underlying differential performance of some task for which there is an objective

standard

Aristotelian Principle: proposition that people enjoy doing what they do well

assessment in context: evaluation of an individual’s abilities obtained in the course of his or hereveryday activities

competence: motive to do things well

general intelligence (g): presumably, general factor common to all instances of skilledperformance

genius: person whose actual accomplishments exert a profound influence on contemporary andsubsequent generations

interest: topic or activity pursued with passion

interest inventory: questionnaires that attempt to match people to appropriate occupations bycomparing their interests to those apt to be satisfied by a particular job

leisure world: culture that develops around a shared leisure activity

multiple intelligences: theory that there are a number of basic and distinct forms of intelligence

polymath: individual eminent in more than one field, which require arguably different skills

specific intelligence (s): presumably, specific factor that influences skilled performance at onetask but not necessarily others

10-Year Rule: idea that people who make important contributions to a particular field haveusually devoted a full decade to the mastery of necessary knowledge and skills

12-7 Rule: idea that people who make important contributions to a particular field have usuallyput in 12-hour days, 7 days a week, for years

well-developed individual interest: attraction to a field marked by a deep intellectual andemotional involvement

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic.

Simonton, D. K. (1984). Genius, creativity, and leadership: Historiometric methods. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

Murray, C. (2003). Human accomplishment: The pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences, 800 BCto 1950. New York: HarperCollins.

Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink: The power of thinking without thinking. New York: Little, Brown.

Huntford, R. (1998). Nansen: The explorer as hero. New York: Barnes & Noble.

Creativity Research Journal

Journal of Creative Behavior

Articles

Silvia, P. J. (2001). Interest and interests: The psychology of constructive capriciousness. Reviewof General Psychology, 5, 270–290.

Simonton, D. K. (2000). Creativity: Cognitive, developmental, personal, and social aspects.American Psychologist, 55, 151–158.

Winner, E. (2000). The origins and ends of giftedness. American Psychologist, 55, 159–169.

Ripley, A. (2005, March 7). Who says a woman can’t be Einstein? Time, pp. 51–60.

Kluger, J. (2005, November 14). Ambition: Why some people are most likely to succeed. Time,pp. 48–58.

Web Sites

http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/sociosite/topics/leisure.html. This is a Web site with lots of informationand resources on leisure, recreation, and sports.

http://www.pz.harvard.edu. This is the Web site of Howard Gardner’s Project Zero at HarvardUniversity. Its “mission is to understand and enhance learning, thinking, and creativity in thearts, as well as humanistic and scientific disciplines, at the individual and institutional levels.”

http://www.jvis.com. For a fee, you can take on-line the “Jackson Vocational Interest Survey(JVIS) … [which] … was developed to assist high school students, college students, and adultswith education and career planning.”

http://quintcareers.testingroom.com. This Web site “includes access to numerous online tests andassessments for self-discovery (including career assessment, values competencies, and work

personality). Membership, assessments, and abbreviated results are free, but you must pay fordetailed test results.”

http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/Simonton/homepage.html. This is the Web site of Dean KeithSimonton at the University of California at Davis. He is the world’s leading investigator ofachievement and creativity in the historical record.

Films

The Miracle Worker (1962)

To Sir, With Love (1967)

Chariots of Fire (1981)

Flashdance (1983)

Amadeus (1984)

Shaka Zulu (1987)

Rain Man (1988)

My Left Foot (1989)

Little Man Tate (1991)

ABC News’s Nightline: “The Streak” (1995)

Best in Show (2000)

Edison: The Wizard of Light (2000)

Steeplechase Entertainment: “Leonardo: A Dream of Flight” (2000)

Steeplechase Entertainment: “Marie Curie: More Than Meets the Eye” (2000)

A Beautiful Mind (2001)

A&E’s Biography: “Albert Einstein” (2005)

ABC News’s Primetime: “Invention Ideas” (2005)

Songs

“To Sir, With Love” (LuLu)

“Centerfield” (John Fogerty)

9Wellness

Psychiatry is always talking about mental health, but no one ever does anythingabout it.—GEORGE E. VAILLANT (2003)

On November 7, 1991, basketball player Earvin “Magic” Johnson announced that he was retiringfrom his professional career because he had tested positive for HIV, the virus that causes AIDS.AIDS had already claimed tens of thousands of lives by the time that he made his announcement,but many people had been able to distance themselves from the disease. Johnson’s celebrity andcandor helped to bring the message to the general public that AIDS was everyone’s problem.

Magic Johnson retired because it was believed that the physical demands made on aprofessional athlete would weaken his body and hasten the appearance of full-blown AIDS. Alsofiguring into his retirement was the fear on the part of other players that they might contract thevirus through physical contact with him. The immediate reaction of many people was thatJohnson had received a death sentence. Magic seemed upbeat about his condition, but many ofus at the time thought that he was fooling himself. Stories written about him read like obituaries.

More than 4 years later, on January 30, 1996, Magic Johnson was not only alive and well,but returning to play in the National Basketball Association. He was bigger and stronger and asskilled as ever. Again, he attracted a great deal of attention, but this time around the sportsmedia focused not on how long he would live but on how much his presence would improve therecord of his team, the Lakers.

There was grumbling by a few players about his HIV-positive status, but most players hailedhis return. As Charles Barkley remarked, “It’s not like we’re going to have … sex. … We’re justgoing to play basketball.” Speaking louder than any sound bite was the way Dennis Rodman ofthe Chicago Bulls guarded Magic in the second game of his resumed career. Rodman bumped,shoved, and fouled him with as much vigor as Rodman bumped, shoved, and fouled any player,which is to say with considerable vigor.

It is now some 15 years later, and Magic Johnson remains alive and well. He has hadnumerous accomplishments, as a businessman, a philanthropic fundraiser, and a sportscommentator. He is involved with the front office of the Lakers and even had a brief stint as theteam’s coach. He is married and has children. And just to show that not everything works outwell for Magic Johnson, he was an abysmal failure as the host of a television talk show.

We have no way of knowing the rest of his story, although it continues to be of interest. The

important point here is that we need to think about illness and health in ways that go beyond thepresence or absence of a virus.

There are many ways to be ill. Consider the factors that count toward our judgment that anindividual is ill (Peterson, 1996):

general complaints about feeling ill

specific symptoms, such as shortness of breath

identifiable damage to the body

presence of germs

diagnosis of specific illnesses

impairment of daily activities

a short life as opposed to a long one

These criteria sometimes disagree with one another. Someone might feel fine but harbor all sortsof germs. Someone else might be free of germs but feel poorly. Or someone might live a long butimpaired life, or a short but vigorous one. One of the intriguing puzzles of modern epidemiologyis why women have more illnesses than men but also live longer (Verbrugge, 1989).

There are also many ways to be healthy, and I will discuss these later in this chapter, whichconcerns itself with good health and the interplay between psychological well-being and physicalwell-being. The theme of plurality emphasized throughout the book is played out here as well.

Some call the broad state of health wellness (Ralph & Corrigan, 2005). Wellness embodies awidely quoted formulation advanced decades ago by the World Health Organization (1946, p.100): “Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely theabsence of disease or infirmity.” The meaning of wellness is sometimes expanded to includespiritual well-being, occupational satisfaction, and environmental safety (Owen, 1999) as well asbalance and integration of these various components (Adams, Bezner, & Steinhart, 1997).

You are by now familiar with the premise of positive psychology that there is more to thegood life than problems minimized or negated (chapter 1), and you should note that what is aradical notion within psychology has long been recognized with respect to physical health. Howdid those interested in physical health arrive at this insight, and what can positive psychologistslearn from their journey?

Health and Illness Throughout HistoryLet us take a brief look at how health and illness have been regarded in the Western world(Taylor, Denham, & Ureda, 1982). We can distinguish three major eras. In the first era, starting

at the dawn of time and continuing to the mid-19th century, when germ theory1 won acceptance,the focus was solely on disease treatment. People went about their lives until they fell ill; thenphysicians and other healers attempted to combat their illnesses.

In the second era, ushered in by germ theory, the focus expanded to disease prevention.Public health workers tried to prevent germs from entering the body. Swamps that hostedmalaria-carrying mosquitoes were drained. Surgeons began to wash their hands before and afterthey operated. Food was inspected and dated for freshness. Disease treatment of coursecontinued, and germ theory provided a powerful rationale for the effectiveness of certain drugsfor certain diseases: They eradicated the culprit germ.

These two eras share something in common: the assumed passivity of the individual. He orshe needed to do nothing except to follow the advice of the physician or the public health expert.But in the third era, which took form only in the last few decades, the individual is called uponto behave in ways that encourage good health. This is the era of health promotion.

Once good health is regarded as something that can be deliberately promoted, our conceptionof what good health means necessarily changes. There is no upper limit, or at least not onedefined as the absence of a germ.

Decades ago, internists began to study the physiology of those who lived at high altitudes,finding that they had higher aerobic capacity, lower blood pressure, and greater cold tolerancethan people who lived at sea level. In at least these ways, high-altitude dwellers weresupernormal (e.g., Schull & Rothhammer, 1981). These sorts of studies were extended to otherspecial populations like athletes, pilots, and eventually astronauts (e.g., Klein, Wegmann, Bruner,& Vogt, 1969). What became clear was that the opposite of illness was not freedom from diseasebut rather fitness and resilience (Vaillant, 2003). There is a story told about Mercury astronautScott Carpenter whose 1962 reentry to the atmosphere after an orbital flight was threatened by adangerously low fuel level. His heart rate hardly increased during the ordeal, and he piloted theAurora 7 capsule safely back to earth.

Good health sets the stage for later longevity and resilience, but its bottom line may well bein the here and now. The person in good health feels alive, exuberant, and vital and reaps all ofthe psychological and social benefits of feeling good (chapter 4).

The third era shifts our attention to lifestyle, and the door is opened wide for psychology tocontribute to our understanding of good health. Given how we are nowadays bombarded bymessages in the popular media about healthy habits and practices, it is remarkable that the ideathat our behavior has something to do with our health is a relatively new one. But pastconceptions of illness left no room for behavioral factors. To be sure, people could make injuriesmore or less likely, depending on how they behaved, but illnesses were brought about by

invading germs that overwhelmed the immune system. These are microscopic events thatpresumably take place in isolation from our behavior.

However, as epidemiological data became increasingly available in recent decades,researchers were struck by the nonrandom distribution of particular illnesses across thepopulation as a whole. Some groups of people were more likely to develop certain illnesses thanothers. Part of this variation could of course be explained by differential exposure to germs ortoxins. Syphilis was long recognized as a disease more likely to be experienced by sailors thanother people, and so was scurvy. Theorists eventually realized that both illnesses had somethingto do with the lifestyle of many sailors: sexual activity with those carrying the syphilis germ anda diet deficient in vitamin C, respectively.

Throughout the 20th century, as researchers took an ever-closer look at who fell ill and whodid not, they discovered a set of behaviors that was related to people’s general health or illness.Belloc and Breslow (1972), for example, studied such behaviors as

not eating between meals

sleeping 8 hours a night

exercising

not smoking

not drinking alcohol to excess

Those who engaged in such habits were on average healthier than those who did not. They alsolived longer (Belloc, 1973). All of these enabling factors are behavioral in nature, which suggeststhat if people can be encouraged to change their behaviors, then they should live longer andbetter.

Minds and Bodies: The Legacy of Descartes

A sound mind in a sound body is a short but full description of a happy state inthis world. He that has these two has little more to wish for; and he that wantseither of them will be little the better for anything else.—JOHN LOCKE, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693)

Early Western thinkers such as Aristotle made no firm distinction between minds and bodies.They expected that minds and bodies would show continuity, with the health of one reflectingthe health of the other. Greek standards of beauty referred not merely to good looks but also toan inner beauty that was necessarily shown in a person’s physical appearance. And the earliestphysicians, individuals like Hippocrates and Galen, routinely ministered to the whole person,

treating a patient’s physical symptoms as well as his psyche.

If I were writing this book in Athenian Greece, there would be no need for a chapterdiscussing how psychological factors influence physical well-being because the mutual influencesof minds and bodies would need no particular explanation. Between the there and then and thehere and now, a great deal has happened, and I want to highlight an intellectual event that hasprofoundly changed how we in the Western world think about minds and bodies and, by

implication, wellness.2

Among the most far-reaching contributions of French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650) was a strong stance concerning the separateness of mind and body, a position that hascome to be known as mind-body dualism. Contrast this notion with the view of the Greekthinkers who preceded him. Do you see how mind-body dualism poses a considerable problem inexplaining (or even allowing for) the existence of psychological influences on physical health andillness?

How did Descartes arrive at mind-body dualism? He was one of the first theorists to proposean account of how the body moved (Peterson, 1996). As a young man in Paris, he would strollthrough the parks to see the popular mechanized statues that were connected to plates in thewalkways. When passersby stepped on a plate, a hydraulic mechanism forced water throughpipes into the limbs of the statue, causing the statue to move, to the apparent delight ofonlookers.

Descartes’s thinking was stimulated by these statues. If mechanical beings moved about inthis way, perhaps people did too. After all, the parts of the body are connected by tubes (nerves).Muscles appear to swell when they are used. And the brain contains hollow spaces (cerebralventricles) filled with fluid. Putting this all together, Descartes hypothesized that our bodiesmoved when fluid traveled from the brain through the nerves to swell the muscles and makesuch movement possible.

This theory is more than quaint. Descartes correctly anticipated the role of the brain ininitiating movement and the importance of the nerves in making it possible. He was wrong aboutthe mechanism of this effect—we now know that nerves work via electrical and chemicalprocesses as opposed to hydraulic ones—but his theory is still impressive. It provided athoroughly scientific (mechanistic) view of people and their overt behavior.

But in saying that our behavior has causes, Descartes was implying that people did not havefree will. This implication was a direct assault on Christian doctrine and its assumption of freewill. The Catholic Church saw the views of Descartes as heresy and punishable by death. To solvethis dilemma, he proposed that the body works in the mechanical fashion he had described; it issubject to causes and effects. But the soul (mind) is free.

By the 1800s, theorists found that scientific concepts—including causality—could be appliedto the mind, and psychology took form (chapter 1). This development in effect dismissed thebasis of Descartes’s distinction. But altogether different disciplines had by then sprung up toexplain bodies on the one hand (neurology, biology) and minds on the other (psychology,psychiatry). The mind-body dualism originally proposed by Descartes had become the mind-bodyproblem: a puzzle to be explained.

What we have seen since is the development of various scientific fields that try to explainmutual mind-body influence, especially with respect to health and illness. In a sense, these fieldsare all the legacy of Descartes and the conceptual problems he created by splitting minds andbodies.

No matter how difficult it is to explain mind-body interactions, they certainly exist. Forexample, Donald Redelmeier and Sheldon Singh (2001) looked at the longevity of actors andactresses who had won Academy Awards. Celebrities are fascinating in their own right, but theseresearchers had a theoretical motive behind their investigation. A link between high social statusand good health is well established, but its meaning is difficult to unpack (e.g., Marmor, Shipley,& Rose, 1984). Social status brings with it not only psychological states of satisfaction andaccomplishment but also confounds like income, education, and access to health care. What isresponsible for the correlation between status and health?

Academy Award winners have high status and ample material assets. But so too do othernotable actors and actresses, which means that a comparison between Oscar winners and theirpeers with respect to longevity starts to pull apart status as a purely psychological characteristicfrom other factors with which status is usually associated. Looking at the past 7 decades,Redelmeier and Singh (2001) identified 235 Academy Award winners, 527 actors and actresseswho had been nominated for Oscars but never won, and another 887 control subjects—actorsand actresses who had appeared in the same films as the winners and had been born inapproximately the same year. All sorts of statistical controls were applied to the survival data for

individuals in these groups,3 but the bottom line is simple: Winners on average lived almost 4years longer than nominees or controls (see Figure 9.1). There was even a modest tendency formultiple-Oscar winners (e.g., Katharine Hepburn) to live longer than single-Oscar winners, whichwould seem to bode well for Tom Hanks, Jack Nicholson, Meryl Streep, and Hillary Swank.

Figure 9.1. Longevity of Academy Award Winners, Nominees, and OtherActors. From Redelmeier & Singh, 2001

It is said that being nominated for an Academy Award is a testament to one’s acting ability,whereas actually winning one is a matter of luck (Redelmeier & Singh, 2001). If there is anytruth at all to this quip, it means that this particular study has some of the methodologicalvirtues of a true experiment in which research participants are randomly assigned to differentconditions, allowing definitive conclusions about causality to be advanced. The psychological

experience of success and victory may actually add years to someone’s life.4

Mind-Body FieldsLet us turn from these intriguing examples of mind-body interactions to the scientific fields thattry to make sense of them. Health psychology applies psychological theories and research to thetopic of physical well-being (Krantz, Grunberg, & Baum, 1985). Behavioral medicine expandstraditional medical approaches to include the psychological context of health and illness (Gentry,1984). They meet in the middle to give us a richer conception of what it means to be healthy orill.

Another mind-body field is psychoneuroimmunology (PNI), which explicitly recognizes the

mutual influences among psychological, neurological, and immunological factors5 (Ader &Cohen, 1993; Daruna, 2004; Fleshner & Laudenslager, 2004; Maier, Watkins, & Fleshner, 1994).Only in the past few decades has this field emerged, and it was sparked by the discovery that thebody’s immune response could be conditioned. In a classic experiment with rats as researchsubjects, Robert Ader and Nicholas Cohen (1975) paired a saccharine taste with a drug thatsuppressed their immune functioning. This pairing was done several times. Then the taste waspresented alone, and antigens were introduced into their bodies. The immune systems of the ratsresponded sluggishly to the invasion. Immunosuppression did not occur when the taste was not

presented.

Assuming we can generalize from the immune functioning of a rat to that of a person, do yousee the importance of this demonstration? On a theoretical level, it shows that psychologicalfactors—learning, in this particular case—directly influence the operation of the immune system.On a practical level, it means that certain environmental stimuli can become associated withpoor immune functioning. If and when these stimuli are encountered, the individual is atincreased risk for poor health.

The other side of the coin, by implication, is that optimal functioning of the immune systemcan be maintained by avoiding “negative” stimuli and perhaps by seeking out “positive” stimuli.Although people’s immune systems vary in their robustness, it is not clear in theory or in practicewhether superimmunity can be conditioned. Immunosuppression can be quickly brought aboutby the administration of a drug, whereas immunocompetence cannot.

Consider the account by Norman Cousins (1976) of how he mustered his body’s psychologicalresources to combat a potentially fatal disease. He checked out of his hospital room and into aplush hotel, where he watched funny movies. After his recovery, Cousins argued that he“elicited” good health from his body, although perhaps it is more accurate (and more modest) toconclude that he avoided a stimulus (the hospital) associated with immunosuppression.

Regardless, his story has become a well-known parable in PNI circles. Whether it is ascientifically accurate one does not detract from the more-rigorous demonstrations thatpsychological factors like stress and depression indeed compromise immune functioning (e.g.,Cohen, Tyrell, & Smith, 1991; Schleifer, Keller, Siris, Davis, & Stein, 1985; Segerstrom & Miller,2004), whereas factors like social support, relaxation training, and confiding in others can boostit (e.g., Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1992; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988; Spiegel,Bloom, Kraemer, & Gottheil, 1989).

Wellness PromotionSeveral hundred years ago, physicians in the West did not believe that the body could heal itselfbecause to assume so—despite ample evidence that this did happen—seemed mystical and atodds with prevailing materialism (Weil, 1988). Because diseases were not seen as self-limiting,the physician was expected to intervene aggressively, and extreme measures like blood lettingwere common. These “treatments” look bizarre in retrospect, but they were motivated by theassumption that in their absence, the patient would die as his illness inevitably progressed todeath. The discovery of the immune system made it possible for physicians of a materialistic bentto explain how people could recover from illness without positing a mystical will to live.

We know now that people can and do heal themselves from many infectious illnesses. We also

know that germ theory is not strictly true. People’s bodies all of the time harbor certain germs,which may or may not create an illness, depending on a host of other factors, including therobustness of the immune system. Finally, we know that people’s habits contribute importantlyto the functioning of their immune systems and thereby to overall well-being.

An irony of our increased understanding of the immune system is that infectious diseases, atleast in the Western world, are no longer the scourge that they once were (Purtilo & Purtilo,1989). AIDS is notable in part because it is an exception to this generalization. Advances inimmunization and antibiotic treatment means that most people in the United States and Europedie not from infectious diseases but from heart disease or cancer, afflictions of the body to besure but not caused by a germ in any obvious way.

Accordingly, contemporary attempts to combat illness and promote health look beyond thephysical body and certainly the immune system to target behavioral, psychological, and socialfactors. We know that behavioral risk factors for poor health, such as smoking or not exercising,can be changed, and that doing so has beneficial effects. Emotional styles and ways of relating toothers, when changed by therapy, may also provide health benefits. Health psychologists areinterested in how to encourage people to behave in healthy ways. They have adapted a variety oftherapy techniques, particularly from the cognitive-behavioral arena, to promote health.Strategies involving relaxation, stress management, and biofeedback have been especiallypopular (Goleman & Gurin, 1993).

Sometimes these techniques are merged with mass communication strategies to give us broad,media-based programs to promote health (Winett, King, & Altman, 1989). For example, in oneproject, health psychologists undertook a community-based health promotion program thattargeted more than 100,000 California residents (Farquhar, Maccoby, & Solomon, 1984). Thegoal of the program was to increase knowledge about health and illness, encourage healthierhabits, and decrease mortality rates. A variety of strategies was employed, includinginformational messages about healthy behaviors delivered through television, radio, andnewspapers; classes and lectures concerning psychological influences on health; andenvironmental changes such as identifying calories, fat, and cholesterol in food served inrestaurants. These interventions continued for 6 years and were successful in meeting their goals.When the residents in these communities were compared to those of otherwise comparabletowns, they showed increased knowledge of the risk factors for disease, decreased blood pressureand heart rates, decreased smoking, and reduced risk for cardiovascular disease.

Health promotion campaigns are not always successful. People might believe that there is alink between behavior and health, but then think that they are immune to these principles. Forinstance, Weinstein (1989) documented a widespread tendency on the part of most people to seethemselves as below average in risk for different illnesses; this unrealistic optimism undercuts

efforts at health promotion (chapter 5). Even if people believe they are at risk, they may regardthemselves as incapable of a lifestyle change or unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices.Further, people often desire unrealistically immediate results from their efforts.

If it is to be useful, health-promoting programs must do more than provide simpleinformation and occasional encouragement (Peterson & Stunkard, 1989). Health promotioncampaigns that are successful—like the California project I just described—are deliberatelybroad-based, changing people’s abstract knowledge as well as their personal beliefs and attitudes,their habits, and their social environments.

Collectively, such health-promoting endeavors are called wellness promotion, and they areproliferating in the form of wellness centers established in schools, the community, and theworkplace (e.g., Guerra & Williams, 2003; Watson & Gauthier, 2003). Like programs of any ilk,some of these are successful—promoting the psychological and physical health of participants—and others less so.

Some wellness programs do justice to the notion of wellness by providing a broad spectrum ofservices, from fitness activities to nutritional advice to stress management to couples counseling.Others are much more narrow, despite a name that promises more. Sometimes a wellness centeris just a gym that sells bottled water.

It is also fair to say that even broad-service wellness centers may be geared more towardpreventing problems than toward promoting well-being (Garofalo, 1994), in part because thosewho pay for them—communities or employers—have an understandable goal of reducingpressing problems like alcoholism, obesity, absenteeism, and attrition. Although the boosting ofgood health pays similar dividends as the reduction of poor health, these benefits are necessarilyfurther down the road and harder to justify in an era of scarce resources.

Not everyone eligible to participate in an available wellness program actually does so(Spillman, 1988), and the irony is that those most in need—the least healthy—are often unlikelyto enroll in the first place or to stay involved (Bungam, Osark, & Chang, 1997). The good news isthat regular participation leads to less illness and better health (e.g., Gebhardt & Crump, 1990;Goetzel, Kahr, Aldana, & Kenny, 1996), but the bad news is that these individual benefits mightnot translate themselves into organizational-level improvement because of the small number ofparticipants. In other words, although participating individuals benefit from wellness programs,the group per se may not benefit in a measurable way, which can only be disappointing to thesponsors.

In terms of health-promoting activities, there are neither quick fixes nor magic bullets.Promoting wellness takes time and effort. Antibiotics start to eradicate a germ within hours, butthere is no equivalent with respect to wellness. Late-night television infomercials promise us

effortless fitness and rapid weight loss, but this is absolute nonsense.

Years ago, when my research showing that optimists were healthier than their pessimisticcounterparts was first published (chapter 5), I received many phone calls from the popularmedia, from Star Magazine to the New York Times and most stops in between. The interviewerswere clearly interested in the research and especially its implications. But even though I couldnot see them on the other end of the phone line, I could tell that their eyes glazed over when Iwould say that optimists are healthier than pessimists because they behave differently and do thesorts of things that make health more likely. No shortcuts. No miracles. No smiley-facedphagocytes engulfing germs. If you want to be healthy, it is not enough to be cheerful and wishothers a good day. I think the writers who interviewed me wanted to hear a quick-fix message, orat least they acted as if their readers wanted one. I never entered into the implied conspiracy,and so my career as a media darling was nipped in the bud.

And here I go again: Wellness results from a healthy lifestyle—sustained habits—as opposedto singular events. Consider that weight loss books are among the most popular in the self-helpgenre in the United States. They have been for years, and they probably will be for years, whichsuggests the obvious: There are no shortcuts to weight loss.

Let me offer some further generalizations about achieving a healthy weight (Peterson, 1996):

Prevention is much more effective than treatment; in other words, the most effective waynot to be overweight as an adult is to have avoided being overweight at earlier points inlife.

Most forms of weight loss, from diets and fasts to individual psychotherapy to behaviortherapy to family therapy to exercise programs, work in the short run in the sense thatpeople lose weight.

Most forms of weight loss fail in the long run in the sense that people tend to gain back theweight that they have lost.

People cannot maintain weight loss if they go back to the style of life that led them to gainweight in the first place. This sounds terribly commonsensical, but it is a message that thegeneral public does not want to hear. Extreme diets are popular because they promise that a fewweeks of deprivation will permanently solve weight problems. But weight loss does not work thisway. The only way to keep weight off is to change one’s life (Wing, 1992). Studies show that theinterventions which do work in the long run are those that lead people to approach eating in aself-consciously moderate way (e.g., Epstein, Wing, Koeske, & Valoski, 1987).

Also worth mentioning are the topics of aging and physical decline. Are these inevitable?Evolutionary theorists have argued that organisms can sometimes further the survival of theirown genes if they sacrifice themselves, so long as their deaths enhance the survival of their close

relatives (Hamilton, 1964). Perhaps it is adaptive for the elderly, who have already passed ontheir genes, to move out of the way and not use up resources that their offspring need. Amaximum life expectancy might therefore be inherited, with the physical declines of aging themechanism that sets the limit.

Each species appears to have a characteristic maximum life expectancy. Even under the bestof conditions, dogs do not live much longer than 20 years of age, and people do not live muchlonger than 110 years of age. Claims of extreme longevity among groups of people, like yogurteaters living in the Caucasus Mountains of the former Soviet Union, always prove to beexaggerated. Such claims persist, but 120 years is the oldest well-documented age of any malewho has ever lived, achieved for example by a Japanese man, Shigechiyo Izumi (Woodruff-Pak,1988), and 122 years is the oldest well-documented age of any female, achieved by a Frenchwoman, Jeanne Calment (Thomas, 1995). Some theorists believe that people’s maximum lifeexpectancy has not appreciably changed for centuries (Fries & Crapo, 1981). Our average lifeexpectancy has increased, but it has an upper limit. The point, of course, is to live well while weare alive (Barsky, 1988).

One more caveat. Much of what passes as wellness promotion smacks of the New Age—aromatherapy, aura enhancement, crystal healing, and the like. I mean no disrespect, but Isuggest that there are excellent lessons to be learned from the Old Age about how to promotewell-being. Your grandmother might know as much as your guru. If you want to be healthier,you should eat a balanced diet, exercise regularly, and not smoke. You should have goodrelationships with other people and pursue activities that are fulfilling. These generalizationsneed not be accepted on faith; the data are unequivocal.

You can certainly explore what the New Age offers, and perhaps there are some benefitswaiting to be found. But you should not take an either-or approach to what might promote yourhealth. There are biological realities of health and illness that cannot be overridden by yourbeliefs and wishes.

Vaillant (2003) observed that people in colonial America did not recognize the health hazardsof excess alcohol consumption. The colonists often drank to great excess, and it was even acommon practice to quiet a crying baby with whiskey. No one thought that any of this washarmful, but liver and brain damage occurred regardless. Stated another way, it is one thing tosay that our thoughts, moods, and behaviors influence well-being but quite another to believethat only these things do. Sometimes biology trumps psychology.

Mental HealthAt the beginning of this chapter, I pointed out that there are different ways to be ill. Since then, I

have made the complementary point that there are different ways to be healthy, includingresistance to disease, resilience in the wake of stress, physical fitness, and having a zest for life.As with illness, these criteria for well-being often line up with one another, but there are caseswhere they do not. Our task is to take an appropriately broad view of well-being and not toprivilege a single criterion above all others. Does anyone other than me remember with ironythat two of the icons of physical fitness during the 1980s—Arnold Schwarzenegger and JaneFonda—were, respectively, a man who used steroids and a woman with an eating disorder? Fromthe outside, they looked fabulous, but wellness means more than muscles and muscle tone.

There is a tendency, perhaps, to regard hard measures of health and illness—those based onphysical or biological tests—as more valid, but from a broad perspective, this bias is notwarranted (chapter 4). Biological criteria, such as aerobic capacity or immunocompetence, are nomore basic than psychological criteria, such as a person’s general sense of well-being or thedegree to which one leads an active life.

In this section, I would like to focus specifically on mental health—psychological well-being—and what it means. The theme of plurality remains front and center, and in previous chapters, Ihave touched upon many of the relevant psychological components of well-being, from positiveaffect (chapter 3) to happiness (chapter 4) to hope and optimism (chapter 5) to good character(chapter 6) to values (chapter 7) to interests and abilities (chapter 8). Here, I try to weave thesetogether, coupling them with an additional component of wellness: good social relationships(chapter 10). I rely on a recent essay by psychiatrist George Vaillant (2003) on the multiple

meanings of mental health.6

As emphasized, discussions of mental health have lagged behind discussions of physicalhealth, for all of the reasons that positive psychology and its focus on doing well have beenneglected by business-as-usual social sciences (chapter 1). As partly responsible for this neglect,Vaillant (2003) noted Sigmund Freud’s dismissal of mental health as a fiction. Also hamperingour understanding of mental health are more practical issues in measuring and therebydocumenting it. But Freud’s influence in the mental “health” professions has waned, and we havetaken great strides in measurement. The time is right to claim mental health as an importanttopic of concern, not just by positive psychologists but by people in general.

Mental Health as Above Normal

What is typical—normal—should not be confused with what is healthy, given that anypopulation includes a fair number of people with demonstrable psychological problems,necessarily bringing down the average of whatever indicators of psychological well-being wechoose to assess (Kessler et al., 1994). However, it is still sensible to suggest that mental healthentails being above average—supernormal—with respect to criteria reflecting good psychological

functioning. We can quibble over where the line between normal and healthy should be drawn,but most theorists agree that it is found in the important domains of work, love, and play.

We can identify people who are doing well in one or more of these domains and ask what elseis true about them. Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the physical health of the originalastronauts. They were also studied with respect to their mental health, and all were exceptional(Ruff & Korchin, 1964). All came from intact, happy, small-town families. All were married withchildren. They trusted others. They could tolerate both close interdependence and extremeisolation. They experienced emotions—positive and negative—strongly, but they did not dwellon them. They were not particularly introspective, but each was socially intelligent and rarelysquabbled with others. Although the original astronauts were chosen from the ranks of testpilots, none was considered to be rash. They had experienced remarkably few accidents in their

prior careers.7

What is responsible for supernormal psychological functioning like that evident in theMercury astronauts? In 1958, Marie Jahoda wrote a prescient book—Current Concepts of PositiveMental Health— which made the case for understanding psychological well-being in its own right,not simply as the absence of disorder or distress. Jahoda surveyed what previous thinkers—mainly clinicians—had to say about mental health and integrated their views. She proposed ahalf dozen underlying processes that produce the states and traits we usually identify aspsychologically healthy:

acceptance of oneself

accurate perception of reality

autonomy (freedom from social pressures)

environmental mastery

growth, development, becoming

integration of personality

At the same time that Jahoda (1958) published her book, William Scott (1958a, 1958b)surveyed the existing research literature on mental health, focusing on research definitions(measures) of well-being and empirically established correlates of these measures. Then as now,the majority of studies ostensibly looking at health were really studies of disorder. He could drawfirm conclusions only about the factors that characterized lack of pathology; good socialrelationships were the most common correlate. Scott cited a personal communication fromJahoda in which she described her attempts to develop measures of several of her criteria formental health (i.e., accurate perception of reality and environmental mastery) as less thansatisfactory, which is probably why her ideas did not stimulate further work for decades.

More recently, Carol Ryff and her colleagues (1989, 1995; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer,1996, 1998) extended Jahoda’s analysis by surveying and integrating what different theorists,again mostly clinicians, said about the psychological components of being and doing well—striving and thriving, as it were. They identified what she called six points of convergence acrossdiscussions of psychological well-being, which agree substantially with those specified decadesearlier by Jahoda:

autonomy

environmental mastery

personal growth

positive relations with others

purpose in life

self-acceptance

Notable about Ryff’s work is that she and her colleagues have solved the measurementproblem and have created reliable and valid self-report surveys of these components ofpsychological well-being. Using these measures, they are currently exploring the links betweenpsychological well-being and physical health (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 2001; Singer & Ryff, 2001).Echoing the conclusions I offered in chapter 4, mental health as measured by Ryff’s scales showsa stronger association with physical health than does a hedonistic orientation (Ryff, Singer, &Love, 2004). Furthermore, the role of the left prefrontal cortex—believed to aid in theorganization of goal-directed activity—has been implicated in this association (Urry et al., 2004).

Mental Health as Resilience

If isolated in a sterile bubble, we would never encounter germs, and it would not matter whetherour immune systems worked well, poorly, or not at all. Although such bubbles exist and are used

medically, there is no equivalent in the psychological realm.8 As we lead our lives, we takemissteps, encounter failures, and experience losses. How we respond to the bumps in the roadprovides another perspective on what mental health means.

Because this perspective on mental health focuses on difficult situations, we know a fairamount about how people respond. Typically, psychologists are interested in the damage done bythese difficult situations, but if we look at the results from the positive psychology point of view,we see that some people do well in the wake of trauma and stress (Bonnano, 2004; Linley &Joseph, 2004a; Masten, 2001; Rutter, 1985).

For example, children can overcome adversity and thrive (Damon, 2004). Although childrenare often regarded as psychologically vulnerable, even fragile, this characterization does not

apply to all youngsters. The first direct challenges to the fragile-child assumption werelongitudinal studies conducted in the 1980s. In one line of research, Norman Garmezy (1983)introduced the notion of the invulnerable child. Some—not all, but some—of Garmezy’s youngresearch participants showed resistance to life’s most severe stressors, flourishing in spite ofevery prediction to the contrary. In a cross-cultural study conducted in Hawaii and the mainlandUnited States, Emmy Werner (1982) found the same result. Werner adopted the term resiliencyto describe the quality that enables many young people to thrive in the face of adversity. And ina monograph that became enormously influential in the youth development field, Bonnie Benard(1991) extended Werner’s findings to virtually all young people, claiming that every childpossesses the potential to develop resiliency. Benard proposed that resilience entails a cluster ofadaptive response patterns that can be learned by anyone during childhood. The components ofresilience, according to Benard, are

persistence

hardiness

goal-directedness

healthy success orientation

achievement motivation

educational aspirations

a belief in the future

a sense of anticipation

a sense of purpose

a sense of coherence

Those with resilience adapt to stressful events in healthy and flexible ways (Luthar, Cicchetti, &Becker, 2000). Resilient people are clearly among those we should regard as mentally healthy.When life gives them lemons, they make lemonade.

Another perspective on resilience starts with Freud’s defense mechanisms, familiar toanyone who has studied psychology or—indeed—lived in the modern world, where Freud’s termsfor the unconscious strategies people use to protect themselves against threats have become partof our everyday vocabulary. In projection, for example, people attribute their own unacceptablecharacteristics to other individuals. Some types of prejudice involve projection, as when sexuallypreoccupied individuals criticize the sexual behavior of other groups—“those” kinds of people. Inrepression, we actively keep an upsetting memory out of our conscious minds. Repression isresponsible for cases of amnesia that have psychological bases. In rationalization, we rewritepersonal history after a disappointment, like the fox in Aesop’s fables who decided that the

grapes he could not have were probably sour anyway.

Taken as a whole, defense mechanisms seem bizarre and far from healthy, but GeorgeVaillant (1977, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2002) had the insight that they could be arranged in ahierarchy from the relatively immature to the relatively mature, depending on the degree towhich the defense is at odds with reality. Denial, for example, grossly distorts what actuallyhappened by saying that it flat out did not occur. Humor, in contrast, reframes reality withoutdenying it. And in sub-limation, we channel our conflicts and impulses into socially valuedactivities. People with severe psychological problems tend to favor immature defensemechanisms, and—more to the point—those who live long and prosper tend to use maturedefenses.

Moving from this psychodynamic emphasis on the unconscious, we can find anotherperspective on resilience and mental health in a line of research that looks at stressful life eventsand their consequences. Initial studies of stressful life events were done in the early 1960s byepidemiologists like Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe (1967). Their research procedure wassimple: Determine the number of stressful events that people have experienced in the recent ordistant past, measure their health status, and then calculate the correlation between the two. Ingeneral, the correlation is negative. When psychologists became interested in this type ofresearch, they looked not just at the occurrence or nonoccurrence of stressful events but also howpeople thought about them. This inquiry began in earnest in the late 1960s, as cognitivetheorizing swept through psychology as a whole (chapter 1).

As research progressed, it became clear that taking into account particular ways of thinkingabout stressful events improved the ability to predict which events would or would not take a tollon well-being. Exits, such as divorce, bring more problems in their wake than do entrances, suchas beginning college. Events seen as unpredictable, uncontrollable, and/or meaningless are morelikely to lead to illness and even death (Mineka & Henderson, 1985). Furthermore, eventsassociated with emotional conflict are particularly harmful.

The best-known cognitive treatment of stress was introduced by psychologist Richard Lazarus(1966, 1982, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). He argued that stressful events and their impactmust be understood in terms of how the individual perceives them. In primary appraisal, theindividual asks what is at stake in the event. Events take on altogether different significancedepending on their implications for the individual. A speeding ticket, for example, means onething if a person is driving on a suspended driver’s license, and something else if she is not. Insecondary appraisal, the individual takes stock of the resources at her disposal for meeting thedemands of the event. Again, events differ drastically depending on whether the person believesshe can handle it, and how. So, the impact of a speeding ticket varies depending on whether aperson has enough money to pay for it and the increased cost of car insurance that will follow.

Problem-focused coping refers to attempts to meet the stressful event head on and removeits effects. Emotion-focused coping is more indirect, referring to attempts to moderate one’sown emotional response to an event that itself cannot be altered. Lazarus pointed out that nostrategy of coping is always preferred. Different events demand different coping styles. Brokenradiators require problem-focused coping, whereas broken hearts respond best to emotion-focused coping. But the point is that the impact of a stressful event depends on how theindividual appraises it. The mentally healthy person appraises events in ways that allowappropriate strategies of coping. As Reinhold Niebuhr’s Serenity Prayer requests: “God give methe serenity to accept things which cannot be changed; give me courage to change things whichmust be changed; and the wisdom to distinguish one from the other” (Sifton, 2003).

Some researchers interested in stress and coping from a cognitive perspective haveinvestigated the role of habitual ways of thinking about stressful events and have discoveredlinks between certain styles of thinking and subsequent well-being. Suzanne Kobasa (1979), forinstance, studied a personality dimension labeled hardiness: the ability to find meaning andchallenge in the demands of life. In a series of studies, she found that hardy individuals were lesslikely than others to be overwhelmed when confronted with stressful events (Kobasa, 1982;Kobasa, Maddi, & Courington, 1981; Kobasa, Maddi, & Kahn, 1982).

Mental Health as Maturity

Decline over time is the rule for the body but not necessarily for the mind.9 Most psychologicaldisorders wane with age, and the elderly are certainly better able to moderate their emotionsthan are the young (Jones & Meredith, 2000). Accordingly, yet another perspective on mentalhealth views it in terms of greater psychological maturity. The relevance to the presentdiscussion is that maturity is not the sole province of the elderly. And conversely, advancing ageneed not bring psychological maturity, as one of my favorite bumper stickers reminds us: “Youare only young once, but you can be immature forever.”

Much of what psychology has to say about maturity has been shaped by the theorizing of ErikErikson (1963, 1968, 1982). He built upon and modified Freud’s stage theory of psychologicaldevelopment. Erikson proposed that throughout their lives, people pass through a series of stagesin which a particular challenge is central. In each case, satisfactory resolution must be achievedif the individual is to progress through subsequent stages. Erikson called his approach a theory ofpsychosocial stages because each challenge revolves around a specific social milestone with far-reaching psychological implications:

Trust versus mistrust. The newborn infant must first achieve a sense of safety, trusting thathis environment (in the form of caretakers) will provide for his well-being. If a child’s needsfor food, warmth, and physical contacts are met, then the child develops trust. If not, the

child develops mistrust, which is shown as anxiety and insecurity.

Autonomy versus self-doubt. At about 18 months, when the child’s physical developmentallows movement and exploration, she begins to confront the notion of her own self. She issomebody who can make things happen or prevent them from happening. Central to thistask is the control of her own body, and here is the social significance of toilet training.Toilet training can be an area of conflict between children and their parents. Who willprevail? If the child successfully resolves this stage, she achieves a sense of autonomy.Otherwise, children doubt their own ability to make things happen.

Initiative versus guilt. The next stage takes place from about ages 3 to 6, when the child startsto initiate his own activities, intellectual and physical. Erikson regarded this stage as criticalin allowing the child to gain self-confidence. If thwarted by parents in these self-initiatedactivities, the child is likely to experience guilt and a lack of self-worth.

Competence versus inferiority. From age 6 to the onset of puberty, the child begins to exploresystematically her skills and abilities. School begins, and she starts to interact with peers. Anumber of possible skills can be developed: physical, intellectual, and social. Children takelessons in ballet or gymnastics, or throw themselves into art classes or swimming pools orthe intense study of dinosaurs. Successful resolution of this stage produces feelings ofcompetence. Children who experience failure in mastering skills during this stage maysuffer feelings of inferiority.

Identity versus role confusion. For Erikson, the central issue of adolescence is the creation ofan ideology: a set of personal values and goals by which to live. An ideology translates itselfinto an occupational identity, a gender identity, a sexual identity, a political identity, areligious identity, a social identity, and so on. These identities orient adolescents to thefuture, determining not just who they are but who they will be. An identity can only bechosen after one has the cognitive skills to do so, in particular, the ability to think inhypothetical terms.

Intimacy versus isolation. For those who leave adolescence with an identity, the next task isto merge this identity with that of another individual to achieve intimacy. By Erikson’sview, people cannot find out who they are in a relationship. Just the contrary: Identity is aprerequisite for a relationship that is characterized by shared feelings and closeness. Thosewho fail to achieve an intimate relationship with another person feel isolated.

Generativity versus stagnation. When identity and intimacy are achieved, men and womenenter Erikson’s next psychosocial stage. Here the concern is with matters outside oneself,with the world and the next generation. Erikson termed this concern generativity. Anobvious way to resolve this issue is by raising one’s own children. There are other ways as

well, through an occupation such as teaching, or through one’s support for causes likeenvironmentalism or the elimination of nuclear weapons. According to Erikson, those whodo not achieve generativity will feel stagnant and self-absorbed.

Ego integrity versus despair. The final Eriksonian stage comes at the end of life, as a personlooks back over the issues he faced. If they have been resolved successfully, the person feelscontent, having achieved the state of ego integrity. One leads but a single life, and integrityresults from the conviction that one has led it well (Wong, 1989). If not, the person feelsdespair. Life has been too short, too unfair, too filled with failure. But if the person hasachieved integrity, he has achieved mental health in the form of maturity.

More generally, maturity means doing the psychosocial tasks well that are appropriate toone’s stage in life. We can speak of a mature 10-year-old, as well as a mature 50-year-old, butthey are of course mature in different ways. Butterflies are not healthier than caterpillars(Vaillant, 2003), but a healthy caterpillar is much more likely to become a healthy butterfly.

We can regard Erikson’s theory with varying degrees of skepticism. There is little evidence tosupport a strict stage approach to social development, and people may deal with psychosocialchallenges in a somewhat different order than he proposed (B. E. Peterson & Stewart, 1993).Nonetheless, the general trend of development is in the direction Erikson proposed, towardexpanding social connectedness, based on the earlier establishment of an authentic identity.

In several longitudinal studies, George Vaillant (2004) studied the predictors of what hecalled positive aging—being physically healthy and satisfied with life at age 75. What hediscovered supports the notion that maturity is closely aligned with well-being.

First, let me mention some surprising findings about factors that were not strongly associatedwith successful aging: longevity of one’s ancestors, cholesterol levels at age 50, social class ofone’s parents, and stressful life events before age 65. I hasten to say that such factors prove to beimportant earlier in life, even to the point of determining who made it into Vaillant’s finalsample of research participants, but among those still alive at age 75, these factors did notpredict how well they were doing. Instead, successful aging was foreshadowed by

not being a smoker (or having quit before age 45)

not having a history of alcohol abuse

normal weight

regular exercise

years of education

stable marriage

use of mature defense mechanisms

Let me elaborate on the education finding. Wellness was predicted by years of education, notbecause more education meant higher IQ scores or greater income, but rather because educationwas associated with greater future orientation and perseverance.

EXERCISE Changing a HabitAs a long-time member of the American Psychological Association’s Media Referral Service, Ispeak to a number of writers from magazines and newspapers about psychological topics. In lateDecember of every year, I can always count on at least one call from a writer doing a story onNew Year’s resolutions, and I try to convey what psychologists have learned about eradicatingbad habits or establishing good ones. That these calls keep coming underscores the difficulty inchanging our habits and the unpleasant truism that good intentions and nebulous “will power”are not enough. Mark Twain once observed that it was so easy to quit smoking that he had doneit dozens of times.

That said, psychologists do know something about how to change habits, but like so muchpractical advice, the devil is in the details. For starters, one needs to be ready to change. In animportant theory, University of Rhode Island psychologist James Prochaska and his colleagues(Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992; Prochaska, Redding, & Evers, 1997) formalized thenotion that change of any sort takes place through a series of steps or stages, beginning withcontemplation (when one thinks about the benefits of change) and progressing through preparation(when one thinks about the difficulties of change and sets a goal) to action (when one actuallystarts to change by arranging appropriate rewards or punishments) and finally to maintenance(when one takes steps to prevent relapse).

So, the purpose of the present exercise is for you to change some health-relevant habit, butonly try it if you are beyond the precontemplation stage. That is, if you have not already thoughtabout change, this exercise is not the right trigger for the subsequent steps.

You may want to reduce or eliminate some habitual behavior or add a new one to yourrepertoire. Sometimes you can do both at the same time, and you may actually want to do so,under the assumption that the bad habit may serve some purpose for you. Merely eliminating itcan leave that purpose hanging and result in backsliding. If you want to quit drinking at theneighborhood bar, perhaps you need to join a chess club that meets every afternoon and fulfillswhatever social needs the local tavern has been satisfying.

It is important to define the habit for yourself in concrete ways that allow you to monitorchanges. “Becoming a better person” is a wonderful goal, but it is a lot easier to know that youhave succeeded at “greeting the doorman of your apartment building every morning.” Alongthese lines, it is easier to change a habit that allows you to do so in small steps, so that you can

note and relish your progress. So, Weight Watchers provides participants with a target weightgoal, but it is the individual pounds that they shed in a given week that are tracked andcelebrated at meetings.

You probably want to get into the practice of keeping a journal with respect to whateverhabit you want to change. If you want to cut back on smoking or drinking, write down at the endof every day how many cigarettes or drinks you have had. If you want to increase exercising,write down the number of blocks you walked, the distance you covered, or the amount of timeduring which you experienced an accelerated heart rate. It is a good idea to keep the journal fora week or two before you try to change the habit. This will give you a handle on exactly what thehabit entails.

Researchers who study goals and their attainment agree that hard and specific goals are moremotivating than easy or nebulous ones, what are derisively termed DYB (do-your-best) goals(Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). However, you need to break hard goals into more-manageable components. And when you do start to change the habit, focus not just on what youstill need to accomplish but also on what you have already done. “I have 50 pounds to lose” isdaunting, whereas “I already lost 10 pounds” is affirming.

Expect occasional backsliding. If you are on a diet, do not interpret one cookie as a sign thatyou are an utter failure. Weight loss specialists have documented the abstinence violation effect,which refers to a common but thoroughly irrational response to breaking one’s diet (Marlatt &Gordon, 1980). Many people conceptualize dieting only in terms of good days and bad days. Agood day is when you stay on the diet. A bad day is when you violate the diet, which I have justemphasized will happen on occasion. Craziness enters the picture when one makes nodistinctions among degrees of bad days. One cookie at lunch leads a person to give up dieting forthe entire day, finishing the bag of cookies in the afternoon and topping it off with a quart of icecream in the evening or a pizza at midnight.

If you can enlist a friend or family member in your efforts, that might help so long as youeach can provide support and encouragement to one another. I know a happily married couplewho embarked on a diet and exercise program together. At first, things worked very well. Butthen one of them began to make much more rapid progress than the other, and the programturned into a competition that tarnished what had always been a wonderfully cooperativerelationship. When they saw the damage being done to their marriage, they were smart enoughto go their own ways with respect to diet and exercise.

Making a change is never as difficult as maintaining the change, whenever the steps taken tochange a habit prove impossible to incorporate into one’s ongoing lifestyle. This is why extremediets have only short-term success, or why an exercise program begun on your vacation falls by

the wayside when you return to work. So, while you think of how to change a habit, also keep inmind what you will do to keep the change permanent. Do not celebrate the loss of 50 pounds byordering the entire right side of the menu at the International House of Pancakes.

I do not urge you to do your best. I urge you to succeed.

GLOSSARYbehavioral medicine: field that expands traditional medical approaches to include the

psychological context of health and illness

defense mechanism: unconscious strategy that people use to protect themselves against threat

emotion-focused coping: reaction to stress that entails changing one’s emotional reaction

hardiness: ability to find meaning and challenge in the demands of life

health psychology: field that applies psychological theories and research to physical well-being

immune system: cells throughout the body that fight off infection by recognizing foreignmaterial and combating it.

mind-body dualism: philosophical stance that minds and bodies are altogether separate

problem-focused coping: reaction to stress that entails meeting the stressful event head on andremoving its effects

psychoneuroimmunology (PNI): field that studies the relationships among psychological,neurological, and immunological factors

psychosocial stages: periods of life characterized by specific social milestones to be achieved

resiliency: quality that enables people to thrive in the face of adversity

wellness: broad state of health, including physical, mental, and social well-being and not merelythe absence of disease or infirmity

wellness promotion: deliberate interventions to promote health

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Jahoda, M. (1958). Current concepts of positive mental health. New York: Basic.

Vaillant, G. E. (2002). Aging well. New York: Little, Brown.

Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. H. (2001). Emotion, social relationships, and health. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Weil, A. (1988). Health and healing (Rev. ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Cousins, N. (1981). The anatomy of an illness. New York: Norton.

Pennebaker, J. W. (1997). Opening up: The healing power of expressing emotion. New York:Guilford.

Wolfe, T. (1979). The right stuff. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. Health Psychology

Articles

Vaillant, G. E. (2003). Mental health. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 1373–1384.

Seeman, J. (1989). Toward a model of positive health. American Psychologist, 44, 1099–1109.

Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. H. (1998). The contours of positive mental health. Psychological Inquiry,9, 1–28.

Maier, S. F., Watkins, L. R., & Fleshner, M. (1994). Psychoneuroimmunology: The interfacebetween behavior, brain, and immunity. American Psychologist, 49, 1004–1017.

Stokols, D. (1992). Establishing and maintaining healthy environments: Toward a social ecologyof health promotion. American Psychologist, 47, 6–22.

Web Sites

http://www.healthsurvey.org/cgi-bin/WebObjects/Project. This is the Web site of the NationalHealth Survey, which “provides a free, on-the-spot analysis of your diet, physical activities,and lifestyle choices.”

Films

On Golden Pond (1981)

Terms of Endearment (1983)

Regarding Henry (1991)

The Doctor (1991)

Philadelphia (1993)

ABC News’s Primetime: “Are Health Foods Really Healthier?” (1995)

ABC News’s Turning Point “Alternative Medicine: Hope or Hype” (1996)

As Good as It Gets (1997)

One True Thing (1998)

Montana PBS: “Introducing Positive Psychology: Personal Well-Being, Social Support, Health andAging Well” (2004)

ABC News’s 20/20: “Myths and Lies: Health and Beauty” (2005)

Songs

“A Touch of Gray” (Grateful Dead)

“It Was a Very Good Year” (Frank Sinatra)

“As Good as I Once Was” (Toby Keith)

10Positive Interpersonal Relationships

Immature love says: “I love you because I need you.” Mature love says: “Ineed you because I love you.”—ERI CH FROMM (1956)

If you have read this far in the book, you will not be surprised by my three-word summary ofpositive psychology: Other people matter.

Despite relative neglect by psychologists over the years, the topic of love now resides frontand center in any discussion of human nature, especially from a positive perspective (Reis &Gable, 2003). The capacity to love and to be loved is viewed by contemporary theorists as aninherently human tendency with powerful effects on well-being from infancy through old age.

Researchers have even started to investigate the biochemical basis of love, with specialattention to the hormone-like substance oxytocin, which is released in the brain in response tosocial contact, especially skin-to-skin touch (Insel, 1997). Oxytocin increases during pregnancyand surges during the process of childbirth. Its presence facilitates the production of milk andmore-general “maternal” behavior. Please note that fathers are not left out of the oxytocinpicture. The oxytocin levels of a father-to-be rise as well during the pregnancy of his spouse, andto the degree that he spends time with his infant, his oxytocin levels continue to increase. So toodoes his interest in his child. And finally, there need not be an infant present for oxytocin to havean effect on adults. It has been called the cuddle hormone, and it has been linked to the creationof a loving bond between two individuals and perhaps even to monogamy (Carter, 1998; Porges,1998; Young, Wang, & Insel, 1998).

Oxytocin is associated with the neurotransmitter dopamine (chapter 3), which is broadlyresponsible for reinforcement, pleasure, and—indeed—addiction, which means that being“addicted to love” is a metaphor with a biochemical underpinning. Neuroimaging studies ofindividuals who describe themselves as madly in love show that their brains work differentlywhen they are looking at pictures of their true loves versus pictures of good friends of the sameage and gender (Bartels & Zeki, 2000). The neural circuitry implicated is the same that is activewhen individuals are high on cocaine. Further research finds that when mothers look at picturesof their own children, brain regions responsible for negative emotions and social comparison aredeactivated (Bartels & Zeki, 2004). We thus have scientific support for what most us already know

in the core of our being: Mom’s love has the potential to be unconditional.

The point is not that love is just biology. The point is that love is also biology, and the factthat our biological bodies are designed to draw us to one another is a strong argument that socialrelationships are neither arbitrary nor merely convenient ways to obtain other things that matter—food, sex, power, whatever. Our biology teaches us that relationships in and of themselvesmatter.

How could this not be? The prolonged helplessness of infants requires love to be built deepwithin them and us to ensure survival (Mellen, 1981). Our ancestors needed not only the meansto attract a mate for the purposes of procreation but also to create the bond between mates toguarantee that the child would be protected and raised. The child in turn needed to be appealing

enough to the parents to elicit their care and concern, even to the point of personal sacrifice.1

I once attended a lecture in which George Vaillant (2005) contrasted reptiles and mammals,and he focused not on the differences that meet the eye, striking though they may be. Rather, hepointed out that baby reptiles, newly emerged from their eggs, are thoroughly silent, whereasnewborn mammals are remarkably noisy. The evolutionary interpretation is that a noisy reptilewould signal itself to its parents as a meal, and the whole species would end rather quickly. Anoisy mammal—a kitten, a puppy, or a human infant—signals to its parents that it needs care,and the species continues, generation after generation. What’s love got to do with it? Everything.

The L Word in PsychologyIn 1975, two young social scientists—Ellen Berscheid and Elaine Hatfield—received an $84,000grant from the National Science Foundation to study romantic love. The grant attracted theattention of Wisconsin senator William Proxmire, who strenuously objected on the floor of theU.S. Senate and awarded them his first Golden Fleece Award for cheating the Americantaxpayers. Proxmire issued a press release stating:

I object to this not only because no one—not even the National Science Foundation—can argue that falling in love is a science; not only because I’m sure that even ifthey spend $84 million or $84 billion they wouldn’t get an answer that anyonewould believe. I’m also against it because I don’t want the answer.

I believe that 200 million other Americans want to leave some things in life amystery, and right on top of the things we don’t want to know is why a man falls inlove with a woman and vice versa. …

So National Science Foundation—get out of the love racket. Leave that toElizabeth Barrett Browning and Irving Berlin. Here if anywhere Alexander Pope was

right when he observed, “If ignorance is bliss, tis folly to be wise.” (Hatfield &Walster, 1978, p. viii)

The Chicago Tribune ran a reader poll pitting the research plan of Berscheid and Hatfieldagainst the criticism of Senator Proxmire, and the senator won by an overwhelming 88% of thevotes cast. Berscheid and Hatfield did garner some support, though, from several Nobel Prizelaureates and Arizona senator Barry Gold-water. New York Times columnist James Reston offeredthe opinion that love may forever remain a mystery, but if “sociologists and psychologists can geteven a suggestion of the answer to our pattern of romantic love, marriage, disillusions, divorce—and the children left behind—it would be the best investment of federal money since Jeffersonmade the Louisiana purchase” (Hatfield, 2001, p. 141).

Although public opinion of course matters in determining what sort of science a societysupports, we ultimately judge science in terms of the specific theory and research to which itleads. The devil is in the nitty-gritty details, even with respect to love, and by this test, thescience of love that Berscheid and Hatfield helped to create has been thoroughly successful.

Why did a modest proposal to study the L word arouse such strong negative feelings? Thecommon criticisms seem to stumble over one another. Love is too important to study—and tootrivial. Love is commonsensical—and a deep mystery. Love is sacred—and, at least in the form ofsexual intimacy, crass. Perhaps the pervasive bias within the social sciences to focus on thenegative led an unalloyed good to be overlooked (chapter 1).

But, as James Reston observed, there are casualties of love in the form of heartbreak anddivorce, in the abuse of spouses and the neglect of children. Loneliness has not earned its owndiagnostic label from psychiatrists but certainly lies near the center of such bona fide disorders asanxiety, depression, schizophrenia, and substance abuse (Booth, 1983; McWhirter, 1990). One ofthe ways that researchers legitimized the study of love was to highlight the problems ensuingfrom its absence. Other researchers studied love under the radar, giving their lines of workneutral labels like interdependence, equity, social exchange, social support, interpersonal relations,and the like (Cobb, 1976; S. Cohen, 1988; Foa & Foa, 1975; Homans, 1958; Kelley et al., 1983;Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

Social psychologist Zick Rubin (1970) deserves credit for focusing explicit attention on loveby showing that this apparently fuzzy topic could be approached with as much rigor as any other

topic within psychology. He developed self-report scales that distinguished liking from loving.2

The scales are filled out by an individual with respect to some other individual. For example, theliking items include:

I think that ____________ is unusually well adjusted.

Most people would react favorably to ____________ after a brief acquaintance.

____________ is one of the most likable people I know.

____________ is the sort of person whom I myself would most like to be.

The loving items include:

I feel I can confide in ____________ about virtually everything.

I would do almost anything for ____________.

If I could never be with ____________, I would feel miserable.

I would forgive ____________ for practically anything.

A respondent indicates his agreement on a scale ranging from “not at all true” through“definitely true.” As is obvious, the liking items reflect one’s positive evaluation of anotherperson, whereas the loving items reflect one’s emotional attachment.

These scales look valid—that is, they have face validity—but more important, each is reliableand has distinct patterns of correlations with other variables. In his research, Rubin studiedcollege students in Ann Arbor who were dating one another. The Love Scale, which by the waydoes not use the word love in any item, was substantially associated with reports of being in lovewith the target person and with expectations of eventual marriage to him or her. In a laboratorystudy, in which couples were observed through a one-way mirror by a researcher, the Love Scalepredicted how much simultaneous eye-to-eye contact the two people made.

Additionally, in a longitudinal study of dating couples, scores on the Love Scale predictedcontinuation of a romantic relationship months later and even its intensifying, but only if bothpartners scored high in the first place. Couples mismatched on the Love Scale were less likely tostay together. Liking played less of a role in these findings, although it is important to note thatthe Liking Scale also predicted the continuation of loving, soap opera plots notwithstanding.

None of these findings is surprising, but the real importance of this research wasdemonstrating that romantic love could be studied with the sorts of methods used bypsychologists to investigate other topics. Arguments about what is or is not possible in sciencehave a way of being resolved rather quickly when a researcher actually does what a theorist,politician, or pundit says cannot be done.

Another love pioneer made his mark by studying baby monkeys—inoffensive and heart-warming. Make no mistake, though. Iconoclast Harry Harlow (1958) was really interested inlove. If you have studied psychology, I am sure you remember Harlow’s famous studies.

He wanted to know if the attachment of infants to their mothers was due just to the fact thatinfants need to be fed. Or is social attachment significant in its own right? Remember my briefdigressions into the history of psychology elsewhere in this book. The 1950s were the height ofbehaviorism and its attempt to “reduce” what looked like complex behaviors to simple processes

of reward and punishment (chapter 8). One prevailing view at the time was that the mother-infant bond was another reducible phenomenon. The infant was attached to his mother becauseshe fed him.

Harlow separated monkeys at birth from their mothers and raised them individually in cageswith two stationary models. One figure was made of wire and the other of terry cloth (see Figure10.1). The wire mother had a nipple that provided milk, whereas the cloth mother provided nofood but had a pleasing texture. If attachment is the result of being fed, then the infant monkeysshould have formed attachments to the model associated with food.

However, the infant monkeys preferred the cloth model. They sought out the wire modelwhen hungry but otherwise stayed closer to the cloth one. When the infants were frightened, byan unfamiliar sight or sound, they ran to the cloth mothers and clung to them. Harlow concludedthat infants are predisposed to form attachments with objects that are easy to cuddle, like theterry cloth models. Blankets and teddy bears may be popular among human children for exactlythe same reason. Harlow’s (1974) research is important for showing that even among animals,social bonds reflect more than the satisfaction of physiological needs.

In a related line of research, Harlow (1965) raised rhesus monkeys in complete isolation.After a year without contact with other monkeys, these animals were fearful and withdrawn.Some of their common behaviors—like biting themselves—can only be described as bizarre. Theisolated monkeys did not interact normally with other monkeys, and they could not interact withinfants. They were not malnourished or physically traumatized, but because they did not havecontact with their own kind, their social development was profoundly impaired.

Figure 10.1. Harry Harlow’s Surrogate MothersOne “mother” is made of wire and provides milk, and the other is made of

terry cloth and has a pleasing texture.

Other studies show that such problems can be corrected if deprived monkeys are placedtogether with normally raised monkeys (Novak & Harlow, 1975). Eventually, the isolatedmonkeys learn to interact normally and display few effects of their earlier isolation. Similarly,studies with human children also find that many of the effects of early deprivation can bereversed if the child subsequently finds herself in a supportive environment (White, 1967). But ifthe deprivation takes place for too long a time, it cannot be easily reversed, suggesting that there

is some merit to the idea of critical periods for social development.3

As research on love took form, two perspectives emerged, one emphasizing the head and theother the heart—thoughts versus feelings, as it were—which still serve as a useful way todescribe psychology’s approaches to love. Let me sketch each.

Equity TheoryEquity theory suggests that close relationships—friendships or romances—persist to the degreethat both people involved believe that what they are getting out of the relationship isproportional to what they are putting into it (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Equitablerelationships last, and inequitable ones break up (Winn, Crawford, & Fischer, 1991). Surely, wehave all been friends with people who cannot remember our birthday, neglect to return ourphone calls, or fail to defend us against gossip, although we do all of these things for them. Thisis an unstable relationship, and something has to change. Our friends need to do more, or weneed to do less, or there is no future.

Equity theory assumes that people calculate the costs and benefits involved in interactingwith others. It is an economic theory and draws our attention to the kinds of things that peoplegive to and receive from another. One representative list of interpersonal resources, as they arecalled, includes the following (Foa & Foa, 1975):

goods

information

love

money

services

status

If you stop and think about it, you will see that some of these resources can be exchanged for oneanother without arousing any special attention, e.g., goods for money, whereas other exchanges,

e.g., love for money, seem less legitimate, although they of course take place.

A similar list comes from studies of social support, which refers to how others help us tocope with stressful events (House, 1981):

appraisal support: constructive feedback, affirmation, and social comparison

emotional support: empathy, trust, caring, and nurturance

informational support: advice, suggestions, and solutions

instrumental support: tangible aid and service

Social support has been linked to good health because it buffers against the effects of stress(Cassel, 1976). In the present context, it is worth emphasizing that not any old support will do.Rather, social support is protective when it occurs in the context of a naturally occurring socialnetwork into which the individual is well integrated. Although strangers on the bus, televisioncharacters, and pets can provide what looks like social support, real social support is provided ina mutually caring relationship (Berkman, Glass, Brisette, & Seeman, 2000).

Numerous studies support the general predictions of equity theory. For instance, people in a

romance bring with them comparable degrees of physical attractiveness.4 Good looks in aromantic partner are desirable and thus constitute a benefit in a relationship. One of the simplestways of achieving equity with a person who is good-looking is to be good-looking yourself. Thisis exactly what happens: Lovers often pair up according to looks, which is why couples like JuliaRoberts and Lyle Lovett attract our confused attention and why the reality television show“Beauty and the Geek” is so jarring (McKillip & Riedel, 1983; Murstein, 1976). And interestingly,same-sex friends also pair up according to their physical attractiveness, although this trend ismore apparent among males than females (Feingold, 1988).

Equity theory also predicts that when people in a relationship are mismatched on onedimension, like physical attractiveness, then there needs to be a compensating mismatch onanother dimension, like occupational success. For example, highly attractive women are morelikely to marry rich men, whose wealth can compensate for other shortcomings (Elder, 1969).We can lament that physical attractiveness is a commodity in our social world, but it is a factthat psychologists repeatedly discover.

According to evolutionary psychologists, males and females differ in how they evaluate thedesirability of a potential opposite-sex mate (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Studies in a variety ofcultures show that men place more emphasis on youth and physical attractiveness, whereaswomen tend to value industriousness and the accumulation of resources (Buss et al., 1990).These preferences may be the result of evolved psychological mechanisms solving the differentsurvival problems faced by our male and female ancestors in choosing the best mates.

This evolutionary interpretation is compatible with equity theory, although it proposes thatmen and women calculate the perceived benefits of a romantic partner differently. Consider thatyoung men and women in the United States experience romantic jealousy for different reasons(Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992). Men become more jealous at the prospect of their(female) partner’s sexual infidelity. Women become more jealous at the prospect of their (male)partner’s emotional infidelity. Buss et al. (1992) advanced an evolutionary interpretation of theseresults, suggesting that men value sexual fidelity because they want to be certain they havefathered their partners’ children, whereas women value emotional fidelity because they want tobe certain of the continued presence and support of their partners once a child has been born tothem.

Equity in the here and now is not the only influence on whether long-term relationshipscontinue. Psychologists have documented other factors that determine who stays together andwho parts company. For example, a couple is less likely to break up if they are satisfied withtheir relationship, if no suitable alternatives are present, and if each has invested a great deal oftime and effort in their relationship (Rusbult, 1980; Rusbult, Zembrodt, & Gunn, 1982).

However, equity theory has limits in its ability to explain love in all of its forms. It cannotaccount for selfless love or acts of altruism because—after all—these are not done with any quidpro quo expectation. Consider organ donors (e.g., Batten & Prottas, 1987). Consider theChristians in Nazi Germany who sheltered Jews at the risk of their own deaths (Oliner & Oliner,1988). Consider the Japanese concept of amae, which is roughly translated as “indulgentinterdependence” and experienced by the child who knows that he is dependent on his motherbut at the same time is completely assured that she will take care of him and his needs (Doi,1973). Amae pervades other sorts of relationships and defies interpretation in equity terms(Berger, Ono, Kumano, & Suematsu, 1994).

And consider studies showing that volunteer work is associated with high life satisfaction andgood health (e.g., Dulin & Hill, 2003; Hunter & Linn, 1981; Krause, Ingersoll-Dayton, Liang, &Sugisawa, 1999; Morrow-Howell, Hinterloth, Rozario, & Tang, 2003; C. Schwartz, Meisenhelder,Ma, & Reed, 2003). These findings challenge equity theory when coupled with other studiessuggesting that giving social support is more beneficial than receiving it (S. L. Brown, Nesse,Vinokur, & Smith, 2003; Liang, Krause, & Bennett, 2001). In other words, it is not an equitablerelationship that is rewarding but rather one in which a person can provide love and support,whether or not the score card comes out even.

Another challenge to equity theory comes from the insight that interpersonal relationshipsexist on two levels (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). First, there are the specific actions andcharacteristics of the people involved. These more or less line up in terms of equity, as in “youwash, and I’ll dry.” But second, there are the various ways in which people interpret their

relationships. Their interpretations cannot be greatly at odds with their specific behaviors.However, a relationship that is strictly a mutual exchange can only be thought of as a businessdeal. To prevent this cynical construal, individuals in a friendship or romance must sacrificesome of their own rewards for the good of their partners. Then the relationship can beinterpreted as a genuine one. What is the point? Outside of commerce, a purely equitablerelationship cannot work, because no one wants to think of a friendship or romance in theseterms.

Finally, equity theory fails most profoundly because it ignores the feelings that people bringto their relationships. You have seen throughout this book how Western thinkers have frequentlyplaced thoughts over feelings, but you have also seen how the actual data of positive psychology

imply just the opposite. Again and again, the heart trumps the head.5 We do not have friends andspouses because we “think” they will benefit us. We have friends and spouses because we lovethem.

Attachment TheoryAccordingly, the second important perspective on relationships is attachment theory, whichemphasizes the feelings that bind us together. The giant figure here is British psychiatrist JohnBowlby, who in 1950 was asked by the World Health Organization (WHO) to report on themental health of children who had been orphaned by World War II. The important conclusion ofhis report was that normal development requires a “warm and continuous relationship” with atleast one adult caregiver. Children reared in orphanages, even where their basic needs for foodand safety were adequately met, nevertheless suffered if they lacked the opportunity to form anenduring emotional bond. Most of the benignly neglected orphans displayed pathologicalbehaviors, like head banging or depression. Many failed to thrive physically. Indeed, some diedsimply from the lack of love.

Bowlby’s (1951) WHO report stressing the importance of emotional bonds resulted in majorchanges in the way children in orphanages and residential nurseries were treated, but it leftunanswered several important questions. Why should the absence of an emotional attachmenthave such profound effects on well-being? And how did the effects occur? Bowlby devoted thenext 20 years of his life to searching for the answers.

His quest led him into literatures far removed from his psychoanalytic training. It was in thefield of ethology, and specifically in the work of Konrad Lorenz (1937) on imprinting amonggoslings and Harry Harlow (1958) on bonding in rhesus monkeys, that he eventually found theexplanation he had been seeking. The young of many species, who are too immature at birth tocare for themselves, have an evolved predisposition to become attached to an adult caregiver.

Bowlby reasoned that the human infants and children who were not faring well despite adequatephysical care were suffering the consequences of a thwarted need for attachment.

This new theory ultimately filled three volumes (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). The core ofattachment theory is the proposition that attachment enhances survival by regulating an infant’srelationship and proximity to his caregiver. He continuously monitors her whereabouts and playscontentedly as long as she is nearby. If the distance between them becomes too great, he will beupset and redirect his attention and effort toward reestablishing proximity. Bowlby (1979)proposed that this attachment system operates throughout the lifespan, from the cradle to thegrave.

Inspired by Bowlby’s theory, other researchers started to take a close look at infants and theirsocial behavior. Here is a consensus summary. Very early in life, human infants are sociallyresponsive but make few if any distinctions among people (Goldberg, 1991; Schneider, 1991).They look at everyone, especially at their faces. In an important study, Johnson, Dziurawiec,Ellis, and Morton (1991) showed that within the first hour following birth, infants are more likelyto track with their eyes a moving stimulus that looks like a face than they are to track similar butnonface-like stimuli (see Figure 10.2). This tendency cannot have been learned. The newborn ispredisposed by evolution to attend to the most-important aspect of the environment—the parent—and the parent’s attention in turn is drawn to the responsiveness of the infant.

Within a few months of birth, the human infant starts to discriminate her primary caretakersfrom others. She responds differently to familiar people, smiling and vocalizing in their presence,and being more easily comforted by them.

After about 6 or 7 months, a third period is entered, where the child shows a strongattachment to a single individual, usually the mother but not inevitably. This stage is marked bythe infant actively seeking contact with the person to whom she is attached. She crawls after theperson and calls out to her. Strangers bring about fear. This pattern continues for the next severalyears of the child’s life.

Figure 10.2. What Catches the Eye of an Infant?Newborn infants are more likely to track with their eyes a moving stimulus

that looks like a face (a) than they are to track similar but nonface-likestimuli (b).

This third stage of attachment has been studied by observing how one-year-old infants reactwhen separated from their mothers, a strategy called the Strange Situation Test (Ainsworth,Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969). The young child, accompanied by hismother (or other caretaker), comes to an infant research laboratory, which is equipped with itsown playroom filled with toys. A carefully scripted series of encounters take place, observed byresearchers behind a one-way mirror:

The mother puts the baby on the floor, some distance from the toys, and then takes a seat.

A stranger enters the playroom and also sits down.

The stranger talks to the mother, and then the stranger attempts to play with the baby.

Next, the mother leaves her baby alone with the stranger for a few minutes.

She returns shortly to be reunited with her infant.

Then both the mother and stranger leave, again for a few minutes.

The stranger returns first and attempts to play with the baby.

Finally, the mother returns and picks up her baby.

This procedure provides rich information about how the child reacts to separation. When themother first leaves the room, about half of the children cry before she comes back. More thanthree quarters respond to her return by reaching out to her in some way: smiling, touching, orspeaking. When the mother leaves the room again, the typical child becomes upset again. Thestranger is unsuccessful in soothing the child. When the mother returns, half of the children keepon crying, and three quarters of them climb into her arms.

Children respond to the Strange Situation Test in various ways.6 Ainsworth (1973) describedthree different patterns of behavior in these circumstances. Avoidant children (about 20% ofthose tested) do not cry when their mother leaves and either ignore her or turn away upon herreturn. Securely attached children (about 70%) show the pattern of seeking and maintainingcontact with their mother. The third pattern, shown by only about 10% of children, is termedambivalent. These kids cry when their mother leaves but are not comforted when she returns.

The Strange Situation Test can be used to assess how other factors influence attachment.

Children whose mothers are supportive and affectionate in dealing with them show the securelyattached pattern: They are sad to see their mothers leave and glad to see them return. Motherswho are critical and rejecting produce avoidant or ambivalent infants. If a mother is depressed,she may be emotionally unavailable to her child, and what can result is an avoidant child(Lowenstein & Field, 1993). Whatever pattern is established has lasting effects on how the childrelates to others. For instance, insecurely attached children are less sociable with peers at age 2,less flexible and persistent at age 4, and more likely to be depressed and withdrawn at age 6(Clarke-Stewart, Friedman, & Koch, 1985).

Children who were securely attached in infancy are appropriately assertive with their parents(Lyons-Ruth, 1991). They explore the world with more enthusiasm, and they are more persistentat solving problems; at the same time, they are more willing to ask for help and to seek comfortwhen frustrated (e.g., Londerville & Main, 1981; Matas, Arend, & Sroufe, 1978; Waters,Wippman, & Sroufe, 1979). In short, securely attached children strike a balance betweendependency and autonomy.

When they enter school, securely attached children require less contact, guidance, anddiscipline from their teachers, and they are less likely to seek attention, to act impulsively, toexpress frustration, or to display helplessness (Sroufe, Fox, & Pancake, 1983). Their teachers likethem more and expect more of them. In relation to their peers, children with secure attachmenthistories are more socially skilled and elicit more positive responses from others (Pierrehumbert,Iannotti, & Cummings, 1985; Pierrehumbert, Iannotti, Cummings, & Zahn-Waxler, 1989; Vandell,Owen, Wilson, & Henderson, 1988). Not surprisingly, they have more friends and are morepopular (Sroufe, 1983). They are also unlikely to be bullies or victims (Troy & Sroufe, 1987).

Secure attachment in infancy does not guarantee all of these desirable outcomes, but theconsistency of the research is striking (Colin, 1996). Secure attachment leads to goodrelationships with others, and we know that good relationships with others are in turn associatedwith all of the manifestations of the good life discussed so far in this book. Other people figure inour pleasures and how we savor them (chapter 3). Social predictors of life satisfaction areespecially robust (chapter 4). Character strengths of the heart are more satisfying than those ofthe head (chapter 6). Teachers and mentors make our accomplishments possible (chapter 8). Andgood relationships with others underlie wellness and longevity (chapter 9).

Two of today’s leading love researchers, Harry Reis and Shelly Gable (2003), went so far as toconclude that good relationships with others may be the single most important source of lifesatisfaction and emotional well-being, across different ages and cultures (Berscheid & Reis, 1998;Klinger, 1977; Sears, 1977). And conversely, when asked to describe bad events or things thathave gone wrong in their lives, the majority of people recount relationship conflicts or losses(Veroff, Douvan, & Kukla, 1981). The typical person enters psychotherapy because of a troubled

relationship (Pinsker, Nepps, Redfield, & Winston, 1985).

Secure attachment in infancy has a lifelong impact because it does not stay in infancy.Children, adolescents, and adults bring their prior attachment history with them, which meansthat we can be described as secure or not at any age. The Strange Situation Test has been used byresearchers long enough that the infants initially studied with it have grown up and are now ableto speak to researchers about their childhood recollections. So, George, Kaplan, and Main (1985)created the Adult Attachment Interview, which asks a series of questions regarding childhoodrelationships with parents. There is a high correspondence between what adults have to say andtheir attachment classification years earlier (Van Ijzendoorn, 1992).

Even more interesting is the finding that attachment styles established in infancy show up inhow adults conduct themselves in romantic relationships. In 1987, psychologists Cindy Hazanand Phillip Shaver had the insight that adults could be described as secure, avoidant, orambivalent in how they approached their intimate relationships. Here is a very simple quizdevised by these researchers. Read the following blurbs, and choose the one that best describeshow you relate to the people in your life:

I find it relatively easy to get close to other people. I am comfortable depending on otherpeople and having them depend on me. I don’t usually worry about being abandoned orabout having someone get too close to me.

I find it difficult to trust people completely. I am somewhat uncomfortable being close toothers. I feel nervous when people start to get too close. Often, I feel like people want me tobe more intimate than I feel comfortable being. I find it difficult to allow myself to dependon other people.

I find that other people are reluctant to get as close as I would like. I often worry thatsomeone I am close to doesn’t really love me or won’t want to stay with me. I want tomerge completely with another person, and this sometimes scares people away.

Some of us enjoy closeness and find intimacy easy to establish; we expect partners to betrustworthy and reliable; and we readily turn to them for comfort and support, and they to us.

These are secure relationships7 (the first option on the test). Others of us are uncomfortable withcloseness; we find it difficult to trust our partners; and we maintain emotional distance fromthem, valuing independence over closeness and withdrawing when distressed rather than seekingcomfort (the second option: avoidant relationships). And still others among us worry constantlyabout being abandoned; we may want more closeness than our partners are able or willing togive (the third option: ambivalent relationships).

Here is a potpourri of research findings about securely attached adults (Feeney, 1999; Hazan& Shaver, 1994; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Shaver & Hazan, 1993). They are

more supportive of their partners in joint problem-solving tasks (Kobak & Hazan, 1991)

more likely to practice safer sex (Brennan & Shaver, 1995)

less upset in the wake of stress (Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993)

more likely to seek support from others when it is needed (Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan,1992)

more likely to compromise in conflicts (Pistole, 1989)

less likely to be depressed (Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1994)

more likely to have good self-esteem (Brennan & Bosson, 1998)

less likely to abuse their spouse (Dutton, Saunders, Starzomski, & Bartholomew, 1994)

less likely to divorce (Hazan & Shaver, 1987)

I assume those of you who do not experience securely attached relationships are feelinguncomfortable in light of all these findings. Rest assured, psychologists have learned somethingabout the cultivation and recultivation of love among adults. Emotionally focused couplestherapy is a well-validated approach for troubled couples, which is based on attachment theoryand teaches a more-flexible approach to the expression and satisfaction of needs (S. M. Johnson,1996; S. M. Johnson, Hunsley, Greenberg, & Schlinder, 1999). Partners learn to comfort, toreassure, and to support one another—in short, to open the door to new emotional experiences,those that bind people together in a secure relationship.

In closing this section, I want to underscore the contrast between equity theory andattachment theory, while also observing that they need not be incompatible. In equity theory, wesee an emphasis on the calculation of perceived costs and benefits. It is a thoroughly cognitiveapproach to relationships. In contrast, attachment theory emphasizes feelings and emotions. Asyou know, the tension between thoughts and feelings is an enduring issue in psychology, but itdoes not have to be inherent. I believe that we can integrate these perspectives to viewrelationships in terms of how we think about one another as well as how we feel. The relativeemphasis might depend on the type of relationship, but thoughts and feelings matter in all ofthem (M. S. Clark & Mills, 1979).

Typologies of LoveA relationship between two people can obviously take many different forms (Berscheid, 1994).Norms prescribe relationships, both formal and informal, and relationships in different historicaleras and cultures vary according to the society’s dominant values (Lee, 1988; Murstein, Merighi,& Vyse, 1991). Hatfield and Rapson (1993) made the provocative observation that personalrelationships around the world are becoming more similar as Western culture is spread through

the global media. For example, the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, traditionallygoals in Western relationships, are becoming increasingly relevant to Asian relationships (chapter3).

Affiliation

Let us consider some of the relationships that individuals may have with others. In affiliation,the people involved simply want to be associated with some other person—his or her specificidentity is not all that important. Leon Festinger’s (1954) notion of social comparison provides amotive for affiliation. In order to evaluate our skills, aptitudes, attitudes, and values, we comparethem to those of others. We cannot do this without associating with other people. In short,affiliation helps us to evaluate ourselves (Buunk, Van Yperen, Taylor, & Collins, 1991; Kulik &Mahler, 1989).

Psychologist Stanley Schachter’s (1959) interest in affiliation led him to investigate themaxim that “misery loves company.” He recruited psychology students to participate in anexperiment and told them that they were to receive a series of painful electric shocks. Otherresearch participants in a comparison group were not told this. For students in both groups, therewas a 10-minute delay while the researcher supposedly set up the experimental equipment. Theparticipants could wait alone or with others. Which did they choose? Compared with those notexpecting to be shocked, those in the experimental group preferred to pass the 10 minutes in thecompany of others. We thus seek out others when we are anxious, presumably because otherpeople decrease our worries. Again, social comparison processes may be at work here. Otherpeople provide clues about how we should act and feel in an ambiguous situation.

Further research by Schachter clarified this phenomenon. When given a further choice,anxious people prefer to associate with other anxious individuals: Misery loves miserablecompany. The positive psychology perspective suggests further that it is not the misery per se

that is attractive but rather what miserable people might be able to teach us.8

Liking

In liking, the people involved have a positive attitude toward each other, and psychologistsknow a fair amount about the factors that predispose these positive attitudes (Byrne, 1971):

proximity: other things being equal, we like those who live close to us

similarity: other things being equal, we like those whose personality traits, values, andbeliefs are similar to our own

complementarity of needs: other things being equal, we like those who satisfy our needs

high ability: other things being equal, we like those who are competent

attractiveness: other things being equal, we like those who are physically attractive or

otherwise pleasing9

reciprocity: other things being equal, we like those who like us

Think about how these findings might be used by enlightened social engineers. Suppose you wereput in charge of creating an apartment building, a college dormitory, a neighborhood, or aworkplace where people would actually like one another. What would you do?

Friendship

When liking is coupled with a mutual perception of similarity and expectations of reciprocity andparity, we call it friendship. Again, psychologists know a fair amount about friendship. Here issome of what they have learned (Hartup & Stevens, 1997).

The word friend enters the vocabulary of children as early as 3 or 4 years of age, shortly afterthey start to interact preferentially with their peers (Howes, 1983). As many as 75% of nurseryschool students have reciprocated friendships, at least as judged by time freely spent in eachother’s company. To be sure, the friendships of young children are concrete and center oncommon activities: “We play together.”

By adolescence, 80–90% of teenagers report having mutual friends, and they usuallydistinguish between “best” friends and “good” friends. In either case, these sorts of friendshipsare marked not only by shared activities but also by emotional support and self-disclosure: “Wetell each other everything.”

For adults, friends are often found among one’s fellow workers, and adult friendships oftencenter on shared work activities to such a degree that theorists describe adult friendship as“fused” with work (Winstead, Derlega, & Montgomery, 1995). Similar fusions occur when friendsare found among neighbors with children of the same age. More than 90% of adults have friends,although the proportion declines a bit among the elderly. In old age, friendships often involvesupport and companionship: “We do each other favors.”

The number of close friends that someone has is always rather small, no more than one ortwo for toddlers and three to five for schoolchildren. Newlyweds seem to have the most friends—seven to nine—which apparently reflects the coming together of their social circles. But bymiddle age, the typical person again has about five close friends, a number which slowlydecreases throughout life. People who have friends at one age are likely to have friends at otherages, and the same close friends are often kept throughout one’s entire life (Elicker, Englund, &Sroufe, 1992). Old friends are deliberately kept later in life in preference to making new ones,with shared histories and experiences being the commonly cited reason (Lang & Carstensen,1994). What does change across the lifespan is the amount of time one spends with friends.

Teenagers spend almost a third of their waking hours in the company of friends, whereas adultsspend less than 10% of their time with friends.

Although the surface features of friendship obviously change, having friends10 is aconsistently robust correlate of life satisfaction and well-being (B. B. Brown, 1981; Gupta &Korte, 1994; Larson, 1978; Newcomb & Bagwell, 1995; Rutter & Garmezy, 1983). However, theconclusions about the benefits of friendship must be qualified by whether the friends in questionare supportive or not (e.g., Weiss, 1986). Bad friends do exist—those who drain us and undercutus—and research suggests that they subtract more from our well-being than good friends add(Hartup & Stevens, 1997).

Bad friends are those who violate the reciprocity that characterizes most friendships. Earlierin the chapter, I pointed out the shortcomings of equity theory as an account of relationships, butthis perspective can shed light on bad friendships. These may be relationships in which we haveemotional attachment but little equity. Said another way, perhaps bad friends are not friends atall.

In any event, what is a good friend? Let me describe the results of a very simple study I didseveral years ago with Tracy Steen, using an Internet sample of adults. Positive psychology wasjust taking form, and so we decided to explore relationships from this new perspective. Wewanted to know about the best friend whom someone had ever had. Researchers interested infriendship and love typically ask respondents about their current relationships, some of whichare good and others not so good. But are any of these described relationships the best that onehas ever had?

Our respondents logged onto a Web site and answered a series of questions about a personthey designated as the best friend they had ever had. Of the 289 respondents—mostly middle-aged, college-educated Americans—fully 97% could think of one such person. Only 15% said thatthis person was their first best friend, although 76% said that they were still friends with theperson. Indeed, on average, the respondents had been friends with the person they described formore than half of their lives. Male respondents tended to have male best friends, and femalerespondents tended to have female best friends, but this was not a strong finding. In other words,best friends could be same sex or opposite sex. However, these special best friends were usuallyquite close in age to those describing them (Matthews, 1986).

We asked respondents to describe the features of their friend and their relationship on a five-point scale reflecting how important they regarded the feature in explaining their friendship. Wepresented dozens of features, drawn from different theories and our own brainstorming. Thosethat consistently emerged as most important (> 4.0 on our scales) converged on a view of a bestfriend as someone with whom one has a reciprocated and sustained relationship marked by

positive emotions. Best friends support the premises of equity theory and attachment theory. Ourrespondents described their best friends as dependable, honest, loyal, and committed. Theydescribed them as kind and loving and also as playful and fun. My friend “brings out the best inme” was also frequently endorsed as a description. Rated as rather unimportant (< 2.5 on ourscales) were features like a friend’s status, attractiveness, physical health, skills, ambitions, andaccomplishments. These sorts of features might open the door for a potential friendship, but theydo not transform the relationship into the best one that a person has ever had.

Love

When a relationship is characterized by reciprocated exclusiveness, absorption, predispositions tohelp one another, and interdependence, we call it—at least in Western culture—love. Love inturn can be subdivided (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1992, 2002; Lee, 1973).

One common distinction is between passionate love and companionate love (Berscheid &Walster, 1978; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Passionate love occurs at the beginning ofan affair and is marked by extreme absorption and dramatic mood swings, from ecstasy toanguish. Companionate love is the unshakable affection shared by two people whose lives havebecome intertwined. It is common to observe that passionate love gives rise to companionatelove as sexual desires cool, but the relationship between these two types of love is more complex.They may coexist rather than be sequential (Hatfield, 1988), or we may experience one type oflove without the other ever occurring before or after. Indeed, the research I described in theprevious section on best friends seems to be research as well about companionate love, so weshould beware of drawing a firm line between friendship and love—I suspect only teenagers dothat. In any event, the important point is that love can be marked by passion and companionshipand that both are desired in a romantic relationship (Noller, 1996; Sprecher & Regan, 1998).

The Nature of Love is a three-volume philosophical history of love from antiquity until themodern era, and its author, Irving Singer (1984a, 1984b, 1987), distinguished four traditions in

thinking about love. Eros approaches love in terms of desire. Phila refers to love as friendship.11

Nomos is submission to God’s will or obedience to the desires of a loved one. And agape is selflesslove that approaches the divine.

An ongoing historical debate is whether romantic love as we think about it today even existedprior to the last few centuries. Certainly, marriage based on romantic love is a relatively moderninvention, dating only to the 18th century in the Western world, and it is still not common inmany other parts of the world (e.g., Gadlin, 1977; Murstein, 1974). But these facts do not meanthat there was no passion prior to the cultural invention of courtly love during the EuropeanMiddle Ages, a stylized ritual that eventually morphed into the modern Western marriage. Othershave argued that passionate love—defined simply as an intense attraction between two people—

is a human universal that eventually joined company with sexuality and marriage.

In the United States, about 95% of the population marries at some point. This overall figurehas stayed much the same over recent decades, although the average age of first marriage hasincreased, particularly among women with professional careers. How does the transition into

marriage take place? Speaking about the Western marriage for love,12 developmentalpsychologists describe the process as a series of steps (Karney & Bradbury, 1995). The mostsuperficial step involves judging a prospective mate on such characteristics as appearance, socialclass, and behavior. The next involves looking deeper at her beliefs and attitudes. It is importantthat these agree. Finally, prospective mates choose each other on the basis of how well theirneeds mesh. Two individuals with a need to dominate an interaction do not get along as well as aleader and a follower (Winch, 1958).

Researchers have extensively studied marital satisfaction13 and find, not surprisingly, thatsatisfaction is high early in the marriage (O’Leary & Smith, 1991). It reaches a low point when acouple has adolescent children. Among those who stay married for decades, marital satisfactionstarts to rise again once the children have left home.

These are descriptive trends, and we should not assume that time is the critical factor. Manyother factors are linked with marital satisfaction—for example, emotional security, respect,communication, sexual intimacy, and loyalty—and the way in which these factors combine toinfluence satisfaction depends on how long a couple has been together (Levenson, Carstensen, &Gottman, 1993; Swensen, Eskew, & Kohlhepp, 1981). On the whole, men report greatersatisfaction with marriage than do women. Women tend to value their marriage more if theyhave children or if they work outside the home (Baruch, Barnett, & Rivers, 1983; Russell & Wells,1994).

Many women today have both a family and a career, but those committed to both theirchildren and their work tend to experience decreased satisfaction with their marriage (Philliber &Hiller, 1983). The likely explanation is that their husbands more often than not fail to shareequally in raising the children or doing household chores, and the women become overextended.

An interesting fact is that married adults are physically and emotionally healthier than theirsingle counterparts (chapter 9). There are various explanations for this phenomenon. Perhaps theless healthy do not get married in the first place. Perhaps the companionship that marriageprovides protects a person against poor health (Cobb, 1976). Perhaps a good marriage even hasdirect effects on the competence of the immune system (Kiecolt-Glaser, 2005). Whatever thereasons, the health benefits of marriage on health are greater for men than for women (Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001).

Some words about divorce. In the mid-1800s, only about 4% of U.S. marriages ended in

divorce. By the 1970s and thereafter, this figure had grown to more than 40% (Castro-Martin &Bumpass, 1989). At first glance, we seem to have an incredible crisis for the American family.But if we place these figures in a historical context, we find another perspective (Peterson, 1997).There is the same proportion of intact marriages today as there was more than a century agobecause people on the average live much longer today. Once upon a time, marriages ended withthe untimely death of one partner or the other. Today, the same proportion of marriages endwith divorce. Of course, the end of a marriage by death is different than the end of a marriage bydivorce, but the fact remains that the proportion of intact American families changed not at allthroughout the 20th century.

The average divorce, if there is such a thing, occurs after 6 or 7 years of marriage (Norton,1983). But divorce can occur at any point during marriage. Surprisingly, marital dissatisfaction isnot a strong predictor of divorce. Considerations like alternative mates, career decisions, andfinancial crises combine to create a divorce. The degree to which divorce is regarded aslegitimate within a person’s cultural group is another crucial factor. For an obvious example,among those whose religion prohibits divorce, it is less likely than among the general population.

Regardless of what causes divorce, it is a painful experience. During the immediate aftermathof a divorce, depression or alcohol abuse may occur. There is also an increased risk of physicalillness (chapter 9). These problems are increased when the couple has children. In the majority ofcases, mothers receive custody following a divorce, causing single mothers to be especiallyburdened (Pledge, 1992). None of these findings suggests that divorce is always harmful forindividuals (Masheter, 1990). Most people make a satisfactory adjustment within 2 yearsfollowing a divorce (Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, 1979). The majority of those who divorceremarry, particularly if they have divorced early in adulthood. A second marriage is necessarilydifferent than a first marriage, but on the average, it is as satisfying (Huyck, 1982). Whethersecond marriages are more or less likely to end in divorce is not clear, because the comparison isconfounded by age and hence the increased possibility of the death of one partner.

But what about marriages that work? Psychologist John Gottman and his colleagues studiedmarriages longitudinally—as opposed to retrospectively, as is usually the case—and found thatdisagreement and anger are not necessarily harmful (e.g., Gottman & Krokoff, 1989; Gottman &Levenson, 1992). All couples have disagreements. What makes a marriage a good one is that thecouple has learned a productive way of responding to disputes. In fact, couples that avoiddisputes, despite a short-term gain in satisfaction, pay a long-term price in terms of the success oftheir marriage. The couple must confront conflicts and express dissatisfaction in such a way thatunderscores what can be called relational efficacy, the shared belief that the couple can weatherconflict together (Notarius & Vanzetti, 1983).

Whining, defensiveness, and stubbornness during disagreements foreshadow divorce, whereas

humor, affection, and more generally positive interpretations mark successful marriages.Gottman went so far as to suggest that the ratio of the explicitly positive to the explicitlynegative during actual interactions must exceed 5:1. Said another way, for every complaint orcriticism that one spouse voices, there need to be at least five compliments! These cannot bemuted, muttered, or otherwise implied because no one’s spouse is a mind reader.

Gable, Reis, Impett, and Asher (2004) elaborated this insight by describing four ways that wecan respond to our partners when something happens to them, including good events, like a raiseat work:

active-constructive responding (an enthusiastic response): “That’s great! I bet you’ll receivemany more raises.”

active-destructive responding (a response that points out the potential downside): “Are theygoing to expect more of you now?”

passive-constructive responding (a muted response): “That’s nice, dear.”

passive-destructive responding (a response that conveys disinterest): “It rained all day here.”

Couples who use active-constructive responding have great marriages. The other responses, ifthey dominate, are associated with marital dissatisfaction.

We need not be Pollyannas to live happily ever after. Some events indeed require criticism orcaution. The point, again, is that the ratio of the positive to the negative matters, and Gable et al.suggested that it needs to exceed 3:1.

The exact number is not critical and no doubt varies as a function of the couple and the otherdetails of their relationship. However, all researchers who calculate these sorts of ratios agreethat the ratio of the positive to the negative must exceed 1:1 for a relationship to survive andflourish (Diener, 2005). This may mean that the negative is more powerful than the positive, ifonly because we are more likely to attend to it (chapter 5). This may mean that most of the timewe experience more good events than bad events in our relationships, which means that thesatisfaction oomph provided by one more good thing does not compensate for what one badthing can take away. Regardless, these results encourage us to accentuate the positive if we wanta good thing to last.

EXERCISE Active-Constructive RespondingAs I have described in this chapter, good marriages are characterized by active-constructiveresponding between partners. Implied in these findings is an exercise you can try that mightmake any relationship—with a spouse, a friend, a child, or a fellow worker—a better one(Seligman, 2003).

Choose a person with whom you are close, and then start keeping track of how you respondwhenever she relays some good news: “I just got an A on my term paper!” “My softball team wonthe tournament!” “My diet is working!” Do this long enough to discern a stable pattern.

Do you respond enthusiastically, asking questions and sharing in the glory of the otherperson? Do you do this much more frequently than any other sort of response? If so, you aredisplaying active-constructive responding, and you probably already have an excellentrelationship with this person. If that is the case, choose another target for this exercise. Keep at ituntil you find someone to whom you do not typically respond in this way.

You may care deeply about the person, and your critical reaction may stem sincerely fromyour love. You may not want your child to get a big head. You may not want your spouse to bedisappointed if the good news heads south. But a steady stream of “constructive” criticism ortempered enthusiasm will take a toll because that is all that the person hears from you.Accordingly, resolve to respond to every piece of good news in an active and constructive way.Keep track of what you do, and make sure the number of active-constructive responses outweighsother responses by at least three to one.

As I always say about these exercises, use some common sense. Your spouse announcing thathe has found someone else to marry or your child saying that she has dropped out of middleschool to join the circus need not be responded to in a positive way. And you certainly shouldnot tell the person that you are responding positively because this book told you to do so.

But most of the good news you hear from someone you love warrants enthusiasm, so let itshow, and see what happens to your relationship.

GLOSSARYaffiliation: relationship resulting from desire to be associated with some other person whose

specific identity is unimportant

attachment theory: theory proposing that close relationships persist because of the feelings thatboth people have for one another

companionate love: relationship marked by unshakable affection shared by those whose liveshave become intertwined

emotionally focused couples therapy: approach for troubled couples based on attachmenttheory that directly teaches a more-flexible approach to the expression and satisfaction ofneeds

equity theory: theory proposing that close relationships persist to the degree that both peopleinvolved believe that what they are getting out of the relationship is proportional to what they

are putting into it

friendship: relationship marked by liking, a mutual perception of similarity, and expectations ofreciprocity and parity

imprinting: tendency of the young of some species, like ducklings, to follow and becomeattached to the first moving object they see

interpersonal resources: things that people give to and receive from another

liking: relationship in which people have positive attitudes toward one another

love: relationship marked by reciprocated exclusiveness, absorption, predisposition to help, andinterdependence

oxytocin: hormone-like substance released in the brain in response to social contact, especiallyskin-to-skin touch

passionate love: relationship marked by extreme absorption and dramatic mood swings, fromecstasy to anguish

social support: how others help us to cope with stressful events

Strange Situation Test: laboratory procedure for assessing the attachment style of a child bybriefly separating the child from the mother

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Blum, D. (2002). Love at Goon Park: Harry Harlow and the science of affection. Cambridge, MA:Perseus.

Bowlby, J. (1979). The making and breaking of affectional bonds. London: Tavistock.

Rubin, Z. (1973). Liking and loving: An invitation to social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart, &Winston.

Buss, D. M. (1994). The evolution of desire: Strategies of human mating. New York: Basic.

Gottman, J. W. (1994). What predicts divorce? Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Journal of Social and Personal Relationships

Articles

Harlow, H. F. (1958). The nature of love. American Psychologist, 13, 673–685.

Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. R. (1987). Romantic love conceptualized as an attachment process.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 511–524.

Web Sites

http://www.unlimitedloveinstitute.org. This the Web site of the Institute for Research onUnlimited Love at Case Western Reserve University. Its mission is “to significantly increaseour knowledge of unselfish love through scientific research, education, and publication.”

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~elaineh. This is the Web site of pioneering love researcher ElaineHatfield at the University of Hawaii.

Films

Casablanca (1942)

The Sound of Music (1965)

The Graduate (1967)

Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (1969)

Brian’s Song (1971)

Charlotte’s Web (1973)

The Sting (1973)

The Big Chill (1983)

Hannah and Her Sisters (1986)

Stand by Me (1986)

84 Charing Cross Road (1987)

Driving Miss Daisy (1989)

Field of Dreams (1989)

Steel Magnolias (1989)

When Harry Met Sally (1989)

Nell (1994)

Toy Story 2 (1999)

ABC News’s 20/20: “Fair Fighting” (2000)

My Big Fat Greek Wedding (2002)

Songs

“Addicted to Love” (Robert Palmer)

“Always on My Mind” (Willie Nelson)

“Back in His Arms Again” (Supremes)

“Call Out My Name” (James Taylor)

“Crazy in Love” (Beyonce Knowles)

“Danny’s Song” (Kenny Loggins)

“Help” (Beatles)

“I Got You Babe” (Sonny & Cher)

“I Walk the Line” (Johnny Cash)

“I Was Made to Love Her” (Stevie Wonder)

“It Takes Two” (Marvin Gaye & Tammy Terrell)

“Lean on Me” (Al Green)

“My Girl” (Temptations)

“On the Street Where You Live” (from My Fair Lady)

“Second That Emotion” (Miracles)

“Something to Talk About” (Bonnie Raitt)

“Stand by Me” (Ben E. King)

“The First Time Ever I Saw Your Face” (Roberta Flack)

“Time After Time” (Cyndi Lauper)

“Your Song” (Elton John)

11Enabling Institutions

Institutions—government, churches, industries, and the like—have properlyno other function than to contribute to human freedom; and in so far as theyfail, on the whole, to perform this function, they are wrong and needreconstruction.—C. H. COOLEY (1902)

In 2003, 1 team-taught with Marty Seligman a course in positive psychology to 120undergraduate students. At that time, it was the largest positive psychology course everconducted. We realized that we could not teach the course like our previous small seminars, eachof which had evolved in response to the emerging interests of the students and the teachers(chapter 2). So, part of the course entailed weekly lectures that we planned in advance. Westructured them according to the positive psychology framework originally articulated bySeligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000): positive experiences, positive traits, and positiveinstitutions (chapter 1). Seligman and I had no difficulty putting together lectures on positiveexperiences and positive traits. There were all sorts of theories, findings, and applications wecould incorporate into our lectures, and many of these ideas have been discussed in previouschapters of this book. To teach our students about positive institutions, we invited speakers whoknew a great deal about education, government, social service, business, and religion. We askedthe guests to speak about the “good” institution in the context of their particular areas ofexpertise.

My favorite speaker was a woman from Pennsylvania who worked for the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) as a rescue dog handler. She brought her dog with her, and shespoke to the class for 90 minutes about their work at the World Trade Center looking forsurvivors following the September 11, 2001, attacks. She told us how the feet of her dog and theother dogs blistered and bled and how they kept on working. The dogs only became frustratedwhen they did not find survivors, just bodies, because the dogs are—above all—trained to locatethe living. The only way to deal with this situation was for the handlers to ask other workers onthe scene to hide themselves in the rubble to be “discovered” by the dogs and thereby sustaintheir motivation. Her story was heartbreaking and heart warming at the same time.

The FEMA presentation was fascinating and even inspiring, but when we and our students

reflected on it, we realized that a characterization of the positive institution remained elusive.Rescue dog handlers are of course doing good work when they make it into the field, butwhether this happens in the first place is subject to all kinds of economic and even politicalconsiderations, as we all learned in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Another speaker was Judith Rodin, who at the time was president of the University ofPennsylvania, and she reflected on her 10 years at the helm of the school. Again, what she saidwas fascinating and inspiring. When she became president, a plan was being tossed about tobuild a wall between the university and the extremely rough West Philadelphia neighborhood inwhich the school was located. (If you think that sounds strange, then you have never been to theUniversity of Chicago, which for years has had just such a wall in place.) Rodin disagreedstrongly with this plan, and she set about to make West Philadelphia a better place in which tolive, to work, and of course to study. As I see it, she and her administrative colleagues succeededin spectacular fashion. West Philadelphia now has grocery stores, restaurants, and shops thatwere not in business before her tenure as president. The university helped to create an excellentneighborhood elementary school. Furthermore, the university made available to staff and facultylow-rate mortgages for those who wanted to buy a home in West Philadelphia, and many peopletook advantage of the opportunity. The houses and yards began to look better and to be better.

They also began to cost more, and here is the downside. Some lamented that WestPhiladelphia was becoming gentrified and thus too expensive for some of its long-time residents.They were forced to move to other parts of the city, and the West Philadelphia renaissance wasaccordingly offset by poor conditions elsewhere in the city. Whether this is an accurate criticism,I do not know, and I am tempted to dismiss it as carping. Philadelphia after all is the city wherefans at an Eagles football game once booed Santa Claus.

But there is a more-substantive lesson to be gleaned from this story and indeed from all of theother accounts we heard of organizations and institutions trying to do the right thing. Becauseinstitutions are necessarily complex, it is all but impossible to characterize them as across-the-board positive, or for that matter as across-the-board negative. Growing up in the 1950s and1960s in the United States, I repeatedly heard about “evil” communist dictators like Marshal Titoof Yugoslavia. With the demise of Tito in 1980 and the ensuing events, Yugoslavia dramaticallyfell apart, and all sorts of horrific things happened from which Eastern Europe is still recovering.So was Tito as bad as he was made out to be? Perhaps, but the alternative proved to be worse, at

least in the short run.1

Institutions are invariably a mix of the good and the bad. Consider McDonald’s, which isproblematic when it encourages its customers to supersize themselves and damage their health,but laudable when it provides jobs for seniors and when it sponsors Ronald McDonald Housesaround the country. Consider Microsoft, rightly criticized for its aggressive tack toward

competition and just as rightly praised for the charitable contributions that its near-monopolyhas made possible. Consider the Roman Catholic Church, under whose auspices very good thingshave been done as well as very bad things.

In short, positive is not an adjective sensibly applied to an institution as a whole. My own takeon the matter is that we have to ask positive for what purpose? in discussing the roles thatinstitutions play in producing and encouraging the psychological good life. In my own thinking, Ihave therefore replaced the term positive institution with the notion of an enabling institution. Mypoint is simply that some institutions can enable certain outcomes better than other institutionscan. Whether one thinks a given outcome is desirable is of course informed by one’s own values(chapter 7).

Enable is light-handed, because it implies that pronouncements about what enables whatshould not be thought of as relentless laws of the universe (p. 112). So, it is a perfectly soundgeneralization to say that children from intact families are on average physically andpsychologically healthier than children growing up without a father or without a mother. Theinstitution of the nuclear family therefore enables the well-being of children, but of course thereare exceptions: children from single-parent homes who thrive and those from the most-intactfamilies who do not.

At the same time, a given institution can do a better or a worse job at its acknowledgedpurpose, and here comparisons across institutions and across time are informative. Harris polls(2005), for example, have for years surveyed the confidence of U.S. citizens in the leaders oftheir major societal institutions, finding that over the decades, confidence has in generaldecreased for virtually all institutions. Figure 11.1 shows representative results from a telephonesurvey done in early 2005. Whether this decrease constitutes an institutional crisis I do not know,but certainly leaders of Congress, large businesses, newspapers, and law firms cannot take pridein the current results. Expressed confidence is not a perfect measure of how well an institution isdoing its job, but it certainly flavors how people interact with the institution in question. Howcan the public’s confidence be restored? This is a question to which I return at the end of thischapter.

Figure 11.1. Confidence in Societal InstitutionsHarris poll (2005) of 1,012 U.S. adults contacted by telephone and askedabout their confidence in the leaders of major societal institutions. Results

reflect the proportion of respondents expressing a “great deal of confidence.”

A Catalog of Social GroupingsObviously, social interactions take place between and among specific people. But can we explainthe characteristics of social interaction simply in terms of the characteristics of the individualparticipants? When is the whole equal to the sum of its parts and when is it different? Almost allsocial scientists acknowledge that social interactions have features not readily derived from thecharacteristics of individual participants, and it is valuable to have a vocabulary for describingdifferent sorts of social groupings.

Social scientists use the term aggregation to describe an assembly of individuals physically inthe same place. They may have nothing more to do with each other than the fact that they are inthat place at that time, like Christmas shoppers in a Wal-Mart, pedestrians hurrying along WalnutStreet at lunchtime, or joggers on a high school track.

What is psychologically interesting about aggregations is that the mere presence of others—whether or not we know them—influences how we act, in part because even a disinterested“audience” makes us self-conscious and in part because the presence of others increases our

autonomic arousal. When aroused, we perform well-learned behaviors with proficiency andpoorly learned behaviors ineptly (Zajonc, 1965). So, as a beginning lecturer, I tried to relaxbefore I spoke. As an experienced lecturer, I now try to be as stirred up as possible.

A collectivity is simply a social category: two or more individuals who can be discussed as awhole (R. Brown, 1954). All aggregations are collectivities, by definition, but not all collectivitiesare aggregates, because people in a collectivity do not have to be gathered in the same place atthe same time: e.g., voters over 65 years of age, Elvis impersonators, people with unlistedtelephone numbers, basketball players with green eyes, jugglers, and employees of the U.S. PostalService.

Social categories provide the way we think about ourselves and others, and some of thesecategories are deeply part of our psychological makeup. For example, consider thatconversational errors like calling a person by the wrong name are similar across cultures,implying regularity to what at first seem to be random acts (Fiske, 1993). These slips are mostcommon when the misidentified person is of the same gender as the intended individual andwhen the basic social relationship (such as friend, child, or employer) is the same. Slips tend notto occur along lines of age, race, or—interestingly—name similarity. These findings suggest thatgender and social role are highly general categories that we use in thinking about other people.

A group is a set of interacting individuals who mutually influence each other (Shaw, 1981).The group in group therapy is a good example, as are families, athletic teams, dance bands, andjuries. Groups are incredibly important. Evolutionary theorists believe that we as a speciesevolved in groups consisting of about 30 interacting individuals (Glantz & Pearce, 1989). Andeven today, we live in small groups, we learn in small groups, we work in small groups, we playin small groups, and we worship in small groups. Even when these groups are embedded in muchlarger institutions, it is in the small group where the day-to-day psychological action takes place.Here is a more-benign way to think about the results of the Harris poll I just described.Americans may have little confidence in Congress, but their own representative is probablyjudged differently. The U.S. Postal Service may be the subject of jokes, but our own letter carrieris a good and dependable person.

An organization is an enduring and structured group. Usually an organization has a body oftraditions and customs. Its members think of the organization as a whole, and their roles aredifferentiated and specialized. By this definition, many work groups qualify as organizations.Consider IBM or the lunch shift at the local Burger King. Youth groups like the Boy Scouts,political groups like the Democratic National Committee, and special interest groups like theNational Rifle Association are also examples of organizations. One way to distinguishorganizations from other groups is to ask whether particular members are dispensable.Regardless of who is coaching, playing, or ailing, National Football League teams go on. Thus,

they are organizations. In contrast, particular families would not have much of an existencewithout Mom and Dad and the kids. They are not organizations.

Finally, an institution is a set of like organizations with especially sustained and pervasiveinfluences within a society or even the world as a whole. Most societies have some form ofreligion, some form of marriage, and some form of education; we therefore speak of these asinstitutions. Those of us in the Western world usually include democracy, a free press, and anindependent judiciary as important institutions.

It is impossible to survey all possible groups, organizations, and institutions and their roles infacilitating positive experiences and positive traits, so what I will do in this chapter is offer somegeneral comments about enabling institutions and then focus on what positive psychology haslearned about particular institutions, like the family and the workplace. If and when a book on

positive sociology or positive anthropology is written, I direct you to it for a fuller discussion.2

Common Features of Enabling InstitutionsAlthough positive traits are by definition characteristics of the individual, I believe thatcounterparts exist at the institutional level (Park & Peterson, 2003). There is a flourishing genreof popular books that discusses “good” organizations, and a common strategy within these booksis to articulate the relevant characteristics. Many of these characteristics resemble the individual-level positive traits described in chapter 6, and some even carry the same names. Not only dothese characteristics contribute to the stated goals of the institution, they also—certainly not bychance—contribute to the fulfillment of the individuals within it. What are the most important ofthese institutional-level virtues? Are they general across different types of institutions orthoroughly specific?

By institutional-level virtues, I mean the moral characteristics of the group as a whole, notsimply summaries or composites of the characteristics of its individual members. As such,institutional-level virtues need to be an enduring part of the institutional culture. A school mighthappen to employ a number of teachers dedicated to the intellectual growth of students, but ifthe school does not have practices in place that allow such dedication to survive personnelturnover, there is no institutional-level virtue.

Institutional-level virtues serve the moral goals of an organization and not simply its bottomline, whether this be profit, power, or persistence. The fact that any institution has multiplegoals, all deemed good ones from that institution’s perspective, challenges us as we attempt toseparate institutional-level virtues from characteristics that contribute to other desired goals.

I have read a number of popular books that attempt to describe what makes some workorganizations better than others (e.g., Buckingham & Coffman, 1999; Collins, 2001; Collins &

Porras, 1997; Levering & Moskowitz, 1993; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Shaw, 1997). Theseendeavors are in effect multiple case studies, comparing and contrasting a handful ofconsensually good businesses with a handful of those that are presumably not so good, with thegoal of discerning critical features (Rosenwald, 1988). The problem with these otherwiseprovocative comparisons is that the criteria used for deciding goodness conflate profitability,longevity, customer satisfaction, and notoriety with moral goodness, and debate ensues about themoral desirability of some of the critical features thereby identified.

One solution to this dilemma is to return to my characterization of individual-level virtues as“contributing to fulfillment” and to propose that an analogous rule be used to identifyinstitutional-level virtues (chapter 6). That is, institutional-level virtues are characteristics of theorganization that contribute to the fulfillment of its members. Fulfillment should not be confusedwith momentary pleasure or happiness per se, if happiness is construed only as the presence ofpositive affect and the absence of negative affect (chapter 3). Rather, fulfillment must reflecteffort, the willful choice and pursuit over time of morally praiseworthy activities (chapter 4).This is why I choose my language carefully here: Virtues contribute to fulfillments rather thancause them in the automatic way that Jägermeister causes intoxication. There are no shortcuts toa fulfillment.

I hope this analysis does not smack too strongly of Puritanism. I am not opposed to pleasureor happiness, and I am certainly not opposed to shortcuts. Self-adhering postage stamps, cruisecontrol, and automatic redial are among the most noteworthy inventions of the modern worldprecisely because they are shortcuts with little downside. But the value of these and othershortcuts is that they save time and effort that would otherwise be spent on unfulfilling pursuits.The moral significance of a shortcut is only indirect, judged by what one does with the time andeffort that have been saved.

What then is the contributory relationship of virtues to fulfillments? I turn again to theAristotelian notion of eudaimonia, which holds that well-being is not a consequence of virtuousaction but rather an inherent aspect of such action (chapter 4). Fulfillment is part and parcel ofthe actions which manifest virtue. For instance, when a work supervisor fairly adjudicates adispute between two workers, her act does not cause her (or the workers) to feel satisfied at somelater point in time; being satisfied is an inherent aspect of justice in action.

It should go without saying that institutional-level virtues need to influence actual conductwithin the group in ways that people can recognize. No less than do individuals, institutions maypay lip service to values that are ignored or even contradicted by their everyday practices.

The institutional-level virtues of most interest in the present context are those that arecultivated and celebrated and that serve as a source of identity and pride for the organization’s

members. To the degree that membership in an organization is fluid, members point to theinstitutional-level virtues as reasons to remain a member. When people say that this block is agood neighborhood in which to reside, that this company is a good place to work; or that thiscollege is a good school to attend, they mean that they are fulfilled—satisfied and gratified—byso doing. In the language of positive psychology, a good organization is one that enables thegood life for its members, and we know that the good life is not simply code for money, status, orpleasure (Myers & Diener, 1995).

I have so far sidestepped any definition of what is moral because of the hoary issues raised bythe notion of cultural relativism. The clichéd examples of Nazi Germany or the ferociousYanomamo of South America make it seem impossible to talk about the moral goals of anorganization from the outside. But another point of view holds out the possibility of identifyingacross groups agreement about the features of good (i.e., moral) organizations. Indeed, I thinkthe ubiquity of given institutional-level virtues is settled by looking at what differentorganizations actually value. Let me begin this examination.

The Good FamilyThe family is an important institution in all societies, although its form varies greatly, evenwithin a given society. Consider these recent changes just within the United States. First, exceptfor the post-World War II burst between 1947 and 1957, which gave us the baby boomgeneration, the birth rate in the United States has steadily decreased throughout the 20thcentury. Families are therefore becoming smaller. Second, because of effective birth control, mostU.S. adults become parents later in life than they did generations ago. Families are thereforebecoming older. Third, with the increase in divorce and subsequent remarriage, there is agrowing number of families that includes stepparents. When we consider the additional trend ofparents never being married to one another, families are certainly becoming more complex.

We hear a lot in the popular media about the crisis in the American family and the need topreserve family values. Often this discussion takes place at a very superficial level that ignoresthe heterogeneity of actual families and the realities that shape this heterogeneity. Given thecurrent variety, is it possible to talk about a “good” family without resorting to a stereotypebased on television shows from the 1950s like Leave It to Beaver?.

Psychologists attempting to answer this question have often been interested less in thedemographics of families and more in the styles of parenting—how parents encourage behaviorsthey like in their children and discourage others. At least in the United States, three major stylesof parenting have been identified (Baumrind, 1971, 1978).

Authoritarian parenting is firm, punitive, and emotionally cold. Such parents value

obedience from their children and do not encourage their independence or involve them indecision making: “Why? Because I said so.” Permissive parenting is loving but lax. Such parentsexert little control over their children. Indeed, these children are given freedom and are allowedto make decisions, but they have little guidance: “Oh sure, honey, whatever you want.”Authoritative parenting involves negotiating with children. Such parents set limits for a child,but explain why, and they encourage independence. As the child demonstrates responsibility, theparents allow more freedom. Decisions are arrived at through give and take: “Let’s talk thisthrough.”

These different styles of parenting affect the subsequent social development of children(Becker, 1964; Durbin, Darling, Steinberg, & Brown, 1993; Parish & McCluskey, 1994).Authoritarian parents tend to produce children who are unhappy, dependent, and submissive.Permissive parents raise children who are likely to be outgoing and sociable, but also immature,impatient, and aggressive. The best approach appears to be that of authoritative parents, whosechildren tend to be friendly, cooperative, socially responsible, and self-reliant. Regardless of thestyle of parenting that children experience, they tend to raise their own children in much thesame way (Van Ijzendoorn, 1992).

Mothers and fathers sometimes differ in their parenting styles, which introduces furthercomplexities into any description of how their children are affected (Bentley & Fox, 1991;Forehand & Nousiainen, 1993; Fox, Kimmerly, & Schafer, 1991). Even so, parenting style is onlyone influence on the social development of children. Just as important as the type of discipline isthe love shown by parents (chapter 10). It is also important to consider a two-way influencebetween parent and child. Because children differ with respect to their temperaments, parentsmay use the method of discipline that their children “allow” them to.

Researchers find that being a parent is both a rewarding and a stressful aspect of adult life(Mowbray, Oyserman, & Ross, 1995). The vast majority of parents report that if given the chanceto start their lives over, they would choose again to have babies (Yankelovich, 1981).Nonetheless, the presence of children in a household profoundly changes the relationshipbetween husbands and wives. Child-rearing responsibilities often fall to mothers, perhapscontributing to the increased depression found among them (Brown & Harris, 1978). Followingthe birth of a child, the typical mother takes on more household chores, regardless of how sheand her mate divided the tasks before (Cowan, Cowan, Coie, & Coie, 1978).

When children grow up and leave home, the roles of parents change. At one time,psychologists thought that parents, particularly mothers, were vulnerable to the so-called emptynest syndrome—a loss of purpose experienced when all of the children have left home. Butresearch fails to bear out this notion. If anything, just the opposite occurs: Mothers report themost satisfaction and the highest morale once their children leave home (Neugarten, 1970). Why

not? On the one hand, life becomes less demanding. And on the other hand, the successfuldevelopment of offspring from dependent children to autonomous adults means that a parent hasdone well.

The Good SchoolAs institutions, schools have unique characteristics. Students are crucial members of schools, theequivalent of customers or clients, and they are the ultimate goal or product. School is sometimescalled a life industry, which means that educational practices affect students not just in the hereand now but also across the lifespan in settings far removed from the classroom. The pervasiveinfluence of schools is not an interesting by-product of education but an integral part of aschool’s explicit purpose. Schools of course intend to impart knowledge and to encourageintellectual excellence, but the intent of a school includes much more than teachingmultiplication or verb conjugation.

Discussions of excellent schools often focus just on achievement and not on the people whoachieve, but we should not confuse graduation rates and test scores with the moral goals ofeducation. Likewise, excellent schools may play a role in reducing such negative outcomes asviolence, substance abuse, and other unhealthy behaviors (Elias & Weissberg, 2000), but theavoidance of problems cannot be the whole picture. Otherwise, schools would beindistinguishable from police departments.

Here I am interested in the features of schools that contribute to the moral fulfillment ofstudents and the adults they become. In doing background research for this section, I had to lookhard for such discussions by educational theorists. The thriving industry of character educationwas less useful for my purpose than I had hoped. Many character education statements dwell atlength on the aspects of individual-level character to be cultivated as opposed to thecharacteristics of schools that actually enable these aspects. When practices are recommended bycharacter education advocates, they often seem psychologically naïve. Reciting the Pledge ofAllegiance every morning is not an automatic route to good citizenship, and viewing the TenCommandments on the wall of a classroom is no guarantee that the exposed students willbecome moral adults. After all, I stared for years at the periodic table of elements at the front of aclassroom, and I certainly did not become a chemist.

Much more useful for my present purpose were the psychologically focused studies by MartinMaehr and his colleagues at the University of Michigan on the sorts of schools that encouragestudents to be engaged and enthusiastic about learning (e.g., Maehr & Braskamp, 1986; Maehr &Midgley, 1996; Maehr, Midgley & Urdan, 1992). Positive attitudes and motives about schooltranslate themselves into good academic performance but, more important, make students

lifelong learners who reap psychological benefits long after graduation (Cowen, 1997; Schneider,2000).

The features of good schools so defined include an articulated and shared vision of theschool’s purpose: For what does it stand, and for what does it strive (Maehr, 1991)? Only when aschool provides explicit goals can students adopt them. Goals increase the motivation to learn,investment in the process, and commitment to the hard work that achievement requires (Maehr& Midgley, 1996). Good schools emphasize the individual student and reward his or her effortand improvement (Anderman & Maehr, 1994; Maehr, Ames, & Braskamp, 1988; Midgley,Anderman, & Hicks, 1995). In contrast, schools that emphasize ability might actually undercutperformance and certainly work against positive attitudes. There is much to commend in therecent movement within the United States to hold students to high standards, but if this entailsteaching to the test, the movement is self-defeating. There is little reason to believe that drillingyoungsters on how to take multiple-choice exams will change their intellectual values or sense ofself (Roeser & Eccles, 1998).

As I have noted, a good school is one that prepares students to be effective learnersthroughout life. Accordingly, such a school starts by providing an environment where studentsfeel safe and proceeds by explicitly guiding them to be caring, responsible, and ultimatelyproductive members of society (Elias et al., 1997; Pepler & Slaby, 1994; Weissberg, Barton, &Shriver, 1997). Social competence and emotional competence can be encouraged by appropriateexercises and activities, which need not be expensive and in any event are not incompatible withtraditional academic pursuits.

Consider the ongoing intervention by Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2000) to encourage civicengagement among U.S. high school students by teaching what she calls “civic literacy” througha combination of student-led classroom discussions and community activities. As a local electionapproaches, high school students survey the electorate about the issues that matter most to them.They determine the positions on these issues of the respective candidates and evaluate theviability of these positions. The students sponsor public discussions and debates. They help toturn out the vote, and those of legal age of course vote themselves.

Rigorous evaluation of educational programs that build character are just beginning inearnest (Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning, 2002), but in themeantime, we can look at the more-extensive studies of programs that reduce problems such asschool violence. Here are some conclusions about good schools judged in these terms (Felner,2000; Felner, Felner, & Silverman, 2000; Hawkins & Lam 1987; Hunter & Elias, 1998):

Students perceive courses to be relevant.

Students perceive that they have control over what happens to them at school.

Students perceive school discipline policies to be firm, fair, clear, and consistently enforced,with a focus on correction and skills building rather than on punishment.

Students see the school reward system as rational: The school recognizes students for theirachievement and rewards their positive behavior.

There exists a strong and effective school governance.

The school principal displays strong leadership.

Practices are in place which decrease the impersonality of the school and increase contactbetween students and teachers, which in turn increase students’ feeling of belonging and

connectedness.3

The Good WorkplaceThe psychological significance of the work we do cannot be overestimated. Brief and Nord (1990,p. 1) introduced their book on the psychology of work with the following observation:

We did not set out to examine the meaning of life, but found it difficult to keep ourstudy of the meaning of work from growing to include such an examination. In fact,given the American preoccupation with work … if we had assumed work and life areone, the assumption might not even have been challenged by many readers.

Work is conventionally defined in economic terms—what people do for financial compensationin order to earn a living—but this definition obscures its richer psychological meaning.

The work we do often defines who we are. An occupation does more than pay the bills; itconsumes one third to one half of the average adult’s waking hours. It provides one of our most-important identities by directing our lives in certain directions rather than others. “What do youdo?” is a conversational gambit that could be answered in any number of ways, but most of ushear it as a question about our occupation (chapter 7).

The U.S. Department of Labor Statistics (2004) lists more than 30,000 types of jobs in thiscountry alone. In trying to understand the meaning of jobs to workers, psychologists haveproposed dimensions with which to classify these various ways of earning a living. For example,jobs differ in terms of physical requirements, intellectual demands, and interpersonalcharacteristics: whether they involve goods (producing things) or services (assisting people).

Work in its broadest sense must also be placed in its historical and cultural context. Themeaning of work to an individual varies according to societal conditions. During a recession ordepression, workers are simply grateful to be employed. During prosperous times, workers areless satisfied and more willing—because they are more able—to explore alternatives to their

current jobs.4 If the country is at war, those who work for defense contractors are more fulfilledby their jobs than when the country is at peace (Turner & Miclette, 1962).

England and Whitely (1990) studied workers in six different nations with respect to

the centrality of work to an individual’s life;

the goals and values preferred by a worker, ranging broadly from economic motives (goodpay and job security) to expressive motives (opportunity to learn new things, harmoniousrelationships with other people at work, autonomy); and

whether work was regarded as a societal right or a societal obligation.

From responses to questionnaires about work, the researchers discerned several commonpatterns, and they proposed a typology of workers in terms of work’s meaning:

alienated worker: For this individual, work is not central to his or her life; it is pursued forneither economic nor expressive reasons; and it is not seen as fulfilling any obligation to thelarger society.

economic worker: The meaning of work for this individual revolves solely around good payand high security.

duty-oriented worker: This individual regards work as highly central to his or her life,undertakes it for expressive reasons, and regards it as a societal obligation.

balanced worker: Here, work is highly central to the individual’s life; and it allows botheconomic and expressive goals to be satisfied

Across all of the nations studied, alienated workers in general tended to be younger andfemale, and they performed low-paying jobs with little variety or responsibility. As you wouldimagine, they rated their satisfaction with work as low. Economic workers in general had lesseducation than other types of workers and were somewhat more likely to be males. Their jobshad little variety or responsibility. Despite the importance of pay to these workers, they tendednot to earn much money. Their satisfaction with work was also low. Duty-oriented workers ingeneral were older and somewhat more likely to be females; they often worked as managers or insales, in jobs with high variety and responsibility, and usually earned good salaries. Their worksatisfaction was high. Balanced workers were usually older males with more education thanother types of workers. They worked at a variety of jobs, typically those high in autonomy. Theyput in the longest hours; and they earned the highest salaries. They rated their work satisfactionas quite high.

These results are not surprising, but note that the meaning of work to an individual—ascaptured by her classification—is associated with a range of personal and occupationalcharacteristics, from motives to educational level to salaries. No single characteristic proves to be

of overriding importance in terms of its association with the meaning of work. The significanceof work is complexly determined (Kelly & Kelly, 1994; Lundberg & Peterson, 1994).

What did England and Whitely (1990) learn about work in different nations? Let us considerjust the contrasts between workers in the United States and in Japan. These differences shedsome light on the often-heard charge (in both countries) that Japanese workers are “better” thanthose in the United States.

On average, workers in Japan put in more hours per week than do U.S. workers. They are lesslikely to describe their work as possessing variety and as utilizing a considerable amount of theirskills. However, Japanese workers report much more satisfaction with their work than do U.S.workers. They are more likely to say that they would choose the same job again if given theopportunity, and they are more likely to say that they would keep working even if they had nofinancial reason to do so.

These findings seem contradictory. Why are Japanese workers more satisfied with work thattakes more time, has less variety, and uses fewer of their skills? Perhaps the answer lies in thepsychological meaning of work. Workers in Japan are more likely to be classified as duty-oriented or balanced, whereas those in the United States are more likely to be classified aseconomic or alienated.

There are innumerable reasons for these national differences in the meaning of work and itstranslation into satisfaction or dissatisfaction. It is unlikely that they can be reduced to a handfulof simple practices and procedures. Rather, we need to consider the larger cultural context fromwhich the significance of work emerges if we wish to understand these differences betweenJapanese and U.S. workers.

A generation ago, there was a great deal of discussion in the United States about thefeasibility of borrowing Japanese work and management techniques (Kono, 1982; Smith, Reinow,& Reid, 1984; Viau, 1990). In retrospect, this seems silly. For instance, Japanese companiesencourage their workers to participate in group calisthenics. But calisthenics, in and ofthemselves, will not make American workers feel less alienated or more balanced in theirmotivation to work. The meaning of work needs to be changed in a more positive direction byundertaking innovations that make sense in terms of U.S. culture. So, given the importance of theindividual “self” in the United States, jobs allowing workers to put their own identifiable spin onwhat they do should be more satisfying than jobs that demand uniform and anonymousperformance.

Besides being culturally congruent with their workers, good workplaces are characterized bycertain institutional-level virtues. Excellent work organizations have an articulated moral goal orvision that can be embraced by workers and customers alike. This vision must guide the actual

conduct within the organization. Slogans and logos provide clues about the vision of a workorganization, but it is our observation of day-to-day practices that provides the real proof of theirexistence.

Workers are treated fairly in moral work organizations, which have reward structures bothexplicit and equitable. The parallel with good parenting as just discussed is interesting. Incontrast to authoritarian or permissive styles of raising children, an authoritative style entailslimits with explanations and ongoing negotiations. Authoritative parenting leads to children who—simply put—have good character. An authoritative managerial style similarly leads toemployees who are independent yet responsible—workers with good character (Peters &Waterman, 1982). The trend in the United States toward employee-owned businesses, like Avis,facilitates authoritative management (Levering & Moskowitz, 1993).

The organization must additionally treat people as individuals and not just as a pair of hands.In the case of employees, this means giving them the autonomy to be innovative. It meanshumane concern not only for workers but also for their families. There are U.S. companies, forexample, that provide health insurance not only for employees and their families but also fortheir pets (Levering & Moskowitz, 1993). It means placing people in jobs that allow them to dowhat they do best. It means promoting from within. In the case of customers, treating them asindividuals entails being honest about the goods or services that can be delivered; it meanslistening to what customers have to say about the work organization and then following theirsuggestions. Finally, excellent work organizations follow through on commitments—to workersand to customers. Promises and contracts, even implied ones, are honored. Said another way, ina good workplace, the spirit of the law trumps the letter of the law.

The Good SocietyWhat characterizes the good society? This question has been posed—and answered—for as longas people have lived together. Consider the vision of the good society articulated in ancientRome (Starr, 1985). The Roman ideal of the good society has pervaded Western organizationsand institutions for the past two millennia. In fact, the Latin words used to describe institutional-level virtues have become familiar in the Western world.

The Romans recognized personal virtues—what I call character strengths (chapter 6)—likegravitas (a sense of the importance of the matter at hand) and veritas (honesty) but also municipalvirtues—that is, institutional-level virtues—that characterize an entire society (Forbis, 1996). So,abundance means that there must be enough food for all members of society. Only a society perse can be characterized by concordia (harmony) and pax (peace). Here are some of the otherRoman municipal virtues, many of which recur in contemporary characterizations of good

institutions:

equity: fair dealing within the society

good fortune: remembrance of important positive events

justice: sensible laws and governance

patience: the ability to weather crises

providence: the sense that the society has a destiny

safety: public health and welfare

It is interesting to compare and contrast this vision with an equally influential one—thesocietal vision articulated by Confucius (1992)—which has pervaded Asian institutions formillennia. In his writings, Confucius extensively addressed the good society, although he did notenumerate its institutional-level virtues as explicitly as did the Romans. Nonetheless, we candiscern his emphases. Basically, he valued social order and thus stressed explicit roleexpectations. He discussed at length these expectations in terms of relationships between andamong people, so an inherent aspect of the Confucian vision of the good society is interpersonal—institutional, as it were. Confucius identified six relationships as crucial, those between

1. ruler and subjects

2. parents and children

3. husband and wife

4. older sibling and younger sibling

5. teacher and student

6. friend and friend

Confucius believed that in each of these relationships, there was a superior and a subordinatemember, except for friend and friend, although even here, if one individual is older than theother, it may become an older-younger sibling relationship. In each relationship, the subordinateindividual has the responsibility of obedience to the superior, but only when the superior in turndisplays benevolence and care. Remember the notion of amae mentioned in chapter 10 (p. 257).

At least in principle, the Confucian ideal of duty does not prescribe humble acquiescence ofthe powerless to the powerful but rather calls for mutual respect, which persons should have inrelation to one another, beginning with the familial relationship and extending outward to thestate and citizen (Haberman, 1998). Put another way, duty is not permission for tyranny butrather the obligation to act honorably and with self-control in all personal affairs, rather thanwith a motive for personal gain. Likewise, the Confucian precept of good etiquette is bestunderstood as a directive to respect others. The cultivation of courteousness and deference in

one’s everyday behavior is more about consideration for another’s feelings than about strictadherence to rules and empty customs.

The Confucian vision of the good society can therefore be captured by a small number ofinstitutional-level virtues embodied in the edicts to honor one’s parents, to love others, to dowhat is right instead of what is advantageous, to practice reciprocity (i.e., the Golden Rule asarticulated in the Western world), and to have rulers who lead by moral example instead of byforce.

In the last few years, the United Kingdom and the European Union have discussed how totrack the psychological well-being of citizens, just as economic indicators of well-being have

been tracked for decades.5 As you know, research in positive psychology has shown repeatedlythat material affluence is at best a small ingredient of the good life, yet policy decisions are basedon economic considerations to the explicit exclusion of psychological ones (Diener & Seligman,2004). If successful, the assessment of national well-being will allow comparisons across timeand political entities. We will have the information we need to offer conclusions about goodsocieties, at least insofar as the goodness of a society is defined in terms of the greatest(psychological) good for the greatest number of people. The impact of societal reforms can thusbe ascertained.

National indicators of psychological well-being will rely largely or exclusively on the self-report of citizens, which raises a caution about the likely success of these intriguing endeavors.Remember the discussion in chapter 5 about what self-report measures really ascertain. If theyend up reflecting relative judgments, they are not apt to change much over time, even if a nationobjectively improves in all possible ways, because people will constantly adjust their bases ofcomparison. What will result is a consistently flat line that cannot inform policy. Stay tuned.

The Good Religion?Is it possible to talk about a “good” religion? To do so is to imply that there must be “bad”religions, dangerous territory into which I care not to enter. I repeat my earlier point that anyconclusions about good or bad institutions must be carefully specified with respect to particularoutcomes. So, to use what I hope is a noncontroversial example, religion in general confershealth benefits, although Christian Scientists—who eschew conventional medical care as anarticle of their faith—on average do not live as long as U.S. followers of other religions (W. F.Simpson, 1989). Being a Christian Scientist does not enable longevity, although I am sure thisfaith has other desirable consequences. For the most part, I cannot offer even qualified

pronouncements about good and bad religions,6 so I will simply describe what psychologistshave learned about religion over the past century (Peterson & Park, in press).

The first great psychologist in the United States was William James, and he was deeplyconcerned with religious phenomena. His 1902 book, The Varieties of Religious Experience,remains in print (reprinted in 1985) more than a century later and is notable for its focus on thesubjective experience of religion. James was especially interested in topics like conversion,mysticism, trance states, saintliness, and repentance.

Another early U.S. psychologist, G. Stanley Hall, established a journal devoted to thepsychology of religion that was published between 1904 and 1915. Hall was a developmentalpsychologist who is often credited with “inventing” the concept of adolescence, and he alsopioneered the use of the questionnaire as a research tool. He was most interested in the moraland religious training of youth (Hall, 1882).

Religion all but fell off psychology’s radar screen from 1930 to 1960 (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974).We can cite various reasons. Behaviorism held sway, and researchers and theorists tended tofocus on what people and animals had in common, which obviously did not include religion. The

associated philosophical stance of logical positivism created a strict fact-value distinction,7 andreligion was seen by many psychologists as too value-laden to be a suitable subject for ascientifically objective psychology. Some have speculated that 20th-century psychologiststhemselves were not an especially devout group, which means that religion did not strike manyof them as interesting or important. Finally, large state universities, where many of the leadingfigures in psychology have worked, usually do not have separate departments of religion orreligious studies, the presence of which might have spurred interest in the psychology of religion.

There were, however, sporadic forays into the psychology of religion. For example, in well-known works like Totem and Taboo (1913/1953b), The Future of an Illusion (1927/1953c), andMoses and Monotheism (1939/1964), Sigmund Freud proposed that religion emerged as aconsequence of the human need to defend against infantile impulses and fears (chapter 5). Godand other divine figures are inventions (illusions) that fulfill the human wish for an omnipotentfather whose love and protection have the kind of enduring power that can never be achieved byactual fathers.

Here, we see the beginning of an issue that still characterizes the psychological study ofreligion. Can (or should) religion be reduced to the merely psychological? To do so makesreligion no different in principle from any other activity or experience that galvanizes people.Not to do so moves religion outside the realm of a deterministic science. Said another way, theissue for psychologists is whether their attempts to link religion to psychological phenomena“explain” religion or “explain it away.” The distinction may be largely in the eye of the beholder.Regardless, religion is an extremely important factor in the lives of many people, as shown by itslink with all manner of thoughts, feelings, and actions.

In 1950, Harvard psychologist Gordon Allport made an important distinction betweenextrinsic religiosity (religion as a means to other ends) and intrinsic religiosity (religion as anend in itself), one that still undergirds a great deal of theory and research in the psychology ofreligion. The extrinsically religious participate in institutionalized religion because it providessecurity, satisfies social needs, or confers status. The intrinsically religious in contrast internalizereligious beliefs and bring their other needs into harmony with them.

To measure these two orientations, Allport and his colleagues developed a brief self-reportquestionnaire that is still widely used (Allport & Ross, 1967). One of the often-cited findings wasthat extrinsically religious people were the most likely to be prejudiced. Largely overlooked wasthe additional finding that intrinsically religious people were the least likely to be prejudiced.Indeed, if we limit our attention to church attendees, the most actively and intrinsically involvedamong them are still among the least prejudiced in the contemporary United States. If we arelooking for a feature of a good religion, I suspect that the degree to which its followers haveinternalized its teachings would be one place to start.

When researchers did include religion in their studies, it was rarely a main focus, whichmeans that they did little more than ascertain a handful of simple indices, like churchattendance, which fail to make important distinctions like the one between extrinsic and intrinsicmotivation. What resulted was an amorphous depiction of religion that did little to inspirefurther research.

Matters started to change around 1960 (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003; Gorsuch, 1988; Hood,1998). Journals like the Review of Religious Research and the Journal for the Scientific Study ofReligion were founded and served as outlets for empirical research articles. Textbooks on thepsychology of religion were written (e.g., Spilka, Hood, & Gorsuch, 1985; Wulff, 1991), andcourses began to be offered. In 1975, an American Psychological Association division devoted tothe psychology of religion was created.

As clinical and counseling psychologists began to take seriously the diversity of their clients,explicit interest in therapy with religious individuals began to emerge, and today, many of thebooks and articles written about the psychology of religion are framed within the context oftherapy. Private foundations like the Fetzer Institute and the John Templeton Foundation beganto support research into the psychology of religion. Measures were devised and disseminated.Apropos to the new millennium, there is even a psychology of religion Web page, which containsa variety of useful resources for psychology researchers and instructors.

Research findings began to accumulate that showed that religion had certain benefits in avariety of psychological domains (Pargament, 1997). Everyone’s imagination was captured bythe possibility that religious beliefs could help a person to cope with problems and even to avoid

physical illnesses in the first place (e.g., Kalb, 2003; McCullough, Hoyt, Larson, Koenig, &Thoresen, 2000; Miller & Thoresen, 2003). Faith-based organizations were found to be effectivein providing social and community services. Whether or not one agrees that the U.S. governmentshould formally support such organizations, their success remains clear.

Following the lead of the larger U.S. culture, psychologists also began to distinguish betweenreligiosity and spirituality. The former term subsumes traditional (religion-based) ways ofexperiencing the sacred and transcendent, whereas the latter term is an ever-expanding one thatmay include religious experience but also one’s compassionate experience of nature or humanity.Thus, people may describe themselves as spiritual because they feel elevated in a beautifulsetting or because they have “moral” values, but they may not believe in God or congregate withlike-minded individuals in worship. This is an important distinction, but too much emphasis on itoverlooks the fact that, however they are defined, religiousness and spirituality overlapsubstantially in their features and usually co-occur in the same person.

Concerns about the definitions of spirituality and religiousness highlight long-standingquestions about how we can know that a phenomenon is religious (or spiritual) or not. Onetradition, which can be traced to William James, suggests that religious events are extraordinaryhappenings characterized by mystical experiences. Another view is that religious events are notin themselves extraordinary or transcendent but are simply those attributed by the individual todivine forces.

Contemporary approaches to the psychological study of the religious and spiritual life tend tofall into several general domains. One important body of work is largely theoretical in nature.Here, several influential schools of thought exist. The psychoanalytic school draws upon the workof Freud and emphasizes the role of unconscious motives for religious beliefs. Contemporarypsychoanalytic theorists are not necessarily as hostile toward religion as was Freud. The analyticschool is based upon the ideas of Freud’s one-time follower Carl Jung. Well known is Jung’stheorizing about universal archetypes (symbols), many of which have religious significance. Theobject relations school draws on more-contemporary psychodynamic theorizing and oftenemphasizes maternal influences. The transpersonal school assumes that religious phenomena—although immaterial—are nonetheless real and can be studied directly. Finally, thephenomenological school attempts to describe religion as it is experienced by the individual.

Another approach to the psychology of religion is a body of work that attends to quantitativemeasurement (e.g., Fetzer Institute, 1999; Hill & Hood, 1999). What are the important domainsof religious and spiritual experience? How can they be measured? What are the psychometricproperties (reliability and validity) of these empirical measures?

It is unfortunate that the measurement tradition is often separate from the rich theoretical

traditions represented by the influential schools of thought, which tend to rely on single casestudies. One would think that theory and quantitative research could mutually inform oneanother. Regardless, the measurement tradition has yielded a variety of intriguing findings aboutthe psychology of religion.

For example, professed religiousness among young people in the United States is associatedwith a tendency to avoid all manner of antisocial activities (Johnson, Jang, Larson, & Li, 2001).Children and adolescents who score higher on indices of religiousness (i.e., church attendance)show greater emotional self-regulation, engage in fewer acts of aggression, have better records ofacademic performance, are less likely to use drugs and alcohol, and tend to delay their sexualinvolvement. They see the world as more coherent. Much the same results are found for adults(Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001). Furthermore, religious involvement among adultspredicts individual happiness and family well-being.

Another line of work is more sociologically oriented, and it maps patterns of involvement ininstitutionalized religion and delineates the impact of that involvement on social cohesion(Maton & Pargament, 1987; Maton & Wells, 1995). Churches, particularly those with strongsocial justice and service orientations, play demonstrably important roles in providing a range ofresources that benefit their respective communities. These churches are able to instill in theircongregations a sense of civic responsibility, which is shown in volunteerism and other forms ofcivic involvement. African American churches play particularly important roles in promoting thewell-being of their communities by providing a range of services, including education,psychological counseling, financial support, housing, clothing, and food to those who are in need(Billingsley, 1999; Billingsley & Caldwell, 1991; Lincoln & Mamiya, 1990).

Following the early example of Hall, researchers have again turned their attention to religioussocialization (Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, & Waite, 1995). For example, what role do parents play inthe religious beliefs and practices of their children? There is some evidence that fathers andmothers play distinct roles (Clark, Worthington, & Danser, 1988). Fathers appear to structure theformal religious involvement of their children, whereas mothers play a more-central role in theways that their children apply the principles of religion in everyday life (Taylor & Chatters,1991). At least within the United States, children raised in nuclear families, children whosemothers are not employed full time, and children whose parents share similar religious beliefsare more likely themselves to be religiously involved (S. Myers, 1996).

Under the influence of positive psychology, there has been increased interest in characterstrengths and virtues (chapter 6), including the explicitly theological (faith, hope, and charity)and the more-secular but still religiously linked (gratitude and forgiveness). What are theircauses and consequences? How can they be encouraged among youth?

Finally, there is a body of work that examines the neurophysiology of religious and spiritualexperiences, attempting to identify the brain structures and mechanisms involved in religiousexperiences (Ashbrook & Albright, 1997; Newberg & d’Aquili, 2001). These investigations spillinto a related line of theoretical work that addresses religion and spirituality in broadlybiological—usually evolutionary—terms. The argument is that people are hard-wired(biologically predisposed) to seek the sacred. For instance, anthropologist Lionel Tiger (1979)proposed that hope, typically embedded in religious beliefs, arose in the human species tocounteract the despair that resulted from people’s growing capacity to contemplate their owndemise (chapter 5).

The psychology of religion has clearly been reborn, but the field has yet to arrive fully withinmainstream psychology (Peterson & Park, in press). It still tends to be marginalized in specialtyjournals, books, and courses. Researchers often seem apologetic for their interest in religion andare occasionally suspected by their colleagues of having a hidden agenda. The trajectory isnonetheless upward.

One can offer more-substantive criticism of the contemporary psychology of religion. Most ofthe research under the psychology of religion umbrella is done in the United States and is mostaccurately described as the psychology of mainstream Protestantism, reflecting the makeup of thetypical sample of research participants. For the most part, researchers have been reluctant tocompare people who follow different religions, which means that the resulting data are not at all

fine-grained.8

The United States has been characterized as a particularly religious nation. More than 40% ofAmericans attend weekly religious services, in contrast to only 4% of adults in Japan (Inglehart &Norris, 2004). If we take these data at face value, they reflect the historical fact that the UnitedStates was largely settled by religious refugees from Europe seeking freedom to worship as theywished (chapter 7). But another interpretation is that these data are an artifact of researchersusing Western (Christian) conceptions of religion and what it means to be devout. BecauseJapanese are mostly Shintoists or Buddhists, not Christians, they are more likely to seek thesacred in the mundane. Church attendance is a category mistake when used to judge howreligious the Japanese are. Regardless, the psychology of religion needs to be extended to allforms of religion. Whether findings established among U.S. Protestants generalize to Jews,Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and others—inside and outside the United States—is a criticallyimportant question that deserves much more attention than it has so far received.

Additionally, the psychology of religion often follows the lead of psychology per se bystudying unselected samples of college students enrolled in introductory psychology courses.They are given batteries of questionnaires to complete, including measures of religiosity andspirituality, and the correlations among these measures are explored. Although the religious

experience of young adults can be interesting in its own right, given that late adolescence is atime of intellectual exploration and identity consolidation, this is far from an ideal researchstrategy if one’s interest is in the psychology of religion more broadly construed and especially ifwe are interested in the long-term consequences of religion.

Many researchers to date have also been content to use very simple research designs, whichhamper interpretation. For example, a study may show that people who frequently attend churchhave better physical health than those who do not. We might be tempted to conclude that churchattendance is good for one’s health, but such data might show instead that health is good forone’s church attendance or that some unmeasured third variable (e.g., affluence) is responsiblefor both. In fairness, researchers are recognizing the need for more-sophisticated research designsthat follow individuals over time and that control for confounding variables (Flannelly, Ellison, &Strock, 2004). The unsurprising but meatier conclusion from more-sophisticated studies is thatreligion confers physical health benefits when it has been well integrated into the individual’s life(McCullough, Hoyt, Larson, Koenig, & Thoresen, 2000).

Still not established to any certainty is the means by which religion confers benefits (George,Ellison, & Larson, 2002). Are the relevant processes intrapsychic (emotional or cognitive) orinterpersonal? Do these mechanisms differ in accord with the consequence of interest? Do theydiffer from person to person even for the same consequence? Again, more-sophisticated researchdesigns are needed.

A final point is that those who study the psychology of religion at times seem almost toorespectful of their subject matter. After decades of neglect if not outright antipathy towardreligion, psychology today appears to be uncritically enthusiastic about the benefits of religion.Surely there are both psychologically healthy and psychologically unhealthy aspects of religion,both of which should be acknowledged and studied.

Kenneth Pargament (2002), one of today’s leading psychologists of religion, has phrased wellthe need for more-articulate research questions:

Religion is a richer, more complex process than psychologists have imagined, onethat has the potential both to help and to harm. Questions about the general efficacyof religion should give way to the more difficult but appropriate question, Howhelpful or harmful are particular forms of religious expression for particular peopledealing with particular situations in particular social contexts according to particularcriteria of helpfulness or harmfulness? (p. 168)

In sum, the psychology of religion today is a moving target, and as analytic questions likethose posed by Pargament begin to be answered, the field may be increasingly embraced by thelarger discipline.

ConclusionsI trust that you have seen agreement across the previous sections about widely valuedinstitutional-level virtues:

purpose: a shared vision of the moral goals of the organization, which are reinforced byremembrances and celebrations

safety: protection against threat, danger, and exploitation

fairness: equitable rules governing reward and punishment and the means for consistentlyenforcing them

humanity: mutual care and concern

dignity: the treatment of all people in the organization as individuals regardless of theirposition

A sweatshop or forced-labor camp fails to be “good” by any of these criteria. But a family, aschool, a workplace, a society, and—perhaps—a religion are likely to contribute to fulfillment tothe degree that more of these virtues are present.

I believe that other institutions, like sports teams, nonprofit organizations, and governmentagencies, can also be described in terms of these virtues. I am further encouraged that thissuggested scheme converges with the one offered by philosopher Sissela Bok (1995) in herattempt to articulate universal societal values (chapter 7). As you recall, Bok proposed thatpeople in all times and places endorse the values identified here as safety, fairness, andhumanity. Missing from her scheme are the values that I have identified as purpose and dignity,but I believe that they belong as well.

I speculate that a good organization can inspire its members to be more than they are—toreveal strengths of character that are dormant or to create new ones that allow them to rise tothe occasions deemed to be important by the organization. A worthy future goal of positivepsychology is to turn its attention to how institutional practices can be engineered so that moralexcellence and personal fulfillment on the part of all institutional members are enabled.

In the meantime, we have the insights from Good Work, an important book by psychologistsHoward Gardner, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, and William Damon (2001). Their names should befamiliar to you because of their contributions to the topics of multiple intelligences (Gardner,1983), flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), and moral development (Damon, 1988). In this book, theyhave blended their considerable skills to function as a positive psychology dream team to addressa topic of mutual interest discovered while all three were in residence in the mid-1990s at theCenter for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto: what it means to do “goodwork” in a profession, work that is excellent as well as ethical.

Good Work examined in detail two different professions—genetics and journalism—in termsof good work. Approximately 100 accomplished geneticists and 100 accomplished journalistswere interviewed by the authors and their colleagues. The bulk of the book presented what waslearned from these interviews, mainly in narrative form in which major conclusions weresupported by extensive quotes from representative research participants.

The original impetus for choosing these two fields was the a priori contrast between adiscipline that tries to change the body (genetics) and one that tries to change the mind(journalism). But in the course of the research, another contrast emerged that struck the authorsas even more important: whether the profession is in alignment versus misalignment. That is, dothe abstract values of the field agree with what people actually do at work? “When theseconditions exist, individual practitioners are free to operate at their best, morale is high, and theprofessional realm flourishes. We term this a situation of authentic alignment” (Gardner,Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon, 2001, p. 27).

According to the authors, alignment is rare and easily threatened. Different domains in a fieldcompete with each other for cultural hegemony and societal resources, e.g., religion versusscience; clinical psychology versus psychiatry; positive psychology versus business-as-usualpsychology.

In these terms, genetics today is an aligned field, and most contemporary geneticists areexcited by what they do. Good work ensues. Witness the Human Genome Project, a scientific tourde force that has vast promise for improving the well-being of us all. In contrast, journalismtoday is misaligned, and many contemporary journalists are demoralized and on the verge ofleaving the field. It is difficult to do good work in journalism. Consider the relaxation ofstandards for accuracy, fairness, and objectivity; the blurring of journalism and entertainment;and the desire by some ostensible journalists to make news rather than to report it. And yes,Geraldo, you’re so vain, you probably think this sentence is about you.

These characterizations are not fixed, and the future could see a misaligned genetics and analigned journalism. The utility of this contrast lies in its ability to clarify good work undercircumstances in which it is easy versus those in which it is much more difficult.

There are three threats to alignment detailed by Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, and Damon(2001), who described how each has misaligned journalism and may someday misalign genetics.First is what they term Promethean technology and the unanticipated problems it can bring in itswake. So, 24-hour television news shows, talk radio, and the proliferation of e-zines and blogs onthe Internet have eroded journalistic standards. And when human genetic engineering becomesmore than a theoretical possibility, all kinds of troubling issues will come to the fore. We havealready seen heated debates about genetically altered fruits and vegetables. Imagine the furor

that would erupt over genetically altered friends, family members, or local sports heroes.

Second is the intrusion of the profit motive into these professions. Journalists have alwayscompeted to break stories, but now the competition is ruthless, and values may go by thewayside. For-profit-only media conglomerates are but one familiar symptom of the problem. Ingenetics, researchers not only aim to discover the function of particular genes but also to patentthem. Secrecy is therefore paramount, and a rush to premature conclusions is all but inevitable.

A third threat to alignment is dumbing down what the profession does in order to appeal tothe lowest common denominator among its various stakeholders. Dumbing down is obvious injournalism today. A generation ago, the phrase sound bite had no meaning except to acousticalengineers, and the on-again-off-again courtships of movie stars did not crowd stories about warand peace from the headlines. In genetics, what dumbing down means is more subtle, butaccording to Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, and Damon (2001), it may someday show itself as apress to investigate only the diseases of the wealthy or to engineer only cosmetic changes inphysical appearance.

The authors described what can be done to facilitate good work not just in these fields but inothers, and here lies the major aspect of their contribution. New institutions can be created, andin this case, technology can be the friend of alignment rather than the foe. The functions ofexisting professions can be expanded, their memberships can be reconfigured, and theirtraditional values can be reaffirmed. Finally, prominent practitioners can take personal stands infavor of excellence, which will have institutional consequences.

“Excellence is generally transmitted from one individual to another through lineages ofmentors and their apprentices” (Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon, 2001, p. 216). As I haverepeatedly noted, one of the emerging truisms of positive psychology is that other people matter.Good Work cites many examples of actual geneticists and journalists who have inspired others todo their best.

My initial reaction to these ideas about creating or restoring the conditions for good work wasshameful. I dismissed them as difficult if not impossible to implement. On second thought, Irealized that of course it is difficult to facilitate good work. To expect anything else is to dumbdown what it means to live the good life.

EXERCISE Working for an InstitutionThink of a group or an organization that is part of an institution in which you believe. It could beyour own school, workplace, political party, church, or local Little League baseball team. It couldbe the neighborhood fire station or Big Brothers/Big Sisters. Perhaps there is a volunteer programnear and dear to your values, like Meals on Wheels or Toys for Tots.

Are you doing what you can do to make this group a better one, thereby strengthening theinstitution and the goals that it endorses? If not, then consider this exercise, which asks you tospend 3 hours a week over the next few months working for the institution in ways that you arenot already doing. You will probably need to speak to the powers-that-be to learn what youmight be able to do that is most helpful. In other cases, you might be able to take some initiative,like organizing birthday lunches for your coworkers. Regardless, do what you can do, do it well,and keep track of how it makes you feel, about yourself as well as about the institution. Thisexercise may overlap with the fun-versus-philanthropy exercise I described in chapter 2, but thedifference is that the present exercise takes place in an explicit institutional context and requiresthat you work in concert with other members of the institution. It certainly will overlap with thebeing-a-good-teammate exercise, also described in chapter 2.

Some social critics charge that the American “community” has collapsed and that individualpursuits have swamped collective pursuits. In an aptly named book—Bowling Alone—RobertPutnam (2000) cited the demise of bowling leagues in the United States as an instance of thiscollapse. Bowling is as popular as ever, but people today are more apt to bowl alone. We alsoplay video games alone, and we surf the Internet alone. Even long-time favorite leisure activitieslike reading and watching television are usually pursued alone (chapter 8). Couple all of thiswith the growing trends toward long-distance education on the one hand and working fromhome on the other, and what we see is a replacement of groups, organizations, and institutionswith what are at best aggregations and collectivities—and virtual ones at that. Is it surprisingthat Americans have little confidence in their major societal institutions? At least in apsychological sense, many Americans do not feel part of these institutions.

This exercise encourages you to reflect on whether institutional membership and participationare good things. I believe that they are, not just because they make society possible but alsobecause they contribute to fulfillment in ways that individual pursuits cannot. This exercise alsogives you the opportunity to be analytic. Remember the institutional-level virtues identified inthis chapter: purpose, safety, fairness, humanity, and dignity. Once you become more familiarwith your group, ask yourself whether these five virtues characterize its actual conduct. If not, isthere a way that you can encourage them?

GLOSSARYaggregation: assembly of individuals physically in the same place

authoritarian parenting: childrearing style that is firm, punitive, and emotionally cold, givingchildren little independence or voice

authoritative parenting: childrearing style that involves negotiating with children, setting

limits but explaining why

collectivity: any social category of two or more individuals who can be discussed as a whole

extrinsic religiosity: religion as a means to other ends

group: set of interacting individuals who mutually influence each other

institution: set of like organizations with especially sustained and pervasive influences within asociety

institutional-level virtues: moral characteristics of the group as a whole

intrinsic religiosity: religion as an end in itself

organization: enduring and structured group

permissive parenting: childrearing style that is loving but lax, giving children freedom but littleguidance

religiosity: traditional (religion-based) ways of experiencing the sacred and transcendent

spirituality: ever-expanding term that includes religious experience but also one’s compassionateexperience of nature or humanity

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Cameron, K. S., Dutton, J. E., & Quinn, R. E. (Eds.). (2003). Positive organizational scholarship:Foundations of a new discipline. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Brokaw, T. (1998). The greatest generation. New York: Random House.

Giacalone, R. A., Jurkiewicz, C. L., & Dunn, C. (Eds.). (2005). Positive psychology in business ethicsand corporate responsibility. Greenwich, CT: Information Age.

Levering, R., & Moskowitz, M. (1993). The 100 best companies to work for in America. Garden City,NY: Doubleday.

McGregor, D. (1960). The human side of enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Noddings, N. (2003). Happiness and education. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Peters, T. J., & Waterman, R. H. (1982). In search of excellence: Lessons from America’s best-runcompanies. New York: Warner.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York:Simon & Schuster.

Terkel, S. (1974). Working: People talk about what they do all day and how they feel about what they

do. New York: Pantheon.

School Psychology Quarterly. Special issue (Summer 2003).

Psychology in the Schools. Special issue (January 2004).

American Behavioral Scientist. Special issue (February 2004).

Articles

Diener, E., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Beyond money: Toward an economy of well-being.Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5, 1–31.

Wrzesniewski, A., McCauley, C. R., Rozin, P., & Schwartz, B. (1997). Jobs, careers, and callings:People’s relations to their work. Journal of Research in Personality, 31, 21–33.

McCullough, M. E., Hoyt, W. T., Larson, D. B., Koenig, H. G., & Thoresen, C. (2000). Religiousinvolvement and mortality: A meta-analytic review. Health Psychology, 19, 211–222.

Web Sites

http://www.bus.umich.edu/Positive. This is the Positive Organizational Scholarship Web site atthe University of Michigan. “It focuses on the dynamics that lead to developing humanstrength, producing resilience and restoration, fostering vitality, and cultivating extraordinaryindividuals, units and organizations.”

http://appreciativeinquiry.cwru.edu. This is the Web site of the Appreciative Inquiry Commonsat Case Western Reserve University. “Appreciative Inquiry is about the … search for the bestin people, their organizations, and the relevant world around them. In its broadest focus, itinvolves systematic discovery of what gives ‘life’ to a living system when it is most alive, mosteffective, and most constructively capable in economic, ecological, and human terms.”

http://www.fortune.com/fortune/bestcompanies. This Web site describes Fortune magazine’s topcompanies for which to work.

http://www.psywww.com/psyrelig. This is the psychology of religion Web site of MichaelNielsen at Georgia Southern University, and it contains a variety of useful resources and links.

http://www.bbbsa.org. This is the Web site of Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, the largestmentoring organization in the United States, where volunteers provide support and advice toyouth.

Films

Miracle on 34th Street (1947)

The Ten Commandments (1956)

Kramer vs. Kramer (1979)

Norma Rae (1979)

Nine to Five (1980)

Absence of Malice (1981)

Silkwood (1983)

Working Girl (1988)

ABC News’s 20/20: “Sharing Sweet Success” (1992)

Bhutan: Gross National Happiness (Modernization) (1997)

City of Angels (1998)

CBS News’s 60 Minutes: “Working the Good Life” (2003)

America’s Heart and Soul (2004)

Songs

“Be True to Your School” (Beach Boys)

“Blowing in the Wind” (Peter, Paul, & Mary)

“My Sweet Lord” (George Harrison)

“Get Up, Stand Up” (Bob Marley & the Wailers)

“Take This Job and Shove It” (Johnny Paycheck)

“Teach Your Children” (Crosby, Stills, Nash, & Young)

“We Are Family” (Sister Sledge)

12The Future of Positive Psychology

Dreams come true; without that possibility, nature would not incite us to havethem.—JOHN UPDIKE (1989)

What is the future of positive psychology? The details are impossible to predict, although theendeavor will swim or sink in accordance with the science it produces over the next decade. Willnew findings, theories, and applications emerge about what makes life most worth living? Willthese be interesting and meaningful? Accurate and generalizable? Time—and of course theefforts of positive psychologists—will tell us if this new perspective is a fad or a fixture in the

making, a hula hoop or a Frisbee,1 Duran Duran or the Beatles (Peterson & Seligman, 2003b).

One point of view is that a thoroughly successful positive psychology will result in the fadingaway of this perspective, leaving us with a balanced psychology, one that recognizes the positiveand the negative and of course their interplay (Lazarus, 2003). As I have said, positivepsychology does not deny the negative, and it may well be that what is most troubling in life canset the stage for what is most fulfilling. So, I have discussed how our complex emotionalexperiences sometimes blend the positive and negative, how optimism is most meaningfullyapparent when we think about setbacks and failures, how crises can reveal our strengths ofcharacter, how ongoing challenges are a prerequisite for us to experience flow in the momentand to achieve something important in a lifetime, and how relationship success is foreshadowednot by the absence of problems but by how we resolve those that arise.

One of the thorny matters with which positive psychology needs to grapple is why thenegative is so appealing, not just as a topic of social science research but also in other domains oflife. We do not gossip about what other people do well. We are more interested in trains thatcrash than those that run on time. We think that Sylvia Plath is an exceptional poet but that e. e.cummings and Ogden Nash are playful ones at best. Why is the tragic view of life so compelling,and how can it be supplemented with one that allows for triumph and fulfillment?

Let us take stock. This book has covered the current concerns of positive psychology, frompleasure and happiness to optimism, character, and values, to interests, abilities, andaccomplishments, to health, to love, and finally to institutions that enable all of these desirablestates and traits. A great deal of work needs to be done, and I conclude here with some of the

questions that I would like to see answered sooner as opposed to later.2

What Is the Neurobiology of Pleasure?As I noted in chapter 1, positive psychology has attracted more researchers from the socialscience end of psychology than from the natural science end, which means that we know muchless about the biological bases of the psychological good life than we would like. We do knowthat some brain regions are more involved in positive experience than are others, and theevidence keeps bringing us back to some involvement of the neurotransmitter dopamine (Ashby,Isen, & Turken, 1999). What is interesting—and perhaps worrisome—is that the neurobiology ofthe good life seems to mirror that of addiction.

Perhaps researchers have not looked closely enough to distinguish “good” pleasure and itsmore-dangerous relative. Or perhaps biologically oriented researchers have focused on intensefeelings, like passionate love, but not on more-serene ones, like contentment, which might havean altogether different neurobiological underpinning. But what if we discover that there really isno difference? We would expect that the pursuit of pleasure, like the use of drugs to get high,would be ultimately futile. We would habituate to pleasure and find its aftermath increasinglymarked by negative feelings (Solomon & Corbit, 1974).

It seems only a matter of time before a pharmaceutical company markets a drug to makepeople happy. Indeed, the antidepressant Prozac, at least for some users, has been called“personality in a pill” and viewed by them as much more than a way to combat symptoms ofdepression (Kramer, 1993). And we certainly know that cocaine and the various opiates produceintense pleasure. So, what will be the fate of a happiness drug and those who use it?

Is There Really a Hedonic Set-Point?In chapters 3 and 4, I reviewed the evidence for and against the notion that our typical level ofsubjective well-being is set by genetics. That we adapt to hedonic experiences is not at issue. Theissue is how much room there is to change over the lifespan. Is happiness more like our heightand therefore essentially fixed (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996), or is it more like a skill that ismalleable if we work at it (chapter 8)?

To take an extreme example, people who are severely depressed or anxious can and dorecover (Seligman, 1994), and their life satisfaction is then no different than that of people whowere never so unhappy (Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2006). Perhaps they learned somethingalong the way that changed their world view and restored their well-being.

We can gain insight into the hedonic set-point by looking outside people to where and howthey live. Years ago, psychologist Walter Mischel (1968) argued that the apparent stability of

“personality” traits could be explained by the typical constancy of a person’s environment.Perhaps subjective well-being stays much the same for most people because their settings—whichenable happiness, or not—also stay much the same.

Whatever the reasons for the inertia of our well-being, what is clear is that if we are tochange our typical level of happiness, it will not be through quick fixes or one-shot interventions.We will need to change permanently our lives and our lifestyles, just as if we were trying tochange our weight or level of aerobic fitness (chapter 9).

What Is the Natural History of the Good Life?Positive psychology provides a vision of the psychological good life. We need to allow forcultural variations as well as nuances introduced by where people happen to be in the course oftheir lives. But there is little disagreement that the good life includes

more positive affect than negative affect

satisfaction with life as it is lived

hope for the future

gratitude about the past

the identification of what one does well

the use of these talents and strengths in engaging and fulfilling pursuits

close relationships with other people

meaningful participation in groups and organizations

And, of course, safety and health provide the context for the good life.

It is unlikely that one person can have it all, at least at the same time, and the components ofthe good life seem to exist in degrees. But the more components that are present and to a greaterdegree, the more confident I am in concluding that a person is living well.

That said, we do not know much about how these components come about, the concrete mixof nature and nurture (and perhaps luck) that makes it all happen. Psychologists for decadeshave tracked the natural history of what goes wrong, and we can specify well the conditions thatproduce disease, defect, and despair. Missing to date—with a few exceptions like the HarvardStudy of Adult Development (Vaillant, 1977, 1983, 2002)—are analogous longitudinal studies ofthe good life.

Positive psychology tells us that we need to do more than flip over the determinants ofproblems if we want to understand the determinants of what goes right in life. Importantquestions need to be addressed. For example, are some or all of the components of the good life

defaults, simply happening in the absence of detrimental events (Peterson, 2000)? Or do theyonly come about because something special takes place? If I had to speculate, I would say thatgeneral life satisfaction (chapter 4) and secure attachment (chapter 10) are defaults for mostpeople but that special talents (chapter 8) and strengths of temperance (chapter 6) need to becarefully nurtured.

To use once again my geographical metaphor, if positive psychology is the study of topicssomewhere north of neutral, which are indigenous, and which are imported? Which are hardy,and which are fragile?

Can Nice Guys Finish First?I have described many studies showing that positive characteristics usually have desirableconsequences. The suspicion may still linger that “niceness” can get in the way of accomplishingcertain things in life, and I admit that I share this skepticism. Do the more ruthless among ussometimes win at work and love? Of course, but to move beyond the striking exampleshighlighted on reality television shows, what is generally the case? Do the Donald Trumps of theworld succeed because of their single-mindedness or in spite of it? If they had stopped morefrequently to smell the roses, especially in the company of others, would their lives haveunfolded differently? Would they be happier but also less rich?

The only way to answer these kinds of questions is with longitudinal studies of large numbersof people, the natural history investigations I just recommended. Such studies would need to gobeyond existing ones to examine simultaneously all of the components of the good life, to see ifthere are tradeoffs among them and to see if more is always better. Aristotle’s (2000) doctrine ofthe mean proposes that all virtues lie between the extremes of deficiency and excess. So, braveryis good, and cowardice is bad, but so too is foolhardiness. Is this doctrine applicable to the othercomponents of the good life? Perhaps there are optimal levels for some of these components, andif we exceed them by too much, we may hamper the development and display of the others.

Why Don’t People Seek Out What Will Make Them Happy?In chapter 3, I called your attention to an important question unanswered to date. Flow is aninvigorating state with desirable long-term consequences. So why don’t we more frequentlypursue activities that put us in flow? More generally, why don’t we do more of the things thathave the potential to make us happy? Having close friends is more fulfilling than surfing theInternet. Doing volunteer work pays more dividends than repeatedly catching the scores onESPN. Living in accord with explicit values is more satisfying than constant compromising. Sowhy do we live as we do? It may just be that those who fail to pursue the good life are hampered

by anxiety or depression—distressingly common in the modern world—which implies thatpositive psychology needs to partner with business-as-usual psychology to understand andimprove the human condition.

Absent the relevant research, I cannot answer definitively for all people. I do know that forme, part of the explanation of this paradox is my frustration with other people. So many of theactivities that make life most worth living involve others, and they do not always cooperate. Justthe other day, I was shopping and tried to chat with the cashier at the store, making a commentabout the weather or something equally innocuous. I was being pleasant, but she did not smile,say anything, or even look me in the face. She simply slapped the change on the counter for meto pick up. Wow. I did not take this personally, but at the same time, it did not encourage me tobe friendly to the next cashier I encountered.

In any event, the point is not about strangers working cash registers, but about the peoplewho really do matter in our lives: family members, friends, neighbors, fellow workers. They toodo not always cooperate with us, which makes solitary activities on our part more likely becausethey are easier to control and certainly not as risky.

The moral insight is that I probably make my loved ones as crazy as they sometimes makeme, and I should “do unto others” to facilitate their good life and hope that the favor is somehowand someday reciprocated. But the psychological insight remains elusive. We know the dance iswonderful when all participate, so how do we get everyone onto the floor? Who makes the firstmove, and how does this intrepid soul sustain his or her good intentions in the absence ofsupportive responses? Perhaps we are unwilling or unable to look beyond short-term annoyanceto see long-term benefit, an insidious example of the duration neglect I discussed in chapter 3.

Can the Psychological Good Life Be Deliberately Created?Psychologists, at least in the United States, are a pragmatic bunch. John Watson, B. F. Skinner,Martin Seligman, and the rest of us are experimentalists at heart, and we do our experiments notjust in the laboratory but in the real world. It is an article of faith among many psychologists—and certainly among most positive psychologists—that the human condition can be improved bythe intelligent application of what we have learned.

One of the most famous quotes by a psychologist is John Watson’s (1925, p. 65) declaration:

Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bringthem up in, and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to becomeany type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yeseven beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, activities, vocations

and race of his ancestors.

Psychologists today do not believe that people are quite the blank states that Watson assumedthem to be (Pinker, 2002), but it is not a stretch to imagine positive psychologists expanding thisassertion and saying that they could take people at random and make them more happy, hopeful,virtuous, accomplished, and socially involved. The exercises I have suggested in each chapterembody this conviction, and in some cases, rigorous research supports it (e.g., Gillham, Reivich,Jaycox, & Seligman, 1995; Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005).

But even the most-compelling research is not based on follow-up that extends beyond a fewyears, and the research participants are usually motivated and willing volunteers. Over the years,

hundreds if not thousands of potentially “positive” interventions have been proposed,3 and wehave just begun to operationalize and test them. How well these interventions will generalize—across diverse people and over time—is a research topic of high priority. Some will work asintended, and some will not, and the only way to know is to look at the evidence (Patrick &Olson, 2000). The good news, if we can extrapolate from research on therapy for psychologicalproblems, is that a variety of interventions are effective and usually equally so (Smith & Glass,1977). However, we need to consider the possibility that the most-useful positive psychologyinterventions are those that match the specific task to characteristics of the individual person(Peterson, 1996). The parameters of this match are completely unknown at present.

We have been experimenting with positive psychology interventions delivered over theInternet because they are highly cost effective and in principle available to much of the world’spopulation, including those who do not have a positive psychologist living down the block.Skeptics worry—and so do we—that Internet interventions lack the human touch, and they citethe argument from the psychotherapy realm that a close relationship between a therapist and aclient, the so-called therapeutic alliance, is a prerequisite for any treatment to work (Bordin,1979). Perhaps positive interventions are different because they have less resistance to overcome.Perhaps not. In any event, the next generation of our Internet interventions will be interactiveand feature a virtual counselor.

Is a Psychological Utopia Possible?

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed people can change theworld. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.—MARGARET MEAD (N.D.)

I have been discussing positive psychology interventions that focus on the individual, whichfollows from my stance as a psychologist. The problem is that there are lots of people who mightbenefit from deliberate attempts to make them happier, and changing the world one person at atime is daunting. Maybe this patient approach will suffice to create a psychological utopia. Once

a sufficient number of people have been changed, perhaps a critical mass will be reached thatwill drag the rest of us along to a better world (Gladwell, 2000).

We can imagine more-efficient strategies. One of the things we are doing at the University ofPennsylvania Positive Psychology Center is teaching positive psychology to coaches, counselors,and clinicians—training the trainers, as it were, and presumably mushrooming the consequences.It is also possible to mount interventions at the level of the group or the community, creating thesocial settings that enable the psychological good life. To do so will require concerted effort andsocietal conviction that this is worth doing. Everything has a price, including utopia. Theresearch surveyed in this book shows that the sorts of topics of concern to positive psychologymatter not just for making people feel better but also for making them more productive and morehealthy. Maybe these findings, if sufficiently disseminated, will convince policy makers in theprivate and public sectors that positive psychology is worth taking very seriously.

Indeed, it would be risky to treat avowed happiness as the only criterion by which to judgeimprovement of the human condition. Remember the possibility that people’s statements abouttheir life satisfaction are ultimately relative ones, which means that people’s subjective standardsare a moving target. We probably need to take into account more-objective bases for judging theattainment of the good life (Nussbaum, 1992; Sen, 1985).

Is Peace a Pipe Dream?

The richer we have become materially, the poorer we have become morally andspiritually. We have learned to fly the air like birds and swim the sea like fish,but we have not learned the simple art of living together as brothers.—MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1964)

Let me for the time being forget utopia, and ask why we can’t all just get along. It has been saidthat the primary lesson of the 20th century is that there is no them, just us. The challenge of the21st century is therefore to ask how we can all be us.

Conflicts between people and groups of people are sometimes about things—resources andaccess to resources (Wright, 1999). However regrettable these zerosum conflicts may be, they arereadily understandable. When they play themselves out, they at least result in one satisfied party.But what about conflicts that leave only losers in their wake? The world seems to have too manyof these, and you can provide your own examples, at the personal or global level. What doespositive psychology have to offer?

If business-as-usual psychology has shied away from what is good in life, it has also beensqueamish about evil, at least in the sense of acknowledging it and grappling with it head on.

Instead, psychologists try to explain away the bad things that people do by attributing them toignorance, cognitive errors, and the like. They offer simplistic recommendations that seem moreinspired by the Disney channel than by hard-headed science. Psychologists need to acknowledgeevil as a real phenomenon urgently in need of investigation.

Philosopher Peter Singer (1981, 1993) has argued that moral progress over the millennia isone of expanding the circle of individuals treated as if their interests are equivalent to one’s own,from the family, to the clan, village, state, nation, continent, and eventually all of the world.Most members of democracies today grant the humanity—if not the attractiveness—of everyhuman group on the planet, a fact that may explain why none of the more than 200 armedconflicts between nations in the 20th century pitted one democracy against another.

Consider South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, who included not only fellow members of theAfrican National Congress in his relevant moral circle but also the White Afrikaners responsiblefor apartheid and his decades of imprisonment. What is remarkable—and I think extremelyencouraging—about the demise of apartheid is that it has ended.

Or consider Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address, delivered March 4, 1865, in whichhe called for mercy on the part of those in the North to their brethren in the South:

With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as Godgives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up thenation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widowand his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peaceamong ourselves and with all nations.

Lincoln could have called for massive retribution and retaliation against the Confederacy, but hedid not. And without putting too fine an interpretation on Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, it seemsimportant that he tersely honored all of the men who had died in the battle, not just the fallenUnion soldiers.

All of the compassion and information in the world may be less relevant to eventual peacethan the simple conviction that “they” are all “us” and that killing them is therefore not anoption. As psychologists and as citizens of the world, we all need to embrace this belief andfoster it, in ourselves and in others.

RESOURCES

Books and Journals

Frisch, M. (2006). Quality of life therapy: Applying a life satisfaction approach to positive psychologyand cognitive therapy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Wright, R. (1999). Nonzero: The logic of human destiny. New York: Pantheon.

Bellamy, E. (1888/1960). Looking backward: 2000–1887. New York: Signet.

Thoreau, H. D. (1854). Walden; or, Life in the woods. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden two. New York: Macmillan.

Huxley, A. (1932). Brave new world. London: Chatto & Windus.

Journal of Peace Psychology

Articles

Seligman, M. E. P. (2003). Foreword: The past and future of positive psychology. In C. L. M.Keyes & J. Haidt (Eds.), Flourishing: Positive psychology and the life well-lived (pp. xi-xx).Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Linley, P. A., Joseph, S., Harrington, S., & Wood, A. M. (2006). Positive psychology: Past,present, and (possible) future. Journal of Positive Psychology, 1, 3–16.

Web Sites

http://www.utoronto.ca/utopia/index.html. This is the Web site for the Society of UtopianStudies, which was “founded in 1975 ... an international, interdisciplinary association devotedto the study of utopianism in all its forms, with a particular emphasis on literary andexperimental utopias.”

Films

Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939)

The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951)

One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975)

Koyaanisqatsi (1983)

ABC News’s Nightline: “Tipping Point” (2005)

Songs

“I Wonder What Would Happen to This World” (Harry Chapin)

“Imagine” (John Lennon)

“Wouldn’t It Be Nice” (Beach Boys)

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Name Index

Abelson, R. P., 184

Abrams, S. J., 15, 189

Abramson, L. Y., 14, 95–96, 120, 122

Achille, N. M., 97

Ackermann, R., 96

Adams, T., 224

Ader, R., 230

Adkins, R., 55

Adler, A., 118

Adler, F., 170

Agnew, Spiro, 132

Ahadi, S., 92

AI, A. L., 227

Ainsworth, M. D. S., 260

Akhtar, S., 116

Albee, G. W., 6

Albright, C. A., 296

Aldana, S. G., 233

Alessandri, S. M., 185

Allison, M., 68

Alloy, L. B., 14, 95–96, 122

Allport, G. W., 116, 138–139, 158, 170, 176, 179, 293

Altenor, A., 126

Altman, D. G., 232

American Psychiatric Association, 5

American Psychological Association, 4, 24, 244, 294

Ames, R., 285

Anderman, E., 285

Angleitner, A., 64

Angner, E., 88

Anjum, A., 159

Anthony, E. J., 126

Antill, J. K., 269

Aquinas, Thomas, 6, 155

Arend, R. A., 261

Argyle, M., 14, 76, 84, 91, 95, 98, 200, 201–202

Aristippus, 78

Aristotle, 21, 47, 58, 78, 140, 199, 209, 217, 227, 309

Arnett, J. J., 30

Asch, S. E., 39

Ashbrook, J. B., 296

Asher, E. R., 271

Aspinwall, L. G., 117, 121

Assom, D., 54

Averill, J. R., 122

Axinn, W. G., 269

Bach, Johann Sebastian, 205

Bagwell, C., 266

Bailey, K. D., 140

Baker, D., 84

Baker, W., 183, 189

Ball, S., 189

Ball-Rokeach, S. J., 186–187

Baltes, P. B. 96

Bandura, A., 6, 184

Barber, B. L., 202

Barkley, Charles, 219, 224

Barkow, J. H., 55

Barlow, F., 212

Barnett, R., 269

Barrett, P. M., 5

Barsky, A. J., 126, 235

Bartels, A., 250

Barth, F., 170

Bartholomew, K., 263

Barton, H., 285

Baruch, G., 269

Basanez, M., 187

Batten, H. L., 257

Baum, A., 230

Baumrind, D., 283

Baylis, N., 25

Beatles 305

Beck, A. T. 96, 116–118, 129, 131, 225

Becker, B., 240

Becker, S. W., 153

Becker, W. C., 283

Beethoven, Ludwig van, 48, 209

Beit-Hallahmi, B., 292

Bell, Harvey 7

Bell, N. E., 63

Bell, R. M., 49

Belloc, N. B., 226

Belushi, John, 148

Benard, B., 239

Bennett, J. M., 257

Bentham, Jeremy 78

Bentley, K. S., 283

Berenbaum, H., 50

Bergbower, K., 88

Berger, D., 257

Bergman, Ingmar 198

Berkman, L. F., 256

Berkowitz, M. W., 29

Berlin, Irving 38, 251

Berlyne, D. E., 205

Berman, Chris 219

Bernard, M. M., 173

Berscheid, E., 147, 251, 255, 261, 263, 267

Bezner, J., 224

Bier, M. C., 29

Bierce, A., 14

Billingsley, A., 295

Bilsky, W., 173, 178

Biswas-Diener, R. 91, 140

Blair-Loy, M., 295

Blaney, P. H., 120

Blehar, M. C., 260

Bloom, J. R., 231

Blumberg, S. J., 11, 54

Boeckenholt, U., 87

Bojaxhiu, Agnes Gonxha (Mother Teresa of Calcutta), 27

Bok, S., 140, 154, 177–178, 298

Bonnano, G. A., 156, 239

Booth, R., 252

Booth, R. F., 207

Bordin, E. S., 311

Boring, E. G., 4

Bossio, L. M., 109, 124

Bosson, J. K., 263

Bouchard, T. J., 64

Boucher, J., 111

Bower, D. W., 269

Bowlby, J., 258–259

Boyes-Braem, P., 141

Bradbum, N. M., 88

Bradbury, T. N., 268

Braithwaite, V. A., 178–179

Branigan, C., 58

Braskamp, L.A., 285

Brennan, K. A., 263

Breslow, L., 226

Brickman, P., 54

Bridges, M. W., 120

Brief, A. P., 286

Brisette, I., 256

Brokaw, T., 15, 156

Brothers, Joyce 18

Brothers, L., 56

Browder, S., 269

Brown, B. B., 266, 283

Brown, G. W., 283

Brown, J. D., 117

Brown, R., 11, 279

Brown, S. L., 257

Browning, Elizabeth Barrett, 251

Bruner, H., 225

Brunhart, S. M., 121

Bruyer, R., 58

Bryan, William J., 109

Bryant, F. B., 69, 70

Buchanan, G. M., 120

Buckingham, M., 146, 195, 281

Bucosky, C. M., 6

Buddha 6, 98

Bumpass, L., 269

Bungam, T. J., 223

Burrell, B., 168, 169

Bursten, B., 225

Bush, George H., 109

Buss, D. M., 49, 65, 98, 116, 256–257

Butcher, J. N., 207

Buunk, B. P., 264

Byrne, D., 264

Cairns, R. B., 202

Caldwell, C., 295

Calhoun, L. G., 156

Callas, Maria, 18

Calment, Jeanne, 235

Cameron, K. S., 280

Campbell, A., 88

Campbell, David P., 206–208

Campbell, Donald T., 54, 90

Cantor, N., 81, 115

Cantril, H., 88

Capote, Truman, 32

Cappella, J. N., 56

Carnegie, Dale, 131

Carnelley, K. B., 263

Carpenter, Scott, 226

Carson, R. C., 96

Carstensen, L. L., 266, 269

Carter, C. S., 249

Carver, C. S., 119–120, 122, 124, 135

Carville, James, 219

Casey, R. J., 256

Cash, Johnny, 13

Cassel, J., 255

Castellon, C., 121

Castro-Martin, T., 269

Catlin, G., 122

Cattell, R. B., 180

Cavior, N., 265

Cawley, M. J., 148

Chang, C. L., 233

Chang, E. C., 130

Chang, K., 269

Chapin, M. H., 55

Chapman, J. P., 50

Chapman, L. J., 50

Charcot, Jean, 8

Chatters, L., 296

Cheavens, J., 130

Chon, K. K., 122

Christopherson, V. A., 269

Churchill, Winston, 277

Cialdini, R. B., 265

Cicchetti, D., 240

Clark, A. E., 97

Clark, C., 296

Clark, D., 63

Clark, L. A., 62

Clark, M. S., 263

Clarke-Stewart, K. A., 261

Clausen, J. A., 63

Clifton, Donald O., 146, 195–196

Clifton, James, 196

Clinton, William J., 109–110

Coates, D., 54

Cobain, Kurt, 148

Cobb, S., 252, 269

Coffman, C., 281

Cohen, A. B., 296

Cohen, N., 230

Cohen, S., 231, 252

Cohler, B. J., 126

Cohn, M. A., 190

Coie, J., 283

Coie, L., 283

Colin, V. L., 261

Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL), 45, 285

Collier, P., 152

Collins, J. C., 281

Collins, R. L., 117, 264

Collmer, W. C., 250

Comfort, A., 20

Compton, W. C., 79

Comte-Sponville, A., 140, 146

Confucius, 6, 47, 209, 290

Converse, P. E., 88

Cooley, C. H., 275

Cooley, M., 75

Copernicus, Nicolaus, 17

Corbit, J. D., 306

Cornish, K. A., 79

Corrigan, P. W., 224

Cosmides, L., 65, 111

Costa, P. T., 62

Courington, S., 241

Cousins, N., 231

Cowan, C., 283

Cowan, P., 283

Cowen, E. L., 6, 285

Cox, M., 270

Cox, R., 270

Crapo, L. M., 235

Crawford, D. W., 253

Crews, D. J., 201

Cronbach, L. J., 180

Crowne, D. P., 7, 148

Crump, C. E., 233

Crumpler, C.A., 38

Cruz, Penelope, 250

Csikszentmihalyi, I., 67

Csikszentmihalyi, M., 5, 9, 15, 20, 22, 47, 49, 65–69, 80–81, 137, 155, 200, 275, 299–300, 306

Cummings, E. Mark, 261

cummings, ee (Edward E.), 306

Cunningham, J. D., 269

Cunningham, M. R., 42, 256

Curtiss, S., 254

Cushman, L. A., 55

Dahlback, O., 237

Dahlsgaard, K., 6, 140

Dahlstrom, W. G., 207

Damon, W., 20, 22, 239, 299–300

Danner, D. D., 76

Danser, D., 296

d’Aquili, E., 296

Dark, V. J., 113

Darling, C. A., 51

Darling, N., 283

Daruna, J. H., 230

Darwall, S. L., 138

Darwin, C., 17, 56, 209

Davidson, J. K., 51

Davidson, R. J., 57

Davis, K. L., 251

de Avila, M. E., 121

Deci, E. L., 10, 66, 78–79, 124

Delle Fave, A., 68

DeMartini, J. R., 30

de Montaigne, M., 25

Denham, J. R., 225

Dennett, D. C., 113

Derlega, V. J., 265

Derryberry, D., 57

DeRubeis, R. J., 96

Descartes, Rene, 227–228

deVries, M. W., 82

Dewey, J., 139

Dewey, Thomas, 188

DiClemente, C., 99, 245

Diener, C., 91

Diener, E., 14, 62, 78, 84–85, 87–89, 91–95, 105, 271, 282, 291, 306

Diener, M., 91

Dion, K., 147, 256

Dobson, K. S., 96

Doi, T., 257

Doris, J. M., 93

Douglas, Michael, 219

Douvan, E., 261

Dow, A., 201

Dr. Pangloss, 114, 129

Duchenne, G.-B., 8

Duckworth, Angela, 28

Dukakis, Michael, 109

Dukes, W. F., 170

Dulin, P., 257

Duncan, M., 68

Dunham, C. C., 174

Dunker, K., 48

Dunst, Kirsten, 41

Duran Duran, 305

Durbin, D. L., 283

Dutton, D. G., 263

Dutton, J. E., 280

Dwyer, J., 123

Dykema, K., 88

Dziurawiec, S., 259

Eagly, A. H., 153

Easterbrook, G., 7, 84

Ebbinghaus, Herman, 4

Eccles, J. S., 202–203, 205

Eddy, Mary Baker, 131

Egloff, B., 44

Eid, M., 87

Einstein, Albert, 215

Eisenberger, R., 126

Ekman, P., 57

Elder, G. H., 256

Elias, M. J., 284–285

Elicker, J., 266

Elkins, L. E., 202

Elliot, A. J., 206

Elliot, T. R., 55

Ellis, H., 259

Ellison, C. G., 297

Emery, G., 117

Emmons, R. A., 6, 33, 38, 89, 91, 293

England, G. W., 287–288

Englund, M., 266

Epicurus, 78

Epstein, L. H., 234

Epstein, S., 179

Erasmus, 78

Erikson, E., 116, 202, 242–244

Ernst, Randy, 25

Eron, L. D., 189

Eskew, R. W., 269,

Estepa, A., 92

Evans, D. L., 5

Evers, K., 245

Eysenck, H. J., 98

Fahey, J. L., 123

Farquhar, J. W., 232

Fatsis, S., 202

Faulkner, William, 32

Feeney, J. A., 263

Feingold, A., 256

Feldman, D. H., 212

Felner, R. D., 285

Felner, T. Y., 285

Festinger, L., 184, 264

Fetzer Institute, 294–295

Field, T., 261

Fineburg, A. C., 25

Fink, B., 203

Finkel, D., 64

Fiorina, M. P., 15, 189

Fischer, J. L., 255

Fisher, G. A., 85

Fiske, A. P., 279

Fiske, D. W., 90

Fiske, S. T., 88

Flanagan, C. A., 39

Flannelly, K. J., 297

Fleeson, W., 97

Fleshner, M., 230

Florian, V., 263

Foa, E. B., 252, 255

Foa, U. G., 252, 255

Föllings-Albers, M., 205

Folkman, S., 60, 70, 241

Fonda, Jane, 235

Fordyce, M. W., 89

Forehand, R., 283

Forsyth, D. R., 40

Fox, N. E., 261

Fox, R. A., 283

Fraley, R. C., 262

Frank, R. G., 55

Franken, A., 171

Fraser, S., 217

Frederick, S., 54, 55

Fredrickson, B. L., 49, 51, 56–60

Freud, S., 8, 14, 60, 115–116, 128, 212, 215, 225, 236, 240, 242, 293–295

Frey, K., 57

Fridlund, A. J., 57

Fried, R. L., 295

Friedman, H. S., 124

Friedman, S., 261

Fries, J. F., 235

Friesen, W. V., 76

Fromm, E., 30, 115, 249

Fulghum, R., 10

Gable, S. L., 249, 261, 271

Gadlin, H., 268

Galen, 227

Galton, F., 210

Gandhi, Mohandas, 215

Gardner, H., 6, 9, 20, 22, 110, 212–215, 217–218, 220, 299–300

Gardner, P. L., 205

Garland, Judy, 148

Garmezy, N., 239, 266

Garofalo, K., 233

Gauthier, J., 233

Gebhardt, D. L., 233

Gendlin, G. T., 10

Gentry, W. D., 230

George, C., 262

George, L. K., 297

Georgellis, Y., 97

Georgia Skeptic, 95

Geraghty, Tom, 28

Gibbard, A., 138

Gilbert, D. T., 11, 52, 54

Gill, K. G., 250

Gillham, J. E., 28, 128, 133

Gladwell, M., 311

Glantz, K., 279

Glaser, R., 231

Glass, G. V., 311

Glass, T., 256

Goetzel, R. Z., 233

Goldberg, S., 259

Goldsmith, L. T., 212

Goldwater, Barry, 251

Goleman, D., 232

Gomez, J., 50

Gootman, J. A., 203

Gordon, Ben, 66

Gordon, J. R., 246

Gorman, J. M., 5, 98

Gorsuch, R. L., 293

Gosling, S. D., 150

Gottfredson, L. S., 206, 208

Gottheil, E., 231

Gottman, J. M., 269–270

Gould, S. J., 65, 197

Grafton, Sue, 198

Graham, J. R., 207

Graham, Martha, 215

Grammar, Kelsey, 18

Gray, W., 141

Greenberg, J., 153

Greenberg, L., 263

Greenberg, S. B., 189

Greenberger, E., 148

Greenwald, A. G., 117

Griffin, J., 82

Griffin, S., 89

Grube, J. W., 186–187

Grunberg, N. E., 230

Guerra, N. G., 223

Guignon, C., 78

Guilford, J. P., 211

Gunn, L. K., 257

Gupta, V., 266

Gurin, J., 332

Haaga, D. F., 96

Haberman, D. L., 291

Haidt, J., 141, 159, 190

Hall, G. S., 292, 294

Hamilton, W. D., 234

Hanks, Tom, 229

Hannity, S., 171

Hansen, J. C., 206–207

Hardin, G., 39

Harker, L. A., 75, 76

Harlow, H. F., 253–254, 258

Harlow, R. E., 81

Harris Poll, 199, 277–279

Harris, T. O., 283

Hartinger, A., 205

Hartnett, S. A., 127

Hartup, W. W., 265–266

Haslam, N., 176

Hassett, J., 55

Hatfield, E., 251, 264, 267, 273

Hathaway, S. R., 207

Hatta, T., 57

Hawkins, J. D., 285

Hayes, J. R., 203

Hazan, C., 249, 262–263

Heath, C. W., 107

Hefner, Hugh, 47, 54

Heider, F., 184

Heine, S. J., 130

Helgeson, V. S., 183

Heller, J. F., 198

Helson, R., 76, 206

Helwig, A. A., 206

Henderson, R. W., 241

Henderson, V. K., 261

Hendrick, C., 267

Hendrick, S. S.. 267

Henry, John, 127

Henry, O., 36

Hepburn, Katharine, 229

Herrnstein, R. J., 216–217

Hess, U., 56

Hetherington, E. M., 270

Hibbs, E. D., 5

Hicks, L., 285

Hidi, S., 203

Hilgard, E. R., 110

Hill, P. C., 16, 293

Hill, R., 257

Hill, W. F., 170

Hiller, D. V., 269

Hills, P., 201

Hilton, Paris, 12

Hinterloth, J., 257

Hippocrates, 227

Hitlin, S., 173, 174

Hobbes, T., 39

Hoffmann, L., 205

Hofstede, G., 178–179

Hogan, T. P., 6

Holland, J. L., 208

Holmes, D. S., 201

Holmes, R. L., 174

Holmes, T. H., 240

Homans, G. C., 252

Hood, R. W., 293, 295

Hormuth, S. E., 82

Horwitz, J., 91

House, J. S., 246

Howe, L. W., 179

Howes, C., 265

Hoyt, W. T., 294, 297

Hubbard, B., 62

Hubbard, Elbert, 13

Huebner, E. S., 88

Huesmann, L. R., 189

Huffman, T., 269

Hughes, M., 170

Hull, C. H., 170, 184

Hull, R., 196

Hume, David, 78

Hunsley, J., 263

Hunt, E., 217

Hunter, J. D., 138

Hunter, K. I., 257

Hunter, L., 285

Huta, V., 79

Huyck, M. H., 270

Hyde, R. T., 201

Iannotti, R. J., 261

Im, C., 35

Impett, E. A., 271

Ingersoll-Dayton, B., 257

Inglehart, R. 91, 176–177, 179, 183, 187–188, 297

Insel, T. R., 249

Iverson, Allen 42

Izard, C. E., 57

Izumi, Shigechiyo, 235

Jackson, Alan, 155

Jackson, S. W., 48

Jacobs, F., 280

Jaffe, K., 263

Jaffe, Y., 126

Jahoda, M., 96, 116, 237–238

James, S. A., 127

James, W., 292, 294

Jamieson, K. H., 285

Jamison, K. R., 61, 197

Jang, K. L., 65

Jang, S. J., 295

Janis, I. L., 238–239

Janoff-Bulman, R., 54

Jaycox, L. H., 128, 310

Jefferson, Thomas, 135, 251

Jennings, D. A., 51

Jennings, Keith, 211

Jensen, P. S., 5

Jesus, 6

Johansson, C. B., 207

John, O. P., 150

Johnson, B. R., 295

Johnson, D., 141

Johnson, Earvin “Magic,” 223–224, 229

Johnson, Jimmy, 68

Johnson, John A., 148

Johnson, M. A., 259

Johnson, S. M., 263

Johnston, W. A., 113

Joiner, T., 60

Jones, C. J., 242

Jordan, Michael, 39, 40, 147–148

Joseph, S., 13, 28, 156, 239

Josselson, R., 149

Joyce, James, 215

Jung, C. G., 84, 295

Kaemmer, B., 207

Kahn, S., 241

Kahneman, D., 11, 43, 51–53, 56, 74, 78, 81, 116

Kahr, T. Y., 233

Kalakanis, L., 256

Kalb, C., 294

Kalsbeek, W. D., 127

Kamen-Siegel, L., 123

Kane, Erica, 201

Kaplan, N., 262

Kaplan, R., 51

Kaplan, S., 51

Kappas, A., 56

Karney, B. R., 268

Kasimatis, M., 44, 56

Kasser, T., 124, 178, 181

Katzman, R., 205

Kazdin, A. E., 5

Keller, S. E., 231

Kelley, H. H., 252, 257

Kelly, G. A., 42, 118

Kelly, Janice, R., 288

Kelly, John R., 288

Keltner, D., 75, 76, 141, 190

Kemeny, M. E., 123

Kemp, B., 55

Kennedy, K., 66

Kenny, G. M., 233

Kessler, R. C., 236

Kewman, D. G., 55

Keyes, C. L. M., 238

Kiecolt-Glaser, J., 125, 231, 269

Kiesler, D. V., 10

Kikusui, T., 264

Kilmer, R. P., 6

Kilpatrick, S. D., 33

Kim, C., 125

Kim, H. C., 174

Kimmerly, N. L., 283.

King, A. C., 232

King, L. A., 14, 75, 95, 98

King, Jr., Martin Luther, 312

Kirschenbaum, H., 179

Kitayama, S., 183

Kiyokawa, Y., 264

Kleck, R. E., 56

Kleiber, D., 67

Klein, K. E., 225

Kleinbaum, D. G., 127

Klingemann, H.-D., 91, 188

Klinger, E., 261

Kluckhohn, C., 170

Knerr, B., 149

Knerr, C., 149

Knetsch, J. L., 53

Kniffin, K. M., 256

Kobak, R. R., 263

Kobasa, S. C., 241

Koch, J., 261

Koenig, H. G., 294–295, 297

Koeske, R., 234

Kohlhepp, K. A., 269

Kohlmann, C.-W., 44

Kohn, M. L., 185

Kono, T., 288

Konty, M. A., 174

Korchin S. J., 237

Korte, C., 266

Korzenik, D., 212

Kraemer, H. C., 231

Kramer, P. D., 307

Krantz, D. S., 230

Krapp, A., 203, 205

Krause, J. S., 55

Krause, N. M., 257

Kristiansen, C. M., 169

Krohne, H. W., 44

Krokoff, L. J., 270

Krueger, A. B., 43

Kubey, R., 200

Kubovy, M., 48

Kuczynski, L., 185

Kuhn, T. S., 17

Kukla, R. A., 261

Kulik, J., 264

Kumano, H., 257

Kurono, K., 56

Kurtzburg, R. L., 265

LaCroix, A. Z., 127

Lam. T., 285

Landers, D. M., 201

Lang, F. F., 266

Langlois, J. H., 257

Lanzetta, J. T., 56

Lao-Tsu, 6, 146

Larkin, G., 60

Larsen, R. J., 44, 56, 62, 89, 257

Larson, D. B., 33, 294, 295, 297

Larson, R., 67, 81, 266, 280

Latham, G., 245

Laudenslager, M. L., 230

Law, H. G., 178

Lazarus, R. S., 6, 70, 116, 118, 241, 305

Lazear, E. P., 196

Le, H.-N., 50

Leach, Robin, 50

Leary, M. R., 40

Leckrone, T. G., 203

Lee, F., 110, 152

Lee, Harper, 32

Lee, J. A., 264, 267

Lee, Y.-T.

Lefebvre, R. C.

Lefkowitz, M. M.

Lehman, D. R., 111, 130

Lennon, John,

Leonardo da Vinci, 209, 217

Lepper, H. S., 89

Lerner, R. M., 281

Levenson, R. W., 58–59. 269–270

Levering, R., 281, 289

Levine, G. F., 129

Levitt, A. J., 6

Lewalter, D., 205

Lewin, K., 28, 118

Li, S. D., 295

Liang, J., 257

Limbaugh, Rush, 219

Lincoln, Abraham, 81, 207, 313

Lincoln, C., 295

Lindzey, G., 176

Linley, P. A., 13, 28, 44, 156, 239

Linn, E., 215

Linn, M. W., 257

Livesley, W. J., 64

Livingstone, S. M., 201

Lobel, M., 12

Locke, E. A., 245

Locke, John, 227

Loewenstein, G., 53–55, 205

Londerville, S., 261

Lorenz, K., 250, 254, 258

Love, G. D., 238

Lovett, Lyle, 256

Lowenstein, M. K., 261

Lu, L., 201

Lucas, R. E., 89, 91, 207

Luke, M. A., 173

Lundberg, C. D., 288

Luthans, F., 280

Luthar, S. S., 240

Lykken, D. T., 84, 97, 307

Lynn, R., 197

Lyons-Ruth, K., 261

Lyubomirsky, S., 14, 38, 89, 95, 97, 100

Ma, Y., 257

MacCallum, R. C., 125

Maccoby, N., 232

MacCorquodale, K., 90

MacIntyre, A. C., 140

MacIver, D., 205

Mackintosh, N. J., 126

Madathil, J., 268

Maddi, S. R., 241

Maddux, J. E., 5

Maehr, M. L., 285

Magnusson, D., 202

Mahler, H. I., 264

Mahoney, J. L., 202

Maier, S. E., 110, 118, 120, 122, 126.230

Main, M., 260–262

Maio, G. R., 173

Malanos, A. B., 97

Mamiya, L., 295

Mancuso, R. A., 58

Mandela, Nelson, 312

Maravich, Pete, 229

Marini, M. M., 174

Markus, H. R., 183

Marlatt, G. A., 246

Marlowe, D., 7, 148

Marmor, M. G., 228

Marshall, S., 185

Marshall, Thurgood, 18

Martin, J. E., 148

Martin, Leonard L., 86.

Martin, Leslie R., 124

Masheter, C., 270

Maslow, A. H., 4, 6, 8–9, 47, 78, 116, 176–177

Massimini, F., 68

Masten, A., 156, 239

Matas, L., 261

Matlin, M., 111–112, 116–117

Maton, K., 295

Matthews, S. H., 267

May, K. A., 256

Mayton, D. M.

McAdam, Douglas, 39

McAdams, Daniel P., 117, 130, 156

McCann, I. L., 201

McCauley, C., 198

McClelland, D. C., 80

McCluskey, J. J., 283

McCombs, B. L., 205

McCrae, R. R., 62, 64

McCullough, M. E., 33, 38, 138, 294–295, 297

McEnroe, John, 211

McGraw, P. (Dr. Phil), 18

McGregor, H. M., 206

McGue, M., 64

McGuire, Lizzy, 10

McHugo, G. J., 56

McKenna, F. P., 237

McKillip, J., 256

McKinley, J. C., 207

McKinley, William, 109

McWhirter, B. T., 252

Mead, Margaret 311

Meehl, P. E., 62, 63, 90

Meier, A., 198

Meisenhelder, J. B., 257

Mellen, S. L. W., 250

Meng, Z., 56

Menninger, Karl A., 116

Meredith W., 242

Merighi, J. R., 264

Mervis, C. B., 141

Metalsky, G. I., 122

Meyer, D., 131

Meyer, G. J., 93

Meyers, J., 11, 54

Miclette, A. L., 287

Midgley, C., 205, 285

Mikulincer, M., 263

Milgram, S., 39

Mill, John Stuart, 78

Miller, E. N., 50

Miller, George A., 18

Miller, Gregory E., 231

Miller, R. R., 119

Miller, W. R., 294

Mills, J., 263

Mineka, S., 231

Mischel, W., 92, 307

Mohammed, 6

Moise, J., 189

Mondale, Walter, 109

Moneta, G. B., 67–68

Monk, R., 82

Montgomery, M. J., 265

Mook, D. G., 60

Moore, Thomas, 78

Moreno, A., 187

Morgan, C., 205

Mori, Y., 264

Morrow-Howell, N., 257

Mortimer, J. T., 206

Morton, J., 259

Moskowitz, J. T., 60

Moskowitz, M., 281, 289

Mouse, Mickey, 250

Mowbray, C. T., 283

Mowrer-Popiel, E., 216

Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 212, 215–216

Mumford, D. B., 57

Murray, C., 197–198, 205, 215–217

Murstein, B. I., 256, 264, 268

Myers, D. G., 84, 91, 282

Myers, J. E., 268

Myers, S., 296

Nakamura, J., 49, 66, 68

Nakaseko, M., 57

Napa, C. N., 75, 98

Nash, Ogden, 306

Nathan, P. E., 5, 98

Neill, A. S., 6

Neisser, U., 110

Nelligan, J. S., 263

Nepps, P., 261

Nesse, R. M., 57, 127, 257

Neugarten, B. L., 284

Newberg, A., 296

Newcomb, A. F., 296

Newhart, Bob, 18

Newton, Isaac, 17, 216

Newton, John, 185

Newton, T. L., 269

Nicholson, I. A. M., 139

Nicholson, Jack, 229

Nielsen, M., 303

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 115

Nisbett, R. E., 11, 93, 111, 113, 138

Nock, S. L., 269

Noddings, N., 204, 280

Noller, P., 268

Norcross, J. C., 245

Nord, W. R., 286

Norem, J. K., 115

Norris, P., 297

Norton, A. J., 270

Notarius, C. I., 270

Nousiainen, S., 283

Novak, M. A., 254

Nozick, R., 42, 82

Nunnally, J. C., 210

Nussbaum, M., 82, 312

Oettingen, G., 109, 127

Ohira, H., 56

Oishi, S., 88

O’Leary, K. D., 269

Oliner, P. M., 37, 257

Oliner, S. P., 37, 257

Ollendick, T. H., 5

Olson, J. M., 173

Olson, K., 310

O’Neill, M., 147

Ono, Y., 257

Orne, M. T., 187

Ornstein, R. E., 113

Osark, K. C., 233

Osgood, C. E., 111

Osgood, D. W., 64

Oshinsky, J. J., 202

Owen, M. E., 261

Owen, T. R., 224

Oyserman, D., 283

Paffenbarger, R. S., 201

Pal, B.C., 250

Paloutzian, R. F., 6, 293

Pancake, V. R., 261

Pargament, K., 33, 294–295, 298

Parish, T. S., 282

Park, C., 118, 121

Park, N., 6, 10, 17, 20–21, 30, 33, 38, 79–80, 85, 88–89, 98, 100, 137–138, 142, 149–150, 152–156, 159, 181, 184, 196, 280, 292, 296, 307, 310

Parke, R. D., 250

Patton, J., 68

Pavot, W., 85

Pawelski, J. O., 7

Peale, Norman Vincent, 131

Pearce, J. K., 279

Peirce, C. S., 113

Pennebaker, J. W., 231

Pepler, D. J., 285

Perrett, D. I., 256

Peter, L. J., 196

Peters, T. J., 281, 289

Peterson, B. E., 244

Peterson, C., 6, 10, 15–16, 20–21, 30, 33, 38–39, 79–80, 85, 88–89, 95, 98, 100, 109–110, 118,121–122, 124, 126, 137–138, 140, 142, 150–156, 158–159, 168, 176, 181, 184–185, 196,202–204, 208, 215, 224–225, 227, 232, 234, 237, 263, 269, 280, 292, 296, 305, 307–308,310–311

Peterson, M. F., 288

Philliber, W. W., 269

Piaget, J., 205, 212

Picasso, Pablo, 215

Pierrehumbert, B., 261

Pietromonaco, P. R., 263

Piliavin, J. A., 173–174

Pinel, E. C., 11, 54

Pinker, S., 310

Pinsker, H., 201

Pippen, Scottie, 39–41

Pistole, M. C., 263

Pittman, T. S., 198

Plath, Sylvia, 306

Plato, 3, 165, 216

Pledge, D. S., 270

Plutchik, R., 56

Podolski, C. L., 290

Pollard, C., 216

Pollard, R., 216

Pollyanna, 13, 114, 129

Polonko, K. A., 269

Pope, Alexander, 251

Pope, J. C., 15, 189

Porges, S. W., 249

Porras, J. I., 281

Porter, E. H., 114

Prenzel, M., 203

Presley, Elvis, 148

Prochaska, J., 99, 245

Prottas, J. M., 257

Proxmire, William, 251

Public Agenda, 165

Purtilo, D. T., 232

Purtilo, R. B., 232

Pusch, D., 96

Putnam, R. D., 39, 301

Pyszczynski, T., 155

Quails, D. L., 79

Quimby, Phineas, 131

Quine, W. V., 119

Quinn, R. E., 280

Rachels, J., 174

Rachman, S. J., 153

Raghavan, C., 50

Rahe, R. H., 240

Railton, P., 138

Raimy, V., 29

Ralph, R. O., 244

Ramsey, D. L., 127

Rapson, R. L., 264

Rashid, T., 159

Rathunde, K., 68

Rausch, P., 269

Rawls, J., 199

Reagan, Ronald, 109, 131

Rean, A. A., 4

Redding, C., 245

Redelmeier, D. A., 51, 228–229.

Redfield, J., 261

Reed, G., 257

Reeves, D. J., 207

Regan, P. C., 268

Reid, R. A., 288

Reinow, F. D., 288

Reis, H. T., 249, 261, 271

Reisenzein, R., 88

Reivich, K. J., 28, 34, 128, 133

Renninger, K. A., 203, 205

Rescorla, R. A., 118

Reston, James, 251

Reuman, D., 205

Rholes, W. S., 263

Richter, L., 121

Riedel, S. L., 256

Riemann, R., 64

Ritter, J. M., 256

Rivera, Geraldo, 299

Rivers, C., 269

Robbins, A., 19, 98

Roberts, Julia, 256

Robins, L. N., 84, 130

Robinson, J. P., 201

Robinson, William (Smokey), 21

Robinson-Whelen, S., 125

Rockwell, Norman, 141

Rodgers, W. L., 88

Rodin, J., 123, 176

Rodman, Dennis, 224

Roeser, R. W., 285

Rogers, C. R., 6, 8, 10, 78, 116

Roggman, L. A., 256

Rohan, M. J., 170, 183

Rokeach, M., 170, 175–176, 178–181, 186–187

Rosch, E., 141

Rose, G., 228

Rosenbaum, M., 126

Rosenthal, R., 93

Rosenwald, G. C., 281

Ross, J. M., 293

Ross, L., 93

Ross, S., 283

Rossi, J. S., 99

Rothhammer, F., 225

Rotter, J. B., 118, 184

Rowe, D. C., 64

Royzman, E., 81

Rozario, P. A., 257

Rozin, P., 48, 50, 51, 198, 296

Rubenstein, A. J., 256

Rubin, D. B.. 93

Rubin, Z., 198, 252

Ruff, G. F., 237

Runyan, W. M., 190

Rupp, D. E., 42

Rusbult, C. E., 257

Rush, A. J., 117

Russell, B., 13, 78

Russell, R. J. H., 269

Rutter, M., 239, 266

Ryan, R. M., 10, 78–79, 124

Ryan, W., 19, 131

Ryff, C. D., 78, 149, 238

Ryle, G., 38, 48, 113

Saari, L. M., 245

Safar, H., 265

Sagiv, L., 178

Sánchez Cobo, E. T., 92

Sandage, S. J., 16

Sandler, Adam, 198

Sandvak, E., 88

Sansone, C., 203, 205

Saunders, K., 263

Sawin, D. B., 256

Sawyer, Tiffany, 151

Scanzoni, J., 269

Schachter, S., 264

Schafer, W. D., 283

Schaffer, N., 269

Scheier, M. F., 119, 120, 122–125, 135

Scheindlin, J. (Judge Judy), 18

Schell, K., 185

Scherer, K. R., 202

Schiavo, Terry, 183

Schimmack, U., 87, 88

Schkade, D., 38, 43, 53, 97

Schleifer, S. J., 231

Schlessinger, L. (Dr. Laura), 18

Schlinder, D., 263

Schmitt, D. P., 256

Schneider, C. D., 34

Schneider, E. L., 259

Schneider, S. F., 285

Schofield, W., 31

Schreiber, C. A., 51

Schuessler, K. F., 85

Schull, W. J., 225

Schulman, P., 121

Schumaker, J. F., 128

Schwartz, B., 28, 29, 157, 166, 167, 190, 191, 198

Schwartz, C., 257

Schwartz, S. H., 140, 173–174, 176, 178–181, 183, 184

Schwarz, N., 43, 78, 86, 87, 88

Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 235

Scitovsky, T., 170

Scott, D., 199

Scott, W. A., 167, 170–172, 176, 178, 179, 237

Sears, R. R., 261

Seeman, J., 126

Seeman, T. E., 256

Segerstrom, S. C., 123, 231

Seidlitz, L., 88

Seligman, Mandy, 26

Seligman, Martin E. P., 4, 15–17, 19, 20, 24–26, 28, 30–31, 33–35, 38–39, 41, 47, 74, 79–81,84–85, 89, 93–94, 98, 100, 105, 108–110, 118, 120–124, 126–131, 137–138, 140, 142, 149,151–156, 158–159, 176, 181, 184–185, 196, 203–204, 215, 249, 263, 271, 275, 291, 296,305–307, 310

Seligman, Nikki, 26–27, 122

Semmelroth, J., 257

Sen, A., 82, 312

Sethi, S., 128, 296

Shakespeare, William, 31–32, 198, 216

Shao, L., 87

Sharpe, K. E., 157

Shatté, A., 133

Shaver, P. R., 262–263

Shaw, B. F., 117

Shaw, K. N., 245

Shaw, M. E., 279

Shaw, R. B., 281

Sheldon, K. M., 38, 97, 124, 228

Sherif, M., 170

Shernoff, D. J., 68

Shernoff, E. S., 68

Shiffman, S. S., 82

Shipley, M. J., 228

Shneider, B., 68

Shriver, T. P., 285

Shumar, W., 205

Siddiqui, M. F., 250

Silverman, M. M., 285

Silverstein, A. M., 230

Simon, H., 166

Simon, S. B., 179

Simonton, D. K., 209, 216–217, 221

Simpson, J. A., 263

Simpson, W. F., 292

Singer, B. H., 78, 149, 238

Singer, I., 268

Singer, P., 169, 312

Singh, S. M., 228, 229

Siris, S. G., 231

Skinner, B. F., 310

Skokan, L. A., 117

Slaby, R., 285

Smart, J. C., 209

Smith, A. P., 231

Smith, C. P., 216

Smith, David A., 269

Smith, Dylan M., 257

Smith, E. E., 110

Smith, Heather L., 289

Smith, Heidi, 87, 91

Smith, M. L., 79, 311

Snowdon, D., 76, 205

Snyder, C. R., 116, 122–125, 130, 135, 138

Solomon, D., 232

Solomon, J., 260

Solomon, R. L., 306

Solomon, S., 155

Sophocles, 115

Southwick, C. H., 250

Spearman, C., 210, 211

Spears, Britney, 18

Spencer, S., 42

Spiegel, D., 231

Spilka, B., 293

Spillman, M. A., 233

Spranger, E., 176

Sprecher, S., 268

Srivastava, S., 150, 206

Sroufe, L. A., 261, 266

Stang, D., 111, 112, 116–117

Starker, S., 130

Starr, C. G., 289

Starzomski, A., 263

Stattin, H., 202

Staudinger, U. M., 96

Stauth, C., 84

Staw, B., 63

Steen, T. A., 28, 30, 33, 38, 80, 89, 98, 159, 266, 310

Stein, M., 231

Steinberg, L., 206, 283

Steinhart, M., 224

Stern, Howard, 211

Stern, W., 209

Sternberg, R. J., 6, 96, 110

Stevens, N., 265–266

Stewart, A. J., 244

Stolzenberg, R., 295

Stone, A. A., 43, 82

Stotland, E., 122

Strack, F., 86, 87, 88

Strack, S., 120

Strauch, B., 29

Stravinsky, Igor, 215

Strawberry, Darryl, 148

Streep, Meryl, 229

Strock, A. L., 297

Strogatz, D. S., 127

Strong, Edward, 206

Strümpfer, D. J. W., 4

Stunkard, A. J., 232

Suematsu, H., 257

Sugisawa, H., 257

Suh, E. M., 85, 87, 91

Sun, S., 56

Sutton, W., 215

Swank, Hillary, 229

Swayze, Patrick, 41

Swensen, C. H., 269

Symons, D. A., 49

Sympson, S. C., 130

Takeuchi, Y., 264

Tang, F., 257

Tausch, A., 44

Taylor, E. I., 6

Taylor, H., 199, 201

Taylor, Robert (J.), 296

Taylor, Robert B., 225.

Taylor, S. E., 12, 13, 88, 116–118, 123, 143, 156, 263

Teachman, J. D., 269

Teasdale, J. D., 120

Tedeschi, R. G., 156

Tellegen, A., 62, 64, 97, 207, 307

Tetlock, P. E., 172

Thaler, R., 53

Thayer, R. E., 201

Thibaut, J. W., 252, 257

Thinley, J. Y., 291

Thomas, D., 235

Thoresen, C., 294, 303

Thornton, A., 269

Thurstone, L. L., 211

Tiger, L., 115, 117–118, 123, 128, 130, 146, 296

Tingle, L. R., 268

Tito, Marshall, 276

Tolman, E. C., 119

Tomkins, C., 129

Tomkins, S. S., 57

Tooby, J., 64, 111

Travers, R. M. W., 197

Triandis, H. C., 183

Troy, M., 261

Truax, C. B., 10

Truman, Harry, 188

Trump, Donald, 35, 308

Tucker, D. M., 57

Tugade, M. M., 58, 60

Turner, A. N., 287

Turner, R. H., 174

Tversky, A., 11, 116

Twain, Twain, 245

Twenge, J. M., 35

Tyrell, D. A. J., 231

Udelman, D. L., 362

Ullian, J. S., 119

Ulm, R. R., 126

United States Department of Labor, 206, 286

Updike, John 305

Urban, H. B. 9

Urdan, T., 285

Ureda, J. W., 225

Urry, H. L., 238

Vaidya, R. S., 16, 21

Vaihinger, H., 118

Vaillant, G. E., 33, 107–109, 126, 223, 226, 235, 236, 240, 242, 244, 250, 292, 306, 308

Valoski, A., 234

van Eeden, C., 4

Van Ijzendoorn, M. H., 262, 283

Van Yperen, N. W., 264

Vandell, D. L., 261

Vang, H. C., 16

Vanzetti, N. A., 270

Varey, C., 51

Vazire, S., 150

Velicer, W. F., 99

Velleman, J. D., 81

Verbrugge, L. M., 224

Vernon, L., 50

Vernon, P., 138, 170, 176

Veroff, J., 70, 71, 261

Viau, J. J., 288

Vinokur, A. D., 257

Vogt, L., 225

Volpicelli, J. R., 126

Voltaire, F., 114

Vyse, S. A., 264

Waite, L., 295

Walder, L. O., 189

Wall, S., 260

Wallach, L., 48, 130

Wallach, M. A., 48, 130

Waller, N. G., 262

Walsh, R., 16

Walster, E., 147, 251, 255–257

Walster, G. W., 255, 267

Wang, Z., 249

Warr, P. B., 196

Washington, George, 207

Wasserman, E. A., 119

Waterman, A. S., 79

Waterman, R. H., 281, 289

Waters, E., 260

Waters, M. C., 83

Watkins, L. R., 230

Watson, D., 57, 62–63, 65

Watson, John, 78

Watson, John B., 18, 110, 310

Watson, R. E. L., 269

Watson, W. E., 233

Waugh, C. E., 60

Wegmann, H. M., 225

Weil, A., 231

Weinstein, N. D., 126, 232

Weintraub, J. K., 120

Weiss, R. S., 266

Weissberg, R. P., 284–285

Weisse, C. S., 123

Weisz, J. R., 5

Weller, A., 263

Wells, E., 295

Wells, P. A., 269

Welty, Eudora, 32

Werner, E. E., 239

Wertheimer, M., 17

Wertlieb, D., 280

Westen, D., 257

Westheimer, R. (Dr. Ruth), 18

Whalen, S. A., 68

Wheatley, T. P., 11, 54

White, B. L., 254

White, J. K., 189

White, R. W., 66, 198

Whitely, W. T., 287–288

Wiebe, D., 205

Wiese, D., 63

Wigfield, A., 205

Williams, G. C., 127

Williams, K. R., 233

Williams, Robin McLaurin, 219

Williams, Robin Murphy, 167

Willits, F. K., 199

Wilson, D. S., 256

Wilson, K. S., 261

Wilson, T. D., 11, 53–54, 113, 148

Wilson, W., 91

Winch, R. F., 268

Winett, R. A., 232

Winfrey, Oprah, 19

Wing, R. R., 234

Wing, S. B., 127

Winn, K. I., 255

Winner, E., 6

Winstead, B. A., 265

Winston, A., 261

Wippman, J., 261

Wissing, M. P., 4

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 82

Wittig, B. A., 260

Wong, P. T., 243

Woodruff-Pak, D., 235

Woolf, Virginia, 215

World Health Organization, 5, 224, 258

Worthington, E., 296

Wozniak, R. H., 185

Wright, R., 140, 167.312

Wright, T. A., 280

Wrzesniewski, A., 198

Wulff, D. W., 293

Yamamoto, M., 57

Yankelovich, D., 283

Yearley, L. H., 148

Yoshikawa, S., 256

Young, L. J., 249

Yurko, K. H., 124

Zahn-Waxier, C., 261

Zajonc, R. B., 53, 279

Zanna, M. P., 169

Zeaman, D., vii

Zeki, S., 250

Zembrodt, I. M., 257

Zimmerman, M. A., 126

Zullow, H., 109

Zytowski, D. G., 206

Subject Index

ability, 146–148, 209–214, 218–219, 285. See also genius

abstinence violation effect, 246

accidents, 64, 237

accomplishment, 214–218

acmeology, 4

active constructive responding, 271–272

adaptation, 36, 54–56, 73

adolescence, 29–30, 68, 202–203, 206, 243, 265, 292, 297

Adult Attachment Interview, 262

affiliation, 264, 272

Africa, 4, 20, 140, 312–313

African Americans, 127, 295

agency, 183. See also hope

aggregation, 278–279, 302

aging, 105, 108, 205–206, 234–235, 242, 244

AIDS, 90, 124, 223–224, 230, 232

Alcoholics Anonymous, 42

Alzheimer’s disease, 76, 105, 205

amae, 257, 290

American Psychiatric Association, 5

American Psychological Association, 4, 24, 244, 294

anhedonia, 50

Ann Arbor, Michigan, 86, 110, 190, 252

anxiety, 50, 58–50, 62, 68, 70, 98, 117, 132, 242, 252, 264, 307, 309

apartheid, 20, 313

archetypes, 295

Aristotelian Principle, 199, 219

Armenia, 187

Asia, 17, 87, 91, 264, 290

assessment in context, 213–214, 219

astronauts, 225–226, 237

attachment, 177, 253–255, 258–263, 266–267, 272, 273, 308

attitudes, 65, 90, 115, 171, 173–175, 179, 180, 184, 187, 189, 191, 206, 233, 264, 268, 285

attractiveness, 76, 92, 256–257, 265, 267

Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ), 121–122

Avis, 289

Azerbaijan, 153

baseball, 148, 197–198

basketball, 39, 66, 147–148, 223–224, 220

behavioral medicine, 230, 246

behaviorism, 8, 18, 78, 110, 118, 198.253, 292

Bhutan, 291

brain, 50, 57, 76, 82, 197, 212, 228, 235, 242, 249–250, 296, 306. See also dopamine,neuroimaging

broaden-and-build theory, 58, 60–61, 73, 124

Buddhism, 6, 98, 140, 144, 292

Burger King, 279

business-as-usual psychology, 4–5, 16, 60, 156, 299, 309, 312

Calcutta, 27, 91

Canada, 79

Carnegie-Mellon University, 199, 135

Case Western Reserve University, 273, 303

CAVE (Content Analysis of Verbatim Explanations), 108–110, 121–122, 124

ceiling effect, 172, 191

Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Palo Alto), 299

character education, 29, 138, 141, 284–285

character strengths, 8, 15, 16, 20–21, 27, 82, 99, 137–165, 171, 182, 184, 196, 218, 236, 261,280–281, 289–290, 296, 298, 306

Cherry Hill, New Jersey, 25

Chicago, 66, 84, 130, 175, 197, 224, 251, 276

childhood; children, 11, 13, 17, 26, 37, 40, 67–68, 76, 81, 89, 99, 108, 126, 128–129, 131–132,135, 152, 155, 169, 185, 190, 196–197, 200, 205–206, 212, 239–240, 242–244, 249–254,257–262, 268–270, 277, 283–286, 289–290, 295–296

China, 16, 115, 149, 188–189, 227

Choice, 8–10, 19, 52, 97, 124, 130, 147, 166–167, 190–191

Christian Science, 292

Christianity, 6, 36, 78, 128, 140, 169, 228, 257, 292, 296–297

circumplex model, 157–158, 162, 182–184

civic literacy, 285

Civil War, 313

Claremont Graduate School, 65

classification, 5, 138–152, 157, 163, 260, 287

cognition, 80, 110, 112–114, 134–142, 177, 241, 263, 312

cognitive consistency, 184–186

cognitive dissonance, 184

cognitive psychology, 9, 20, 110–111, 116, 118–119, 134,

cognitive revolution, 110–111, 134, 184, 241. See also cognitive psychology

cognitive therapy; cognitive-behavioral therapy, 116–117, 128–129, 131–132, 232

cohabitation, 268–269

collectivisim, 183, 268

collectivity, 279, 302

comfort, 50, 73, 83, 175

comity, 40

common methods factor, 94

communion, 183

companionate love, 267–268, 272

competence, 22, 38, 113, 182, 198–199, 202, 212, 218, 243

confound, 76–77, 95, 104, 150, 156, 207, 228, 269–270, 297

consciousness, 62, 112–114, 131, 134

convenience sample, 150, 187–188, 191, 216

coping, 60, 69–70, 241, 246, 247

Cornell University, 110

correlation coefficient, 92–93, 104, 107

counterfactual thinking, 85

creativity, 4, 90, 142, 160, 171–172, 220–221, 305. See also genius

culture, 16–17, 20, 49, 57, 88, 92, 110, 117, 123, 129–131, 139–141, 144–146, 153, 155–156,170, 172, 177–178, 182, 187–189, 198, 202, 218, 239, 256, 261, 263–264, 267–268, 270,279, 282, 287–289, 307

cuteness, 240. See also attractiveness

Dartmouth College, 107

defense mechanisms, 14, 240, 244, 246

demand characteristics, 187

Democratic National Committee, 279

Depression, 12–13, 39, 55, 57, 62, 64–65, 68, 84, 96–99, 114, 116–117, 121, 125, 127–131, 231,237, 252, 258, 270, 283, 287, 306–307, 309

depressive realism, 95–96

desire theory, 82–83, 104

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), 5

disease model, 5, 137

dispositional optimism, 119–120, 122, 125, 134–135. See also explanatory style; hope; optimism

divorce, 30, 97, 241, 251–252, 263, 269–271, 282

doctrine of the mean, 309

dopamine, 50, 250, 306

duration neglect, 51–54, 73, 310

duty, 287–288, 290–291

education, 3, 6, 8, 20, 29, 41, 65, 76, 83, 92–94, 98, 104, 111, 154, 187, 205, 213, 221, 228,240, 244, 269, 275, 278, 280, 284–288, 295, 301

emotion, 11, 13–14, 29–30, 32–33, 48–49, 56–62, 66, 68, 73, 76–77, 79–8o, 84, 104, 113, 115,119, 123–125, 134, 144, 157, 159, 184, 201–203, 206, 220, 232, 236–237, 241–242, 246,250, 252, 255, 257–258, 261–263, 265–267, 269, 272, 283, 285, 295, 297, 302, 305

emotionally-focused couples therapy, 263, 272

empty nest syndrome, 284

endowment effect, 53, 73

engagement. See flow

epicurianism, 47, 76

equity theory, 252, 255–258, 263, 266–267, 272, 290

ethnicity. See culture

ethology, 258

etiquette, 291

eudaimonia, 78–80, 104, 281

Europe, 36, 65, 79, 91, 108, 155, 189, 200, 232, 268, 276, 291, 297

European Union, 291

evolution, 17, 40, 57–58, 64–65, 117–118, 140, 212, 234, 250, 256–257, 259, 279, 296

exercises, 21, 29–31, 97–100

Active Constructive Responding, 271–272

Apology Letter, 34

Being a Good Teammate, 39–41

Changing a Habit, 244–246

Choosing When and How to Choose, 190–191

Forgiveness Letter, 31–34

Fun Versus Philanthropy, 34–36

Gift of Time, 36–38

Gratitude Letter, 15, 31–34

Have a Good Day, 43–44

Honey Versus Vinegar, 41–42

Identifying Signature Strengths, 99

Learning Optimism on the Hot Seat (Rapid Fire Technique), 131–134

Letting Go of Grudges, 34

Letting Someone Else Shine, 40

Recrafting Your Work to Capitalize on Your Interests and Abilities, 218–219

Savoring, 69–72

Serious Introduction, 25–28

Three Good Things, 38–39

Using Signature Strengths in New Ways, 158–162

What is Your Happiness Profile?, 100–103

Working for an Institution, 301–302

Writing Your Own Legacy, 22–23

You at Your Best, 99

existentialism, 8–10, 23

experience sampling method (ESM), 67, 81–82, 85, 87–88, 104

explanatory style, 120–122, 124–125, 129, 134. See also dispositional optimism, hope, optimism

extraversion, 62–63, 90, 92–94, 97, 115, 174, 216

extrinsic religiosity, 293, 302

face validity, 149–150, 252

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 275–276

Fetzer Institute, 294–295

flow, 48, 65–69, 73, 80, 104, 124, 174, 198–199, 201, 299, 306, 309

football, 68, 83, 276, 280

forgiveness, 31–34, 144, 150, 152–154, 158, 160, 182, 184, 252, 296

friendship, 155, 160–161, 265–267, 271–272, 279–280

fulfillment, 6, 15, 20, 35, 98, 125, 130, 141, 146, 154, 159, 280–281, 284, 298–299, 301, 306

full life, 36, 79, 103, 180

Gallup Organization, 146, 195–197, 209, 211

gender, 51, 63–64, 79, 92–93, 97, 131, 139, 147, 154, 187, 197, 200, 202, 206–208, 216, 225,229, 239, 243, 256–257, 268–269, 279, 287–288

generational replacement, 188–189, 191

genetics, 5, 50, 62–65, 73, 77, 87, 92, 97, 104, 129, 139, 147, 234, 300, 307. See also heritability

genetics (scientific field), 299–300

genius, 6, 197, 209–210, 215–216, 219. See also ability; accomplishment; intelligence

Georgia Southern University, 303

germ theory, 225, 231

Germany, 149, 189, 257, 282

goals; goal-setting, 8, 13, 16, 30, 40, 65, 79, 115, 119–120, 122–124, 127, 130, 134, 143, 160,162, 165–167, 170–176, 187, 192, 206, 209, 238–239, 243, 245–246, 264, 280–282, 284–285, 287, 289, 298, 301. See also values

Golden Rule, 291

gratitude, 17, 31–34, 37–38, 92–93, 99, 145–146, 152–154, 157–158, 160, 162, 184, 296, 307

Great Depression, 84, 207

Greece; Athenian Greece, 5–6, 49, 111, 140, 147, 227

Greenland, 140

group, 39–41, 65, 143–144, 151, 159, 162, 167, 169, 172–173, 177–179, 187, 202, 207, 213,238–239, 270, 278–280, 301–302, 308, 311–312

groupthink, 238–239

happiness, 6–7, 10, 12, 14–15, 19, 20, 24, 30, 33, 39, 42–43, 47, 52, 54–55, 70, 74–105, 119–120, 124, 137, 141, 155, 159, 175, 178, 180–181, 188, 196, 200, 236, 280–281, 291, 295,306–307, 311. See also life satisfaction

happiology, 7–8, 48

hard diagnostic test, 90, 104

hardiness, 239, 241, 246

Harvard Study of Adult Development, 107–108, 114, 120, 308

Harvard University, 108, 176, 220–221, 293

Hawaii, 238–239

health psychology, 4, 230, 232–233, 247

health, 15, 65, 68, 76, 88–89, 92, 94–95, 98, 108–109, 114, 119–120, 123–124, 126–128, 205,223–238, 244–245, 248, 256–258, 267, 269, 277, 284, 290, 292, 287–298, 306, 308, 311. Seealso mental health

hedonic capacity, 62, 73. See also positive affectivity

hedonic treadmill, 54, 73, 97, 307

hedonism, 35, 48–49, 78–83, 104, 174, 182–183, 238

Hell, Michigan, 110

Heritability, 63–65, 73, 87, 97–98, 147, 234

hierarchy of needs, 176–177, 191

Hinduism, 140, 292

Hollywood, 189

hope, 13, 15, 51, 107–135, 139, 142, 145–146, 153–155, 158, 160, 169, 185, 196, 236, 296,307, 310. See also dispositional optimism; explanatory style; optimism

Hope, Arkansas, 110

Human Genome Project, 299

humanistic psychology, 4, 6, 8–10, 97

illness. See health

immune system, 123–124, 226, 230–232. 236, 238, 247, 269

imprinting, 254, 258, 272

independence, 183

individualism, 183, 268

infancy, 62, 235, 242, 249–250, 253–254, 256, 259–262

institution, 8, 15, 20–21, 41–43, 142, 172–173, 175, 178, 188, 275–302, 306

institutional-level virtues, 280–282, 289–291, 298–299, 302

intelligence, 6, 14, 63, 65, 92, 112, 146, 197, 209–214, 216–220, 299. See also social intelligence

interdependence, 183

interests, 8, 20, 39, 58, 62, 68, 73, 142, 173, 175, 195–220, 236, 306

internal consistency. See reliability

International Business Machines (IBM), 279

International Classification of Diseases (ICD), 5

Internet, 18, 21, 99, 125, 138, 150, 159, 187, 199, 202, 266, 294, 300–301, 309, 311

interpersonal resources, 255, 272

intrinsic motivation, 66, 73, 159, 203, 205

intrinsic religiosity, 293, 302

introversion, 64, 97, 174

Inughuit, 140

invulnerability. See resilience

ipsative assessment, 180–181, 191

Islam, 128, 140, 169, 189, 292, 296–297

Israel, 187

Japan, 87, 89, 149, 189, 216, 235, 238, 257, 288, 297

jobs. See work

John Henryism, 127

journalism, 22, 169, 299–300

Judaism, 128, 140, 169, 292, 296–297

Kenya, 140

Kirkland College, 252

Korea, 16–17, 88, 115

Lake Woebegone, Minnesota, 111

learned helplessness, 120–122, 125–126

leisure, 88, 92–94, 98, 155, 178, 182, 198–203, 206, 218–220, 301. See also play

life industry, 284

Life Orientation Test (LOT), 120, 122, 125

Life Satisfaction Scale, 89

life satisfaction. See also happiness, 12, 14, 53, 55, 79–80, 84, 86–89, 91–92, 97, 104–105, 154–156, 167, 179, 181, 196,